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ἐν Λυκείῳ. Cf. Pausanias i. 44: 'The Lyceum is named from 271 Lycus the son of Pandion, but was from the first considered, as it a 1 is now, a temple of Apollo, who was here first called Lyceus.' After Aristotle had made the περιτάγων, or covered walk, of the Lyceum the place for teaching his pupils, a scene very similar to that which is described in the Euthydemus occurred there. In the Panathenaeus 236 D Isocrates says that he had heard how 'some three or four of the vulgar Sophists who pretend to know everything had been sitting in the Lyceum' and railing against him.

ἡ πόλις. The affirmative ἡ in Plato usually begins an answer to a previous speaker, as in Pol. 453 E, 530 C, 567 E, Euthyphr. 14 B; but Heindorf's proposal to omit it here is rightly rejected by Bekker as too arbitrary.

περιεστήκει. The common reading is περιεστήκει: but Schanz, Praef. xiii, refers to Choenobosus, Dict. 596, 27 ἐγένετο εἰσετήκειν διὰ τῆς ἑαυτῆς ἰδιοτάτης.


᾿Οπότερον τοJV. Cf. Lys. 212 C ὅποτέρος τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πολέμου 6 ἑότερον; Pol. 348 W ὅποτέρος ἐν σοί, τῷ δ' ἐγώ, ἄριστοι, 'Gentler and less direct than πολέμου. Would you tell me which of the two ways you prefer? Cf. Euthyd. 271 B' (Jowett and L. Campbell). On Pol. 348 W, cf. Adam: 'Hermann writes πολέμος, but the text ought not to be changed either here or in Euthyd. 271 A.' In Lys. 212 C there is apparently no various reading, and it would be difficult to accommodate Hermann's remarkable conjecture ὅποτέρον, adopted by Adam, to ὅποτέρος, Pol. 348 B. Cf. Jann. 2038: 'The use of the relatives in indirect questions brought them into association with the ordinary or direct interrogatives, and thus
rendered them admissible in questions also, especially in A. *dialogues*, i.e. in the dialogue of Classical Antiquity, 500–300 B.C.

8 τρίτος ἀνά σοι, 'next but one to you,' Socrates himself being counted in.

The sons of the elder Alcibiades were Cleinias (Hdt. viii. 17) and Axiophon, and their sons were the famous Alcibiades and this younger Cleinias, who were therefore first cousins.

3 ἕλκιαν. The first meaning of the word is 'size,' *stature,* as in Lucian, *Vera Hist.* i. 40 ἄνδρας μεγάλους δακτόν ἡμετεροῦς τὸς ἕλκιαν. But 'stature' being in early years an indication of 'age,' ἕλκια is commonly used in the latter sense, as here.

ἐκεῖνος μὲν... ὅπως δί. These words are wrongly referred by Routh and Winckelmann to the two Sophists. In correcting this error Stallbaum seems to fall into another by referring *ἐκεῖνος* to Cleinias, and ὅπως to Crito-for. In reality ἐκεῖνος indicates the one who is thought of as more remote (ἐκεῖ, *onder*), being only incidentally mentioned, namely Crito-or, the nearer in thought, namely Cleinias, of whom Crito has been chiefly speaking. Cf. Xen. *Mem.* iv. 3, 13 τῶν τοῦ ἄνδρον, ἡ καλὸς καὶ ἅγιος τοσοῦτο μὲν ἰώματα, δυῖς ἐκεῖνο μὲν ἀφήμενο, τούτο δὲ ὅσον ἀπείκον, ἐν δὲ τις άνδρα δέχεται, ἑπείρη τι. *Demosth.* De *Cherson. 108* τὸ βίλλιαν ἂδω, μὴ τὸ μέρος ἀνάπτυχα λέγειν ἐπ’ ἐκεῖνο μὲν γὰρ ἡ φιλία αὐτῆς μαθεῖται, ἐπὶ τοῦτό δὲ τὸ λόγον ἢ πρώτον διὰτελεύτητα τῶν ἀμφότερον πολίτην. Cf. *Kühner-Bliss*, Gr. *Gr.* § 467.

Schanz, *N. C. P.* p. 69, understands ἕλκιαν as referring to 'stature,' and ἐκεῖνος to Cleinias, and quotes Xen. *Conv.* iv. 11–12 as proving the superior beauty of Crito-for, though the passage evidently means the very reverse. For after speaking of his own desire to be thought handsome Crito-for says: 'I take more delight in looking upon Cleinias than in all other beautiful things in the world: and I would choose rather to be blind to all other beautiful things than to him alone. And I am vexed by the night and by sleep, because I do not see him, but most thankful to the day and the sun, because they show me Cleinias again.'


