THE APOLOGY

OF PLATO,

WITH

A REVISED TEXT AND ENGLISH NOTES,

AND A DIGEST OF PLATONIC IDIOMS,

BY THE

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COMPLETE in itself, this volume is yet but a fragment of a larger undertaking. In the Oxford series of Plato's works, which commenced with Mr. Poste's edition of the Philebus in 1860, the Apology, Crito, Phædo, and Symposium were undertaken by Mr. Riddell. Had he lived, all four would probably have appeared together. The Digest of Idioms, founded on an examination of all the writings of Plato, which he had prepared to accompany his edition of these dialogues, would not have seemed out of proportion to the other contents of such a volume. His death on the 14th of September, 1866, left the undertaking incomplete. The preparations which he had made for the Crito, Phædo, and Symposium, though extensive and valuable, had not received their final shape. But the Apology seemed to be ready for the press. Its text was settled, a critical and exegetical commentary was written out fair, and a full introduction had been provided, together with an appendix.
on the δακρόνος of Socrates. The Digest of Idioms also, to which frequent reference was made in the commentary, appeared to have been transcribed for the printer, although a few pencil notes (which have been printed in this volume at the foot of the pages to which they belong) showed that additions would have been made to it, if the writer had lived to print it himself, and perhaps in some instances a different expression would have been given to the views which it contains. Under these circumstances it has been thought advisable to publish the Apology and the Digest of Idioms by themselves. My task has been only, in conducting them through the press, to remove clerical errors and to verify references.

It may be convenient to state that Plato is cited in this volume according to the pages of Stephanus. In reference to the Orators the sections of Baiter and Sauppe's Zurich edition have been given together with the pages of Stephanus in the minor Orators and Reiske in Demosthenes. In the Dramatists Dindorf's numbers are followed as they stand in the edition of the Poete Scenici published in 1830. With regard to quotations, the text of the Zurich editions has been used both for Plato and for the Orators, the text of Dindorf (from the edition of 1830) for the Dramatists. Wherever a reading is quoted which is not found in these editions, I have endeavoured to indicate the source from which it has been derived.

The text of the Apology itself is in the main that of C. F. Hermann. Even the punctuation is his. Some of the brackets found in his edition have been silently omitted; but, with this exception, every instance in which he has not been followed is mentioned in the commentary.

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INTRODUCTION.

PART I.

THE TRIAL OF SOCRATES.

1. Nature of the Proceeding.

The trial of Socrates took place before a Heliastic court, according to the forms of an ordinary ἡγεμονία. The indictment (ἐγκλήμα) is called ἀντωμοσία 19 B, 24 B, and ἀντιγραφή 27 C,—terms which allude to the proceedings of the ἀνίκτατος before the Archon Basileus, before whom both the indictment and the plea in answer to it were presented in writing and confirmed severally by oath. And the terms ἀντιγραφή, ἀντωμοσία, proper at first to the defendant, came to be used by the prosecutor, and even were transferred to the indictment (ἐγκλήμα) itself, thus presented in writing and sworn to.

2. The Accusers.

The indictment was preferred by Meletus; see below the form preserved by Diogenes Laertius, and compare Plato's Euthyphro 2 B. Hence it is Meletus who is called on by Socrates to answer arguments as to its words and meaning in the Apology. Hence again Socrates asks why did not Meletus bring witnesses (34 A), and again observes (35 A) that the penalty for not obtaining 1/5 of the votes would have fallen on Meletus. Little account can be taken of the statement of Maximus Tyrius, Disp. xxxix. p. 228, Μέλιτος μὲν ἐγκλήματο "Ἀντωνὸς δὲ εἰσῆγονε Ἀγόνα δὲ ἐνώπε. For authors vary on this distinction, and the continuation of the passage—κατέδίκασαν δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐδόγκα ὅτι ἑαυτάκτως δὲ ὁ ἐνενημέρι—shows that these words are, as Stallbaum says, magis oratoriae.
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of those who exercised professions of the principles of which they could give no intelligent account. Nowhere is this cause of offence traced more connectedly than in the Apology itself of Athenian citizens. There seems no ground for thinking with Wiggers (Sokrates p. 97) and others, who have followed in this view Petits’ Comment, in Legg. Attic. Lib. III. Tit. iii, that there was any order of ῥήτορες, ten in number, appointed yearly, and deriving their origin from Solon. Any such institution could not but have interfered with the ἔγγορα which even to the time of Demosthenes was the cherished charter of Athenian democracy. On the contrary, the precedence which was allowed by Solon in the assembly to speakers above the age of 50 seems to have fallen into abeyance. But we find that in the time of the Oration or earlier (see the latter part of Cicero’s speech in Euh. III. 40) those ῥήτορες had attained a mischievous importance. Ξερεχωνα speaks of them (Ili. v. 54) as δευτερόλεπτον λάθος περιοικωντας, and in Aesch. 1145 A. It is said that ἤτοι δε θυσία η πόλις πράττει πρὸς ἄλλον πόλιν ή αὐτή καθ’ αὐτήν, ἄνω τῶν τῶν ῥήτορων ἐπος ἡ πόλις γίγνεται. To be a ῥήτορας had become a regular profession. A new art had arisen, designated by the name ῥήτορας, which is seen to have been itself a new word from the way in which it is used in the Gorgias (448 D)—τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ῥήτορον. In their capacity of σύμβουλοι the ῥήτορες were brought into prominence (Hec- ren, Politi. Hist. of Anc. Greece, e. 13. p. 232 of Eng. Transl.) by the frequency of state trials in the time succeeding the Peloponnesian war. But it was no less a σύμβουλος to the Assembly that the ῥήτορες were in requisition. In all questions of legislation and of policy the debate was mainly in their hands. The epoch of this ascendancy is dated by Isocrates (viii. 121. p. 183, where he calls it τοῦ τῆς ῥήτορος διάστασις) from the Deceloan war, or subsequent to Pericles (ib. 126. p. 184). The two species, συμβουλευτική and διοικητική, of Aristotle’s triple division of ῥήτορων in his treatises correspond with this double scope of the ῥήτορος’s profession. The πολίτευος as a class must have emerged at the same time as the ῥήτορες. In itself πολίτευος means no more than ‘Statesman’ in the sense in which this term might have been applied to Pericles. But an Athenian of Plato’s time, speaking with reference to Athens, would mean by πολίτευος that class of men who made public business their profession,—τοὺς πολίτευους λεγομένους, Plat. Polit. 303 C. Our conception of the πολίτευος will be best completed by comparing them with the ῥήτορες. Down to Pericles’ time there would be no distinction. He united both characters like the great men before him. But afterwards the debates came into separate hands, and the speakers in the Assembly were for the most part no longer the great commanders in the field and the bearers of the highest offices. The fact and the reasons are stated by Aristotle (Tol. V. v. 3), τῶν καὶ τῆς ῥήτορος προμήχυς ἐν δυνάμεως λόγοι δημοσιογραφία μὲν ἐκ τῶν δὲ τῶν πολιτικῶν συμβουλών. At the same time, inasmuch as counsel as well as action was needed for the conduct of the state, those who were engaged in the different branches of this common work were not absolutely contradistinguished: cf. Plato, Gorg. 520 A, Phdr. 255 B, and the general terms in which the ῥήτορες are described—e. g. by Lytias (xvii. 16. p. 150) as τῶ τῆς πόλεως πράττοντα.
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(21 C—22 C). Illustrations occur also abundantly elsewhere. We see from the Ion (533 E) how poets were brought under this censure for parading inspiration as the substitute for reason. The rhetoricians again as in the Gorgias were censured for producing persuasion without knowledge. Yet stronger and yet more incessant was the denunciation of the mischievousness and presumpuousness of undertaking politics ἀπὸ ταὐτομοῦν (Xen. Mem. IV. ii. 3), or without knowledge of principles (Aleib. I. 113 C). But Anytus was actuated, over and above such a class-feeling, by personal animosity. One ground of this has been said to have been his "amor spretus Alcibiadae:"

so Lucare and Wiggers. Plato further (Meno 94 E) makes him threaten Socrates with mischief in bewildering and mortification at being told, in effect, that in teaching his son the family business he had done nothing towards his real education. These personal motives, however, remained in the back-ground; and so again, if he entertained yet another grudge against Socrates as the teacher of Critias, the avowal of it was incompatible with the Act of Amnesty. Therefore he made the attack under cover of defending the democracy. The ἐπείρεσα of the restored people did not last long (Plat. Epist. VII. 325 B), and was naturally succeeded by a sensitive and fanatical zeal for their revived popular institutions.

3. NUMBER OF THE JUDGES.

The statement of Wiggers (Socrates p. 132 note), and of Matthiae (Miscell. Philol. vol. I. p. 252. note 35), that the number of the judges on Socrates' trial was 556 or 557, has been repeated without question even by Mr. Grote (Hist. Gr. vol. VIII. p. 654, chap. 68). It is, however, as Dr. Cron remarks (in his note on Apol. 36 A), merely an assumption from the false reading τρεῖς in this passage, taken in connection with the

statement of Diogenes Laertius (II. v. 40), κατεδικάσθη διακονεῖας ῥήματα ὑπούσα νυμφαί τῶν ἀπολογουμένων, whence the numbers are supposed to have been 281 for condemnation, 275 for acquittal. There is no reason (as Mr. Grote allows) for mistrusting the precise statement of Diogenes, nor is there any more reason, if we have regard to Greek habits of expression, for doubt that the 281 represented the aggregate majority, not the amount by which it exceeded the minority.

Hence, accepting the reading τρεῖς here, the whole number cannot have been 556 or 557. An independent argument against such a number would be that it resembles no other recorded numbers on trials. Those which we find, such as 200 (Dem. in Med. 223. p. 585), 500 (frequently), 700 (Isoc. xviii. 54. p. 381), 1000 (Dem. in Med. 223. p. 585), 1500 (Plut. Virt. Pericles, 72), 2000 (Lysias, xiii. 35. p. 133), 2500 (Din. in Dem. 52. p. 96), 6000 (Apol. i. 17. p. 3), even if they are only approximate, must stand for something near multiples of 100.

Now Pollux (VIII. 48) mentions 401 and 201 as the numbers in two different cases of ἀφαίρ., and elsewhere 10001 and 1501. This affords the clue to a conjecture of much probability (Meier and Schömmer, Der Attische Process, p. 140), that this was a provision not exceptionally but uniformly for an odd number of judges, (frustrated sometimes, it would appear, by the default of individuals at the last moment), but that the common way of indicating the number was, for brevity's sake, to mention the variable constituent, omitting the invariable 1. And Heffter (Athen. Gerichtsverfassung, p. 55) elenches this by a passage from Ulpian's Commentary on Demosthenes' oration against Timocrates: ἂν τὸ τούτῳ ἡ ἡ ἐπεισεθείτο ἢ τοῖς δικαιαῖς ἔνα μη ἤτοι ἕχοντο σήμερον τῇ σφηνῇ. Thus a Helioic court always consisted of some multiple of 100, + 1.

Accordingly, if we take the total number of Socrates' judges

1 The enmity of the rhetoricians extended itself after Socrates' death to the Socrates (Lazae de Dig. Serr. Scot. ii. § 4).
2 The story of this "amor Alcibiade" rests on the testimony of Plutarch and of Satyras apud Atheneum, but is unlikely in itself, and because Plato and Xenophon are wholly silent about it.—Zeller II. p. 141 note.
3 Cf. Xen. Apol. Soc. 29. ἄντων ἀπειτοῦ ἐκ τὴν αὐτὴν τῶν μεγίστων ἐπὶ τὴν πίθου ἀξίωματον ὡς ἑκατέρα θέρα τοῦ ἑδραὶ τοὺς τρίτους σφηνοῦν.
4 Flato's Ausgewählte Schriften erklärt von Christian Croon and Julius Deuschle.—Tammberg, 1805.
as 501 (which is also Heffer’s conclusion), and the number of those for condemnation as 281, we have 220 for his acquittal. Then 31 exactly, or 30 in round numbers, changing sides, would have effected his acquittal. Cron, not allowing for the odd 1, reckons 219 for acquittal.

4. FORM OF INDICTMENT.

Plat. Apol. 24 B. Σωκράτης ἄδικε τούς τε νέους διαφθείρον καὶ θεοίς ὅν ἡ πόλις νομίζει οὖ νομίζουν ἑτέρα δὲ δαιμόνια κακά.

Diog. Laert. II. 40. ἡ ἀντιμοσία τῆς δίκης εἶχε τούτοι τῶν τρόπων ἀνάκειται γάρ ἐτι καὶ νῦν, φησὶ Φασκωρίνου, ἐν τῷ Μητρόφῳ. Τάδε ἔγραφατο καὶ ἀντιμοσίατο Μέλητον Μελίσσου Πρεθέντος Σωκράτης Σωφρονίκου Άλκιπέκηβεν. Ἀδίκεις Σωκράτης οὖν μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὶ οὖ νομίζουν, ἑτέρα δὲ κακά δαιμόνια ἐσοργανομενοι ἄδικες δὲ καὶ τῶν νέων διαφθείρουν. τίμημα δένατον.

5. PROCEDURE AT THE TRIAL. ORDER OF THE PLEADINGS.

From Ἀeschines (iii. 197 p. 82) we learn that in a γραφή παραστόμων the time assigned for the trial was divided into three equal lengths: ἐγχειται τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἤδωρ τῷ κατηγορῷ . . . . . . τὸ δὲ δεύτερον ἤδωρ τῷ τῆς κρατίας αὑτοῦ καὶ τού τοῦτο αὐτῷ τὸ πρώτον ἔνθεσιν (i.e. τοὺς συνήγρου, not the witnesses whose examination was extra to the time allowed for the pleadings: cf. Lys. xxiii. 4, 8. pp. 165, 167, καὶ μει ἐπιπάλης τὸ ἤδωρ) . . . . τὸ τρίτον ἤδωρ ἐγχειται τῷ τιμόνι τῷ μεγέθει τῆς ὀργῆς τῆς ἔμπειρας (i.e. for the prosecutor to speak again on the amount of penalty, and the defendant to reply, and the judges to vote).

The second of these lengths then would be occupied by the defence of the accused and his συνήγρου, represented by the main part of the Apology, i.e. as far as 35 E. The Xenophonian Apology says (22) that speeches were made ὡς τε αὐτῶ τοῖς συναγορευόντοις φίλων αὐτῷ, but the Platonic manifestly would have us think of Socrates defending himself alone.

Then would follow the taking of the votes of the judges, and the announcement of the result, by which the charge is declared proven.

The third length then begins with the second speech of the

† [Favorinus wrote a work on Socrates in the time of the Emperor Hadrian.]
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The other citations are general; e.g. 17 A, χρή ὡς ἐλε-βεβηθής οὐκ ὑπὸ Σωκράτους ἐξαπατηθής ὡς δεινὸν ὑδος λέγει, and 33 B, καὶ τοῦτο ἐγὼ ἐκ τῆς χρήσεως γίγνεται. ἐκεῖ μὴ οὖ-δὲ δικαίως τὴν αὐτὴν ὑπάρχου—an allusion to the alleged deter-mination by him of Critias and Alcibiades, which was made much of by the prosecution according to Xenophon.

In the Memorabilia of Xenophon likewise the citations are all ascribed in general terms to ὁ καθόροις. Mem. I. ii. 9, Ἀλλὰ τὴν Δία, ὁ καθόροις ἐγὼ, ὑπεραρχὴν ἐποίησε τῶν καθοστάτων νόμων τῶν συνόπτων, λέγω ὡς μοιρὰν ἐγὼ τοῖς μίν τῆς πόλεως ἀρχήν ἀν μόνον καθοστάσαε. . . . τοὺς δὲ τοιούτους λόγους ἐπαρέθην ἐγὼ τοὺς νεὼν καταθεσον τῆς καθοστάσεως πολιτείας καὶ ποιεῖ ζωικ. Ἰβ. 12, Σωκράτης ἡμεῖς ἐγνώμονες Κριήτας τε καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης πλεύτα κακὰ τῆς πόλεως ἐποιήσαν. Ἰβ. 40, Σωκράτης . . . τοὺς πατέρας προσπελάκειν ἐδοκοῦσα πέθων μὲν τῶν συνόπτων αὐτῷ σοφότεροι ποιεῖ τῶν πατέρων, φάσκω δὲ κατὰ νόμον ἐζητεῖ παρανοίας ἐλόσα καὶ τού πατέρα ἄρῃ, τεκμη-ρίον τοῦτο χρῆμασιν ὡς τοῦ καθοστάτων ἒκ τῶν νόμων ὑπὸ τοῦ σοφότερον νόμо-μον εἰρήθησα. Ἰβ. 51, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων συνεχείας ἐποίησε ἐν ἀγαθῷ εἰς τοῦ αὐτῷ συνόπτω, λέγω ὡς ἐκεί τοὺς κάμπτον- τας τοὺς διακινουμένους τοὺς συνεχείας αὐτοὺς ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν τοὺς λατρείας τὸς αὐτῶν ἀντικρίσατε. ἐφ᾽ ὑμῖν καὶ περὶ τῶν φύλων αὐτῶν λέγει, ᾧ ὡς Ὀμήρους εἰσαίως εἰς τὴν καὶ αὐτοῖς διακρίνεται μόνοις δὲ διὰ τὸν αὐτῶν δεδομένα εἰσαίως εἰς τοὺς μὲν τοὺς ἀντικρίσατε τὰ δόειται ἐκ τοῦ ἄγνωστης ἐκ τοῦ ἀναγκαζόμενου. ἢν ἵνα εἰς τὴν καὶ ὁμολογήσατε ἀναγκαζόμενος εἰς τοὺς τοῖς μὲν τοὺς λατρείας τὸς αὐτῶν διακρίνεται ἐκ τοῦ τούτων διακρίνεται. Ἰβ. 50, ἐϕ᾽ ὑμῖν δὲ αὐτῶν ὁ καθόρος καὶ τῶν ἐνδοτότατον ποιητῶν ἀναγκαζόμενος τὰ ποιητήρια καὶ τοὺς μεγαριτὰς χρῆσοι διαδέχεσθε τοὺς συνόπτως κακονεργοὺς τε εἰνεὶ καὶ τυραννικοῦ. Ἰστοῦσαν μὲν τὸ

"Ἐργον δὲ οὐδέν οὗτος ἀρχηγεὶς ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἕνων τούτου ἐλέγειν αὐτών ὡς ὁ ποιητὴς κελεύς μεθὲν ἔργον μήτε ἀδικοῦ μήτε αὐθεντοῦ ἀπέκλειον ἄλλα καὶ ταῦτα ποιεῖ ἐν ὑπέρκριτον . . . τὸ ὁμήρου ἐγὼ ὁ καθόρος πάλαις αὐτῶν ἐλέγειν ὑπὸ Ὀμήρου.

"Οὕτως μὲν βασιλεία κ. τ. λ.
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It has been questioned by C. F. Hermann whether Plato intended the reader of the Apology to imagine any introduction of witnesses to take place. It can hardly be doubted that he did: it is part of the verisimilitude which characterises the whole speech. At 19 D Socrates, wishing to appeal to the judges as witnesses, employs the common formula for doing so —μάρτυρας δ' αὐτοῦ ὕμων τοῦ πολλοῦ παρέχομαι. Cf. Esch. ii. 122. p. 44, καὶ τούτων ὑμεῖς ὅ τινες ψήφους μέλλουσιν φέρειν ἐστέ μοι μάρτυρες. Similarly, when at 21 A —καὶ τούτων πέρα ὅ ἄλλοτε ὑμῶν αὐτῷ συνταξαμένης, ἐπειδὴ ἤκεινς τετελευτηκε —he used the very circumstantial formula commonly in use in such a case, he must intend us to go on to fill up the picture with the actual production of the witness. And at 32 E καὶ τούτων ὑμῶν ἑσταυρώσω πολλὰ μάρτυρες must mean that the production of the witnesses is to follow, coming so near as it does to the common formula τούτων δ' ὑμῶν τοῖς μάρτυρας παρέχομαι (cf. e. g. Antipho v. 20. p. 131, and Lysias x. 5. p. 116). The future consistently used in the two last cases (contrast the present in the first case) would not suit the supposition of mere reference to persons who are not to be produced. Again, 34 A, τοῦτον τῶν τοιχωμένων εἰρήνης is very like an implied promise to produce evidence. Lastly, the employment against Meletus of the common topic (34 A) —Why did he not call witnesses who if what he said was true could not have failed to establish it? —and the subjoining of the conventional challenge εἰ δὲ τὸτε ἐπελθόντο ὕπ' παραχώφω ἐγὼ παραχώρω —would be suicidal in a speaker who forbore to call witnesses himself.

Interrogation of the accuser.

In accordance with the law (Demosth. c. Steph. B. 10. p. 1131, τῶν ἄνωτές άπαντας εἴη τί παρακλήσουσιν ἄλλος τὸ ἡρωτόμενον μάρτυρες δὲ μὴ), and with the common practice (cf. Lysias xii. 32. p. 132, where spaces are left for a
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(i.) Employment of commonplaces.

We may trace this in detail through the defence or the first of the three parts of the oration.

The exordium may be completely paralleled, piece by piece, from the Orators. The imputation of conjoint falsity and plausibility, the denial of being δεινὸς λέγων (cf. Lys. xix. 1, 2. p. 152, Isæus x. 1. p. 79), the asking pardon for λόγους πολὺ \textit{τόσον} ἠδυσμένων λέγεσθαι παρ’ ἵνα ἑξιλαμβάνω (as Isoc. xv. 179 expresses it), the plea of unfamiliarity with law-courts (Isoc. xv. 38. p. 318, οὐκοσ ἀπέχομαι τούτων ὡς οὐδεὶς ἄλλως τῶν πολιτῶν), the begging for an impartial hearing (Lys. xix. 2, 3. p. 152), the depreciation of ἄρρητος (cf. e. g. Ῥεχσ. ii. 24. p. 31, ἐπισώσι εἰς ὑπερβαλλέν ἴμασ, ὡ ἄνδρας, ὥσ τι στηγ, καὶ δικαίως ἴμασ ἀσώσε), the disclaiming a style unbecitting an old man (cf. Isoc. xii. 3. p. 233, Ἡγούμεναι γὰρ οὐχ ἀρμοττεῖν)—these topics, of which the exordium of the Apology is wholly made up, occur continually in the Orators.

Next, in meeting the judges’ prejudices, advantage is taken of another common topic—allegation of the existence of ζω-βολαὶ (cf. Lysias xix. 5. p. 152). The way in which the charge of being a σοφὸς is dealt with has many parallels: cf. e. g. Isoc. xv. passim. No accusation was more indiscriminately launched than this, and the answers to it assumed consequently, in great measure, the character of commonplaces.

Socrates twits Meletus with having instituted the whole of the proceedings for his own amusement (24 C); so Lysias xxiv. 18. p. 170; and again with presuming on the inadvertence or obtuseness of the court; cf. Lys. xxvi. 5. p. 175, ταῦτα χρὴ ἀποκαλυφθῶνες μὴ εἰπθεῖν αὐτῷ εἶναι δοκήτω.

Socrates alludes (32 A), though in a refined way, the meritorious acts of his past life;—a common τόπος. Cf. Lys. xvi. 13, xxii. 1. pp. 146, 161.

Compare again ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος μὴ οὐδεὶς πότε ἐγκέφαλῳ (33 A) with Isoc. xv. 85, ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν μὲν θειαὶ διδάσκαλοι πάσιν φοιτήσαι παρακαλέσας ἐπ’ ἵμασ τὴν ἓν πάλιν δὴν πειρᾶμα πεθεῖν τούτοις πρόμαχοι ἐπικεφαλεῖς ἐξ ὲν ἀοίδοι τε εὐδαίμονοι κτλ.

The answer to the charge about perverting the young is
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paralleled by Isoc. xv. 240, τούς πατέρας ἄν ἐωράτε τῶν συνήλιον ἡμῶν καὶ τοὺς οικεῖους ἅγιακατονύτας καὶ γραφομένους.

The particular form of challenge is paralleled by Andoc. i. 35. p. 5, τούτων τῶν τῶν ἀδρόμων οὐ μὲν ἔκακος καὶ εὖ τέκνα, ἐν τῇ ἐπιθανάτῳ εἰσὶ πολλαὶ προσήκουσιν, ἵπτε ὅσια βολεῖσθαι ἐν τῇ ἐκμένῃ λόγῳ ἀναβάσις με ἐλεγχόμεθα.