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Προφερθεί Δὲ τῷ μὲν χρόνῳ προσβέτερος, τῇ δὲ δεῖ χρόνει προσβέτερος. In B there is a marginal note *σκληφόροι* ὁ τῷ μὲν χρόνῳ προσβέτερος, τῇ δὲ δεῖ χρόνει προσβέτερος. In *A* there is a marginal note *σκληφόροι* ὁ τῷ μὲν χρόνῳ προσβέτερος, τῇ δὲ δεῖ χρόνει προσβέτερος. Cf. *Aristot.* *Soph.* iii. 17, *Probl.* i. 30, 14, where σκληφόροι is a better reading than Bekker's *σκληφόροι*.

καλάς καὶ ἁγάθος τῷ δόμῳ, 'of a noble presence': so Plato describes Parmenides, *Parm.* 127 b. In *Xen.* *Conv.* iii. 7, iv. 10, v. 1 Cleinias is represented as especially proud of his acknowledged beauty.

περὶ θείᾳ. Heindeorff's conjecture *περὶ θείᾳ*, adopted by Stallbaum 8 and Badham, is quite unnecessary. Socrates is referring to the custom of the two brothers, not merely to yesterday's exhibition.

κανονὶ τινες αὐτοὶ, ὅτι οὐκ ἀποκαλύπτοντι *σοφισταί*. This sentence formerly 9 assigned by Ficinus, Routh, and others to Socrates, is rightly transferred by recent editors to Crito. The conjecture ὅτι *σοφισταί* is much more appropriate to Crito than to Socrates, who knew all about the two Sophists. Stallbaum after *σοφισταί* interpolates *ζω. Νε*., unnecessarily.

αὐτοὶ, 'again,' implies that in Crito's opinion they had already had Sophists enough in Athens.

ἔκτενος τοσοῦ, i.e. from some part of Greece including the islands. *E.*

Θούριοι. Thurii or Thurium was a town of Magna Graecia on 3 the Gulf of Taranto, deriving its name from a neighbouring fountain Thuria. After the destruction of Sybaris by the people of Crotona an Athenian colony was sent out by Pericles (c. 443 B.C.) to found a new city near the ruins. The history of Sybaris and Thurii is given by Strabo, 263, and more fully by Diodorus Siculus, xii. 9–11.

φεύγωντες. Heindeorff's conjecture *φεύγωντες* is unnecessary, as *φεύγων* means not only 'to go into exile,' but also 'to be in exile.' Both these meanings are well illustrated by Hdt. vi. 103 Κύμαμα τῶν Πηνελούδων κατελαβα θρησκείαν εἰς Ἀθηναίων Περιπετείας τῶν ἰππο- πάτους καὶ οὔτω φεύγοντι διαμακάτον ἀναλέγχουσι τεθήκασι σωθείν.

ἐκάθεν, i.e. from Thurii. Heindeorff points out the error in the 4 statement of Athenaeus xi. 506 ἄνωθεν αὐτοῖς (τῶν Πλάτωνα) καὶ 5 τὴν ἐν Χίον τῆς παραμέθον τυχορίον, ἀδρί δὲ ἐν θυρίοις κοινωκήθησαν.

περὶ τούτῳ τούς τόπους, i.e. Greece, in distinction from Italy or Magna Graecia.
omitted in T, and by Schanz and C. F. Hermann (Teubner), and placed by Badham after μάχεσθαι.

But the tense of ἐγκφέσθαι shows that its subject is τὸ Ἀκραία, not the Sophists, and instead of removing ἐγκφέσθαι we need only for κατὰ read καθ᾽· A careful inspection of Codex Clarkianus shows that there has been an erasure after the first a in καθα (sic). Cf. Xen. Mem. iv. 6, 5 ἐδέως ἂν ἦτοι φάμα, καθ᾽ ἂν δὲ νως ἀλλήλους χρησίμα, φόβοι ἐν ὑπ. Hellen. ii. 7, 29 ἀκραία τὸ πράγματα, καθ᾽ ἂν καὶ ἂν ὑμεῖς δοκεῖτε γεγενῆσθαι.

καὶ μάχεσθα, ὥστε πάντων ἦτοι κρατῶν TV, ἦτοι om. B: Schanz omits τό 2 and ἐτι, Madvig conjectures μάχη τό πάντων κρατεῖ, Badham and Burnet omit the whole clause. Ficinus follows the text of TV: 'hi vero corpore primum pugnare maxime possunt, et eo genere pugnæa quo omnia (omnes) superantur.' Heindorf, rightly retaining the text of TV, explains it as follows: 'Pugnae genere, quod verum est pugnæam. Spectant haec liquidus ad superiorem illa ἦτοι ἐν τοι παγκρατιάτα.' But the real meaning of the clause is most clearly shown by what immediately follows, ὥστε δὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ μάχεσθαι. The art of fighting in armour with the real weapons of war was the perfection of military training, as described by Nicias, Lath. 181 E, 'he who understands this art could certainly not be hurt at all by any single assailant, perhaps not even by many, but in every way would thus have an advantage.' In Gorg. 456 D ἔρισθε τα νοστίκευός τε καὶ παγκρατιάτα ὥσπερ καὶ ὅπλως μάχεσθαι, διὸ πρῶτον ἐδότε καὶ πφιλὰ καὶ ἐχθρὰς, the most important art is named last. Cf. Legg. 813 E, 833 E.

καὶ ἀνωτέρωσθαι, Schanz omits καὶ without sufficient reason: in 272 ἀνωτέρωσθαι there is an allusion to speaking in person, which is here a 2 contrasted with teaching others.

συγγραφίσθησα λέγουν, 'to get speeches composed.' Cf. Quintil. 3 Inst. Orat. ii. 15 'Socrates in honorem sibi credidit orationem quam ei Lysias reo composuerat; et tum maxime scribere litigatibis quae illi pro se ipso dicenter erat moris, atque ita iuri quo non liocat pro altero agere frases adhibebatur.'

παγκρατιαστικὴ τέχνη, 'Velle, interiecto articulo, τῇ παγκρατιαστικῇ τέχνῃ' (Heindorf). The article would be out of place, or at least, unnecessary, as 'pancratiastic art' is not here limited to the well-known bodily exercise.
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8 ἐν τοῖς λόγοις μάχεσθαι, an allusion to ὁ ὡπλος μάχεσθαι, 'to fight in their armour of words.'

b 2 παραδοθῶν ὑμῖν, 'to give myself over as a pupil.' Cf. 285 C παροδιθήματα ἡμάτων Δωρυκάρδης τοῦ αὐτ. Legg. vii. 511 E τού τενού αὐτοῖς παραδοθήκην ὑπάκουε τε καὶ παθήεις.

7 ἔννοον Τ, ἔννοον Β; cf. 285 E ἔννοον Β (Schans).

8 παρακαθήλθον τοῖς μη φοβεροῖς. The article with the infinitive expresses the purpose or effect of the parakathēlon. Cf. Aesch. Prom. V. 224 ἔννοον τοῖς μη διαρροφόσφερες εἰς Ἀπελλής μοῦ. See Hermann on Viger, De Idolol. Gr. not. 271. Paley's suggestion that in τοῖς μη two constructions are mixed, το ἐν για τετε μη, and τοῖς μη is unnecessary.

9 τῆς σοφίας ἐδώ εἰ ζωή ἐπίθηκα, τῆς ἐρωτικῆς. Diogenes Laertius in his life of Protagoras (IX. 55) names first in a list of the works of Protagoras then extant Τεχνή ἐρωτική. In Plato the word ἐρωτική first appears in Λεγ. 211 B ἀλλὰ ἐπὶ ὁποῖο συμπεριήχεις μεν, εἰν μὲ σθένους ἐσπεριζά τον Ἐννέανον ἡ οὖν ἀπαίστα ὡς ἐρωτικός ἐστιν; In the Meno, 80 e, the argument, that a man cannot inquire about that which he knows, or about that which he does not know, is termed an ἐρωτικός λόγος, and contrasted with the doctrine that the soul is immortal and knows all things by reminiscence: 'and therefore we must not believe this ἐρωτικός λόγος for it would make us idle, and is sweet to the ear of the feeble.' Cf. Meno 75 C, Soph. 225 D.

In Aristot. Soph. El. xi we find the following definition: 'Eristic is illegitimate fighting in disputation. The competitor who is bent on victory at all hazards sticks at no artifice; no more does the eristic reasoner. If victory is his final motive, he is called contentious and eristic (ἐρωτικός καὶ φιλορέος); if professional reputation and lucre, sophistic. For Sophistic is, as I said before, a money-making art.' (Poste).

c 1 ὁ Β, αὐτῆς Τ. αὖ has its usual sense 'again,' for Socrates adds that he had already brought disgrace upon one of his teachers.

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περίδραμος, 'hoc proprie adhibetur de infamia vel labe, qua quem 2 aspergimus' (Heinrund). Cf. Lysias 164, 1 οί σωματεῖς αὐχεῖνε χονδύλη καὶ ἐρωτικοὶ καὶ ἐναίδεις περίδραμος.