The argument (34 A) καὶ ἁλλαξεὶ πολλῶν ἐγὼ ἐκακός ἔτι ἐπεὶ ἐπιθανότων ἐκ τῆς ἀκούσανος λόγῳ παρασκέπασιν Μέλετον μάρτυρα is a stock argument against an adversary who does not produce witnesses. Cf. Arist. Rhet. I. xv. 17. The avowal of disdaining to solicit compassion is to be compared with Isoc. xv. 321. p. 345, and Lys. xviii. 24, xx. 35: pp. 151, 161.

The leaving the event to God (19 A), τοῦτο μὲν ἐκ τῆς ἀκούσανος, and (35 D), ἔπειρας τοῦ θεοῦ φίλος, and (35 D), ἐπείρας τοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ φίλος, is not characteristic of Socrates, for it occurs in the typical oration of Antipho (iii. 20. p. 113, ἡ ἀϊνδα ἐξει ἐγαυκοῦντο, καὶ ἐπείρας τοῦ θεοῦ φίλος, and ibid. 25. 31. p. 114), though indeed sparingly in the Orators generally. The Gods are invoked at the outset of Demosthenes’ speech on the Crown (p. 225).

(ii.) “The old accusers.”

Aristotle in his Rhetoric (III. xv. 1.) remarks, περὶ δὲ διαβολῆς ἐν μὲν τῷ ἔξω ἄν ἐν τῇ ὑπολόγω ὁμολογήσῃ ἀπολόγητον οὐδὲν γόρα διαφέρει, εἰτε εἰς ὀφείλεις, εἰτε μή.

An artifice in the Apology which demands separate notice is the way in which the prejudices of the judges are dealt with. The attack on them is so carefully masked that its point might be missed by a cursory reader. The strength of the prejudice which existed against Socrates demanded that a substantive and prominent portion of his defence should be directed specially against it. He could not hope to combat the charges of his prosecutors on their own merits in presence of a general aversion which was in harmony with these charges. Worst of all, this aversion was too well reflected by the Court itself. It was matter of exigency, therefore, to deal with it at once, and so we find it succeeding the exordium almost hurriedly. But to this was joined the necessity of avoiding both the direct imputation of it to the judges, which would have been to offend them further, and the designation of it at once as a vox populi, which would have been to acknowledge its weight.

It is therefore introduced to the judges under a disguise. Their attention is drawn to it not as the attitude of their own minds, but as matter of common fame, but as emanating from certain individuals who with time and perseverance have done their work. The calumny, now so wide-spread and influential, is all traceable to them. It is not possible to single them out (“except perhaps a certain play-writer”); in default of which, —the only fair method,—they are individualised in imagination. They are marked off by a special designation,—“the original accusers,”—and their calumny is made more tangible by throwing it into the form of a technical indictment supposed to be preferred by them and read before the Court.

Ot πρώτοι κατήγοροι are but a figure for ἂν τῶν πολλῶν διαβολῆς, and what makes the neutralising of this διαβολῆς at once so necessary and so delicate a matter is that it is that ὅτῳ ἐν πολλῷ προδότῃ ἐξερεύνη. But these two identifications emerge in one or two places only. Twice only is the reference to the judges pointedly disclosed,—“I hope, if possible, to convert you from a prejudice which you” (the repeated pronoun is emphatic) “have so long harboured” (19 A, 24 A). Immediately, however, after these disclosures, the argument resumes its disguise. In like manner once only, considerably later (28 A), when he notices the inferior importance of the charges of Meletus, which he has just answered, to the older charges, he acknowledges these as vox populi—שרות τῶν πολλῶν διαβολῆς τοιοῦτοι φίλος.

The seriousness of tone which marks the answer to “the old accusers,” the ἄγαν χρήσις which is thrown into it, and the absence of irony, contrast sharply with the banter with which the charges of the real indictment are met immediately afterwards. This earnestness and almost anxiety of tone, the prominent position of this portion of the Apology, the irrelevance of its ostensible reference, the very technicality with which it is drawn up, forbid a more literal acceptance of its drift, and constrain us to find in it a signal exercise of rhetorical art.

(iii.) The Delphic response.

Again, as the objective prominence given to “the old
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The general arrangement of the defence properly so called.

Every care has been taken to marshal the topics of the defence to the best advantage. The answer to the indictment itself is placed in the middle of the speech, where least attention naturally falls upon it. The arrangement is the same as that of Demosthenes' speech on the Crown, but the reasons are different in the two cases. In both the technical argument is introduced, where it will least challenge attention; but there because it is the weak point of Demosthenes' case, here because, though easily established, it is comparatively immaterial to the issue. The real effort of the defence needed to be exerted first in combating the general prejudices which affected Socrates as a reputed Philosopher and Sophist, and secondly in offering a somewhat more particular personal justification of Socrates. Accordingly the portions of the defence which are concerned with these two points, as they are the fullest and most earnest, are also the most conspicuous by position. The first confronts us at the outset, and the other engages us after Meletus has been dealt with.

(v.) Dramatic framework.

The customary procedure of an ἄγων τιμώρος has prompted Plato to crown the Apology of Socrates with a further artistic completeness. The oration becomes a drama. An action in three stages passes before us; the tone changes with the action; there is even some change in the dramatis personae. We take our stand among the listeners who crowd the court. The first Act comprises the defence, with the dialogue between Socrates and Meletus, the voting of the judges, and the declaration of their verdict. The second comprises the τίμωρος of the prosecutor, Socrates' ironical ἀντιτίμωρος, the intervention of Plato and other friends of Socrates, the first suspense, and then the final verdict. In the third Act the judges appear before us distinguished into two separate bodies, addressed separately by Socrates, the one his friends, his true judges, the other divested of the name and doomed to the consequences of their unrighteous deed. The tone of apologetic argument in the first Act is succeeded by dignified irony in the second, and this again in the third by a strain of lofty prophecy.

2. How far is the Apology characteristic of Socrates?

Zeller (II. 134. note) insists that there is an absence in the Apology of that free artistic handling which characterises the Dialogues, and claims this as an evidence that Plato has bound himself to follow the line actually taken by Socrates. But the strength of this position is diminished by several considerations. In the first place we have seen how great an amount of art has found its way into the structure of the Apology; we have seen too how that same art has not been
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restricted to the arrangement and outward dress of the speech, but so penetrates its very substance, that even here it is impossible to ignore or definitively to limit the rhetorical element. It is only with this considerable abatement that Zeller’s assertion of the absence of free artistic handling can be admitted. But, in the second place, so far as the fact remains,—and to a certain extent it does,—it is referable to more obvious causes than that of fidelity to the speech of Socrates. The conditions which Plato had to fulfill were those of a speech in a court of justice, pronounced on a definite historical occasion; he had to consult the exigencies of forensic verisimilitude, and to embody a reply to the definite charges of a well-known indictment. And although with him (as with Xenophon in the Memorabilia, though in a different manner,) the main object certainly was the ultimate one of presenting to the world a serious and adequate justification of his adored teacher, yet he was none the less under the necessity of adopting for his framework the circumstances of the actual trial. In the third place,—in presence of little or no independent testimony as to what Socrates actually said,—we have the fact before us that the Platonic Apology was not alone in the field as a professed record of the great teacher’s defence. The Xenophantine Apology, devoid as it is of authority, being perhaps a compilation from Xenophon’s Memorabilia I. i, ii, IV. viii (see Stein- hart’s Anmerkungen I. 2 in Platon’s Sämtliche Werke über- setzt von Hieronymus Müller, Leipzig 1851), is a case in point. Had the Platonic Apology been a record of confessed history, is it possible that the Xenophantine Apology should have been so framed as to differ from it not only as to what was said but as to what was done,—as for instance in the statement (22) that Socrates’ friends spoke at the trial as συμφόροι, and again (23) that Socrates refused ἑπιτχώσαι altogether, both which statements conflict with the Platonic representation? But there were yet other Apologies extant besides these. Aristotle in the Rhetoric (II. xxiii. 13) quotes from a Socratic Apology of Theodectes, as containing the following passage, εἰς τοὺς θεόν ἰδρύν ὑπεζήκει; τίνας θεοτο τετήρηκεν οὗ ἡ πόλις νομεῖ; and besides in the same chapter he quotes the following passages without mention of their authors but obviously from similar compositions; μέλετε δὲ κρίνειν ὅ
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which lie beyond the intellectual or moral ken of the judges. Here we have that singularity of ways and thoughts which was half his offence obtruding itself to the very last in contempt of consequences. Here we have that characteristic assertion of private judgment against authority which declares itself in the words ἐγὼ ὣ...(29 D). Here we have also his disapproval of the existing democracy of Athens which he rather parades than disguises. And lastly, the deep religiousness which overshadowed all his character. He breathes forth in the account he renders of his past life, in his anticipations of the future, and in his whole present demeanour.

Thus, while the problem of the relation of the Apology to what Socrates actually said must remain unsolved, there is no doubt that it bodies forth a lifelike representation; a representation of Socrates as Plato wished to conceive of him, yet at the same time as true to nature as the art of Plato could render it.

3. THE ADEQUACY OF THE APOLOGE AS A DEFENCE.

That the Apology aims at much more than a refutation of the indictment of Meletus is already sufficiently evident. We have seen that the avowed answer to Meletus is that part of the speech which by its position least challenges attention, and which least characterised by an air of serious concern. The statement is besides repeatedly made, that the real strength of the prosecution lies outside of the indictment, and requires a commensurately wider effort to meet it.

The worth, then, of the Apology as a defence must be measured, in the first instance, if we will, by its sufficiency as an answer to Meletus, but chiefly and ultimately by its sufficiency as a justification of Socrates' whole manner of life.

It will not much affect our estimate, whether we regard the Apology as no more than a defence adapted to the historical occasion of the trial and to judicial ears, or as a posthumous justification of the great master in the eyes of the Hellenic world. Though the more comprehensive aim is doubtless the real one, yet public opinion had undergone so little change

3. As a matter of fact, the Athenians never repeated of Socrates' death. The story of their passionate remorse being evoked by the representation of Euripides' Phaedo is fabulous. Euripides predeceased Socrates by 7 years. Xenophon and Plato would have made the most of any such change of feeling: whereas we find Zeller, p. 138, note.
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Here therefore Socrates contents himself with a dialectical victory over Meletus; instead of entering into the merits of the question with him, he disposes of him summarily by adding him to the list of pretenders. If the charge of διαμόρφωσ καυκά is subjected to the same treatment,—a treatment characterized by Döllinger as little better than sophistical,—it is because that charge is itself a sophistical one. It wrests τὸ διαμόρφωσ into διαμόρφωσ, the divine agency of which Socrates consistently spoke into divine beings. Socrates therefore is only returning Meletus' sophism upon himself, when he treats the διαμόρφωσ of the indictment as if it had been διαμόρφωσ πράγματα. His whole dealing with the question of heterodoxy has an observable air of carelessness. Though he explicitly disavows atheism, and calls the sun and moon gods, yet he nowhere commits himself to a distinct recognition of the state gods, any more than he repudiates belief in any others. But it must be remembered that in those days few could have cast a stone at Socrates for such reticence: and that if a man's practice was religious, there was little enquiry into his opinions; and that Socrates' character as a religious man, his strictness and frequency in religious observances, was beyond doubt and made proof superfluous,—though the Xenophontean Apology enters into it at length. From the personal imputation of irreligion, in short, Socrates had little to fear, and he could afford to deal with it lightly; whereas to that of perverting the youth he addresses himself twice elsewhere, in addition to the dialectical refutation of it here.

Thus what was really formidable in the indictment of Meletus resolved itself into the mere general imputations which connected Socrates with those two suspected classes of men, the Philosophers and the Sophists; and, keeping in view the fact that the Apology addresses itself elsewhere in full to those imputations, any fuller treatment of them under the head of the indictment can be spared.

The remainder of the defence is taken up with two lines of argument: the first, at the outset of the speech, deals with the general prejudices, which existed against Socrates as Philosopher (Physicist) and Sophist; the other, which follows the special reply to the indictment, offers a particular justification for Socrates' manner of life as a citizen.

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In the earlier portion Socrates does what he can, first to separate himself from those two suspected classes, and then to explain how the prejudice arose in the public mind, and how it became strengthened by personal animosity.

It is hardly necessary to show that the imputations of "the old accusers" contain nothing of an individual character, but are (as Socrates alleges) mistakenly transferred from the popular notion of the Philosophers and the Sophists. The title σοφός ἀνήρ, which Socrates takes such pains to disclaim, is the appellation originally bestowed on the Ionic philosophers, as men whose speculations had fathomed the universe, and from this association was matured that distinction between it and φιλόσοφος which we find in Aristotle (Ethic. Nic. VI. vii. 5. Θαλής καὶ τοὺς τακτούς σοφοὺς μὲν φιλόσοφοι ζῷον φασίν εἶναι). It was in connecting Socrates with a supposed class of speculative men that the force and odiousness of the designation σοφός ἀνήρ consisted. The imputation contained in the words τὰ μετέφερα φροντίζων οὐ ζητῶν, ι. e. τὰ οὐφάσμα is equally general. The Scholast on Aristoph. Nub. 96 says, καί τῶν τῶν λόγων ὑπάρχουσαν ἡ λόγοι περὶ τῶν μετεφράτων διάδοσεως. In 431 B.C. Diokeithes, a fanatical Rhetor, carried the law εἰσαγαγότοι τοὺς τὰ θεία μὴ νομίζων ἡ λόγοι περὶ τῶν μετεφράτων διάδοσεως (Plutarch. Vit. Peri. 169 D, Aristoph. Vesp. 380). Eupolis (Fragm. Com. ed. Meineke, II. p. 490) says of Protagoras, ἀλασάμενα μὲν ἀλασάμενα, περὶ τῶν μετεφράτων. Once more, the reference in τὸν ἄλογον κριτῶν ποιῶν καὶ ἄλογοι ταύτα ταύτα διάδοσιν is palpably general. The earlier Sophists, as teachers of pleading, first incurred and perhaps courted the imputation of τὸν ἄλογον κ.φ.α., and from them the imputation was derived to others. Socrates (xv. 15. p. 313) speaks of the charge being made against himself, ὡς ἐγὼ τὸ πέρος ζῆμον κριτῶν δίαμαι ποιῶν, and again (30. p. 315), ὡς διαφθείρω τὸν νεότερον λόγεσ διάδοσιν καὶ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀλγοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν. Odium also attached to the profession 11 of an instructor in speaking. Hence Δσχίνης' designation (i. 94. p. 13) of Demosthenes as λογογόφος, and (117. p. 16) ὡς τῶν λόγων τέχνης καταφεγγισθέντος τοὺς πέντε διάδοσιν, crowned by the freedom of speech. How come the suspicion of λόγον τέχνη ἐπὶ τοῦ τυμανοῦ ἐπιτελεῖν?
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been. He dwells on the most external difference alone. He points to the Sophists giving courses of lectures on various subjects, professing to turn out finished politicians, pleaders, debaters, and the like, pursuing this as a regular trade, and flourishing by it; he flatly disclaims any such characteristics (for even these, it seems, had been attributed to him, εἰ μονού ἄνιδον κ.τ.λ. 19 D), and so passes on. Here certainly was a sufficiently palpable dissimilitude, demanding no acuteness to appreciate it; but why was it not worth while to clinch the argument by going more thoroughly into the contrast? We miss the manifold and deep divergence which might have been traced between a system which relied on the attainment of objective certainty, and one which, while it questioned received opinions, had no interest in either substantiating these, or establishing truer ones in their place; between a system which opened out a method of truth-seeking investigation, and one which, had it prevailed, would have made philosophy henceforth an impossibility (Zeller, II. p. 130); between a system which proposed to place all human action on an intelligible principle, and one which professed to furnish the intellect alike for any use, regardless of principles. All this and more could have been pleaded in evidence of the wide gulf which separated Socrates from the Sophists; we can only suppose that the Court, or the people of Athens (to which ever we suppose for the moment the justification to be directed), were incapable of appreciating the fundamental likeness, and that the dropping of the subject here is at once true to the Socratic irony, and at the same time suggests that the real position of Socrates was never understood by the mass of his countrymen or by their compendious representative the Hieratic Court.

The sequel of this disclaimer of the popular identification is a setting forth of the facts which were the occasion of it. A man who himself exercised no practical profession, was ever showing himself dissatisfied with received empirical rules and maxims, and ever requiring from others a reason for what they had never questioned, while in doing this he evinced matchless dialectical powers and forced a confession of ignorance from men known to be perfectly self-satisfied,—such a man answered sufficiently well the description of Philosopher...
and Sophist when once Aristophanes had given the hint. This was the naked explanation of the popular identification, and this it is in fact which lies couched under Socrates' parables of the wisdom which consisted in knowing his own ignorance, the Delphic Response, and the tour of questioning (Apol. 20 D—E, 23 A—B). And this account, which has all the appearance of truth, must stand good, in our estimate of the defence, as a plea which ought to have commanded attention. The speaker himself indeed despairs of its obtaining entrance into minds preoccupied; it was likely, he says (20 D), to sound to them like a jest. But the cause for despair lay not in the insufficiency of the plea, but in the invincibility of the prejudice to be combatted. Nor has the whole strength of that prejudice yet been indicated. Had Socrates been really a Philosopher or a Sophist, there would have been nothing to be added; the supposed mischiefs of his teaching would have been alone in the scale. But so far as popularity was concerned, the difference between Socrates and Philosophers or Sophists told against him and not in his favour. The moral suspicion harboured against what he was supposed to be was aggravated by personal animosity against what he was. The ever busy talker, the merciless questioner, who avowed the exposure of self-deceived pretenders to be the mission of his life, and pursued this mission uncompromisingly for a quarter of a century and more in such a narrow society as was comprised within a Hellenic state, without ever even stirring from the midst of them, encountered enmities which never lighted on the head of Philosopher or Sophist; a specimen of which is the individual grudge which Anytus is said to have borne Socrates.

It is then a mistaken moral prejudice, intensified and quickened by the actual smart of personal affronts,—the former refuted to no purpose, the latter absolutely intractable,—which here threatens to overbear the defence. It is this aggravated prejudice, the working of which is foreshadowed in those discerning words (28 A), καὶ τοῦτο ἐστὶν ὅ ἐστι αἰνομενον, ἐπανερ

11 Zeller remarks that the fact of the Aristophanic caricature having stuck to Socrates to the end of his life shows that Aristophanes hit the popular conception. May we not rather suppose that he led it, and regard the Apology here as elsewhere as true to facts?

On Socratic principles, a defence had discharged its office when it had set before the Court not grounds of feeling but rational grounds for its acceptance. Socrates has hitherto disproved (as fully as the range of the popular mind admitted) the mistaken 12 identification of him with Philosophers and Sophists. He has given the explanation of the mistake, and he has pointed out how that very explanation accounts for the confirming of the mistake irrationally through personal animosity. He has exhausted his armoury; against this animosity itself he has no weapons; if his judges or the public will allow it to affect their verdict, it cannot be helped—τοῦτο ἐστὶν ὅτι, ὃ ἄνθρωπος Ἀθηναίος, τάλαθί, . . . . . . καὶ τοῦ οἶδα σχέδων ὅτι τοῖς αὐτῶι ἀπεχθάνομαι (24 A).

Beyond the reply to Meletus' indictment we find a fresh branch of the defence before us. Socrates is no longer overtly answering charges, old or recent, but rather directly justifying the usefulness of his life. He takes a view of himself, as it were from further off, and reviews his whole attitude as a citizen.

The question arises, how this part of the speech serves any direct purpose of the defence.

Of the strong points on the side of the prosecution, one has remained hitherto almost untouched: it is not one which appears in the indictment proper, or in that of "the old accusers;" nor again has it that stamp of inveteracy which would have marked it had it been part of the Aristophanic caricature. But it was the moving cause of the present indictment being preferred at all.

12 The mob who in 1791 sacked Dr. Priestley's house at Birmingham in consequence of his espousal of the principles of the French Revolution, of which the news had just reached England, proceeded to threaten all with whom Priestley had been associated not in politics or religion but merely by a common devotion to chemistry and invention. "A common cry among the mob was, 'No philosophers! 'Church and King for ever!' And some persons, to escape their fury, even painted 'No Philosophers' on the walls of their houses! . . . Boulton and Watt were not without apprehensions that an attack would be made on them, as 'the head and front of the Philosophers of Birmingham.'—Smiles Life of Boulton, ch. 20.
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It is tolerably clear from the accounts of the speeches for the prosecution that political charges entered freely into them. See Xen. Mem. I ii. 9, 12, &c. To Socrates was there ascribed the evil done to their country by Critias the oligarch and Alcibiades the demagogue; the strange doctrine that the poorer private citizens were a fair mark for ill usage; the unfriendly criticism on election to offices by lot,—which was probably made use of as a special ground in support of the accusation of perverting the youth, since the ventilation of such doctrines tended to make them disloyal or insubordinate. A line of Hesiod was alleged to have been wrested by him to a like purpose, as countenancing rapacity.

There were indeed independent and domestic proofs alleged for perversion of the youth, but those which have been noticed were political. All these topics had been employed by the prosecution, and it is scarcely likely that in addition to them Socrates’ abstinence from public affairs, his relations to Charmides, another of the Thirty, and to Xenophon, the friend of Sparta, and under sentence of banishment at the time, and perhaps his depreciating mention of the tradesmen in the Ecclesia (Xen. Mem. III. vii. 6), were not also brought up against him. Such charges and insinuations as these were indeed foreign to the indictment, but they were calculated to have considerable weight with the Court.

For one characteristic of the moment was the keen feeling with which since the restoration of the democracy the Athenians cherished their particular conception of political loyalty. That conception was somewhat narrow and exacting. The primary requisite was not only ‘assent and consent,’ but enthusiasm towards the letter of the constitution; and second only to this, as the natural reaction from the depression which the usurpation had caused, was a devotion to the material interests of the state, and the display of energy in amassing wealth.

The prosecutors, or at least the leading spirit among them, were no doubt actuated in their institution of the proceedings by the same political sensitiveness which they sought to inspire in the judges and betray in their speeches. Anytus was a man of strong political convictions; he had lost a fortune through his fidelity to the cause of freedom. And if he was partly animated by a personal grudge against Socrates, he was none the less the person to take up a political grievance against him.

There must have come to the surface some fresh element for the old prejudice so to pronounce itself. As Sophist or Philosopher, Socrates’ cup had long been full; nor was there any reason in that point of view for its overflowing now if it had not before. Aristophanes had ceased to attack him. As a mark for personal enmity he had been more prominent and defenceless either in connection with the Hermas trials or after the battle of Arginusae. It would be a difficult problem, why the extreme step was taken now and not till now, did we not take into account the political sensitiveness which, as the offspring of the restored democracy, formed a new element in public opinion as it affected Socrates.

We shall not be unprepared, then, to find that the remaining part of the defence is in some sense political,—as much so, as that of a non-political man could be. It is the defence of a reformer, though not of a political reformer. To ignore the political charge altogether in the defence would have been either a confession of weakness or a dangerous oversight; however fully the indictment might have been disposed of. But, moreover, political insinuations had been pressed into the service of the indictment itself in connection with the charge of perverting the youth.

It is obvious, that Socrates was precluded from meeting these charges in the way which would best have pleased his judges. He could have said that he had never transgressed the laws; he could say (as in fact he does say) that he loved his countrymen intensely; but for the existing constitution he could profess no enthusiasm. Yet here we must observe, that his coldness did not arise from frank political dislike of democracy, nor is his dissatisfaction to be measured by the one or two well-known criticisms which he passed upon it. He cared

18 Cf. Zeller, II. p. 152. The usur-
for politics only as involving the interests of the individual (Xen. Mem. III. iv. 12), and it is to his view of individual well-being that we must look, if we would understand the degree or the significance of his reserved attitude towards the constitution. Its faults connected themselves in his mind with other faults at once further from the surface and far graver. To him the alarming symptoms were such as these,—that this system extolled as so perfect could coexist with an utter abeyance of principles; could be carried on by men, who, in knowledge of it, were mere empirical adventurers; that it neither undertook nor directed education; that much might be going wrong within it, without its giving any check or warning; that morality might share the general wreck and not be missed;—and that, all this while, the Athenian mind should throw itself without misgiving into such a system, and find all its wants satisfied, and its self-complacency encouraged; that, while intolerance was stimulated, the belief in any unwritten law of right beyond and above the positive enactments of the state had all but died out, and a belief in divine sanctions was scarcely felt (Apol. 35 D).

It was for these deeper reasons that Socrates was totally out of harmony with the political optimism of his countrymen. Here was the cause of the gravest manifestation of his irony. The discord was the more complete, because it turned upon considerations of the well-being of individuals rather than upon political predilections and fancies. And out of those considerations there rose up before his mind a clear vision of a great need, and of the remedy which would remove it, and of an obligation upon himself to be the applicer of that remedy.