Κόννο τοῦ Νττροβίου. Cf. 295 D, Menex. 235 E. On the supposed identity of Κόννον with Κοννάς, who gave the name to a comedy of Ameipsias, see the long dissertation of Winckelmann, Prolegomena, cap. viii.

τῇ καθαρσίᾳ . . . καθαρίζων. Badham proposed to omit the former, and Schanz the latter, but without authority or necessity. On the affinity of music to philosophy cf. Lach. 158 D καὶ κομμὴ μοι δοκεῖ μουσική ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐστὶν ἄριστος καὶ τὸν ἐν ἐφεμερίνιον καὶ ἀρχαίους ὡς ἄριστος. All this, 632 C Κάμου δὲ διὰ τοῦτο διαφέρει μουσικής ἐντὸς μουσικῆς. Καὶ γὰρ Ποντικᾶς ὁ Ζήμων, τρικατέχοιν δόξαν ἐκ τῆς μουσικῆς καταφέρειν ὡς ἐκ πολλῶν ἐκ πολεμίσεως ἄξιον μουσικῆς . . . τὸ δὲ δῶμεν ἵνα πολην τῶν ἐκλέγων σοφία τῇ μουσικῇ μάλιστα εἶναι δυνατόν . . . καὶ πάντας τῶν χρώματος τῇ τέχνῃ ταὐτό συμφωνείν, διατηρεῖν καὶ Ασκληπίου ἐκποίεσιν. 'Εντὸς συμφωνεῖν καὶ μουχαλεῖν, όισυ μοι τι περίδραμος . . . ΒΤ. Badham omits μοι, for 4 which Stallbaum and Schanz adopt μοι from Vindob. But it is not likely that μοι, if original, would be changed into μου immediately before ἔτοι. There is not the same reason for μοι here as in συμφωνεῖν μοι παράλληλο below. In B there is a light stroke, seemingly meant for a comma, between μοι, and ἔτοι.

τῶν φοβερῶν τάχα. 'Obvious hic adp Atticis pleonasmus in 6 Platone quidem frequentissimum est. τῶν τάχα τὸν Γέμ. 38 E, Legg. iii. 676 C, 685 D, Apol. 31 A (Heinrund).

καὶ σύ τί σε συμφωνεῖς; διὰ Winckelmann. The objection to the d reading of the best MSS. καὶ σύ τί πους συμφωνεῖς τῶν ΒΤ is that σύ seems never to be joined with an imperative.

ἐξεμεν Τ et ἐξεμεν Vind., ἐξεμεν B. 'And as a bait for them we 2 will take with us your sons.'

νεῖτοι. 'The late accusative singular νεῖτοι, reprehended by Phryn. chus, with its consort νεῖα, has not found its way into any Attic text' (Rutherford, N. Phryn. 143). Cf. Kühner-Blase, i. § 138 Anmerk. 3: Schanz, Plat. Legg. Praef. p. viii. § 5

1 P. Foucart hanc observationem ex inscriptionibus Attici scribevit (Rev. de Philologio, i. 35): une série d'exemples, depuis le
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cinquième siècle jusqu’au deuxième avant notre ère, montre que, au moins en prose, les Athéniens employaient toujours la forme ἦς.' Schanz adds: 'In Clarkiano huls scripturae, quod sciam, n ullum est vestigium; in Parisiino omnibus fere locis ἦς reperitur.' The Codex Clarkianus being our best authority in the Euthydemus, which is not contained in the Parisinus, I have not taken upon myself to rewrite our chief MS. in respect of this word.

6 ἦς τι καὶ μαθησιμέθη, 'what it is we are going to learn.' On the force of ἦς see Riddell, Plat. Apol. 176.

7 οὐκ ἐν φλάνναις ὑπόκοιοι, 'Iiam audies?' The ordinary explanation, 'you cannot hear it too soon,' is far better than Hermann's elaborate and confusing note on Viger, De Idiomas Gr. 320. Cf. Kühner-Jelf, § 694, Obs. 2.

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μαθησια. By placing this immediately before ἰμοὶ δοκεῖν Badham makes the connexion more evident.

καὶ ἄλλοι μαθησια ἄρα αὐτὸ πολλεῖ ἰμοὶ δοκεῖν. αὐτὸ is found in B, but omitted in T Vind., and altered by Schanz to αὐτοῖς. If retained it may be rendered 'besides' or 'also,' as in Protag. 323 a τὸς αὐτὸς τεκμήριος, 326 a τῷ τε καὶ καθαρστάς. Badham places μαθησια immediately before ἰμοὶ δοκεῖν, in order to make the connexion clearer, 'disciples as it seemed to me.' Without this transposition Ficinus gives the same sense: 'et aliui multi cum illis, qui illorum mihi discipuli videbantur.' Schanz supposes that ἦς or some such word has dropped out before ἰμοὶ δοκεῖν. There is probably some error in the text of B, for αὐτὸ seems to be superfluous after καὶ ἄλλοι μαθησια ἄρα, 'and disciples besides with them.' On αὐτῷ and other 'expletives' see Janaris 1700 (1).

εἰσελθόντες δὲ περιπατεῖν τὴν ΒΤ, εἰσελθόντες τι. Vind. 'probavit 3 Cobet' (Schanz). The dual and plural are so frequently interchanged in the context that it is hardly necessary to alter the reading of ΒΤ.


οὕσω... περιλαμβάνοντι ᾠστην, καὶ ἀκοβελέταις. On this use of καὶ 4 after a definition of time, so frequent in the New Testament, cf. 277 B οὕπο... τοῦτο ἐφεστο... καὶ ὁ Διονυσίωνος... Thus. i. 50 'Ἠνθε ὤν ὄψι καὶ αἱ καρδίας ἐξαπέληπται πρῶταν ἐκροίων.' Xen. Cyр. ii. 1, Το σε μεν τῆς ἑσομαι ἄν καὶ τῶν Περσῶν ὅμως οἱ ἀρχηγοὶ παρήκσαι. Απαδ. 2, 18.

πολλαὶ τε [καὶ] ἄλλα καὶ Κτήσιστος. Cf. Schanz, Nov. Comp. Plat. 6 p. 56 'quod coniectando invenimus, optimo libro Clarkiano confirmatum vidimus, qui καὶ omitis.'

Παναενής. Paeania was a borough (ἄρμος) of the tribe Pandionis. 7 Demothenes belonged to Paeania.

ἔσων μη ἔρμωσθην [81] δα τοῦ νόου εἶναι BT. Winckelmann omits δα as an error caused by δα following, and compares 301 B 'Ἡνθὲ δὲ τοῖν ἄνδρον τὴν νοσίαν ἐπεχείρειν μεμείον, where for δα cod. B has
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διά. δοῦν μὴ ἄβρασθης quite literally means 'as far as he was not boisterous,' i.e. 'except that he was boisterous.' The construction is the same as in Πραγμ. 64 D καθ' δοῦν μὴ πολλ' ἄνγκης μετέχεις αὖθις, 'except so far as it is absolutely necessary to have to do with them:' ibid. 83. η πείζουσα δὲ εἰ τούτων μὲν ἀνακριβῶς δοῦν μὴ ἄνγκης αὖθις χρῆσθαι. Πλιτ. 716b. [p. 303] πρὸς διαφορές ὥσα μὴ σφόδρα μυστήριον εἶναι.

b 1 ἀνθα τῆς ἐσόδου, 'having from the entrance caught sight of me sitting alone.'

4 έπεστάντε διελεγόμεθα, 'stopped short and began to talk to each other.' Cf. 177 D καθ' ἑπεστάντ' περιέμενα. Συμμ. 212 D ἐπιστάμεθα ἐτίς τὰς ὀρέσις.

άλλα καὶ ἄλλα ἀποβλέποντες, sc. ἐφη, 'glancing now and then.'

'Usitiusus fuitset ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλα' (Heind.)—but that would have meant 'this way and that,' which is not the meaning here.

6 οἴκτης, 'they came and sat down, one of them, Euthydemos, beside the youth, and the other beside myself on the left.'

7 Εὐτέλθησον Β, δ' Εὐτέλθησον Τ. Schanz adopts the article in his edition, 1880, though he had shown in the Newa Commenationes Platonicae, p. 64, that it is often omitted even in a renewed mention of the name as in 289 E, 294 C, 297 B, D, and elsewhere frequently.

παρ' αὐτόν ἐμή. Winkelmann reads παρ' αὐτῷ ἐμή, and for the position of αὐτός between a preposition and its case refers to Pol. 371 D τοῦτο εἰς ἂν αὐτῷ διαλήκτατε: Polit. 302 D ὡς ὀριθείον πολλὰς ἐκ δ' αὐτῷ τοὺς πολλοὺς: Πραγμ. 71 A ἀπὸ δ' αὐτοῦ ἡ τῆς ἐμῆς. For τὴν ἐμή cf. Θαλ. 166 A ἡ ἀλήθεα δὴ τὴν ἐμὴ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐπίθετο. The conjecture though simple and ingenious is unnecessary.

c 2 μοίτια seems to have an explanatory as well as an assertive force, giving a reason why he welcomed them: 'These two gentlemen, you know, Cleinias, are skilled not in trifling things, but in those of great importance.'