The discord had jarred upon the sensitive ear of restored democracy, and filled it with a feeling of offence which presently found interpreters in Anytus and others. The whole deep disharmony did not strike them; but, conscious of its presence, they detected and treasured up superficial results of it, such as the detached adverse criticisms upon the government, and perhaps followed with a like jealousy the abstinence from public life; and they added to these other irrational aggravations, such as the connection with Critias and Aleibiades; and the well-known cry of perversion of the youth. It was the same offended sense which prompted the decisive step and brought Socrates to trial; and which, while the charges brought were the old and staple cries against the Philosophers and Sophists, aggravated these with a new political stigma.

But it is time to return to Socrates, and to the part of the Apology which still remains to be considered. We are now in a position to judge of it as a political defence, if such it shall turn out to be.

Of the particular political charges we find Socrates here only touching upon one, and that allusively,—the charge of being answerable for the misconduct of Critias and Aleibiades and perhaps others (33 B). The line he mainly follows is general.

We have analysed the attitude of Socrates towards the state of which he was a citizen into the following parts;—first, dissatisfaction, chiefly on moral grounds, with the prevalent state-theory; secondly, conception of the remedy to be applied to it; and, thirdly, conviction that the application devolved upon himself. And in a full general justification of himself in a political point of view, he would have had to expound all these points seriatim. We find him however reticent as to the first point: at most he only hints at it in the simile (35 E) of the high-bred horse, whose greatness of frame makes him somewhat sluggish, and who needs some gadfly to stir his spirit, and in the remark (31 A) that it is an extreme boon to be so roused. He interweaves the second point with the third, yet sparingly, and only in the way of explanation. It can hardly be said that the conception of the remedial plan is completely unfolded; though we find notices of it in the doctrine (29 D sqq.) that the care and improvement of the soul, and the pursuit of wisdom, truth, and virtue, are to be ranked infinitely above the pursuit of riches; the doctrine (36 C) of the need of consciously-possessed principles of individual and political action, tested (29 E, also 38 A) by self-examination; and the doctrine (33 A) of the imperative duty of adhering to what is just, alike in public and in private life. It is the third point, the assumption by himself of this mission, into which the speaker throws his strength: with this he starts, and to this he limits his justification. His first and paramount plea in this justification is that (28 B sqq. and 33 C) the work was under-
taken in obedience to the above-mentioned divine call, i.e. was an indefeasible duty, and therefore to be performed without respect of consequences, or counter-inducements, or human inhibition (29 D).—the proof of the divine call, i.e. of the reality of the obligation, being that nothing else would have sustained him in such a course of self-sacrifice (31 B). His other plea is that his assumption of this work was an incalculable benefit to his countrymen. In what remains he sets forth, in answer to supposed objections, first, that to have entered public life in preference to dealing with individuals would have been neither a practicable nor an effective method of pursuing this mission (31 C sqq.); and, secondly, the innocent tendency of his work (inculcating righteousness, not training for professions or imparting knowledge, 33 A), excluding the suspicion of perverting the youth,—a suspicion which is also refuted independently (33 C).

To have enlarged upon the first point would obviously have stood Socrates in little stead. He could not have done so without appearing to admit the political allegations of his accusers in their entire force; and thus the vindication of himself as a reformer lacks the support which it would have gained from a premised statement of the need of reform. But, to pass on from this first drawback to its effectiveness, the actual vindication offered must in itself have seemed to the majority of the Athenians partly paradoxical and partly visionary. In representing himself as having done good service by urging on them the care of their souls, by unwaveringly insisting on righteousness in them and in himself, Socrates was traversing ground where they could not follow him. These things had for them no meaning. They required devotion to the letter of their constitution, they were on the verge of a panic at the appearance of disaffection; and this was their righteousness. With this they were content, when the substance of the old religion and the old morality were really departed from them. They were necessarily far from believing that it could be any man’s duty or mission to set himself up among them as a preacher of righteousness,—as he himself says expressly in the ἀντίτιθέντο (37 E—38 A). To us there may seem to be nothing so far out of the common in the moral work of which Socrates claims to be the sole promoter, as to elevate him to a position of singularity. But it was a novel work enough to his contemporaries. It is a difficulty throughout the way of appreciating Socrates, that positions, which even since his time have been household words, not in moral philosophy merely but in common life, were in his mouth, to the men of his generation, original and novel; and that the simple principles he lays down here, so far from being commonplace to his audience, must have rather transcended their moral apprehension.

Nor must it be forgotten that their old distrust of the Sophist came in to the aid of their distaste for the reformer. So far from believing in his principles of moral reformation, they were confusedly identifying these with the old sophistical teaching. Hence it is that the disclaimer ἔγνω διδάσκαλος ἐδείκνύεις κ. τ. λ. finds place here.

There were ample reasons, then, why this part of the defence should fail. Socrates stood before his countrymen a confessed reformer, and they were strangers to the idea of reformation except in a political sense,—a sense in which the Athenians of the day had no room for reformers.

But the failure of the defence here urged by Socrates upon his countrymen is to be laid not to his charge but to theirs. The point upon which our whole judgment must turn is this. Was the need of a reformation so urgent as Socrates supposed it to be? If so, then Socrates was no less in the right, no less a benefactor, because they failed to feel the need, and they in crushing 10 him were no less guilty of a national hypocrisy.

There is no need to sum up at any length the results of our

10 It is a poor sophism to urge that the stages of an ἐγκάθισμα, or the venality of Athenian jailors, made Socrates’ death his own act,—an eventuality which his accusers themselves never contemplated. This last assumption (which Köchly espouses) is directly at variance with the Apology, which (29 C) makes Anytus responsible for the argument that it was better Socrates should never have been tried, than that he should escape with his life. To excuse the judges as having been after the first step unwilling instruments of a legally unavoidable catastrophe, is a plea which we never think of allowing to the eastern despot, who after betraying his righteous minister “laboured till the going down of the sun to deliver him.” The justice or injustice of the catastrophe is involved in that of the first step. The whole responsibility fell upon the judges from the moment when, in affirming the accusation Ἀμφάτος δίκαιος κ. τ. λ., they gave their voice against the truth.
inquiry into the worth of the Apology as a defence. Its art is consummate; its statements are (as the exordium promised) unalloyed truth; its reticences are condescensions to the audience with whom it deals. It is exhaustive; it lays open by turns all the motives and influences which were at work against Socrates; and the more pains we are at to represent these to ourselves by means of an independent investigation, the more reason we shall find to acknowledge that the true clue lay all the while close to our hand in the Apology.

26 That the Sophists had no hand in bringing about the condemnation of Socrates is clear. Anytus was the enemy of Sophists. The Sophists had no political influence, and were themselves too much under the same suspicion with Socrates to have dared to infringe that suspicion. Cf. Zeller, II p. 159.

ABBREVIATIONS IN TEXTUAL COMMENTARY.

V = Vulgar text, settled originally by Stephanus.
B = Bekker.
S = Stallbaum.
Z = Zurich editors.
H = Hermann.
Oxon. = the Bodleian MS. known as 'Codex Clarkianus.'

[Dr. Gaisford first published the readings of this MS. in 1820. Mr. Riddell collated the Apology anew for this edition, and also the Críto, Phaedo, and Symposium.]

I. "O ti μὲν ὑμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πεπόνθατε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμῶν καθηγόρων, οὗτοι ἤδη ἢ γὰρ οὕτω καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπ’ αὐτῶν ὀλίγου ἐμαντοῦ ἐπελάθησαν: οὔτω πιθανῶς ἔλεγον. καὶ τοι ἀληθὲς γε, ὥς ἐποίησαν, ἢν οὖν ἐφικμάσα, καλύπτοντα τῶν πολλῶν ὃν ἐφεύγαντο, τούτο ἐν ὑπ’ ἔλεγον ὅσον ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς εὐλαβεῖταί, μὴ ὑπ’ ἔμοι ἐξεπαραγήθητε, ὅσον δὲ ἐπειδὴ ὄντως λέγειν. τὸ γὰρ μὴ αἴσχυνθηται, ὅτι αὐτίκα ὑπ’ ἐμοὶ ἐξελεγχθησονται ἐργα, ἐπειδὴ ἀλλ’ ὑποσε τινών φαίνωμαι δεινὸν λέγειν, τοῦτο μοι ἐδοξεῖν αὐτῶν ἀνασχυντῶντος εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἀρα δεινὸν καλοῦσιν ὄντοι λέγειν τὸν τάληθρον λέγοντα: εἰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο λέγοντος, ὁμολογοῦν ὅν ἐγὼ γιὰ κατὰ τούτους εἶναι ῥήτωρ. οὕτως μὲν ὦν, ὀσπερ ἔγω λέγω, 15

5. ὡς ἐποίησα] This qualifies the oôsô following, making it equivalent to ἦν τι ἐν οίδει below.
8. μη — ἐξεπαραγήθητε] This sentence is not affected by the tense of the main construction, because the contingency it expresses remains still future at the moment of its being addressed to the speaker. Digest of Tidsoms, § 90.
14. ὕπ’ ἐν οίδει A thorough litotes: 'far above these;' 'far greater orator than they.' Cf. Hdt. i. 121, πατέρα καὶ μητέρα ἔφρεισι, οὐ κατὰ Μεραδίαν τε τῷ Βοῦκλῳ καὶ τῷ γυναικὶ օίτε.
ΛΕΞΙΚΟΝ
ή τι ή οὐδὲν ἄλλης εἰρήκασιν· ὑμεῖς δὲ ἐμοῦ ἀκούσατε. p. 17.
σεθεῖς πάσαν τὴν ἁλήθειαν. οὐ μέντοι μιὰ Δί, οὐ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, κεκαλπημένως ἦσαν λόγους, ὅσπερ οἱ τούτων, ῥήματι τε καὶ ὠνόμασιν, οὐδὲ κεκοσμημένοι.

1. ή τι ή οὐδὲν] This form of expression we have from Homer, Od. iv. 80, ἀνέρον δι' ἦν ἀν τοις μῖσοις, έκεῖ καὶ οὐκι. So Hdt. iii. 140, ή τι ή οὐδέν. And Eurip. Dana. Fr. vi. Κροιτος γιὰ τούτα ξημπάτως πέφη κἀστῃ, πάντα εἶν τὰς δοκίμιας ηδονάς ἐρίτταν ἥν ὡς ὅρα.

2. οὐ μένοι] Opposed to ἀκούσανθεν π. τ. δ.λ. — You shall have the truth entirely, but not drest up. This contrast is only carried as far as ὄνομας after which the idea of the contrast between truth and falsehood is resumed (that is, πιστῶν γιὰ κ.λ. gives the rationale of ὑμεῖς δὲ—ἀλλ' ἔδειξα) and continues to εἰσίναια—since πλάσσας λόγους refers not to artificial language but to falsification; a μερόκες, to hide a fault, uses falsehood and not rhetoric.

3. ὅσπερ οὐ] The nom. is the regular construction, where the noun brought into comparison can be made the subject of the clause introduced by ὅσπερ. The attracted construction, exemplified by ὅσπερ μερόκες below, is less common. Dig. 176.

4. μὲν εἰ μὲν... ὠνόμας] What do these two terms mean here? For in Sophist, 262 a, b, they distinctly mean 'verb' and 'noun,' in Cratyl. 399 b, c, as distinctly 'expression' and 'word' (Δέ λέος is the βῆμα, Δίκλεος the δομα). Now the conjunction phrase seems to have had a familiar rhetorical signification; cf. Symm. 198 b, τοῦ ἕπε τελεύτα τινὰ καὶ μεταμφίεσθαι τῶν ὁμώματος καὶ ἔμοιματος την τοῦ ἐξελθόντος ἔκλεισθε; 199 b, ὄνομας καὶ θέη ἐμμποτως, 221 e, τοῖσιν καὶ ὄνοματα ἐκ τῆς ῥήματος whence we may conclude that the association here is similar. And if we compare passages of rhetorical criticism in the Orators, where these words occur, shall we not find the meaning approaches to that in Cratyl. rather than that in Sophist. e.g. Aschin. iii. 72, p. 64, συν γὰρ ἔρχοντας (καὶ γὰρ τὸ δῆμον ῥήματα ἔστω ἐκεῖ, διὰ τῆς ἱκανότητος τῶν ὀνόματος) ἀπορρίψετε τὴν κακομαθήν πρὸς τὴν ῥήματος—where the ῥήμα is the whole expression, the δομα is ἀπορρίπτεται. Further, as Orators could not speak without 'expressions' and 'words,' it is the artistic use of them here dieciasia; which, in the case of ὀνόματος, would consist in what Aschines—ii. 153 p. 48—calls ἵνα τῶν ὀνόματος στοιχεῖα, and also in tropes and other figures of speech, and choice of unusual words, cf. Isocr. ix. 9. 190, μὴ μόνον τῶν τετυπομένων ὀνόματων, ἄλλα τὰ μὲν εἶναι τὰ δὲ καλλίες τὰ δὲ μεταφορικά while τῆς ῥήματος would extend to whole expressions, cf. Aschines' cari- cature, iii. 166, p. 77, τὰ μεμβρικάτα καὶ ἀνθίσσε τοί ρήματα.

ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ. 45

P. 17. μένοι, ἀλλ' ἀκούσατε εἰκῇ λημέναια τοῖς ἐπιτυχούσιν ὀνόμασιν τιτανεία γὰρ δίκαια εἶναι ἂ λέγοι, καὶ μηδεὶς ὑμᾶς προσδοκησάτω ἄλλως· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δήσῃ τοῖς πρέσσω, ἀν ἄνδρες, τῇ ἡλικίᾳ ὅσπερ μεραικοὶ πλαστοῦντο λόγους εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσίναια. καὶ μὲν 7 τοι καὶ πάνω, ἀν ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, τοῦτο ὑμῖν δέουμε καὶ παρέμερα ἐν διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγον ἀκούσατε μοι ἀπολογημένου, δι' ὅσπερ εἰσάγα λέγειν καὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν, ἢν ὑμῖν πολλοὶ ἀκούσατε, ἀν ἂν ἀλλοθείς, μήτε θυμάσθε ἡμῖν θυρυτείν τούτου τοῦ ἔνεκα. ἔχει γὰρ οὕτως. νῦν ἐγὼ πρῶτον ἐπὶ δικαστήριων αἰναθηθήκα, ἐπὶ γεγονός πλεον εἰδομήκοντα.

12. πλεῖον] Hermann's note may satisfy us here: "Πλεῖον vel contra Oxon. cum VDB retinere quam cum Turicensibus omittere.

4. ὅσπερ—ἰσόνα] Three peculiarities: 1. μερωκή is extracted into the case of πλαστοῦντο, cf. Dig. 176; 2. πλαστοῦντο is attracted into the case of ἡλικίας and 3. the gender of πλαστοῦντο notwithstanding follows the thought, cf. Dig. 184.

5. καὶ μέντοι] A stronger form of καὶ—δι' Α. Dig. 145.

7. τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων] This has respect primarily to the conversation with Meletus, which is prefaced by the request, 27 b, ὑμῖν θυρυτείν εἰναι ἐν τῷ εἰσοδίᾳ τρόπῳ τούτος λόγου παύσαμαι. But, as something like this was recognised in ordinary pleadings under the name of ἐφώσκης (see Intro: p. x.), the reference here probably extends to the conversations rehearsed (20 a), alluded to (21 c sqq., 25 c), and imagined (28 b, 29 c), in the course of the defence; perhaps also to the castigation intermingled with it (30 d, 31 a, 35 b, c).


ἐν ὑμίν πολλοῖς ὑμῖν is emphatic. As Stabib. remarks, the frequenter of the τραπέζης would be of the richer class.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

Ἄγγελος ὁν ξιφὸς ἔχοι τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως. ὦσπερ p. 17. οὖν ἄν, εἰ τὸ ὅτι ξιφὸς ἐνυχανον ὄν, ἑνεγινώσκετε δῆτον ἂν μοι, εἰ ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ φωνῇ τε καὶ τῷ p. 18. τρόπῳ ἔλεγον, εἰ οὔστε ἐπεθέραμη, καὶ δὴ καὶ καὶ εἰς τότε ὑμῶν δέομαι δίκαιον, ὡς γὰρ ἐμοί δικαιώματι, τῶν μὲν τῶν τῆς λέξεως ἐμῶν ὑμῶν μὲν γὰρ χεῖρας, ἑστὶν δὲ βελτίων ἂν εἴην αὐτῷ δὲ τότε σκοπεῖν καὶ τοῦτο τὸν νόον προσέχειν, εἰ δίκαιων λέγω ἢ μὴ δικαστοῦν μὲν γὰρ αὐτὴ ἀρετή, ὡς ὁ τρῶν χαλαρωσίν II. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δίκαιως εἰμι ἀπολογήσασθαι, ὡς άνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα μου ἱερουμενα κατηγοροῦμεν καὶ τῶν προστάτων κατηγοροῦμεν, ἐπεί ταῦτα διέα τῇ ἦτορα καὶ τοῖς ἐστέροις, ἐμόν ἔμοι πολλοὶ κατηγοροῦμεν γεγονότοι πρὸς ὑμᾶς καὶ πᾶλα πολλὰ ἡγούμενες ἡγούμενα καὶ ὀσὶν ἀληθεῖς λέγοντες, ὡς ἐμὸς μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι ἢ τοὺς αἰμφὶ λάστον, καίσπερ οὗτος καὶ μαλλι, quia docetis additamentum est quam quod ad interpolatorem referuntur. Inmo facile egei poterat propere Crion. 52 c, videtur innumeros Apollodoro ignotum fuisse, quia apud Diog. La. II. § 44. ipso septiesimo ante mortem anno natum statuit: at duos unde minimos annos adiungemus esse, etc. Boeckhus Corp. Inscript. II. p. 341 prebavit, nosque max. comparato Syneus. Calv. Encom. c. 57 confirmavit; cf. de theor. Deliae, p. 7a. Zeller agrees, but makes 72 years the extreme limit.

5. δίκαιος 'I request this of you as a piece of justice.' Cf. 41 ὁ χρή ... τοῖον διανοίασαι ἄδικας, Legg. 795 c, ταύτων δὴ τοῦτο ... εἰ τοῖς ἀλλαῖοι πιέζοντα χρή προσφέροντο ὅρθως 'as the right thing.'

6. ἤκουσέν μεν γὰρ] The reason urged is a general one. The consideration of style, if allowed at all, will be operative just in those cases where it is better or worse than the case deserves,—just where it will interfere with true judgment.

9. αὖτα] This represents the preceding clause αὕτω—ἡ μῆν being in fact τῶν, attracted into the gender of ἀρετή. Dig. 251.

13. τὸ ταῦτα] This εἰκόναι emphasis παραδείγμα. Dig. 133. And in καὶ ἐκδέχοντο—λέγοντες we have the common εἰκόνα after παραδείγμα. It was 24 years since the Clouds were represented: Forster.

ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

p. 18. τούτου δεινοῦ· ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνοι δεινότερον, ὡς ἄνδρες, ὡς ἐμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκ παιδῶν παραλαμβάνουσε ἐτειθὼν τε καὶ κατηγοροῦσιν ἐμὸν μᾶλλον αὐθεντῶν, ὡς ἐστὶ ταῖς Σωκράτεις, σοφὸς ἄνερ, τὰ τε μετεσχεῖ προφορικάς καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς ἀπαθῶν ἀνεξίτικας καὶ εἰ τοῦ ἦτοι λόγον κρίματο ποιών, οὕτως, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὧς ταύτῃ τὴν χρῆμα κατασχέσασθαι, ὡς δεινοὶ εἰς μου κατηγορούμενοι· ὧς γὰρ ἀκούοντες ἠγούμενοι τοῦτο ταύτα ἐξολοθρεύματι, ὡς τε ἐπηκολύθη τῇ ἡλικίᾳ λέγοντες πρὸς υμᾶς, ἐν ἡ αὐτῷ ἀληθεῖς λέγοντες, ἐνοὶ δὲ ὑμῶν καὶ μειράκια, ἀνέχομαι ἑρήμου κατηγορούμενες ἀπολογίουμενοι μᾶλλον. ὡς δὲ

2. τοῖς πολλοῖς] Closely with τοῦ παιδᾶς. They ἔπειθον all, but only not, most, not all, as children. Cf. below c, παιδές ὄστες, ἐνοὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ.

3. μᾶλλον] With ἐπειθὼν κατηγοροῦσιν just in the same way as παραδείγματι. Cf. below e, Where it is intended to balance the comparative διανοίασαι—were more busy in accusing me and trying to persuade you.'

4. σοφός—ποιῶ] This "accusation," both as given here, and as repeated with mock formality τοῦ παιδᾶς, is nothing more than a vivid way of representing, for a rhetorical purpose, the popular prejudice, in which the court shared. See Introd. p. xxxii. The charges it contains are two-edged, being borrowed partly from the vulgar representation of the Philosopher, partly from that of the Sophist: the μετεσχεῖ προφύ. points to the Philosopher, the τὸν—ποιῶ to the Sophist. The title σοφὸς ἄνερ would at once be understood as a class-appellation,—cf. 23 a, 34 c; in it the meaning and associations of Philosopher are uppermost, yet not so as distinctly to exclude those of Sophist. See Introd. p. xxxii. n. 12.

13. παιδές . . . μειράκια] We should have reversed the order, and said, 'when you were all of you young, and most of you mere children.'

14. ὡς δὲ—ὁτι] This is not a changed but an abbreviated
πάντων ἀλογοτατών, ὃτι οὐδὲ τὰ ὑόματα οἶνον τερ. 18. αὐτῶν εἶδόμεναι καὶ εἰπόν, πλὴν εἰ τις κωμῳδοποιοῦν τυχαίνει ὦν ὅσοι δὲ φθόνοι καὶ διαβολὴ χρωμένοι ὑμᾶς ἄνεπεθεῖν, οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ πεπεισθέντες ἀλῶντες εἰς πείδοντες, ὅσοι πάντες ἀπορώτατοι εἰσών οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀναπληγάσασθαι οἶνον τ' ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἐναυδαὶ οὐδὲ ἐλέγξαν ὦνδὼν, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἀτεχνὸν ὀσπέρ σκα- μαχεῖν ἀπολογομυεῖν τε καὶ ἐλέγχειν μηδενὸς ἀπο- κορομφέον. ἀξιόσωτε ὄν καὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς, ὀσπέρ ἔγι 10 λέγο, διττοῦ μοι τοὺς κατηγόρους γεγονέναι, ἐτέ- ροις μεν τοῖς ἀρτί καταγρηγοροῦται, ἐτέρους δὲ τοὺς πάλαι, οὐς ἔγι λέγο, καὶ οἰκήσε τεν πρὸς ἐκείνους ἐν πρὸς ἐκείνους ἐν πρῶτον μὲ ἀπολογομυοῦσαι καὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ἐκείνων πρῶτον ἠκούσατε κατηγοροῦται, καὶ πόλει μᾶλλον

2. κωμῳδοποιοῦν [VII]; κωμῳδοποιοῦν BSZ with 2 MSS. B quotes Fischer mistakenly asserting that at Phaedo 70 e all the MSS. have κωμῳδοῖ; but this is untrue for Oxon. and 6 others. Morris’ assertion that κωμῳδοποιοῦν is the Attic and the other the common form does not bind us.

construction. In full it would be δὲ δὲ πάντων ἐστὶν ἀλογοτάτων, ἐστὶ τούτο, ὥστε Dig. 247.
2. εἰ τίς Aristophanes is named below, 19 c, and is doubtless chiefly meant, but not exclusively. Eupolis had said (Meineke ii. p. 573). ἔτι ἐν τῷ τῷ ἑαυτῷ. The use of ἑαυτῷ in Aristophanes’ Clouds, was called the Connoos, and the Chorus was of Phrontiste (Athen. v. p. 218). It is likely enough (Zeller, ii. p. 41, note 3) that Ameipsias introduced the same fact, or the same fiction, as Plato (Menex. 235 c, Euthyd. 272 c), and made the musician master Connoos’ instructor.

Ameipsias, represented with Aristophanes’ Clouds, was called the Connoos, and the Chorus was of Phrontiste (Athen. v. p. 218). It is likely enough (Zeller, ii. p. 41, note 3) that Ameipsias introduced the same fact, or the same fiction, as Plato (Menex. 235 c, Euthyd. 272 c), and made the musician master Connoos’ instructor.