6 καὶ ὅσα ἐν ὅπλαι μάχησθαι διδακτεύον. Schanz brackets μάχησθαι, following Badham, but as suggests as a better reading καὶ ἐν ὅπλαι μάχησθαι, omitting both ὅσα and διδακτεύον. There seems to be no need for any alteration in the text of the MSS., 'and all necessary teaching to fight in arms.'

d 1 κατατροφήθην is the inference which Socrates drew from their looks and laughter: 'I saw that they despaired me.'

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273 d

βλέποντες εἰς ἄλλακτος Β, βλέποντες εἰς ἄλλακτος Τ. Cf. Plat. 2 Phaedr. 272 B ὥς κατάβαται ἐς τὸ Νυμφιακόν, where κατάβαται (Steph.) may be due to the κατ' following. Here, however, βλέποντες was probably the original reading, corresponding to ἄλλακτος, for ἄλλακτος Τodor is a very doubtful correction. On the combination of a dual subject with a plural participle see Kühner-Blass, § 368; Janzaris, Gk. Gr. 1172; Xen. Mem. i. 2, 33 καθάρωσιν ἐκ τῆς Κρήτας καὶ ἐκ Χαριλέου τῆς Ἀκμῆς τοῖς νόμοις ἐπικεκριμένον ταῦτα.

τὸ ἔργον...πάρεργα, 'your work must be something grand, if it matters so greatly as these are your amusements.'

'Ω Ζεύ, ὅτι δ' ἐγώ. The reading of BT, ἐφθην ὅτι δ' ἐγώ, may be probably have arisen from a marginal quotation or reminiscence of 294 A. 'Ω Ζεύ, ἐφθην ἐγώ, since ἐφθην in our present passage is an evident gloss or interpretation.

λέγεντον πράγμα. Cobet would omit λέγεντον without any sufficient reason.

ἀριμάτων. Any great good fortune or unexpected gain was attributed to the influence of Hermes. Cf. 295 A, Συμμ. 217 A ἀριμάτων ἐγγεγένη ἐμήν καὶ εὐφέρχα ἐμῶν θαυμάσσα. Ruhnck. Τίμ. Λεξ. 'Ερμαίος νόημα. Stallib. Plat. Phaed. 150 c ἐρμαίοις ἑπηρέα. For τούτο is not to be joined with τὸ πόλις, but is explained by ἐν τὸ ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι, 'clever for the most part in this, I mean in fighting in armour.'

ἐποδημιστὰν AV, γρ. T; ἐποδημητὴν T. The imperfect would imply that they were at home in Athens, the aorist that they came to it as visitors. Cf. Protag. 310 E ἤτο γὰρ παῖς ἢν ὅτι τὸ πρῶτον ἔποδημεν.


ἀλάς εἶπεν, 'be merciful.' Cf. Plat. Phaedr. 257 A ἀλλὰ τῶν τὸ πρῶτον τε συγγρώμαν καὶ τῶν γέρων ἔχουν, εἰςεύθυ μὲν καὶ ἠλέας τῆν
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crastos μη τέχνην, τον Εσκαλ, μητε αφθηγη μητε πρόσης δε αργην: ibid. "εφετερη και Λεων σοληνιας est dictio de diis volentibus profitebatur" (Heind.).

274 a Αλεγρον ΒΤ, 'sed 1 in ras. additum videtur in B' (Schanz).

b 3 'Vide et utrum vera loquarini' (Ficinus). Stallbaum sees no reason to alter the reading of the MSS.

7 μηνα βασιλεα. As every one knew who the 'Great King' was the article was unnecessary, as in the case of a proper name. Cf. Xen. Memn. iii. 5, 26 εν τη βασιλεως χρις: ibid. Conv. iii. 13 τα βασιλειων χρις.

b 3 ον μην Β, άλλ' οι μην Τ. That άλλα is an unnecessary addition is shown by Schanz, N. C. P. p. 63, quoting Pol. 412 Β, Phaed. 87 Α. οι μη ήχοντες. "Intell. αυθην" (Stallbaum): i.e. 'the unwise will wish to learn of you'; a rather sarcastic compliment.

5 ηγομαι. The active voice means 'to give a pledge,' the middle 'I pledge myself,' that is 'I make myself an έγγυης or bail.' Cf. Protag. 336 έπει ζωκρατη γε γη έγγυαι μη επιλησθαι.

7 καρις δοκεισιν ου. Badham rightly argues that εμοι δοκειους ΒΤ refers to επικεφαλειας, not to έπι ηλειας, which was not a matter of opinion but of evident fact. He therefore reads καρις δοκεισιν ου, ου εμοι δοι δοκεισιν αυθη, either of which is preferable to the unacceptable conjecture of Schanz παρα ρα κεξεις τατ Κελλοι εμοι δοκεισιν διαθ ου.

c 1 έπισκαται. The verb seems to be used by Plato only here, but is not uncommon in the Orators and Polibius, and occurs also in Aristotle. Rhet. 1. 7 επισκαται τη κρατη το ιδιον ιδον λυσθαι.

d 2 αφρα ΒΤ, αυτο Τ. Here T has been corrected, probably from B.

6 επιδιοθετον ΒΤ, επεδιοθετον Τ. The reading of B is retained by Winckelmann, Stallbaum, Badham, and Schanz, and justified by 274 Δ ου επιδιοθετηκε και διεικουνε, and the many passages of Plato quoted by Winckelmann. As the exhibition is to be made at the request of others, not for their own sake, the active is the right voice, not the middle as in 278 c 4.

ει τα μην ουν πλεοντα, 'the main part.'

274 a, b  NOTES

h θρετη. Schanz however (N. C. P. p. 70) defends τη προμα, referring to Prot. 327 ο τον του τη προμας τη ριθης. See also Jann. Ch. Gr. 1178 b.

φης, like age in Latin, is often found before a question, as if pressing for an immediate answer: 'Come, tell me.' Cf. Plat. Gorg. 514 Δ φης προς αθανατον, αφθηγη δε η ζωκρατη γε γη αυτον ερθει αν ισομερον; Legg. 1. 633 c την ανθρωπην δε φης τη θαμ; Aristoph. Thesmoph. 780 φης δε των, έτοι και δεινης αυς, τη και λιποτη όμης; έξαλλη B, άλλως BT: the correction in B was probably made by 5 Arethas.

Cf. Προτρήματα. Winckelmann retains the reading of BT, προ- 275 τρίγεστε, but the future indicative with εισ is, to say the least, so a usual that προτρήματα is certainly to be preferred. Schanz refers to 278 c 4, where there is a similar variation between ενδιεξοθεν Β, ενδιεξοθεν Τ, and ενδιεξοθεν Βινδ. i.

uνης. Schanz and Burnett read ιδον, without any remark. Cf. of Zonaras, 1763, ap. Lobeck. Phryn. 40 'Την, ένεν τω ι, 'Αττικοι. Rutherford, New Phryn. 143: 'It is probable that throughout the Attic period the iota was never written. At all events Herwerden (Lapid. de Dial. Att. Test. pp. 11, 12) distinctly states that in no Attic inscription of a good age does any form but ιδον appear except in verse, and even in that case ιδος, ιδες, &c. are sometimes found. . . . The reason for the prevalence of ιδος, ιδες, &c. in the manuscripts of Attic writers is not far to seek. Those forms gradually took the place of ιδος, ιδος, &c., in stone records after the time of Alexander.' In Homer, Η. vii. 130, xvii. 575, 590, iv. 473, v. 612, vii. 47, where the word is printed with a diphthong, a short syllable is required. See 272 d 2, note.


περι αυτον Β, περι αυτο Τ. Both constructions occur frequently, b 2 the dative chiefly in cases of fearing for or the contrary. Cf. Thuc. i. 60 δεδωκας περι τη χαριν. Phaed. 114 Θαρρειν χρι περι τη ισοτη ψυγη.

ει μην τα διαφανεις. Τhe same phrase occurs in Plat. Lach. 187 Α ουν ιδην μη τα διαφανει.

δμα ανδρεφες τα και θαρραλεαις. Badham objects to δμα: 'Absurde 8 praeponitur δμα duabus rebus tam similibus quam sunt οδηρεια et
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"θόρος." Schanz, N.C.P. p. 71 replies: 'At ἀμα not pertinent ad ἀνδρείας καὶ θαρραλέως, sed ad ἠφι' i.e., 'No sooner had I spoken than Euthydemanus said,' &c. But in fact 'bravely' and 'confidently' are not synonymous, and ἠφι is too far from ἀμα to be referred to it by 'hyperbaton.'