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APOLOGLIA ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

p. 19. δίκαιος φύγωμε; ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἔμι τοὺς, ὁ ἀνδρείς ἀνθρώπους, οὐδὲν μετέστη. μάρτυρας δ’ αὐτῶς ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς παρέχομαι. καὶ ἄλλως ὑμᾶς ἄλλους διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν, ὥσις ἐμοὶ πᾶστε ἄγνοι καὶ διαλέγομαι. πολλοὶ δὲ ὑμῶν οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἐστὶ φράζετε οὖν ἄλλους, εἰ πάστε ἡ συμφωνία ἡ μέγα ἦκουσε τῆς ὑμῶν ἐμοὶ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων διαλέγομεν καὶ ἐκ τούτου γνώστητε ὅτι τοιάω ἐστι καὶ τάλλα περὶ ἐμοὶ ἂν οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσι.

IV. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὔτε τοιῶν οὐδέν ἔστιν, οὐδὲ γ’ ἐν ἐν τὸν ἐκείνου ἅπασαν ἀνθρώπους καὶ χρήματα πράττομαι, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἄλλης, ἐπεὶ καὶ γε οὐκ εὐδοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι, εἰ τις οἶος καὶ τ’ ἐκ παρευμένους ἀνθρώπους ὡσπερ Γοργίας τε ὁ ἔτοις Ἡ. brackets. But if we read αὐτοῖς just before, following the weighing of MSS., τοις is required by the Greek.

was ignorant,—the fault he himself so strongly reproved in others.
1. ἀλλὰ γὰρ] ’But the truth is.’ Dig. 147.

Ἀλλάριος διδάσκει τε καὶ φράζει. This is a hysteron proteron: Dig. 308. With φράζει is to be supplied of course ἄλλης, dropped by an idiom of abbreviation: Dig. 233.
14. ἄστερ Γοργίας] Gorgias is spoken of by Isocrates as having made greater profits by teaching than any other man of his profession. Yet the sum was but small: ο δὲ πλείστα κτησάμενος ἦν ἡμῖν μυστικῶς ἀγνόουσα, Θεοτόκος, though a single man and unburdened by Liturgies, χαλύμιον μόνον στατήρας κατέλαλη. Isocr. xv. 155. p. 83. The ἐκσοφρατί, he says, ib. 157, made much greater fortunes. Nor indeed is Socrates saying that the profits made by the Sophists were great. The sum which Socrates mentions below, 20 b, as Evanes’ price, 5 mina (500 drachmas), seems to have been above the average: Isocrates, xvi. 291, speaks of 3 or 4 mina (3-400 drachmas) as a common price. Isocrates has been said, it is true, to have taken as much as 10 mina for his rhetorical course: Gorgias and Prodicus even 100. But what made the frequenting of Sophists’ courses expensive was that people never thought they had had enough of them.
Λεοντίνος καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κέας καὶ Ἰππίας ὁ Ἡλεώς. Π. 19.
toúton γὰρ ἐκαστος, δ’ ἀνδρὲς, οἷς τ’ ἐστὶν ἰδον ἐκάκια τῶν πόλεως τους νέους, οἷς ἔκαστος τῶν ἐκαστὸν πολιτῶν προείληκα Ἐχούναι ὃ ἂν βουλοῦνται, 5τούτοις πέσονται τοῖς έκακοίς ἐνοικοῦνται ἀποκλίνονται π. 20.
σφίσα Ἐχούναι χρήματα διδοῦται καὶ χάριν προσείλθει.
ητεί καὶ ἄλλος ἁνερ ἀπείτε Πάρισι ἐναδέι σσσάρος, ὃν ἡγὼ ἁσθόμου ἐπιδομοῦνται ἐτυχον γὰρ προσελθόντων ἁνερ ὃς τετέλεσε χρήματα σσφίσα ται 10πλεώ ἢ ἐξαιτοῦσι ὃς ἁλλοι, Καλλιε ὁ Ἰπποκλινοῦ
τούτων οἱ ἁνεροί—�新τῶ γὰρ αὐτῷ δόσυ νιεῖ—ὁ
Καλλία, ἢν ὃ ἐγὼ ὃς εἰ μὲν συ τοῦ νιεῖ πόλω ἢ
μοῦσχο εὐγενίζθην, ἐχομὲν ὃν αὐτῶν ἐπιστάτην λαβ
βεῖν καὶ μαθοῦσθαι, ὃς ἐμελλεν αὐτῷ καλῶ τε καὶ
15ἀγάθῳ ποιῆσῃ τὴν προσχώσουσιν ἀρετὴν ἢν ὃ ἔν ὃ
οὖτα ἢ τῶν ἄπικων τις ἢ τῶν γεωργικῶν νῦν ὃ
ἐπείδη ἀναφέρθης εἶναι, τινά αὐτῶν ἢ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐπι
στάτην λαβεῖν; τίς τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρετῆς, τίς ἀνθρωπ
πίνης τε καὶ πολιτικῆς, ἐπιστήμων ἐστίν; οἴμαι γὰρ

14. καλῶ τε καὶ ἄγαθῳ] So Oxon. It seems unnecessary to introduce a synaloepha.
5. τούτων πείθουσι] The construction is changed from the infinito, to a finite verb. Dig. 277. The change of construction is not gratuitous, but expresses (ironical) admiration. The passage in Theages, 128 a, is a reminiscence of this passage, including the change of construction.
6. προσελθόντων] The προῖς stands compounded in its adverbial and not in its prepo
sitional sense. Dig. 129.
7. ἐτεί καὶ] The connecting thought is— and at Athens there is quite as good a field for professed teachers as elsewhere.'
8. ὅνελαμβάνῳ] Socrates implies that he speaks from hearsay when he states ἅτιν ἐσθάθην. 10. Καλλία] Cf. Cratyl. 391 b, oi σσφίσα, οὐκ ὥς καὶ οἱ ἀνθρώποι σου Καλλίου πολλα τελεσα χρή
ματα ἀνθρωποί δοκεῖ ἐσθάθην. H Calli
lias fuit omnium Atheniensium suet atatis non modo facile di
tismissum, tua ut simpliciter ὃ
πλοῖος dicretur, sed etiam nequissimus suique peculi maxime prodigus. —Fischer.
9. ὑπολαβάζοι δὲ αὖ ὁ] Here Socrates, though still ostensibly occupied with 'the old accu
sers,' passes from the denial of the imputations current against him as a reputed so
fand to an account of the per
sonal dislike which had be
fallen him individually. See Introcl. p. xxiv.
10. πράγμα] In the sense of pursuit, or plan of life or
study or the like. Cf. Crito
53 δ, τῶν Ἐφικτήνοις πράγμα,
Εὐθυδ. 304 a, τοῦ τοῦ πρά
gματος σήμερα, ο, χρηστὰ γι τὸ πράγμα
νόμι αἰεί ή λαλοσύνη.
The order of the words in this clause gives emphasis to

σοι! 'What is it, then, that you (since we are not to identify you with the sooth!) have been about?'
13. ὃ Ὅμω] καὶ ὧνοι This clause is the double of σου Ὥσοι—προφανημοῦνον an instance of the widely extended idiom which I have ventured to call Binary Structure: Dig. 207. Very parallel is Thuc. V. 97, καὶ τὸ ἀσφαλές ἦν διὰ τὸ κακοπραγ
θήθαι αὐτῷ ἐπαναλαμάθῃ . . . . ὃ Ὅμω πε
ρογινυμοθῆτα—ίδην ὃ Ὅμω περιγι
νυμοθῆτα κερασῖν διὰ τὸ κακοπραγ
θήθαι. Cf. also Hom. Od. ii. 246, ἐκαὶ γὰρ χ' ὁ Ὅμως ἐάν καὶ ἄλλως ἐν αὐτῷ εἰσκειρταν πόρων ἔπιστο, ἔλθεσαν μόχον.
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όνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολὴν. ἀκούστε δὴ. καὶ ὰτὸς μὲν πρὸς τὸν ἄλλο ὄνομα παῖζει, εὐς μέντοι ἦς, πάσαν ὑμᾶς τὴν ἄλλης ἐρώτησιν. ἔγον γὰρ, τὸ ἰδίως Ἀθηναῖοι, δὴ ὀφεῖν ἄλλα καὶ διὰ σοφίας τῶν ταῦτα τὸ ὄνομα ἔχομεν. 5ποιαν δὴ σοφίας ταύτην; ὃπερ ἐστὶν ὄσος ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία. τὸ ὅστις γὰρ καυδένοις ταύτην εἶναι σοφός, ὁ ὁποῖος δὲ τὰ ὁδόν ὄν, ὃς ἀρτί ἔλεγον, μεῖκον τινα ἐν ἡ καὶ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία σοφία εἶναι, ἡ οὐκ ἔχω τὸ λέγει. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔγονει ὁποῖη ἐπιστήμη, ᾧ πρὸ τοῦ γὰρ ἔλεγεν, ἀκήθιστος, μὴ ἡμέριος· ὑπάρχουσιν τὸ δὲ τὸ ὑμῖν μέγα λέγει· οὐ γὰρ ἔμοι ἔρωτον εἶναι σοφός· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ὑμῖν ἔρωτον εἶναι σοφός· ὁ δὲ τὸ τὰ ὁδόν ὄν, ὃς ἀρτί ἔλεγεν, μεῖκον τινα ἐν ἡ καὶ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία σοφία εἶναι, ἡ οὐκ ἔχω τὸ λέγει. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔγονει ὁποῖη ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλ᾿ ὡστὶς τὸ φαινόμενα ταῦτα καὶ ἐπιστήμην τῷ ἔρωτον εἶναι σοφός· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ὑμῖν ἔρωτον εἶναι σοφός· ὁ δὲ τὸ τὰ ὁδόν ὄν, ὃς ἀρτί ἔλεγεν, μεῖκον τινα ἐν ἡ καὶ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία σοφία εἶναι, ἡ οὐκ ἔχω τὸ λέγει. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔγονει ὁποῖη ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλ᾿ ὡστὶς τὸ φαινόμενα ταῦτα καὶ ἐπιστήμην τῷ ἔρωτον εἶναι σοφός· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ὑμῖν ἔρωτον εἶναι σοφός· ὁ δὲ τὸ τὰ ὁδόν ὄν, ὃς ἀρτί ἔλεγεν, μεῖκον τινα ἐν ἡ καὶ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία σοφία εἶναι, ἡ οὐκ ἔχω τὸ λέγει. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔγονει ὁποῖη ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλ᾿ ὡστὶς τὸ φαινόμενα ταῦτα καὶ ἐπιστήμην τῷ ἔρωτον εἶναι σοφός· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ὑμῖν ἔρωτον εἶναι σοφός. 15

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p. 20. λόγον, ὃν ἂν λέγω, ἀλλὰ εἰς ἀξίονρεον ὑμῖν τῶν λέγουσα ἄνωτα. τῆς γὰρ ἐρήμης, εἰ δὴ τῆς εὐεργετής σοφία καὶ οἷα, μάρτυρα ὑμῖν παρέχωμαι τὸν θεὸν τὸν εἰς τὸν 

p. 21. Δελφοῖς. Χαρεφόροντα γὰρ ἦσαν πυρ. οὗτος ἐμὸς τε 

3. μάρτυρα—Δελφοῖς], "There is no need (says Zeller, Phil. of the Greeks III. p. 45, note 2), to deny the authenticity of the oracle, but we cannot regard it as having given the primary impulse to Socrates’ tour of enquirer. Socrates must have been already a known personage for Cherephon to have put his question to the Pythia, or for her to have taken it up. It is therefore semi-rhetorically that the oracle is here represented as the cause of Socrates’ eccentricity and unpopular proceeding. The Iambic form.—σοφός ἠρειοδέος ἢ— in which the response appears in Diog. II. 37, and Suid. σοφός, is a later invention—an expansion of the Pythia’s simple negative restated here. 6. καὶ ἐμὸν—ἐκτῆτε αὐτὴν αὐτὴν αἰτήσεις] This allusion to Cherephon’s antecedents is added not without purpose,—to dispose the court to hear more indulgently the story which is to follow. In detail:—The full point of the phrase πλῆθει ἡτανον εἰς to be found in the contrast of the adherents of the Thirty; more especially the ἤταν of the oligarchical clubs, and the body of 300 hoplites organised by the Thirty from their partisans. παίσιες refers to the subsequent expulsion of all not included in the 300 from Athens, and their withdrawal presently after (when they found no safety in Attica) to Thbes, Megara, Oropus, Calchis, Argos, &c. This flight, as an event still vividly remembered, is called τοιαῦτα, ‘the recent.’ So Isocr. matches it with the old troubles under the Pisisistratidæ.—τὴν δημοκρατίαν... ἔτο ζηλὸν καθολικάκεα, καὶ τὸν παίσια τὸν ἡτανον ἂν τᾶν τῶν τυμφάνων καὶ τῶν ἢταν τῶν τυμφάνων γενεσίας, viii. 123. p. 184. With καθαρός cf. Lyceas, x. p. 116, ἢ ἐνδικτικὸς καθαρός; it is the recognised description of the restoration of democracy and end of the eight months’ reign of the Thirty, signalised by the solemn return of Thrasylalus and the exiles from Piraeus to Athens.
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σοφότερον εἰναι, καὶ τούτων περὶ ὧδελφός ὑμῖν π. 21. αὐτῶν οὔτως μαρτυρήσει, ἐπειδή ἐκεῖνος τετελεύ̄

VI. Σκέψασθε δὲ ὃν ἕνεκα ταῦτα λέγω· μέλλων δὲ γαρ ὑμᾶς διδάξειν, ὦθεν μοι ἡ διαβολή γέγονε. ταῦτα γαρ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας ἐνεθύμουμι οὕτως· τὶ ποτε λέγει ὁ θεός, καὶ τὶ ποτε αἰνήτεται; ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ ὡστε μέγα ὡστε συμφωνία ξίνωθα ἑμάρτω χορδος ὁ δὲ ὡς τὶ ὁ θεὸς. λέγει φάσκον ἐμὲ σοφότατον εἰναι, οὐ γὰρ ὁ θεός ἐμὴν αὐτῷ καὶ πολλὸς 

15 μὲν χρόνῳ ἤπορον, τὶ ποτε λέγει, ἐπειτα μόνον πάνω ἐπὶ ζῆσην αὐτῶν ταὐτάτη τινα ἐστάτοις; οὕτων ἐπὶ τινα τῶν δοκούντων σοφὸν εἶναι, ὡς εἰ ἐνεπάθομεν, εἰ πέρ τοι, ἐλέγξων τὸ μαντεῖον καὶ ἁπάνοιον τῷ χρήσιμῳ ὑμᾶς σοφοτέρος ἡμεῖς, στὶς ἐμὲ ἐρήμησα, διακοσμῶν ὡς τῶν ὑμῶν—ἀνέμιοι γὰρ οὐδὲν δόμαται λέγειν, ὡς ἐν τῶν πολεμικῶν, πρὸς ὃν ἐγώ σκοπῶν τοιοῦτον τί ἐπαθὼν, ὃ ἄνδρες ἀθραυσίας· καὶ διαλέγομεν αὐτῷ, ἐδοξοῦσε μοι οὕτω 

20 ὁ ἄνηρ δοκεῖ μὲν εἰναι σοφὸς ἅλλος τε πολλοὶ

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p. 21. ἀνθρώποις καὶ μάλιστα ἐαυτῷ, εἰναι δ' οὗ ἀπαιτήτω χειρόμεναι, ὅτι ὁ θεός μὲν εἰναι σοφός, εἶπ' δ' οὗ. ἐπειδήθεν οὖν τούτῳ τε ἀποχήματι καὶ πολλοῖς τοῖς παρόντοις, πρὸς ἐμαυτῷ δ' οὖν ἀπίων ἐλο-

15 γιόμισθαι ὅτι τούτῳ μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐγὼ σοφοτέρος τοράς εἰμι· κινδυνεύει μὲν γὰρ ἢμῶν οὐδέπερος οὐδὲν καλὸν κάθαρον ἐδέχεται, οὖν οὐδὲν μὲν οἰκίηται τοιοῦτοι εἰδέ anvai. ἐπειδήθεν ἐπὶ ἄλλων ἢ τῶν ἐκείνου δο-

p. 22. καὶ ἂν τῶν κυρίων, ὃ ἄνδρες ἀθραυσίας· ἓν γὰρ πρὸς τῶν ταῦτης ταῦτα τιμάριτος ὑμῖν ἀνθρώπων ἤμιν ἤτοι ἐπαθὼν τινα τοιοῦτον, ὃς μὲν μάλιστα ἐπιδιοκμοῦστέοι ὡστε μοι ἠλάτων δὲν τοῦ πλείουσαν ἐπείναι κατὰ τὸν θεόν, ἄλλοι δὲ δοκοῦντες φασιλότεροι ἑπεικέστεροι εἰναι ἄνδρες πρὸς τὸν φρονίμους ἐκεῖν. δεῖ δὴ ὡς τὸν 25 ἐμίν πλείως ἐπιδιείκει ὡστε πόνους τινας πονοῦν-

20. τῷ τῶν ἄνων] What was meant by this oath is clear from Gorg. 452 b, μὲν τὸν εῖνα τὸν Ἀλκάταον θεόν,—that is, the dog-headed or, more correctly, jackal-headed Anubis. In Plato this oath is only found in the mouth of Socrates. In Aristoph. Vesp. 83, a slave, Sosias, uses the same oath.

ποτος, ἢν μοι καὶ ἀνέλεγχος ἡ ματεία γένοιτο. μετὰ π. 22.
γὰρ τοὺς πολιτικούς ἢ ἐπὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς τοὺς τε
τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ τοὺς τῶν διδακτικών καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὡσ ἐνταῦθα ἐπ᾽ αὐτοφόρῳ καταληψάμονος
ἐξαιτήτων ἀμαθέστερον ἐθείραν ὡστά. ἀναλαμβάνων
οὗ ἀυτῶν τὰ ποιήματα, ἢ μοι ἐδοκεῖ μάλας πε-
πραγματεύσθαι αὐτῶν, δηδοτὸν ἀν αὐτὸ τα λέ-
γοιει, ἢ ἀμα τι καὶ μενθάνουμι παρ’ αὐτῶν. αἰσχύ-
νομαι ὅτι ἤμιν εἰπεῖν, ἢ ἄνδρες, τάληθ᾽ ὄμοι δὲ
τοῖς ρήτοις. ὡς ἐποὶ γὰρ εἰπεῖν ἄλγον αὐτῶν ἀπαντας
οἱ παρόντες ἄν ἐβλητὸν ἐλεγον περὶ ὧν αὐτοὶ ἐπεπο-
ηκασαν. ἔγον ἄν καὶ περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐν ἄλγος

1. καὶ ἀνέλεγχος] H's conjecture διὰ ἀνέλεγχος (1) is mere con-
jecture; (2) would not give the sense he wishes, since ἀλεγχος
is not 'contradicted' but 'admitting contradiction'; and (3) if it
did, would spoil the general meaning, since Socrates' leading
principle throughout is that the oracle must be true, and that
the proof of this would come out simultaneously with the true
sense. For, eis ἄλγος] H's conjecture ἐν λέγοι is needless. For
ἐν ἄλγος means the same, viz. 'in short,' not 'in a short time,'
just like ἐν βροχῇ, Ἀγορ. 217 a, ἐν δοκιμαστή, Ἀποκ. 40. p. 111.
Of course ἐν λέγοι occurs also, e. g. Λυσιασ, xii. 38. p. 133.; and
H might have argued something from the variation of reading
between ἐν ἄλγοι and κατὰ λέγοι. Theoc. vii. 34. med.

...
which experiments further supplied the key to the intensity of the prejudice against Socrates individually, in the personal qualities which they had excited;
αὐτοῦ ἐρωτᾶτε, ὃ τι ποιὼν καὶ ὃ τι διδάσκων, ἔχουσιν ὑπ’ εἰς τοὺς μὲν οὖν εἰσίν, ἀλλὰ αἰχμαλώτους, ἵνα δὲ μὴ δοκῶσιν ἄποροι, τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφοῦντων πρό-
χειρα ταύτα λέγουσι, ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα καὶ τὰ υπὸ τῷ 5 γῆς, καὶ Θεοὺς μὴ νομίζειν, καὶ τῶν ἐντὸς λόγων κρείττον ποιεῖν. τὰ γὰρ ἀληθῆ, ὅμως, οὐκ ἂν ἐθέ-
λονες λέγειν, ὅτι θαύματοι γίνονται προσποιο-
μέναι μὲν εἰδέναι, εἰδέναι δὲ οὐδέν. ἄτε οὖν, ὅμως, φιλότιμοι ὄντες καὶ σφοδροὶ καὶ πολλοὶ, καὶ ἐκ
τοῦ ταχεύμου καὶ παθημάτων λέγοντες περὶ ἐμοῦ, ἐκπεπλή-
κασιν οὖν ἄν ταῦτα καὶ πάλαι καὶ σφοδρῶς δια-
βάλλουσιν. εἰ τούτων καὶ Μέλιτος μοι ἐπέθετο καὶ
and lastly, in com-
bination
9. ἐντευκτημένος] So BSZ. H with two MSS. ἐντευκτημένως.
But ἐντευκτημένος means 'in set array.' cf. Ἀδησ. ii. 74. p. 37; cf ἐντευκτημένοι βίρωσε.

4. ταῦτα Latin ita; idiomatically expressive of con-
tempt. Dig. 318.
ὅτι τὰ μετεώρα] Understand ζητῶ or the like, by com-
parison of 19 b.
12. ἐκ τοῦτοι] 'It is upon this footing'—namely that of
an old general prejudice, ag-
gravated by supervening per-
sonal animosity.—that I am
now attacked by' &c. The
meaning 'in consequence of'
would be too strong both for
the sense here, and for the
idiomatic use of the phrase;
see Dig. 116: the meaning
'upon the strength of' would
also exceed the warrant of the
Greek, though not of the sense,
cf. 19 a. § ἐν καὶ παντοῖς Με-
λίτος κ. ἐτ. τ. Λ.
καὶ Μέλιτος—βιρωσός] For an
account of Socrates' three
accusers and their motives,
and of the classes of persons
called here πολιτεῖα and
βίρωσε, see Intr. p. 31; note 1.

The δημοσιογραφοί are here joined
with the πολιτεῖα, because An-
ytus represented a trade himself,
and herein was but one of many
instances of the same conjunc-
tion of pursuits in those times
at Athens. Socrates was wont
to speak slightly of mechanical
arts (Xen. Oeconomic iv. 3),
—a view which would seem to
close itself with his praise
of σκληροῖς (Diog. ii. 31; Eli. Var.
x. 14); and a conversation, in
which he pressed an uncom-
mercial view of education upon
Anytus himself with reference
to his son, seems to have been
among the causes of Anytus'
personal hatred of Socrates.
(See again Intr. p. xii.)

1. ὑπ’] We are to under-
stand, not that the accusers
were acting on behalf of their
respective classes, but merely
that they were to be regarded
as representatives of the feel-
ings of those bodies.
9. τοῦτοι] Lit. 'through
the same things;' that is, in
stating the facts I am virtually
reiterating and attesting the
charges.
11. ἡ διαβολὴ ἡ ἁμη] Empha-
sis is of course on διαβολὴ.
'This is,' i.e. 'in this con-
sists—the prejudice against
me.'
16. ἔφαθο] 'Public bene-
factor.'
20. ἔχει δὲ ποιὸ ἄλλο] See In-
tr. p. xiv.
a. Perversion of the youth.

Two answers (both dialectical):
1. the hypocrisy of the charge;

3. σπούδα χαρακτῆρας] Oxy-moron: 'is playing off e. jest under solemn form.' The machinery of the law, with all its solemnity of circumstances and all its serious consequences, is set in motion by him for his mere amusement. Cf. χαρακτήρας in the same sense 27 n, where it is explained by παιδιόνος.

8. Καί μοι κτ.λ.] The examination of Meletus by Socrates, which now follows, though it naturally affords scope for exhibiting Socrates' characteristic talent, is legally speaking the customary ἐρωτήσεως, to which either party was bound to submit at the requisition of the other. Introd. p. xviii.

18. ἀμείβων] 'Better citizens,'—better toward others: whereas ἄθλοι above means, strictly speaking, better in themselves.

24. ἀλλὰ γὰρ] 'But the truth is;' as above 19 c, &c. Dig. 147.

26. ἀποφαίνεται—ἀμείβειν] Between ἀμείβειν and Μέλητε a play upon words is doubtless intended; see several instances in Plato collected Dig. 324. In this case the probability is strengthened by the constant
ΧΙ. Ἐπὶ δὲ ἡμῖν εἰπὲ ὁ πρὸς Δίως Μέλητε, πᾶτερ ὑμῶν ὁ πότερον ἔστιν ὅνικεῖν ἀμείνον ἐν πολίταις κριτοὶς ἤ ποιητοὶ; ὃ τών, ἀπόκρισις ὄνδεν γὰρ τοῦ χαλεπῶν ἐρ τῶν, οὐκ ὅπερ μὲν ποιητοί κακῶν ποτέ ἐργάζονται τῶν ἔκει ἐγγυτάτω ἐαυτῶν ὄνται, οὐ 'ο γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθοὶ τί; Πάνω γε. Ἐστὶν οὖν ὅστις βούλεσαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐννστοντων βλάπτεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ὀφειλέσθαι; ἀπόκρισις, ὃ γαθέ καὶ γαρ ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἐπὶ δὲ ὅστις βούλεσαι βλάπτεσθαι; Οὗ δή; Δέρε 10 δή, πότερον εἰμὶ εἰσάγεις δεύτερον ὅσον διαφθείροντα τοὺς νοετέρους καὶ ποιητέρους ποιοῦσα ἐκόπτες ἢ ἄκοντα; Ἐκόπτες ἔγω γε. Τί δή; Ὁ Μέλητε; τοσοῦτον αὐτῷ ἐμὸν σοφότερος εἰ τηλικοῦτον ὅστις τηλικὸν ὄν, ὅπερ οὖ μὲν ἔγων ὅστις οὗ μὲν κακῶν κακῶν τί ἐργά 15 ὅμοια τοῖς μάλιστα πλήθους ἐαυτῶν, οὐ δὲ ἐγαθεὶς ἢ παθοὺς ἀγαθοῖς ἢ γεὰς δὲ τούτων ἀμαθῶς ἢ καταγγεῖν ἢ, ὅπερ, εἰ τών μικρὸν τοιάσω τῶν ἐννέαντων, κυβερνών ἐκάκων καὶ λαβεῖν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ, ὅπερ τοῦτο τὸ τοσοῦτον κακῶν ἔστιν ποτέ, ὅσ 20 φθεῖ ἢ γε; ταῦτα ἐγὼ σοὶ οὐ πείθομαι, Ὁ Μέλητε, οἷον μὲν οὐδὲ ἄλλον ἀριστοῦν ὄνειδα ἢ ἀλλὰ ὃ ὁ π. 26 διαφθείρω, ἢ εἰ διαφθείρω, ἢ καταγγεῖν, ὅπερ, οὗτος σὺ γε καὶ ἀμφότερα πεισεῖν. εἰ δὲ ἄκον διαφθείρω, τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἀκούστων ἀμαρτήματος δὲ ἀφίνη κακῶς εἰσάγα 25 γεν ἔστιν, ἀλλ’ ἂν ἄρα διαφθείρω καὶ νοθετῶν’

reincurrence of the juxtaposition; see 24 c above, and 26 b below.

1. ἐπὶ — Μέλητε The address ὁ πρὸς Δίως has suffered from the interlacing of ἐπὶ πρὸς Δίως with it: Dig. 288. See also Rep. 332 c, τὴν ὁ πρὸς Δίως, ἢ τὸ ἐγώ, and 26 c below. 8. ὁ νᾶμος See note, 24 c.

13. ποιητεῖς Μeletus was a very young man: cf. Euthyph. 2 b, c, and below 26 c extr.—Stallb.

APΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

p. 26. ὃ ἁλον γὰρ ὅτι, εἴαν μάθω, παύσομαι ο ὃ γε ἀκούν ποιῶ. σὺ δὲ ἐγχυγγυσθάι μέν μοι καὶ διδάξαι ἐφηγεῖ καὶ ὃς ἡθέλησας, δεύτερο τε εἰσάγεις, οἱ νομός ἑστὶν εἰσάγει τῶν κολάσεως δειμένως, ἀλλ’ οὐ μαθᾶς ἔστώ.

XIV. Ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὃς ἀνδραὶ Ἀθηναίοι τοῦ μέν 5 δήλων ἡθέλων, ὃς ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι Μέλητρο τούτους οὕτως μέγα ὁ ποτέ σκορπός πῶς πόστερος ἐμέλησεν ὅμως δὲ δὴ λέγει ἥμιν, πῶς μὲ φθές διαφθείρω, ὃς Μέλητρο τοὺς νοετέρους; ὃ δήλων ἢ ὃ ταῦτα τὴν γραφήν, ἢ φήμην, θεὸς διδάκτου μην νομίζεις ὃς ἡ πόλις 10 νομίζεις, ἐτέρα δὲ διαίσθησις καμία; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις ὅτι διδάσκων διαφθείρω; Πάνω μὲν οὖν σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω. Πρὸς αὐτῶν τούτων, ὁ Μέλητε, τούτων τῶν θεῶν, οὐκ ἔνω ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, εἰπὲ ἐτεροφθόρες καὶ εἰμὶ καὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσι τοιούτοις. ἔγω γὰρ ὁ δυνάμαι 15 μαθῶν, ποστερον λέγεις διδάσκεις μην νομίζεις ἐναι ταύτας θεοὺς, καὶ αὐτὸς ὃρα νομίζεις ἐναι θεοὺς, καὶ οὐκ εἰμι τὸ παράπαν άθεος οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἀδικοὶ, οὐκ χρὴν οὕτως γε ἡ πόλις, άλλ’ ἐτέρους, καὶ τοῦτο 20 ἐστίν ὃ καὶ ἐγκαλεῖς, ὅτι ἐτέρους ἡ πανταπάσιν ὡς μὴ νομίζεις αὐτῶν νομίζεις θεοὺς τοὺς τὰ ἀλλὰ ταῦτα διδάσκεις. Ταῦτα λέγω, ὃς τὸ παράπαν νομίζεις.

2. ἐφηγεῖν ‘Didist decline.’ Cf. Al. Ach. 717, Καθαλλείαιν χρὴ το λαοῖν, εἰπ’ ἐφη το εὐ- μοῦν. With Plato, however, this meaning of the word is more common in the compound διαφθείρων. Cf. Symp. 174 a. ἐφηγεῖν and oúκ ἢ ἢ form a hysteron proteron, though not a strongly marked one.

7. οὗτος — συμμάχοι] Accurs. cognate after ἐφηγεῖν, not nom. to ἐφηγεῖν. Dig. 6. 14. ἐν νῦν] ‘Whom the argument of present concerns,’ equivalent to oúκ λέγον μαθάς distinguished from ποτὲ ἐν λέγον.—Stallb., rightly. Cf. Soph. 263 a, σῦν ἔρνον δ’ ἐφηγεῖν ποτ’ οὐ’ ἐστίν καὶ οἷον [ἐς λόγος], Lecq. 79 οτί, πόλεως καὶ πολιτείας περὶ καὶ νομοθεσίας, ἡταν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν πάρεστε, . . . μὴν εἶμι. b. Disbelief of established gods, and setting forth of strange spiritual agencies—answered by reducing Meleto to a contradiction.
3. Μά Δε" Understand o νομίζει.

5. 'Αναξαγόρας Xen. Mem. IV. vii. 7, makes Socrates refute the alleged opinion of Anaxagoras, των ἤλιων λόγω διάτριβος εὐν. Anaxagoras' formula was μέδους διάτριβος, which others took to mean a mass of iron. Of the moon he asserted that it had ὀλύσεις, λόφους, φάγωσας, whence that he believed it to be γυς was an inference.

8. β' Ἔως "Is secundum Isaur. II. iii. 8, et Clem. Alex. ibi ab interp. laudatam, philosophorum primam βιβλίων ἕξεσθαι συνρρητήσις, ἣν οὖν αὐτὸν ἐστὶν καλούσιν ἐκείνου. Hec tamen de Anaximandro aliis, aliis de Pherecyde Syro dicunt.—'Ficarst.

9. καί θ' καί] Irregular: 'and so then,'

10. αὐτομοῦν] The doctrines, not the books, 'εντος that is, if they should happen to see a play in which these doctrines are promulgated, as in Eurip. Orest. 982, μόλοις τῶν οὐρανῶν μέσων χθόνος τε ἑπταμένων ἀναφώμει πέτρων ἀλεύαρχος χρωμάτων, φερόμεναν δικά, τák̄t̄ οὐκ ἄφθονον. Dacier, as Stallbaum observes, curiously mistook the sense of this passage, and imagined that a volume of Anaxagoras might be bought at that time for a drachma. But in fact the price of paper itself was then excessive at Athens. Ennile Egger, in a letter to Firmín Didot (Revue Contemporaine du 15 Septembre, 1856), mentions fragments of an account rendered by certain Athenian officers in 407 B.C., in which the price of sheets of paper (χάρτα) for writing copies of these accounts (ἀντίγραφα) upon, was 1 drachma and 2 obols each, i. e. 1 fr. 20 cent.—a sum which, according to Bocchi's computation, accepted by Egger, would be equivalent to 4 fr. 80 cent. now.

11. τί πάντα πολλὰ] 'At the most,' the same expression occurs Alcib. I. 123 c, ἐξεν μων πεντάκατα τί πάντα πολλὰ, θείας ἁμαρτίας ἥψωρα. The ut-

most the διαχρόνως could demand for any place was a drachma; the price for an ordinary place was two obols. See Bocchi, Public Economy of Athens, translated by G. C. Lewis, p. 223. n. 315 of 2nd edition.

2. Δίνας τε καί] Which the youths must know are not mine, 'to say nothing of their singularity,' which would make the theft still more glaring. Steinhardt has well observed that the meaning of ἀσίκα is not 'absurd,' but 'uncommon' or 'peculiar;' etymologically, what cannot be assigned to any known place or origin. He further remarks that neither Socrates nor Plato would have rejected these notions as 'absurd.' Of the striking passage in Legg. 886 d, where Plato declines to controvert these positions although he would uphold the gods.

3. ἀτιτότως—ἔνα] The two sentences ἀτιτότω σαὶ δοκεῖ, ἐν δὲ ἀτιτότως—ἐνας are both descriptions of the same fact, the re-statement being the more precise; ἀτιτότω σαὶ δοκεῖ stands by a sort of attraction for ἀτιτότω (sacri per ἐνας), of which the filling up in the re-statement would have been ἐνδιδομένα—ἐνας. Dig. 227, 208.

5. "Ἀποστολος κ. τ. λ.] The question Meletus had answered affirmatively was, not whether Socrates was an atheist, but whether it was his opinion that Socrates was an atheist,—ἀσίκα σαὶ δοκεῖ; Socrates' comment on this is 'Very well; nobody else will believe that, and I am pretty sure you do not yourself,' i.e. I am pretty sure you are saying what you know to be untrue.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

27. ἀλλοις τουτοις. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ γε ἀπόκρυπται· εἰς οὕτως ὑπαγοντία μὲν νομίζει πράγματα εἶναι, δαίμονας δὲ οὐ νομίζει· Οὐκ ἦστων. Ὑμεῖς ἀναγκαστεύετε τὸν κανὴν σε ἀναγκαζόμενον. οὐκοῦν, οὐκ ἐξετάσουσα καὶ διαπέρασαν, εἰς τὸν κανὴν σε αὐτὸν καὶ διαμόρφωσαν. ἐν τῇ ἀντιγραφῇ, εἰς τὸν κανὴν σε αὐτὸν καὶ διαπέρασαν, ὑπαγοντία οὐκ ἦστος· οὐκ ἦστος. τοὺς δὲ δαιμόνες οὐκ ἦτοι θεοὺς γε ἦγον. ἦτοι δὲ θεοὺς γε ἦγον. ὑπαγοντία οὐκ ἦστος· οὐκ ἦστος. τοὺς δὲ δαιμόνες οὐκ ἦτοι θεοὺς γε ἦγον. ἦτοι δὲ θεοὺς γε ἦγον. 

ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

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XVI. 'Alla gar, ois andreis Athnaios, ois mev evoi oikou kata thn Melitou graphin, ou pollh mous dekei einai apolalugia, alloi ekopoi se kai ta sas. O de kai ev tous epiprosbisen elegov, oti pollh moi aptechnia genous kai pro polllous, eis oti altheres esti. Kai tout estin o eme aieresei, eansper aier, ou Melitou oude 'Annost, alloi ou thn pollon diakolhs te kai phusos. Oi pollous kai allous kai agathous anerous eirinei, oima dei kai aieresei oude de deinom ou ev emoi sth. Iostis de ain oiv estoi ti.'

6. peithis an ou os] The ou is not simply pleonastic, as in the case of two negatives in the same clause, but it is irrational. It is a confused anticipation of the coming negative odousia. Dig. 264.

18. odie — sti] 'The rule is in no danger of breaking down in my case.' This use of odie deinov is idiomatic: cf. Gorg. 520 d, odie deinov athos mou aletheia, 'we need not apprehend for him any injury.' Plaeso 84 b, odie deinov mou fshethi, 'we need not apprehend that the soul will have to fear.' The 'apprehension' is supposed to affect the speaker and his hearers, as interested in the contingency under discussion. So here Socrates is speaking half ironically, interesting himself, as it were, for the rule, against himself. sti is also idiomatically used, as a quasi-impersonal; — that is, a vague nominative, such as 'the course of events,' is understood. See Dig. 97; where among other parallels is given Ar. Eth. Nic. VI. ix. 9, sth- stovn ypar kaliei. sti is literally 'come to a stand still.' Stalh. is wrong here.

4. upologiesetha] See below, d note.

5. osw to kai smerios] 'A man of any worth at all.' This idiomatic concurrence of kai with smerios is frequent: Dig. 132.

APOLOGETIA SOKRATOU. 73

p. 28. eiv oik avxhinei, o Sokrates, tosoauto episthemeina epiterhseis, eis o oikounein avsi upoqabnei; evo de totoy av diakou logon evneitoym, oti ou kalos legei, o antrhpa, eis oik ou kaiyous upologizesai tou zwhn e tebhaini anbri ou the tis kai smerios fyllois ekei, all oik oukein mouv skopoei, oti prmttr, totores dikai ouk oi prmttrai, kai anbri o ignition o rghma b kakan. fainh plor ou dei sewlog eivn tou oumheon ou thei a Thetidin ou, ois tosoauto tou kinh thn tis fyllo evneioseis para a avxhron ti upomeinai, the ev neikei epivn oik oukein avtou pronoymenevmen, 'Ektora upokteiteis, theos ouvta, ouvtoi pous, ouvta moraiw osw pai, eis tis mprresi Patroklo to etairi ton fyllo kai 'Ektora upokteiteis, avtou apodanei av-15 tikha para, fosi, mev 'Ektora puios etoiou o de tais akousa ton mou thnaton kai ton kinhwn oulyagorres, poli de malwn deiaso thei zwhn kainw ou dei kai tos flous ouv tis mprresi, avtika, fosei, tebainon fyllo ev theis to oukouv, ian mou evnadei mou kath 20 gelastos para enoi koronwsh ouvirfis. ouv athenov ou eis frowtis thaivan kai kinhwn; outhe gar eixe ois andreis Athnaios, th alberia; ou an tis evtou taei ou theisamenvs bkeistovn einai ou ou avxhron tayh, eiwtiai deai, ouv emoi dokei, mevontai 25
πλονος κωνδυνείων, μηδὲν ὑπολογίζομενον μήτε θάνατον μήτε p. 28.
αὖλο μηδέν πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ.

ΧΣΠ. Ἐγὼ oun δεινὰ ἡν εἰρήν εἰργασμένος, ὃ ἀνήρ Ἰδρυαῖος, ἐί, ὅτε καὶ τοὶ ἄρχοντες ἐπτατούν, 5 οὐς υμεῖς εἰλέεσθε ἄρχειν μου, καὶ ἐν Ποτίδαιᾳ καὶ ἐν Ἀπμιπόλει καὶ ἐπὶ Δηλῷ, τότε μὲν οὐ εἰκόνιν ἐπτατούν ἀπὸ ποτα καὶ ἀγαλματικῶν ἀποθανείων, τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάπττοντος, ὃς ἐγὼ φίλην τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον, φιλοσοφοῦστα μὲ δεῖν χριν καὶ ξετά-
10 ἦτον ἐμαυτῶν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνταῦθα δὲ φοβοθεῖς p. 29.

η θάνατον ἡ ἄλο ὑποθετόμενον ἄρχειν τὴν τάξιν.

δεῖν τῷ ἐν οἴνῳ, καὶ όσον ἁγιάζω τοῦτό με δικαίως εἰσάγει τοὺς δικαστήριον, ὃτι οὐ νομίζω, ὅτι εἰναι ἀπελθένων τῇ μακελείᾳ καὶ δεῖον διστάνον καὶ υόμενοσ
15 σοφῶν εἰμί τού οἴν. τὸ γὰρ τοῦ διστάνον δεδιναί, δὲν ἀνήρ, οὐδεν ἄλο εἰναι ὧν δοκεῖν σοφόν εἰμί μὴ ὅντας δοκεῖν γὰρ εἰδέναι αὐτὸν ὡς ὀιδέν. οὐδὲ
μὲν γὰρ οὖδεις τοῦ διστάνον οὐδὲ εἰναι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων μεγίστον ὡς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, δείδαις
20 δὴ ὡς εἰ ἔφη ὅτι μὴ μισεῖν τῶν κακῶν ἐστὶ. καὶ b
τοῦτο πῶς ὧν ἀμαβία εἰστὶ αὐτὸ ἢ ἑπονειδίας, ἢ

1. ὑπολογίζομεν] 'Giving any countervailing weight to;' literally, 'reckoning opposed to'
contrary.'The ἐπὶ conveys no image of subtraction, according to our notion of the operation, but the signifies of meeting from an opposite direction: see Dig. 131.
5. Ποτίδαιᾳ—Δηλῷ] At Potidaea (see Charn, in It., Symp. 219, 220) between 432 and 439 B.C. Socrates rescued the children but resigned in his favour his claim to the reward of
bravery. Delium, 424 B.C., witnessed his famous retreat, (Symp. 221 a, b, Lach. 181 b). Of his campaign before Amphipolis, 422 B.C., we know less.
10. ἐνταῦθα δὲ ἔστειλαν repotot tov βεβαίως τάστος Θ.Λ. — δὲ marks the apodosis.
20. καὶ τοῦτο . . . αὐτῇ] Not plenometric; but 'what is this but that very same reprehensible ignorance?' τοῦ ὡτεθάν which follows is a negative expegegetic of ἀμαβία. Dig. 24.

απολογία σωκράτους. 79

p. 29. τοῦ ὡτεθαν εἰδέναι ἢ τού oίδαν; ἔγω δὲ, ὃ ἀνήρ, τοῦτο καὶ ἐνταῦθα Ἰδρυαῖος διαφέρω τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώ-
πων, καὶ εἰ δέ τι σοφοτέρον τοῦ φαίνῃ εἰναι, τοῦτο ἂν, ὃτι οὐκ εἰδώς ικανόν περὶ τῶν ἐν 'Αινων οὖσα καὶ υμοίας ὡτεθαν εἰδέναι τὸ δὲ οὐκείων καὶ ἀπεβαίνων τοῦ βεβαίων, καὶ σοφοτέρω καὶ ἀνθρώπω, ὃτι κακὸν καὶ

2. τοῦτο καὶ τ.λ.] 'In this province also [of the unseen] I believe I am distinguished from the mass of mankind herein, and if I were to say I was wiser in any point than any other person, I should say it was herein, that &c. The former as well as the latter toûτo both relate to the same fact, to the same αὐτον,—upon which a strong emphasis is thus made to converge. Cf. Gorg. 484 c, λαμπρὸς ἡ ἐκπνοοῦ ὡς τοῦτο, καὶ τοῦ ὡτεθαν ἐπι-

13. ἐκδικοῖν] The construction of the fut. indic. with ἐκ is abundantly established. ἀδεικτον ὡς here belongs to διαφέρωντα, and to refer it to the part. ἀνθρώ-

15. ἀπατητήρωτα] 'Disbelieving,' the representation urged by Anytus as the reason why Socrates should die; not 'refusing to follow Anytus' counsel' to put Socrates to death.
then it is not an event which is assumed as about to happen at all.

4. ἐὰς... [For constructions of relative pronouns and adverbs with the infinitive, see Dig. 79.]

8. ἀσπαζόμεναι καὶ φιλῶ] "Ἀσπαζόμεναι καὶ φιλῶν ἐσται: ut cum amplexarit; filiōn ita, ut cum suscipierit."—Stallb. Here of course both words are used, by transference, for the feelings which those actions betoken. Note too, that the transference affects both: it is not that filia already expresses a feeling, and thus gives the turn to ἀσπαζόμεναι their coordination in the phrase requires that they should enter into it homogeneously.

πείσομαι—ὑμῖν] The parallel is striking to the declaration of the holy apostles, Acts v. 29, πείσασθε δὲ Θεῷ μᾶλλον ἡ ἀρετής.

14. ἵνα] Stallb., after Fischer, "de animi magnitudine et fortitudine."

15. ταῦτα] 'If preaching virtue is perversion, then indeed I am a mischievous person; for I never rest from preaching it.' The ταῦτα is not identical with the ταῦτα of the line before, but is more comprehensive; it stands for the whole clause referred to in the phrase ταῦτα λέγων, and means 'this practice of mine.'

ΠΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ή ύμας αυτοίς ἐμὲ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἂν βλάψεις ρ. 30. ὡς Ἔλετος ὥστε Ἰνοῦς ὥστε γὰρ ἂν διότατο ἃν γὰρ οὐκ θεμένων εἶναι ἀμείνοις ἀνδρὶ ὑπὸ χεριοῦς βλάπτεσθαι. ἀποκτείνεις μὲν ἂν ἰσός ἡ ἐξελάσσατεν ἡ ἀτιμάσσεις ἀλλὰ ταῦτα οὐσίω τινώς οίσεται καὶ ἀλλὸς τίς που μεγάλα κακά, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐκ οἶμαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ποιεῖ ἰσός νῦν ποιεῖ, ἄνδρα αὐτώς ἐπιχείρεις ἀποκτείνεισθαι. οὐν, οὐ, ὁ ἄνδρας Ἀθηναῖοι, πολλοὺ δὲν ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπολογο-γείσθαι, ὥς τις ἂν οἰστήτορο, ἅλλου ὑπὲρ ύμῶν, μὴ τι ἐξακράτησθε περὶ τὴν θεοῦ δόσον ύμῶν ἐμὸς κατα-

p. 31. ἀν Με, πειθόμενοι Ἀντών, ἡμῶν ἂν ἀποκτείνατε, εἵτα τὸν λοιπὸν βίων καθεύδοντες διατελοῦ ἂν, εἴ μὴ τινα ἄλλου ὁ θεός ύμῶν ἐπικείμενοι κηδόνος ύμων. ὅτι δὲ ἐγὼ τυχαῖον ὅποι τοιοῦτος, ὁς ὑπὸ b τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ πόλει ἐδοχθήθη, εὐθεῦς ἂν κατανοῆσατε: εὔνομος ἂν ἄνθρωπος ἐοικέ τὸ ἐμὲ τῶν μὲν ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπάντων ἡμελήκειται καὶ ἀνέκειται τῶν οἰκείων ἀμε-

5. ἀτιμάσσεις [H II conjectures a conjecture of his own, ἀτιμώτερος, quite needlessly; for ἀτιμῶς, though it properly means to treat or regard as ἄτιμος, while ἄτιμος is to make ἄτιμος, yet also has this technical sense: cf. Legg. 762 d, περὶ τῶν νόμων διὸς ἕτε-

10. τὸν τοῦτον ἀδόκειον, ὁ ἄνδρες, ἀλλὰ ἐὰν ἐμὸς πεί-

13. ἢ καὶ γελοῖον τοὺς ὑπερὶ καθαρίζων. τοῖς οὕστῳ ὁ ῥα-

14. ὁς οἷς οἷς δὲ] They would doubtless make the assertion, cf. 19 d: but what they did not find it practicable to do was to bring evidence in support of it. That is, grammatically speaking, the primary intention of the sentence ἀπαναγχειάσατο — μάρτυρα lies in the participial clause, and not in the verb ἀπαναγχειά-

15. θεός ἂν υḿν ἀοῦν ἂτοτον εἰναι, ὅτι δὴ c. (In an-

19. ἢ τῶν ἀν ὁς] The dominant reason of Socrates' absti-

23. κρούσατες] 'With a sin-

20. 15. τὸν τοῦτον ἀδόκειον, ὁ ἄνδρες, ἀλλὰ ἐὰν ἐμὸς πεί-

22. παναγχειάσατο] Another unhappy conjectural substitution of Ἰ occurs here.—ὁροφοίστες, because (he says)
5. γίγνεται φασὶ] All MSS. have this φασὶ, and all codd. except V bracket it. Needlessly; Fischer points out the parallel to the next sentence, τούτω εὖν εἰς παιδὸς ἀφήμων φασὶ τῆς γυνα-, μέν 9. τούτω δ ἄν] Edh. prefer τούτω. But ἀποτρέψει πράττει τοῦτο ἐστὶ a construction borne out by Thesst. 151 a, ὑπὸ μὲν τὸ γεγονός μοι διακόνοις ἀποτρέψει εὐρύθρα, [Dem]. Proconm. xx. p. 1431. δέβεται δὲ τότε ἑμαρτήτες, καί ἀποτρέψει ταῦτα παιδίων, and analogous constructions such as Xen. An. III. i. 20, παρκεθεύσα τά ἐπιστήμημα ἑυρήκοις ἤματι. τούτω here is the reading of five MSS. besides Oxon. It is moreover less likely to have been invented than τούτω. 15. καὶ μὴ μὲν] He alters this into καὶ μὴ μά π., comparing Phaedo 105 b. But καὶ μὲν is a common commencement of a sentence in the Orators.

APΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

P. 31. γὰρ ἐστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων σωμήτεια οὐτε ὑμῶν οὐτε ἄλλο πλῆθει οὐδεὶς γνησίος ἐναντιοῦμενος καὶ δια- P. 32. καλῶν πολλὰ ὀνόμα καὶ παράνομα ἐν τῇ πόλει γίγνεται. ἂν ἄναγκαιον ἐστι τῆς τοῦ ἁγιοῦ μεγα- μένου υπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ εἰ μέλλει ὁλίγον χρόνους σωμήτεια, ἰδιώτευτεν ἀλλὰ μὴ δημοσίευτεν.

XX. Μεγάλα δὲ ἐγών ὑμῖν τεκμηρία παρέχωμαι τούτων, οὐ λόγους, ἀλλὰ ὑμῖν τιμᾶτε, ἐργα. ἀκού- σατε δὲ μοι τὰ ἐμοί ἐμπειρικά, ὑπείθητετε ὅτι οὐδὲ ἐν ἑνὶ ὑπεικάθημι παρὰ τὸ δικαίον δεῖσας βίαντος, τὸ μὴ ὑπείκοις ὑπὲρ αὐτὸν ἀπολογήτην. ἔρως δὲ ὑμῖν ὑπο- τικά μὲν καὶ δικαίως, ἀλλὰ ἔρως ὑπὲρ. ἐν γωρ, ὁ Ἀθη-

11. ἂμα καί] This is Ant's conjecture. Mss. are chiefly divided between ἂμα καί ἢ ἦν (which Oxon. exhibits), ἂμα καί ἃς ἄρκον, and ἂμα καί ἢ ἦν ἀπό ὑμαικίας. Λαμ. ἢ ἦν καί ἃς ἄρκον. It seems vain to find more than a shadowy justification for ἢ καί ἢ ἦν. The variants may easily have come from ἢκαί ἢ ἦν, in the form ἢ ἂμα καί ἢ. My friend Mr. Campbell ingeniously proposes ἂμα καί ἢ ἦν ἀπό ὑμαικίας, 'should be ready to meet death in sundry forms:' cf. Soph. O. T. 661, ὁ τε τιμῶντος θάλαμον. 12. δεδακὼν] H. conjecturally prefixes ὅ, observing 'quis erat, Socratem, qui statim a principis se ἐξέρχεσε τινων ἐνδέχετο λέξεως professus est, nunc judicialia verbis promittere?' But equally how then should Socrates know that what he was going to say was not灾难; Besides, the speech in point of fact betrays abundant knowledge of technicalities; cf. 34 b, ἢ ἂν τοῦ κ. τ. λ. See Commentary below.

8. ἢ—ἐργα] 'What your body is wont to appreciate highly, the actions of a life,' ἢ ἂμα (s. Socrates),—not as individuals, but as representing Athenians generally, when as judges in the Ecclesia, or as the Helias, —'you particularly are susceptible to such appeals.' Here appears, in a refined form, the common thesis of rehearsing a man's past services in his defense; of which practice Lysias, xii. 38. p. 123, says, ἢ ἂμα τὸ πολεμεῖν ὡς ἐποίησαν τοῦτο, πρὸς μὲν τὰ κάτωπερα μαίνει ἀπολογία, ποιὲ ἢ ἐρωτά- αὐτῶν . . . ἢ τίτιμον ὡς ἀγαθοῖς καὶ τ. τ. λ. Whence again So- crates says just below, he is 'about to employ a topick of vulgar use, and one that sa- vows of the law-courts.'
stands here in its simple meaning of ‘vulgar’ in the sense of ‘common’—not as implying (as Fischer and others think) self-assertion or bad taste; a meaning which (1) would make ἐνώς sound blunt even to harshness; (2) (1) does not harmonise with δικαία, for an arrogant tone is not characteristic of persons addressing their judges; and (3) does not suit the parallel passage Gorg. 432 εἰς τοιαύτα ἀγίας φρονεῖσθαι καὶ διδομένας... διὰ φύσεις μὲν οἶκοι ἔτος καθά, νόμος δὲ δικαίωσις is likewise a colourless word; not ‘lawyerlike’ in the sense of ‘dry,’ nor yet ‘streitschichtig’ (Steinbart), but simply ‘characteristic of speakers in courts of justice.

3. τοῖς δέκα] Strictly only eight; for Conon was not included, and another of the ten was dead. Xenophon, in one of his accounts (Mem. I. 1. 18), speaks with more definite inaccuracies of ἐνώς στρατηγὸς.

5. παραδόσεις, in two respects; (1) that they were tried ἄθροι (see Thirlwall, Hist. Gr. vol. IV. App. 2, where it is shown that this right of separate trial is not to be traced to the decree of Cannibales); and (2) that they were not heard in their own defence; for in the assembly as the charge was brought first informally, they only (Xen. Hell. I. vii. 5) ὑμεῖς ἐκεῖστε ἐπιλογίζειν κατὰ τὸν νόμον κατὰ τὸν νόμον κατὰ τὸν νόμον κατὰ τὸν νόμον... διὰ φύσεις μὲν οἶκοι ἔτος καθά, νόμος δὲ δικαίωσις is likewise a colourless word; not ‘lawyerlike’ in the sense of ‘dry,’ nor yet ‘streitschichtig’ (Steinbart), but simply ‘characteristic of speakers in courts of justice.’

7. ἐπιστάτης... ἐνώς ἐσθραφήσειν! What is the precise reference of these expressions? Was ἐπιστάτης a refusal to put the question? This is left for uncertain by Mr. Grote, who says that upon Xenophon’s shewing ‘it can hardly be accounted certain that Socrates was Epistates.’ (Hist. Gr. ch. 64.) Again, to what act does ἐνώς ἐσθραφήσειν refer?

It may be well to give the other accounts of this occurrence at length—

(a) Xen. Mem. I. i. 18, βουλευτῶν γύρω ποτε... ἐπιστάτης ἐν
προβολεύσεις, would be to lay the scene of it too far from that of ἡσυχίαν ἀκάμερον, with which it is coupled, and would make μόνον τῶν ρητορῶν flat, since the προβολεύσεις had no prominent functions in the council. The remaining alternative, and this is in itself a plausible one, is to refer it to the first stage of proceedings in the assembly, where, preparatorily to the προβολεύσεις being read out by the κύριος, it was handed to the προεδρικ, who with the nomen
methete had to pronounce whether it contravened any existing law. Here was the precise moment at which legal provision had been made for entailing the very objection taken by Socrates. We may then, with at least some probability, refer ἐνδεικτικά to Socrates' condemning the bill as illegal when it was referred in due course to the joint consideration of the προεδρικ and nomenmethete. The hyberon προεδρικ is on Greek principles natural: ἡσυχίαν—κύριος precedes, because it, and not the earlier opposition, was the conspicuous and crowning act in Socrates' whole proceeding; Dig. 308.
With Socrates' more glorious refusal to put the question may be compared the conduct contemptuously attributed to Demosthenes by Læs
chines, ii. 84, p. 49, ἀγωγοποιοῦντος τοῦ ψηφίσματος, ἐκάστας ἐκ τῶν πρεσείων διαμάζειν εἰς ἅμα τὸ ψηφίσμα επιγραφέν τοῖς πρεσεῖοι βουλευόντως ἐκ ἅμα κατ' ἄμεμα καλοῦντον, instance) against any pytane or procedus who in discharge of his function in an assembly of the people should depart from the form of proceeding prescribed by law (Dem. e. Timoc. 22. p. 727). In the latter case, offenders were liable to a fine, and to ἔνδειξις, which ἔνδειξις was not only an expedient for levying the fine, but had the immediate effect of suspending them from office until the fine was paid. The Thesmophoriae had exclusive cognizance of ἔνδειξις. The statement of Plutarch, that it pertainzd to the Archon Basileus, is unsupported; likewise his definition of ἔνδειξις, on which some writers rely—that it was ἠμοργοποιοῦντος ἔξω οὖ κρίνεται ἄλλα τιμορίας διο-
μονον—is called by Heffter 'a mere jingle of words.' Ἀργο-
γογγος was of wider application than ἔνδειξις. Moreover, its object was the bringing the offender into custody, which in ἔνδειξις was not the rule.

ἈΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ. 85

p. 32, κελευτόντων καὶ βοήσων, μετὰ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τοῦ ὁ δικαίου ὧν μὴ μᾶλλον μὲ δεῖς διακυβεύειν ἢ μὲ ὧν γενέσθαι μὴ δικαία βουλευμένον, φοβηθέντα δειμνὸν ἢ βάναυσον. καὶ τούτα μὴ ἐπὶ δημοκρα-
tουμένης τῆς πόλεως ἐπείδη ἄλλοις ἐ γίνεσθαι, οἱ τριάκοντα αὐτὰ μεταπεμφάνισμεν μὲ πρέποντα ἅμα ἐις τὴν θύλα προετοιμάζεις ἥρισεν εἰς Σαλαμίνον Δέντα τοῦ Σαλαμίνον, ἦν ἀποβάνον ὀρα ἢ καὶ ἄλλοις ἐκείνοι πολλοῖς πολλά προετατ鲠, βουλο-
μενοι ὡς πλείοντος ἀναπλάσαι αἰτίων τότε μεν οὐκ ἐγὼ οὐ γιὰ ἐνδεικτικήν ἀργο ἐνδεικτικήν ἢ ἐμπεποθηκαίναι.
θανάτου μὲν μέλει, εἰ μὴ ἀγροκότερον ἢν ἐίπειν, οὐδὲν ἐπ. 32. οπιού, τοῦ δὲ μηδὲν ἀδικοῦ μηδὲν ἀνόιον ἐργάζεσθαι, τούτου δὲ τὸ πάν μέλει. ἐμὲ γὰρ ἐκείνη ἡ ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἔχειτο ὑπὸ τὸν Ἱεροκόλον ὑπαστάτη, ὡστε ἀδικοῦ τι ἐργάζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ ἐπιθυμοῦ ἡ τῆς θλοῦ ἐξελθομένοι, οὐ μὲν τέταρτες ὀρθοί έίχον Σαλαμίνα καὶ ὑγαίωνος. Λέντα, ἐγὼ δὲ όμοιόν ἄλλους οἶκες. καὶ ὁσαξ ἂν δὲ τις ταύτα ἀπέδωκαν, εἰ μὴν ἡ ἀρχὴ διὰ ταχέως κατέληγε τινος τοῦτος οὐκ ἔστω τοις μαρτυρεῖν.

10 XXI. Ἀρ' οὖν ἂν μὲν οὐνὶς δεικνύεται ἡ διαγνωσθείσα, εἰ ἐπράττον τὰ δημοσία, καὶ πράττον αὖτος ἀνθρώπος ἀγαθὸν ἐξοίκισαν τὸν δικαίον καὶ, ἀκόπτων, ἠθῆσαι, πολλοῦ γε ἔτει, ὡς ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναίων. οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων 15 οὐδείς. ἀλλ' ἐγώ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου δημοσία τε, εἰ π. 33. τοι καθαρὰ, τοιούτου φιλόμενος, καὶ ἡ ἐκάστος, οὖν, σώματος ἐκείνης ἑγκυροτέρας οὐνὲν παρά τὸ δίκαιον οὔτε ἀλλα πάντων οὐδείς, οὕτω δὲ διὰ τοῦ νέου καὶ ἐκαθαρισμοῦ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἑκάστου, ἐκάστα μὲν ἐκαθαρισμός μὲν ἀκόπτως ἐκαθαρίσατος, ἔκαστος πολλοὺς ἐστὶν, οὐδὲν χρήσατο μὲν λαμβάνον b

9. ἐκ 
10. ἐκ Μ. S. c, d. { }

ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ. 87

P. 33. διαλέγονται μὴ λαμβάνον οὐδὲν. ἀλλ' Ἰούσιος καὶ πλούσιος καὶ πένθος παρέχει ἐμαυτὸν ἐρωτηθήναι, καὶ εἷς 

10. diadikazein

2. καὶ τιμωρία [om.] BS om.; VZ retain; H brackets. The likelihood is not great that the words have been inserted from the end of the former sentence (H brackets then there, by mistake); the rhythm almost requires them; and there is point in attributing the same vindictive feeling to the kinme in as to the youths themselves. The repetition is like Brutus' repetition of 'for him have I offended,' in Shakespeare's Jul. Cesar. Act III. Scene ii.

With Critobulus Socrates holds conversation in Xen. Mem. I. iii, II. vi. He is mentioned also in Athen. V. 220b, with Echelus, distinguished from others of the name as Ἐχελους, the son of Lyssias (see Diog. Laert. II. 69), who afterwards became a teacher for money of the Socratic doctrines, and wrote Socratic dialogues (Schol. in Menex.). He was at variance with Aristippus (Luzac de Dig. Soc. sect. II. § 2), and there is a fragment of an invective written against him by Lysias, illustrating the enmity of the Orators against the Socrates: he is of the company named in the Phaedo (59 b).

Epigenes is mentioned Xen. Mem. III. xii. 1, and Phaedo 59 b: his father Antipho is not otherwise known. Democritus, the father of Parmenides and Theaetus, is an interlocutor in the Theages. Of Theages it is said, Rep. 496 b, τι φιλόσοφος ὁ τοῦ Παρσάκου ἐστι καὶ ὁ τοῦ ἀριστοκράτους ὁ Θέατους ὁ πρότεστα ἐστιν τοῦ ἀριστοκράτους πρότεστα. 

XXIII. Eś was the scene of Anakreon and Sophocles, of the poets who adorned the court. The reason for not en- bridging the nect of the court.
οὐδὲν ἄρα τούτων πιστεύω, καὶ ταῦτα κινδυνεύων, p. 34. όσο ἡν δόξαμαι, τὸν ἔχων τοις κινδύνους. τάχει οὖν τις ταῦτα ἐνώσονται αὐθαδέστερον ἄν πρὸς με σχοινήν, καὶ ὥργησθένι αὐτῶν τοιτούς θείον ἄν μετ᾽ ὀργῆς 5τῆρ ὑψίθρου. ἐπεὶ δὴ τὸ κάκον ὃδε ἔχει,—οὐκ ὀδυγεῖ, μὲν γὰρ ἔχωνε· ἐδὲ οὖν, ἐπιτείκνει ἂν μοι δοκηᾷ πρὸς τούτον λέγειν λέγον ὅτι ἔμοι, ὅ ἀρρήτε, εἰσὶ μὲν πού τινες καὶ οἰκείοι καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου, οὖν ἕξω ἄν τροφις οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρης πέ- 10φυκα, ἀλλ' ἔχει ἀνδρόποτον, ὅστε καὶ οἰκείοι μοι εἰσὶν καὶ οὐκές, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, τρεῖς, εἰς μὲν μειράκιαν ἡ, διὸ δὲ παιδία· ἀλλ' ὁμοὺς οὐδέν αὐτῶν δεῖρο ἀναβιβαζόμενος δεῖροιμαι οὐκ ἀποφημίζεται. τι 15δὴ οὖν οὐδὲν τούτων πιστεύω; οὐκ αὐθαδόζομεν, εἰ ἂν ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, οὕτω μιᾶς ἀτιμίζομεν, ἀλλὰ εἴ μὲν διαφάνειοι ἔγνω ἔξω πρὸς θάνατον ἡ μή, ἄλλος λόγος, πρὸς δὲ οὖν δόξις καὶ ἔμοι καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ὅλη τῇ πόλει οὐ μοι δοκεῖ καλῶν εἶναι ἐμὲ τούτων οὐδὲν ποιεῖν καὶ τριλοίκων ἄντα καὶ τοῦτο τούφωμα ἔχοντα, 20εἰς οὖν ἄλλες εἰσ' οὖν ψεῦδος. ἀλλ' οὖν δεδογμένων γε ἐστὶ τῷ Ὀμήρῳ διαφέρειν τινὸς τῶν πολλῶν

21. τῷ Ὀμήρῳ] VBS τῷ Ὀμήρῳ, ZH τῷ Ὀμήρῳ, both with some MS authority. The last is worst; for such an emphatic use of the name Socrates palpably requires the article. And

2. ἐν δὲ δόξαι] Refers to κινδύνου, not to ἔχων—danger, as he would think it.' 5. εἰκ' ἄδω μὲν γὰρ] γὰρ refers to αὐτ'] [I say it'], for though I do not expect it of you, yet [making the supposition], if it should be so.' 6. 'ἐπειδή] 'Conclitatory.' 9. ὁμήρων] Odys. xix. 163.

11. εἰς μέν] Lamprocles (Xen. Mem. P. ii. 1), διὸ Sophronicus and Menonemus (Plato in 11b) 15. εἰ μέν] 'Whether I can look death in the face or not.'—Whewell. 19. τοῦ] The name of σοφοῖς' cf. 20 d, and below, εἰς σοφία εἴτε κ.τ.λ.

13. οὕτω καί] VII οὕτω, BSZ (following 2 MSS), οὕτω. II says 'οὕτω καί commodum sensum praebet, nec plebem, modo aitque loco haberi velit, facere, nec si singulis facient, necessiter debere.'

3. ἐστοιτ[.] 'If we are to have such conduct on the part of those,' &c. εἷς would have

against both this and τῶν Ὀμήρων stands the consideration, that the meaning would be 'people have made up their minds that Socrates is to differ.' it is the form of a resolution which is to take effect; whereas the meaning required is 'they have made up their minds that Socrates differs' now. τῶν Ὀμήρων leaves this clear. It is the reading of Oxon. and three other MSS.; and in accepting it we follow Bernhardy (Syntax. p. 94), who supports it with parallels. See Dig. 183.

13. διαφέρει] Oxon. here has διαφέρω, but it is not consistent. Dindorf (on Ar. Nub. 510) says ἀπερίει alone is the true form, as proved (1) by the Ionic διεσθίεις διαφέρω (2) by the fact that in poetry it never occurs where the metre would require ἀπερίει (except in Eur. Herc. F. 475, παρήκτο ἐνίσχυσθη, μέγα φρόνεος ὃς ἂν ἀπερίει, which Elmsley has emended διαφανής); (3) by the testimony of Etym. M. p. 491, 53, that the traditional orthography was ἀπερίει till Apollonius invented διαφερέω (4) by the presupposing adherence of the MSS. to ἀπερίει. The meaning of Socrates stands the consideration, that the meaning would be 'people have made up their minds that Socrates is to differ.' it is the form of a resolution which is to take effect; whereas the meaning required is 'they have made up their minds that Socrates differs' now. τῶν Ὀμήρων leaves this clear. It is the reading of Oxon. and three other MSS.; and in accepting it we follow Bernhardy (Syntax. p. 94), who supports it with parallels. See Dig. 183.

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φειδθε το τα έλεενα ταυτα δράματα είσαγοντος p. 35 και καταγελαστον την πόλιν ποιοντος ή τον ηπιο-
χαν άνουντος.

XXIV. Χρονις δε της δόξης, ό άνδρες, ουδε
δίκαιοι μοι δοκεί εναι δείσαθαι του δικαστου ουδε ο
δεομεν άποφεγγεν, άλλα διδάσκει και πείθειν.
ου γάρ επι τοιτο κάθοιη ο δικαιίας, επι το κατα-
χαρίζοθαι τα δίκαια, άλλ’ επι το κρίνειν ταυτα’
και ορισμοίκες ου χαριείφθην αίς αν δοκη αύτη, άλλα
10 δικάσεων κατά ους νόμουν. ούκ ους χρη ουτε ήμι-
σε ώδειν ώμας επιστροψ, ουθ ώμας εβίζοθαι’ ουδέ-
tερο το γαρ άν ήμων ενυβεθον. μη ουν αξιοιτε με,
ω άνδρες Αθηναίοι, τοιαύτα δειν προς ώμας πράττειν,
α μήτη γροθύναι καλά είναι μήτη δίκαια μήτη ούσα,
15 άλλως τε μέντοι νη Δία πάντων και άσεβειας φευ-
δοντα υπό Μελίτου τουτού. σαβος γαρ άν, ει
πεθομει ήμας και τω δεισθαι βιαζόμενη άνθρωπότα,
θεος άν διδάσκομεν μη γροθυθα ήμας είναι, και
άτεχνοις άπολογούμενοις κατηγοροίν άν έμαυτων ώς

9. άμοικον] Part of the judge’s oath was ή μην άμοικον
άκοφεσθαι των κατηγορούντων και των απολογούμενων Ιοσε.
χρησιμού] ‘That be will not favour whomsoever he feels
inclined to favour.’
10. ήμα] Defendants in
general.
11. εβίζοθα] ‘Allow yourselfs to be habituated;’ an
instance of the semi-middle sense. Dig. 88.
15. άλλως—καὶ] ‘But, by
Zeus, especially; when I am on
my trial at Meletus’ instance for
impiety.’ A remarkable
hyperbaton. The phrase άλλως
τε μέντοι και is rent asunder to
admit the μέντοι νη Δία (which is
also a familiar sequence, Phed. 65 d, 68 b, 73 d, Rep.
332 a), which could have found
no other convenient place.
What makes such a tussle
possible, without prejudice to
perspicuity, is the very fact
that άλλως τε μέντοι και is a
sufficiently familiar phrase to
admit of this dismemberment
and yet be recognised : Dig.
294. Thuc Bekker, in reading
arbitrarily άλλως τε μέντοι νη
Δία μελίτου μέντοι και, is wide
of the mark.
μόναι μετέπεσον τῶν ψήφων, ἀποστείφειγάν. Μέ- p. 36. λητον μὲν οὖν, ὃς ἐμαί δοκεῖ, καὶ νῦν ἀποστείφειγαν, καὶ οὐ μῶνον ἀποστείφειγαν, ἀλλὰ παντί δῆλον τούτῳ γε, ὦτ, εἰ μὴ ἤμετρα "Ἀντωνός καὶ Δίκων καταγγή- ῶς σωτερ ἐμοί, κἂν οὕλη χιλιάς δραχμῶν, οὐ μεταλαθήναι τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων.

α. Proposal

XXVI. Τιμᾶται δὲ οὖν μοι ὁ ἄνθρωπος. εἰς' ἄλλος ὤφαν τὸν ἰσόμεταρον, ὡς ἔτι δὲ ἔτι τῶν ὑμῶν ἀντιπρὸς, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι; ἢ δηλοῦ ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀξίας; τί οὖν; τί ἀξίων ἢ ἢπειρον ἢ ἢπειρον, τοῖς μαθῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐχ ἠσχύσατο ἢγεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀμελήεισαν ἄνωτέροις ποιεῖται τις ὑποκριτικής καὶ ἱστορίης καὶ δημοκρατίας καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν κριτικής καὶ ἐξομολογοῦν

The implication in μόναί is that the majority was small would recommend the corruption of τίμημα into τίμησι. In Ἀδρόκ. ii. 4. p. 23. τιμήσεως is a necessary emendation for τιμήσις. Cf. Taylor, Lectio. Lys. cap. vi.

2. ἄναξίας ἀναφέρεται] Half in jest, in allusion to his accusers being three to one, Socrates represents the majority as obtained by the joint influence of the three: supposing then each accuser represented by one-third of the majority, Melothes get less than 100, i.e. less than one-fifth of the whole. The indication of the name of Melothes' name, but the really formidable accuser was Anytus: see again Introd. p. x.

6. τό πάντως μ.] Not 'a fifth,' but 'the indispensable fifth.'

10. παθεῖν ἢ ἀνελεύσασα] A technical legal expression; ἀνελεύσασα applies to a presumptive penalty, παθεῖν to death, imprisonment, or the like. See Dem. Mid. 47.

p. 529, ὅτως ἐν κατηγορίᾳ ἢ ἡλικίᾳ, τιμᾶται περὶ αὐτῶν παρεχόμεθα, ὡς ἐν διότι δίκαιος εἶναι παρεχόμεθα ἢ ἀποτιμᾶσα (part of the κάτω ἔβρεως), in Timocrit. 105. p. 733.

δὲ τί μαθήματι] 'For having taken it into my head, in the dispossession of my life, to deny myself rest.' ἤ is not 'during.'

13. ἀλλά] Here is the idiomatic use of ἀλλά for 'besides.' Dig. 46. ἀλλά agrees with all three genitives following: 'and what not besides—the magistrates, clubs, and factions.' ἐξαιρομένων] These associations were as rife at Athens as in the Peloponnesian war.

5. ἐπὶ δὲ—ἐπιφανείᾳ] This clause is repeated in the word ἐπιφανείᾳ, and governed by βάς and the law with εἰπέτερα is a redundancy. (At the same time probably another clause is confusing itself with this in the speaker's mind, to which ἢον would be essential, namely, ὁ δὲ ἢον ἐκατὸν ἐμελλόν ἢον εἰπέτερον, i.e. ὁ δὲ ἢον ἐμελλόν ἢον ἐκατὸν εἰπέτερον.)

14. τιμᾶσα] 'That I should lay the penalty.'

16. εἰπέτερον] Stallbaum cites Xen. de Vectig. iii. 11, Lys. xx. 19. p. 159. Add Dem. F. L. 330. p. 446. τοί δὲ; διὸ καὶ ἐν προσωπικῷ εἴπετο ἢ ἄλλα τοις διαφόροις, αἱ τίμηται τοὺς εἰπέτερας; 17. μάλλον πρέπει ὑπὸν ἢ.] This is the form of comparison with ἢ, complicated by the redundant insertion of τοὺς. Dig. 164.

20. εἰς τῶν καὶ ἦν τοιαύτα καὶ τοῦτο εἰπέτερα ἢττον.
ο μὲν γὰρ ἤμας ποιεῖ εἰσδαίμονας δοκεῖν [ἐνιαίον], ἐγὼ ρ. 36. δὲ εἶναι' καὶ ὁ μέν τροφής οὐδὲν δέιται, ἐγώ δὲ ἐδορμαί. εἰ οὖν δεὶ με κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον τῆς ἀξίας τι- ρ. 37. μάθαι, τοὐτοῦ τιμῶμαι, ἐν πρωτεύουσα στηρᾶν.

5 XXVII. Ἰσος οὖν ἄριστον καὶ ταύτι λέγων παρὰ- πλήσιον δοκεῖ λέγειν ὁσπερ περὶ τοῦ ὁικτοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀντιλήψεως, ἀπαθαινήθηκεν. τὸ οὖκ ἄγεται, ὁ Ἀθηναῖος, τοιοῦτον, ἀλλὰ τοιοῦτον μᾶλλον. πεπεπεμεῖται ἐγὼ ἔκειν εἶναι μηδενάς ἀδικεῖν ἀνθρώπους, ἀλλὰ ἰμάς
tούτοις οὐ πείθον. ἀλλόγων γὰρ χρόνων ἀλλόξως διε- λέγειτον ἐπεί, ὅσον ἔγειρα, εἰ ἦν ἰμάς νομοὶ, ὁσπερ καὶ ἀλλοις ἀνθρώποις, περὶ θεαντοῦ μὴ μίας ἦμερας ἰμόν κρίνεις, ἀλλὰ πολλάς, ἐπείσδειτο ἂν' ἐν δ' ὁ ὂν ῥόζουν ἐν χρόνῳ ὁλίγον μεγάλας διάβολος ἀπολυ- εῖσθαι. πεπεπεμεῖτο ὕπερ ἐγὼ μηδενάς ἀδικεῖν πολλόν
dεῖν ἐμαυτόν γε ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ κατ᾽ ἐμαυτὸν ἐμείναι αὐ- τός, ὅσον εἰμί τοῦ κακοῦ καὶ τιμήσεις τοιοῦτον τὸν ἐμείναι, τί δέισται; ἢ μὴ πάντω τούτῳ, ὅπερ τοῦ Μελὴγος μοι τιμᾶται, ὁ φθοῦν οὐκ εἰδέναι οὐκ οὔτε
tοῦ ἀγάθου οὔτε εἰκὸν ἤμας; αὐτὶ τούτῳ δὴ ἔλομαι ὅτι ἐν οὔτε ὅτε κακὸν ὧν τοὺς, τιμήσαμεν, τὸτες ἐξενέῳ, καὶ τί με δεὶ ζητένει ἐν διαμετρήμα, τὸ διαλεύνει τῇ ᾠεν καθαρᾶς ἁρχῆς, τόις ἐνδεκα, ἀλλὰ χρημάτων, καὶ δεδομένῃ ἔσω ἀν ἐκτίσω; ἀλλὰ

12. ἀλλος ἀνθρώπους. The Lacedaemonians, for instance. See Thucyd. i. 132.
21. οὐδεμίας Genitive of a noun with participle after verbs of knowing, &c. Dig. 26. The clause however is complicated by the presence of ὅτι, indicative of a momentary intention to adopt a finite instead of a participial construction: Dig. 279.
23. τοῖς ἐνδεδικεῖ εἰς ὄρθ' ἐκα- τὰς φύλης ἑγώντεστο, καὶ γραμματε- τεῖν ("secretary") αὐτοῖς συν- πραγματεύοντο Poll. viii. 102. They had charge of the prisons, as well as of the execution of sentences.

p. 37. ταύτῳ μοι ἐστίν, ὑπὲρ νῦν δὴ ἐλεγον' ὡς γὰρ ἐστί μια χρήματα, ὅποιον ἐκτίσω. ἀλλὰ δὴ φυγῆς τιμή- σωμαι; ἴσως γὰρ ἃν μοι τοῦτον τιμήσατε. πολλῆ
mεν' ἃν με φιλοσοφεῖν ἔχοι, εἰ αὐτῶν ἀλάγησος εἰμί, ὡστε μὴ δύνασθαι λογίζεσθαι, ὅτι ὑμεῖς μὲν ὠντες 5 πολὺς μοι οὐχ οἷοι τε ἐγένετε ἐνεγεκά τὸς ἐμας ἀδιατρέβα καὶ τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλὰ ὑμῖν μικρότερα γε- γοναι καὶ ἐπιφθονύσηραι, ὡστε ἐξελέγεται αὐτῶν νῦν ἀπαλλαγήναι· ἀλλοι δὲ ἐρα αὐτὰς ἐκεῖνοι ῥόδινοι, πολλού γε δεῖ, ὁ Ἀθηναῖος. καλὸς οὖν ἂν μοι ὁ βίος το ἐφ' ἐξελεύθαντι τηλικὸρα ἀνθρώπῳ ἀλλήν ἐκέχων ἐκ ἔκσελη
πολὺς πόλεως ἀλλισιμοῖν καὶ ἐξελαινομένα ἐκ δρόμων. ἐφ' ἑαρ ποδὸν ὦτε, ὅποι ἂν ἔλθω, λεγόντος ἐμοῦ ἀκροα- σομαι οἱ νεῖοι ὄσπερ ἐνθαδεὶ κἂν μὲν τοὺς ἀπε- λαύνον, οὗλοι ἐμὲ αὐτοὶ ἐξελέφθης, πείθοντες τὸς 15 ἐπερευτέρους· ἐαν δὲ μὴ ἀπελάφων, οἱ τούτων πα- τέρες τε καὶ ὀικεῖοι δὴ αὐτοῖς τούτους.

XXVIII. Ἰσος οὖν ἃν τις εἶπος σιγῶν δὲ καὶ ἠμυγών ἀνέγα, ὁ Ὀρκατεῖ, ὦν ὄσος τ' ἔστω ἦμων ἐξελέφθων ἔκμιν; τούτῳ δὲ ἐστὶ πάντων χαλεπότατον 20 πείσας τίνας ὑμῖν. ἐαν τε γὰρ λέγω ὅτι τῷ προ- ἀποικίας τοῦτον ἀποθανεῖν ἀντέθην ἢ μέρας τῆς ἡμέρας τον 36. ἀγνω, ὡς πεισθέ ἢ μοι ὡς εἰρυκενείντον· εὰν τ' ἀδ ἔλεγο ὅτι καὶ τυγχάνει μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ὃν ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦτο, ἐκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ ἀρετῆς τοὺς λόγους ποι-15 εἴσαθαι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, περὶ ὃν ὑμεῖς ἐμοὶ ἀκουέτε

20. τοι] Cf. textual note on ταυτόν, 22 c.
2. ἀλλὰ δὴ] Introduces the last of a series of suppositions. 11. ἔκαθοτε] 'If I quit the city.' as below 11. ἔκαθοτε ἔμμ. Dig. 142. 20. τοι] Namely, ἦπεν ὀχ. οὖν τ᾽ ἐστώμαται. 11. ἔκαθοτε] 'If I quit the city.' as below 11. ἔκαθοτε ἔμμ. Dig. 142.
The interrogatory discipline which Socrates thus extols was that to which he sought to bring all with whom he conversed.

The subject, about which the answerer was questioned, was himself: which is the reason why Socrates always identified the process with the carrying out of the Delphic precept, γνῶθι σεαυτόν. The branches of enquiry to which it led were manifold:

1. knowledge of one's own natural endowments and position, with a view to living for the greatest good of oneself and others:

2. a review of the actual use to which one has been and is putting one's life—Laches 187 c, διὰ τινά τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων, ἥστατα τοῖς παρελθόντων χρόνοις βεβαιῶσας and below 39 c, διὰ τῶν ἐλέγχων τοῖς μέλησι

3. examination of one's opinions, —their coherence, their consistency, the history of their formation; of which the results are—consciousness of one's own ignorance, and consciousness of the grounds of one's knowledge: Xen. Mem. III. ix. 6, Soph. 230 b—d:

4. investigation of the principles of human life and action (for which the knowledge of one's own nature is a prerequisite): Alc. I. 133 c, λέγειν μὴ γραμμάτων ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς... διακρίνειν ἄν διδάξηται τι ἡμᾶς αὐτῶν καθαρὰ τῇ ἀρχῇ.—Xen. Mem. I. i. 16, περὶ τῶν ἐνθυμευτικῶν, ὧν ἑξήκοντά σοι τόθεν τίς ὡς ὧνς, τί κολάς, τί αἰσχρόν, τί δίκαιον, τί ἄλογον, τί σωφροσύνη, τί μανία, τί ἀνθρώπινα, τί διαλῦσται, τί παλτικότητα, τί ἀρχή ανθρώπων, τί ἀρχής ἀνθρώπων, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὧν τοὺς εἴδοντες ἡμῖν ἤντο κατά κακὸν καθαρὰ καθαρὰ, τίς τῶν μεταμφίς συνέχεια, τίς τῶν ἐλεγχόμενων απελευθερώθησαν δεινώσαντας καὶ δυσεπιστεύοντας καὶ ἀσέβεον ἐπερήματα καὶ ἀδαφικά ἐκκαθάρισαν καὶ ἀνακόπταν (just above) τυχαίαν μέγεθος ἔχοντο δὲ αὐτοῦ ταύτα, ἐκάστη ἤμορφα περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος πολλῆς ἡμέρας.

But this examination was not a mere discipline ending in itself, but a preparation to qualify a man for receiving culture and improvement (Alc. I. 124 d, ἐνομίστηκαν δήμητρας, Laches 188 b, ἄξιοντα μενέλαιον τοσσέρ δὲ ἤμεν), for attaining connectedness of knowledge and rational method in action, and for doing the best by himself and the state.

Socrates seems to have employed the strongest terms he could find to assert the indispensability of this discipline:

—Xen. Mem. I. i. 16 (quoted above), III. ix. 6, τὸ σηκωτὸν ἐναυσόν, καὶ δὴ μὴ οἴησεν τὸ καὶ οὐκ οὐκ εἰς ἑγέρσαι, συγκαλλότα μνειαὶ ἑλησθέντο, Soph. 230 ὧν, τὸ δ’ ἀνέλεγκτον ὧν ὑμοῦς ἐκατέρχον, τῶν τούτων βασιλέων, τῶν τῆς μέγας ὡς τὰ μεγάλα ἐλεύθερα ὡς, ἀπεκδάκτυλο τε καὶ αἰσχρῶς καὶ ἀληθῶς καὶ θεῖος ὁδοί τινες τῶν ἁγίων καὶ ἀρχιτέχνων καὶ ἀρχηγῶν καὶ ἀργυρίου."
C. Last reflections, addressed to the judges: a, to those who had voted for his condemnation;

XXIX. Of πολλοὶ γ` ἕνεκα χρόνου, ὁ ἀνδρὸς p. 38. Ἀθηναίοι, ὅμως ἦσαν καὶ αὐτοί ὑπὸ τῶν βουλευμένων τὴν πόλιν λυοῦσιν, όσο Σωκράτη ἀπεκτάνατε, ἀνδρὰ σοφοὺς φήσουσι γὰρ δὴ μὲ σοφὸν εἶναι, εἰ 5 καὶ μή εἰμί, οἱ βουλευόμενοι ὑμῖν ἀνεῳδέζω. εἰ γὰρ περευκέται δόλων χρόνον, ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ἃν ὑμῶν τοῦτο ἐγένετο· ὥρα τέρα τῆς τῆς ἥλικας, ὅτι πῶρον ἦν ἐπὶ τῶν βίων, βασιλέως δὲ ἐγγύς. λέγω δὲ τοῦτο οὐ πρὸς πάντας ὑμᾶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἔμοι δὲ 10 καταφθασμένους βασιλέως. λέγω δὲ καὶ τίδε πρὸς τοὺς αὐτοῖς τούτους. ὅταν με σέβην, ὁ ἀνδρὲς, ἀπορία λόγων ἐαλωκέα τουτοῦτων, αὐς ἃν ὑμᾶς ἕπεισε, εἰ φήμι δὲν ἀπαιτά ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν, ὡστε ἀποφυγέων τὴν δίκην. πολλοὶ γε δὲν, ἀλλά ἀπορία 15 μὲν éλασα, οὐ μέντοι λόγων, ἀλλὰ τόλμης καὶ ἀνασκυπτίας καὶ τοῦ ἐβέλου λέγει πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοιαύτα, αὐς ἃν ὑμῶν ἔδωκας ἢ ἁκούειν, θρησκούσις τέ μου καὶ ἀνδριμένου καὶ ἄλλα ποιητικά καὶ λέγοντας πολλὰ καὶ ἀπάξια ἐμοί, ὡς ἐγὼ φημί ἢ να ἔτη καὶ εἴσθε αὐτοῖς τῶν ἄλλων ἄκουείς. ἀλλ` αὐτὲ τότε φήμην

who choose such a concession and bear him.

Whether such a concession was actually made to Socrates, or whether it was only a sufficiently common practice to give verisimilitude to the fiction, is a question which can hardly be determined. See Introd. p. xv.

1. of πολλοὶ γ` ἕνεκα χρόνου Socrates is telling the Athenians that they would not have had to wait long to be saved the reproach of putting him to death, by letting nature take her own course. ‘It was but a brief space after all, by fore-stalling which they were entailing on themselves the reproach.’ éνεκα marks here the efficient not the final cause; the meaning is not ‘you will incur reproach for the sake of taking from me a brief remainder of life,’—but ‘a brief space will be the cause of your incurring it.’ The ‘brief space,’ accordingly, is not that between the present moment and his execution, but that between his execution and the moment when he would have died in the course of nature.

p. 38. δἐν ἑνεκε τοῦ κινδύνου πράξεων οὐδὲν ἀνελεύθερον, οὔτε νῦν μοι μεταμέλεις οὕτως ἀπολογοσμένῳ, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ μᾶλλον αἱρόμεια δὲ ἀπολογογράμμου τεθνεῖ τῇ ἐκείνους ᾑ διὸν οὔτε γὰρ ἐν δίκῃ οὔτ` ἐν πολέμῳ οὔτ. p. 39. εἰ μὲν ἄλλον ὑποδεικνύεται πᾶν ποιήν σάβαντον, καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μόνοις πολλὰς δήλως γίγνεται ὡς τὸ γε ἀποθανατεῖν ἃν τις ἐκφύγων καὶ ὅπλα ἄφειν καὶ ἕφ` ἱκετείας τραπεμένων τῶν δικαιούντων· καὶ ἄλλα μὴν χαρὰ λέγειν, ὡς τοῦ καθαρτοῦ, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ χαλεπώτερον ποιητήν θάνατον γὰρ θανατὸν δεί. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἄρδει εἰς ἄναγκης ὑπὸ τοῦ βραδυτέρου ἐάλων, οὐ` ἐμαυέλακα κατ' ἔναν, ὡς τοῦ τοῦ ἐθικοῦ καὶ ὡς ὑπὲρ ἐντὸς τῶν καθαρτών, τῆς κακίας. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἄπερνυ ὑμᾶς θανάτον δίκην ὁφλῶν, οὕτως δ` ὑπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας

7. τὶ ἐν ἀποθανατικῷ τε ὑπερ. Before δὲ VH have ῥέον BSS reject it. H errs in thinking that ῥέον exists in Oxon.—no doubt misled by Gaif. Lact. Plat., in whom “p. 39 a 3 μαίων” must be an erratum for “μαίων om.”

4. ἁνεκα] Understand ἀπολογοραμένος again.

12. ὡς ὡς τῇ ἑκατέρας διαθεομένης μεταγεως τῇ ἑκατέρᾳ τῷ ἐνδικαστι. Between danger and death there is many a chance of escape, as Socrates has just before said; but none between the evil deed and its internal consequences. Stalibb.'s quotation of Odys. viii. 329, ὡς ὡς ἐν τῇ ἑκατέρᾳ καθαρίᾳ καθαρίᾳ τῷ βραδυτῷ ἐνακία, is not to the point.

18. ἐνακία—ἀφθάνοντες.] ‘Sentenced by Truth to receive the penalty of.’—Whewell.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ὁφληκτος μοχθηριαν καὶ ἄδικαν. καὶ ἐγὼ τε τῷ π. 39.
tιμήματι ἐμένοι καὶ οὕτωι. ταύτα μὲν τὸν ἰσως ὀφθω καὶ ἐδεί σχεῖν, καὶ οἱμι αὐτὰ μετρίως ἔχειν.

XXX. Τὸ δὲ ὑπὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπίθυμον ὑμῶν χρη-
ςυμβοῦσαι, οὐ καταστηρισμένοι μοι καὶ γὰρ ἐμὰ
ἡδη ἐνυπάνθα, ἐν ὁ μάλιστ' ἀνθρώπου χρησμοδοῦσιν,
ὅταν μέλλοντας ἀπολλειπόμεθα. γῆρα, ό άνδρες,
ὅμοι ἀπεκτόνωτε, τιμωρίαν ὑμῶν ἢξείν ἐνθά μετὰ
τὸν ἐμὸν θάνατον πολὺ χαλεπωτέρας ἡ Δί' ἡ οὐαν
τιο ἀπεκτόνωτε τ' ὅμοι γὰρ τοῦτο ἐργάσασθαι ὁμογε-

10. οἴκεμον.] After οἴκεμον H inserts conjecturally μὲν, taking this to be suggested by οἴκεμοι μὲ of some MSS., and by an erased blank in Oxon. The erasure in Oxon. was probably μὲ, for an accent has been erased also from —οι. This however may have been an erasure by the original scribe; such an instance must have been that at Crito 53 d, where stands δοθέρων with an erasure between—δοθέρων being plainly the true reading.

p. 39- ὑμῖν παλι ἐνακτον ἀποδόθονται, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι. πλει-
άδισι οὐς ἔσουσι ϊμας οἱ ἐλεγχοντες, οὕς νῦν ἐγὼ κατείχον,
ὑμεῖς δὲ οὐκ ἔσθανον ποτ' χαλεπότεροι ἐστοι ὧν τερτάριον εἰσὶν,
καὶ ἡμεῖς μᾶλλον ἀγανακτητε. εἰ γὰρ ὡςθε ἀποδείκτησιν ἀνθρώπων ἀποδίκησες τού ἀνεδίκητον τω ὑμῶν ὅτι οὐκ ὄρθως ἦτε. οὐκ ὄρ-
θως διανοοῦσε οὐ γὰρ ἐσθ' αὕτη ἡ ἀπαλλαχθ' οὔτε
πάντων δυνατ' οὔτε καθή, ἀλλὰ ἐκείνη καὶ καλλιτέ
καὶ κράτω, μὴ τοὺς ἄλλους κολονοὺς, ἀλλ' ἐκαντὸν
παρακενδαίως ὅπως ἔσται ὁς βέλτιστος. ταύτα 10
μὲν οὖν ὑμῖν τοὺς καταστηρισμένοις μαντεύσαμεν

XXXI. Τοῖς δὲ ἀπονεφολικομένοις ἡδον ἐν δια-
λεγείσην ὑπὸ τοῦ γεγονότος τοιοῦτοι πράξαμες, ἐν
ὁ οἱ ἐρχοντες ἀγαλλιάν ἔγνωσι καὶ ὡς ἔρχομαι,
οἱ άλλοι με δει τεθάναι. ἀλλὰ μοι, ο άνδρες,
παρασκευάζεται τοιοῦτον ἐρωτον ὑδρὰν γὰρ κολνε

p. 40. διαμηθολογήσατι πρὸς ἄλλοις, ἔως ἔστειν. ὑμῖν
γὰρ ὃς φίλοις οὕτω επιδειξε θέλω ὅτι τινι μοι
εὐμεθερίκος τί ποτε νοεῖ. ἐμοὶ γὰρ, ο άνδρες δικα-

15. οἱ ἐρχοντες] That is, of

20. δικαστα.] Steinhardt

22. οἱ άνδρες] 'The direction

24. πάντων ἐπὶ σμηνοῦς] εἰς

the divine voice.' See App. A, on

το σμηνοῦς. to

the which it belongs: Dig. 298.
ΆΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ. 105

p. 40. τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ τόπου τοῦ ἐνθέδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον, ἃ καὶ εἴ γε μηδεμία αἰσθήσεως ἔστων, ἀλλ' ὅνων ὑπόσ, ἐπειδὼς τις καθέως μηδὲ ὁμοίως ὑπάρχος κέρδος ἂν εἴη ὁ θάνατος, ἡγοῦ γὰρ ἂν ὑμῖν, εἴ τινα ἐκκλησίας τοίς τῶν νυκτῶν τῇ νυκτὶ, ἐν ή ὑστὸς καταδεχθέν, ὅπως μηδὲ ὠρίων ὑπάρχοι, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας νυκτάς τας τῶν ἀντιπαραθέσεων τῇ νυκτὶ διὰ σκέψεως εἴπον, πότας ἁμέρων καὶ ἅμων ἡμέρας καὶ νυκτῶν ταύτης τῆς νυκτὸς βεβλοκένων ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ βίῳ, ὑμῖν ἂν μήτε ὑδεῖτε τινὰ, ἀλλὰ τῶν μέγαν καὶ κακῶς διερμηνευόμεν 

p. 41. δικαστήριον; εἰ γὰρ ταῖς ἀφίκομαι εἰς Ἀδιού, ἀπόλα- 

lαγής τούτων τῶν παρακόμων κακοτάτοις εἰς, ἐφιάλη 

σε τούτων ὡς ἀληθής δικαστάς, ἀπέρ καὶ λέγονται 

ἐκεὶ δικαίως. Μίνος τε καὶ Ἡραclίδιας καὶ Αἰακὸς 

21. ἀντ. So VBS; ZH omit. Oxon. has it above the line but in first hand. The ὑ is constantly added where it is a popular appellation of which the propriety is recognised, and is frequently found after the article, as Frdr. 256 b, τῶν ὡς ὀλβιοίς 'Ολυμπιακοί, Κερ. 345 εἰς, τοὺς ὡς ἱπποδ. ἔρχονται, &c.

1. τῆς τοιοῦτος τῇ ἐνθέδε καὶ ἐνθέδε καταρτήσει, after the intervention of ἐνθέδε. ἐν ἄρει.
καὶ Τριπτόλεμος καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσιοι τῶν ἤμιθέων δίκαιοι· p. 41. ἔγενοντο ἐν τῷ ἐαυτῶν βίο, ἀλλ᾿ ἀλλήλη ἐν τῇ ἀποδομῇ; ἦ αὖ Ὀρθεὶ ἔγειρεν ταῖς αὐτῶι καὶ Μουσάιοι καὶ Ηνιῶδες καὶ Ὁμήρῳ ἐπὶ πόρου ἐν τῷ δεῖξαι ἃν εἶναι; ἔγινεν μὲν γὰρ πολλὰκα τὸν τῆν τεθνάνα, ἐναὶ τὰ τῆς ἀλήθειας ἐπεί ἐμοι καὶ ἀὐθινὴ διαμορφή ἐν τῇ ἀλήθειας ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπ᾽ ἐμοὶ ἢ καὶ τῆς ἐπίθευμα ἤτοι, ὡστε ἐντύχοις Παλαμίδης καὶ Ἀθηνοὶ τῶν Τενείων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν παλαιῶν διὰ κρίνεις ἄδικον τέθνηκε ἀντιπαραβαλλο—

Demet. 153 he sits in judgment on earth. Also Plato is the only Greek who styles Ἀέας judge of the dead, here and Gorg. 523 c; though many Romans mention him thus. But the same principle accounts for the ascription of such a subterranean preeminence to these two, and in the remaining two more widely recognized judicial personages named here. All four were connected with the secret rites, or mysteries, of their native places; Minos with the Cretan mysteries, which through the Orphic influence were widely known. Rhadamanthus, his assessor, is his countryman. Ἀέας was the hero of Ἐγίνα, where there were (Pan. II. 30, Origin adv. Cels. vi. 290. c. 22, Lusi- ation, Navig. 15) mysteries of Orphic origin. And Triptolemus was connected, of course, with Eleusis. These judges are an instance of the fact that certain features of the Greek mythology were first the product of the mystery-worship, and thence made their way into the popular mind.—Düllinger, Gunt. and Jew, Vol. I, Bk. iii. p. 175. The same account may be assumed to hold of the ἀλλοι τῶν ἤμιθέων, who are subjoined to these four; for very many places had mystery-rites. Rhadamanthus is mentioned in Homer, (Od. vii. 234), and therefore antecedently to mysteries, as a judge, but on earth and not in the nether world.

6. ἐμοι καὶ αὐτῷ Ι. c. 1. should have a pleasure peculiarly my own.'

7. διαπραβαί. Cf. Euthyps. sub init., Legg. I. 625 a. ἐπίδει—τέφθεικεν. This depends upon ἀντιπαραβαλλο—

The whole sentence ὅπερ—ἀλλὰ εἰ γι is a re-statement more at length of διαμορφή ἐν ἕκατον ἢ διαμορφή, which it follows asynodically,—an instance of Binary Structure: Dig. 207.

9. ἀντιπαραβαλλόμενος. Socrates' comparison of himself with Palamedes recalls the fable of the representation of the Palamedes of Euripides soon after Socrates' death, when, at the words ἔπειτα ἐκαίνοι τῷ τὸν πόλισαν, ὅ δακτι τὸν αἰλένιον ἀλληγόρισαν ἄθλον Μουσάων, τῶν Ἐλλήνων τῶν ἄριστων, the whole audience, reminded of Socrates, burst into tears. Cf. Intro. p. xxviii. 10. ἄριστα. The desire for brevity in the summing up of the enumeration breaks off the legitimate plan of the sentence: Dig. 207. 16. ἄληθες. 'As a verity.' See 18 a, note. 20. πραγμάτωσι. The wants and hardships of old age. Cf. Xen. Apol. 32, ἔφθαν ἐν ὁδοί 20
APPENDIX A.

Τὸ δαμόνιον.

The word ὁμοίωμα was used to denote either ὑδός or a spiritual being inferior to ὑδός. Its distinctive meaning as applied to either class is that it denotes such a being in his dealings with men. From Homer to Plato ἱμοίωμα is persistently marked by this meaning. 

Δαμόνιον therefore denotes a connection with divine agency; and τὸ δαμόνιον denotes sometimes such an agency, and sometimes the agent itself. So Aristotle (Rhet. II. xxiii. 8), τὸ δαμόνιον ὁδὸν ἐποίησεν ἧδ' ὑδός ἐστιν ἔργον, and for this distinction we may compare Plato (Phdr. 242 c), τῷ ἔργῳ ὑπέρ ὑμών ἤτοι ἐπιθυμία ἡ τῆς ἱμοίωμα ἐν τῇ ἐνω. When we read in Xenophon (Mem. I. i. 2), δεσποταύτη ὡς ὑπέρ ἱμοίωμα τὸ δαμόνιον ἵπτην σημαίνειν ὑδός, ἐδειπνοῦσα ἡμᾶς διὸ καὶ μιλοῦσα μὲν διάδοχοιν αὐτόν ἀπαλογείσαν καὶ ἱμοίωμα εἰσεχθὲν, both senses of the word are exemplified. Socrates meant by τὸ δαμόνιον a divine agency; Meletus wrested this into the sense of a divine being. 

In the Apology Socrates marks the position as a caricature by the expression ἐπικαμαθέν, and then gives the interpretation consistent with his own meaning—viz. δαμόνιον πράγματα. That Socrates is not speaking of a being in clear from other passages also, as when he says (Apol. 31 c), ὃν μοι διενέχθη τι καὶ δαμόνιον γέγονεν, or (Phdr. 242 b), τὸ δαμόνιον τε καὶ τὸ ἐνδοθεὶς σημεῖον γέγονεν, or (Ethyl. 272 e), τὸ ἐνδοθεὶς σημεῖον τὸ δαμόνιον, or (Theat. 151 d), τὸ γνώμων μοι δαμόνιον. Nor does Plato, who recognizes the common notion

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1 In Plat. Symp. 202 d — 203 a, this view of δαμόνιον appears very distinctly, though there, as the doctrine held is that ὑδός ἐνδοθεῖς ὑπάρχει μίμηται, all ματσή is the province of the ὁμοίωμα.

2 Whence the phrase of Ἀικείνης (ill. 117. p. 70) ἦσαν ἄν καὶ δαμόνιον τῶν ἐξαρμακτῶν αὐτῶν προφημονία is indeterminate.
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of a personal attendant δαμόω (Legg. 739 a, Tim. 90 a), ever give this name to the phenomenon in question. Even Theages (as Zeller remarks, II. 65, n. 2) gives no personality to τὸ δαμόων. Ἡ φωσὶν ἡ τοῦ δαμόων (Theag. 126 e) is ambiguous. Plato’s use is sometimes adjectival (e.g. τὸ δαμόων σημεῖον), and sometimes elliptically substantival. Grammatically, Xenophon confines himself to the latter use only,—still merely in the signification of a divine agency. Zeller notices that the interpretation of Socrates’ δαμόων as a being remained peculiar to his accusers (Cicero translating it by divinum quiddam, Divin. I. 54, not by genius) until it was revived by Plutarch, the Neo-Platonists, and the Christian Fathers.

What then were the nature and function of this δαμόων σημεῖον?

Let us first consult Xenophon, in whom the chief passages are these:

Mem. I. i. 2–5, διετελέσθη γὰρ ὡς φαίη Σωκράτης τὸ δαμόων ἐστὶ σημεῖον ὅπως δὴ καὶ μάλα ποτὲ δοκεῖσθαι αὐτὸν αἰτίασθαι κατὰ δαμόων εἴπερθεν. ὁ δὲ αὐτῆς καυμένος εἰσῆλθεν τῶν ἄλλων, ὅπου μαθητὴι νομίζετο ὁμοίως τὸ χρώσει καὶ φήμα ἔκμισθε καὶ συμβολέως καὶ ὀνόματι. οὗτοι τὸ γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνοντο αὐτὸ τῶν ὀρθῶν οὐδὲ τῶν απαντῶν εἰδέναι τὰ συμφέροντα τοῖς μαθητοῖς, ἀλλὰ τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς σημεῖα, κύκλῳ δὲ αὐτῶν ἔναμβη. ἀλλὰ οἱ μὲν πλῆθος φαινότα ὡς τῶν ὀρθῶν καὶ τῶν απαντῶν ἀπαντήσασθαι ταῖς καὶ προσφέρεσθαι Σωκράτης δὲ, ὡς εἰρήνησκε, οὕτως ἐλέγει. τὸ δαμόων γὰρ ἐφή σημεῖα καὶ πολλάκις τῶν φωνῶν προφητέρως τὰ μὲν ποιεῖν, τὸ δὲ μὲ ποιεῖν, ὡς τοῦ δαμόων προφητευόμενον, καὶ τῶν μὲν πειθώμενοι αὐτῷ συνεέφεραν, τοῖς δὲ μὲ πειθώμενοι μετάβαλε.

IV. iii. 12–13, Ἐνδ. δ', ἐφή, ὁ Σωκράτης, έκκοικον ἐνιακάνεις ἢ ἄλλος χρήσαις [ὅτι έπαιε], ἐγὼ γάρ μὲν ἐπέρριψαν ὑπὸ τούς συμπραγματεύουσά ὑμᾶς αὐτὸ τῷ χρῆσαις καὶ τῷ μή. Ὄτι δὲ γὰρ αἰσθάσθη λέγει καὶ σύ, δὲ Ἐθέρδημος, γνώσης, ὅτι μὴ ἀπειράσθη ἢ ἃ τῶν μαθητῶν βιοῖς ὑπῆρξεν ἀλλὰ ἔκακας ἢ τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν ὁμοίως αἰσθηθηκαί καὶ τάμης τοῖς θεοῖς.

IV. viii. 1, φάσκοντος αὐτοῦ τὸ δαμόων ἐστὶν προφητεύειν ἢ τέ δικαίος καὶ τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ποιεῖν ὑπὸ τῶν δικαιῶν καταγεγραμμένον δίκαιον.

IV. viii. 5–6, Ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦ Διᾶ, φάσαν αὐτόν, δὲ Ἐρρύμηνος, ἔφη μοι ἐπιβεβαίωσάςται τῇ πρὸς τοὺς δικάστας ἁμαρτίας ἡμαρτών τὸ δαμόων, καὶ αὐτὸς εἰπών, θαυμάστα λέγει, τὸ δὲ, θαυμάσιον, φάσα, ἐκ τῆς ἐσχή δικαίως βέβαιον εἶναι ἣ πελεύσῃ τῶν ἱερῶν ὑπῆρξεν.

IV. viii. 11, εἴσεβην δὲ αὐτὸ τῆς δικαίως ἄνω τῆς τῶν θεῶν γνώμης ποιεῖν.

Symp. viii. 5, τοιτε μὲν τὰ δαμόων προφητεύομενον οὐ διαλέγει ματι τοῦ δ' ἄλλου τοῦ ἐφάμενον.

To which must be added still from the Memorabilia, I. i. 19, Σωκράτης ἔγειτο πάντα μὲν θεοὶ εἰδέναι, τὰ τε λεγόμενα καὶ πρατόμενα καὶ τὰ στομά θαυμάκημαι, παρατηροῖ δὲ παρεῖσαι καὶ σημαίνει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους πάντας.

Thus we see that Xenophon tells us nothing as to the nature of Socrates’ δαμόων, save that it was the instrument through which divine intimations reached him unsolicitedly. He adheres (unless we admit as his the the θεοὶ μὲ φωνή φαίνεσθαι in § 12 of the Xenophontean Apology) to the expression σημεῖον τὸ δαμόων, meaning by this expression (as already said) that τὸ δαμόων is but the instrument, while it is the gods who are the agents, whence in other passages we have as equivalent expressions [θεοὶ] προφητεύεισθαι (Mem. IV. iii. 12), τὸ θεὸν δικαίον (ib. vii. 6), θεῶν γνώμη (ib. i. 11). Its intimations differ from those obtained by ματικι in being given spontaneously. Socrates is represented as having thought himself singular, as a matter of fact, in possessing this gift. He did not urge others to seek for a similar sign. Although he believed (Mem. I. i. 19) πάντα μὲν θεοὶ εἰδέναι . . . παρατηροῖ δὲ παρεῖσαι καὶ σημαίνει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους πάντας τοῦ ματικοῦ, seems either to have directed others to ματικι (Mem. I. i. 6), or the oracle (Cic. de Divin. i. 54), or to have given them the benefit of his own divine intimations (Mem. I. i. 4). He however believed that if others had not this gift, it was by their own fault (Mem. IV. iii. 13).

What its function was according to Xenophon, we gather from the identification of its province with that of ματικι, which is defined in Mem. I. i. 6–9, ὅλᾳ μὴν εἴσοι καὶ τἀῦτα πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιστήμονας τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀνιγκεῖαι συνεβεβίλιν πρὸς ταῖς ἀμύλλωσιν ἵνα προσβῆναι· περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὡς ἀπαθετοῦμεν παραδειγμάτως ἐπερείπτα τι ποιήσατο καὶ τὸν μελέτησαν οὗτος τις καὶ πόλεμος ἡ ἀκεφαλεία ματικις ἂ φησι προσεύξεσθαι τηκτονικῶς μὲν γὰρ θεὸν ἐχειροκρίτην ἡ γαργορία ἡ ἀδελφασία ἢ ἡ τῶι κοινωνία ἢ ἡ ποιήσαι ἢ ἡ ματικις ἢ ἡ προσφέρεσθαι καταλέπτως, ὅπως ὁ θεὸς ἔσται τοὺς ματικις. This agrees with Plato, Apol. 40 a, ἢ εἰπώσαι μὲν ματικι ἣ τοῦ δαμόων. It was no such guide in the matter of right and wrong as conscience is; nor yet an universal oracle to reveal truths of science or of futurity. Its function was on the one hand practical.
—to pronounce upon a proposed course of action, of which Socrates had cognizance, either as himself a party to it or in the interest of his friends,—on the other hand it pronounced 2 not on the morality but on the expediency (in the Socratic sense of what was really for the best) of the proposed course. This would not exclude from its decision moral questions, where the obligation either was obscure or mainly depended on the consequences. It was not a mere pretense, a foreboding of chance misfortune or of chance success, the mere reflection of a man’s own feelings of happiness or gloom while in spite of them he carries out his course of action. It stamped in Socrates’ belief a definite character of expediency or inexpediency on the course intended, and he never disobeyed it.

In Plato the notable passages are these:—Apol. 31 c-d, τοῦτον δὲ αἰτίαν ἔστω ὁ μένει ἐμὸς πολλὰς διέρασσε πολλαχῶν λέγοντος, ὦτι μιᾶς ταῦτα καὶ λογικῷ γίνεται φωνῇ, δὴ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐπεκτειναν Μηλίτης ἔγραψεν, ἐκάθεν δὲ τοῦτο ἔστω ἐπὶ παθῶς ὁρθόν, ψωφὴ ταῦτα γεγονότα, ὥσπερ γέμνει αἰτία ἀποφεύγει με τούτο, δὴ δὲν μέλλει πράξειν, προπρέπει δὲ ναότας, τοῦτο ἔστω δὲ μοι ἐναντιότατα τὰ πολεμικὰ πράττειν. 40 a-b, ἢ γὰρ εἰσοδεύει μοι μαυτήρ, ἢ τοῦ διαμόνον ἐν μὲν τῷ πρόσφερεν χρόνῳ ποιεῖ τὰ ποικίλα ἀλλὰ ἤ, ὅταν ἢ πόθεν ἢ προσελκύειν, οὗ τι περιέχει, μὴ ὁρθοὶ τρέφει. καθὼς δὲ γιόρτας καὶ αὐτοί, ταύτα, ἢ γὰρ ὑπὲρ ἂν τις καὶ γνωρίζει ἐρωτήσῃ κακῶς οἷα, ἐμὸι δὲ αὐτὸ ἐξέλεγεν ἑαυτῷ οἰκεῖον ἐπικοινωνίαν τοῦ θεοῦ λόγῳ, οἷον ἀνέβασθον ἔστω αὐτὸ τὸ διακτύσιον, οἷον ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἀποδεικνύει τι τρέφει καὶ ἀλλὰ λόγος πολλὰς δὲ μὲ ἐπίκτητη λέγοντα μεταξύ, 

καθὼς δὲ ἀδικοῦντ' ἀπειρήνα τὴν πρᾶξιν οἷον ἐν ἑαυτῷ αἰτίας, ὡς ἐν τῇ πάντως πρότεινα, καὶ ἢ ποιεῖ τῷ ἐπίκτητα λόγῳ, ἀναπτύσσεται ἀποτελούμενος δὲ μοι ἐνίκητον τὸ εἴδωλον σημεῖον τοῦ διαμόνον, πάντων ὑπὸ καθιστήραμα.—Phdr. 242 b, ἤρει ἐμὸλυν, ἐναρκῇ, τὸν παραπάνω διαλέκτου τὸ διαμόνον ταῦτα καὶ τὸ εἰσόδου σημεῖον μοι γέμνεται εἰργάνων, αἰτὶ δὲ μὲ ἐπίκτηται δὲ μὲν μέλλων πράξεως, καὶ τυποῦσιν θέλω ἀνάκλινης ἀκούσαντα, ὡς μὲ αὐτὸ ἐρώτησαι πρὸς ἰδιαφορώς, ἦτο τὸ ἐμπροσθήκην εἰς τὸ ἔκρημ,—Alcib. I. init. 103 a-b, τοῦτον δὲ τὸ αἰτίου γέμνειν οἷον ἀναθέτειν, ὅλα τὸ διαμόνον ἐναντίον, ὡς τῷ ἐν τῷ διάλεγον καὶ ἄνεγέρθησα, κἄν εὖ ἐπίκτηται ἐναντιότατα, ὡς προελεύσθητον, ἐέκλινε δὲ εἰς καὶ τὸ λατονοῦ μὲ ἐπικλεῖσθαι συμφορὰν.—Thet. 151 a, ἐνίοις μὲν τοῦ ταχυμένου

2 Wiggers and Zeller have noticed this. Remark the contrast in the Apology. The matter of duty—not to desert the post of preacher to the Athenian people—is thrown on the divine mission (38 e), the matter of judgment—to abstain from politics—is attributed to the daemon (31 d).

Το δαμόσων. 113

μοι δαμόσων ἀποκαλεῖ τοὺς ἐνδίκες τοῖς ἔξω.—Rep. 495 0, τὸ δὲ θητέρον οἷον ἄκουσι λέγει, τὸ δαμόσων σημεῖον ὁ γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει τὴν ἄλλην ἢ ἄλλην τῶν ἔμπροσθήκης γέγονε. The passages in the Theages consist in part of parrot-like repetitions of descriptions of the phenomenon culled from various dialogues, in part of inventions founded on these.

The account in these passages exhibits some additions and variations as compared with that of Xenophon.

As to the nature of the phenomenon, it is explained to be a sign, which consists of articulate words, and the use of which corresponds to the μαυτήρ of other men. It is represented as a gift almost peculiar to Socrates, though by him possessed from his childhood upwards.

Its function seems somewhat heterogeneous, compared with what we have found it in Xenophon. Besides giving warnings as to an intended course of action, it reminds of a duty unperformed (Phdr.); or an advantage accrues from obeying it, which has no rational connection whatever with the obedience (Euthyd.). The tales of the Theages dwell on the marvel exclusively; yet, while they leave the ωφη unconnected with any act of the judgment, they leave room for supplying such a connection. Plato further tells us that its function was a negative one—ἀτενίστεραι προστρέψετε δέ ναότα (Apol.). The importance of this limitation shall be considered presently.

From these data we may now seek to arrive at a conclusion for ourselves. According to both Xenophon and Plato the fact itself, which Socrates accounted for by the δαμόσων σημείων, was a sudden sense, immediately before carrying a purpose into effect, of the expediency of abandoning it,—or, Xenophon would add, of prosecuting it. Meanwhile we are not bound to accept Socrates’ account of the cause of this sudden feeling; first, because he was no psychologist, and, while in his own belief he was merely describing his own consciousness,—or, as Xenophon says, ὅσωρ ἐξηγήσεως οὗτος καὶ ἐγέρα,—he was really importing into his description an inference of his own; secondly, because he rather diminishes the weight of his own testimony for us, not merely by his attention to dreams (Phaedo 60 c), but more by his absolute faith in μαυτήρ and its use in obtaining for others the same divine guidance which he obtained unasked through the σημείων; and, thirdly, because while he believed himself to have detected divine agency here, he was perfectly unconscious of it in its more ordinary province, as the author of “all holy desires, all good counsels, and all just works.” If, then,
We must therefore adopt the alternative which involves less considerable difficulties, and regard Plato as less faithful than Xenophon in his illustration of the phenomenon. It is not difficult to suppose that by tracing it back to Socrates’ boyhood nothing more may be intended than that his memory did not serve him to indicate the first beginning of those habits of observation and that moral and mental training from which the faculty grew. And as to the heterogeneous instances of warnings given by it, since as individual instances they are certainly inventions, part of the machinery of the dialogues in which they stand, it is doing no violence to Plato’s genius to suppose, that as an inventor he has not scrupled to travesty the character which belonged to the actual and serious use of the gift, and to extend its operation playfully into the domain of chance.

There remains to be noticed in Plato’s account the well-known restriction of τὸ δαμόνων to negative functions. In describing the sign as a voice, Plato adds (Apol. 31 d), ἀεὶ ἀποπέμπει με τούτον ὅ ἄν μέλλω πράξειν προερχεῖται δὲ ᾧ ὀνομάζεται. One difficulty lies in the nature of the case. What kind of divine communication or what kind of judgment could that be which yielded only negative utterances? Certainly no act of judgment could be such: the same penetration which could discern the inexpediency of a course of action would serve for the discerning of the more expedient alternative. A divine communication might be imagined under any self-imposed restriction; still the restriction would, in proportion to its arbitrariness, discredit yet more this hypothesis, which we have already seen reason to abandon. Another difficulty lies in the conflict of testimony as to this peculiarity. Xenophon attributes the sign an approving as well as disapproving force (Mem. IV. viii. 1, φάνοντον αὐτῷ τὸ δαμόνων ἐναντὶ προσημαίνων ἄ τε δεσι καὶ ἀ μὴ δεσι προειρήματ' ὑπὸ τὴν προερχόμενον, cf. I. i. 4, as quoted above). Cicero (De Divin. i. 54) simply echoes Plato. Plutarch (De Socr. Dem. c. 11, p. 1015), agreeing with Xenophon, represents the sign as καλὸν ἢ κακὸν.

These are the two difficulties which have to be met. No attempt has been made to meet the first: the second has been met by swallowing the first whole, and supposing Xenophon to be in error in not distinguishing the actual communication made by the sign, and the inference which Socrates made from it, and which might (as in Apol. 40 a) be positive. But we shall meet both difficulties by some such explanation as the following. As to the reconcilement of authorities, when Plato makes Socrates say ἀεὶ ἀποπέμπει με, he
describes it by its most perceptible act, for its coincidence with an existing purpose would be superfluous and little noticeable. It was only when the presentiment ran counter to his will that Socrates became distinctly conscious of it. An illustration of this oversight occurs in the statement of some moderns concerning conscience, that it has only a negative function—as if there were no such thing as "an approving conscience." In this case also the origin of the misstatement is the same, the more acute and marked character of the negative function. Thus it is the statement of Plato which needs to be supplemented, while that of Xenophon, so far from needing qualification, is alone commensurate with the common sense of the case. As to the fact to which Plato's notice points, the words προτέρεται δὲ οὖν would seem not to be an idle tautology, a reiteration of what we have seen to be a defective statement, but to mark another feature in the case. The Voice was no impulse; it did not speak to the will, but had a critical or reflexive function; it did not contribute to form a purpose, but pronounced judgment on a purpose already in being. Motives, on the other hand, impel the will always in some direction; they cannot be negative. Thus the setting forth the first part of the statement on the negative side only is justified in a way by the antithesis. And the meaning of the two clauses together is, that the Voice is a reflexive judgment on purposed actions, but does not supply motives of action.'

The fact which τὸ δαμόνον represented was an unanalysed act of judgment,—not on a principle, but on a particular course of action already projected; not on the morality of this, but on its expediency in the Socratic sense of the term. It was κριτική, not κριτηρική. Whatever connection it might really have with the springs of the will would certainly be left out of the statement by one who could identify virtue with knowledge. It was Socrates' substitute for μαρτυρία. This implies that in the province where men are wont to supplement the failure of penetration by external preternatural aids, Socrates refused, for himself, such irrational expedients, and found, in many instances at least, a guide within himself. But to this guide, being (as we have seen) the outcome of an assemblage of unanalysed processes of thought and judgment, he in all good faith gave a religious name. His mental acts, so far as he could unravel them, were his own, were human; beyond his ken they were divine; and what really was of the nature of an immediate critical sense seemed to him an immediate inspiration.

No Christian would be startled by a view which recognised every part of his mental processes as performed in dependence on God,—nor on the other hand would he be shocked to hear them spoken of as independently and properly his own. So long as each view reached the whole way, he would be satisfied with it, and would comprehend it. What Socrates did was to separate each of these views, and to speak of his mental processes as human up to the point where he could still follow them,—beyond that as divine.