C 1 ἀποκρίνεσθαι Β, ἀποκρίνεσθαι Τ: cf. C 3 τὸ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὥστε ἀποκρίνεσθαι Τ. In both passages B gives the better reading: in dependence on the present ἦν ōθη, indicating a general willingness to answer, ἀποκρίνεσθαι alone is right. In C 3 the aorist ἀποκρίνεσθαι is rightly used of the answer to be given to a particular question: cf. 275 E 1 ἀπερώναι ἀνδρείας.

2 'Ἀλλὰ μὲν ἦ, Ἡρώ, in truth.' Cf. Gorg. 466 B, 471 A, 492 E, 506 B, D.


d 1 Μοῖσας τε καὶ Μνήμην. Cf. Phaedr. 237 A ἐγένος δή, διὰ Μοῖσας, ἠμὶ μοι λαβάσθαι τοῦ μένου. It is evident that Ἰημνή ἐστι here not one of the Muses, but their mother, who is more commonly called Μημοσύνη. Plat. Theatest. 515 E τὰς τῶν Μοίσας μητρὶς Μημοσύνης. Aesch. Pers. 561 μῆρων θ' ἀπάντων μισόμενορον ἐγὼ ἐγώ. Paus. 795 'The sons of Aloeus thought the Muses were three in number, and named them Μιλέα, Μεμή, and 'Αιδη.' Hom. Hymn. in Herm. 429 Μημοσύνην μὲν πρῶτα δεδομένων καθέναν ἄλλην Μνήμην. P. lli. 491 'Ολυμπιάδες Μοῖσας, Δώσις αἰγών θηρίων χύπαται.' Od. xxiv. 60 Μοῖσας ὡς ἐνεκὸς πάσης. Hes. Theog. 53:

Μοῖσας' Ολυμπιάδες, κοινὰς Δώσις αἰγών, τὰς ἐν Περίγα Κροκόδη τέκε βατι πατρί μνήμα Μημοσύνης.

On the various families of Muses see Plut. Mor. 703; Diod. Sic. iv. 7; Cic. De Nat. Deor. iii. 21.

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megáleus. 'H. l. idem est quod χελεατος, prorsus ut Latine 5 magna quaestio dicitur pro difficil. Ἰταλ. Mai. 287 B ｖ ｖ ∉ ｉ ｔ ｕ ｔ ｐ ｏ ｔ ι ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ ｔ tré 275 b 275 d
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3 ἀποστοματική. Cf. Ruhnke, Tim. Lex. Ἀποστοματίζειν, ἀνά μῆνες λέγειν. 'Timeus et ex eo Suidas h.I. (277 A) exponunt memorăm rectitare, orae, non scriptae, proferent. At Pollux ii. 102 Ἀποστοματικῶς τὰ τῶν παιδῶν Πατρόν ποὺ λέγειν, ἥγου τῶν διδάσκαλων ἐφοσοῦσα τὰ μαθήματα, ὡς ἀνά στομάτων λέγειν. Pollux consentit vetus Grammaticus apud Suidam: Ἀποστοματίζειν φασὶ τὸν διδασκαλόν, ὅταν κελεύῃ τὸ παιδί λέγειν ἕττα ἀνά στομάτων.' In our present passage the former interpretation is to be preferred, for ἀποστοματικῶς ὡς the dative shows that it is the master who speaks ἀνά μῆνες and ἀνά στομάτων. In St. Luke xi. 53, ἀποστοματικῶς αὐτῶν ἔπειτα πλεῖστοι, the other sense is to be preferred, 'to make Him speak off-hand of many things,' as is evident from the accusative αὐτῶν, and from what follows, ἢρεται τι ἐκ τῶν στομάτων αὐτῶν.


7 οὐκ εὖ σοι Burnet: 'οὐκ εὖ ὑπὸς 'ΙΒ: οὐκ εὖ scripsit Schanz.' This good correction by Schanz is still further improved by Burnet's addition of αὐτῷ.

d i καὶ πάντα μέγα Β. Vind. It is of course possible that μέγα, which is omitted in B, may be an interpolation, as Schanz seems to suppose, from 300 D μέγα πάντα ἄνασκογισάτο: on the other hand πάντα ἐγγυάσαν is a very questionable phrase, while the constant use of neuter adjectives with γελάν, and of μέγα with similar verbs such as λέγειν, βοᾶτ, φοινίκω, δέλτα, makes the omission of it here very doubtful.

5 ἡ ὄρσα καὶ, 'Τ Vind. ἡ ὄρσα B: seclusit Schanz (Burnet). It is more likely that καὶ should have been dropped out in B than ἡ ὄρσα interpolated in T. Vind., and Schanz therefore was not justified in omitting the clause.

διστηρεῖς εἰ ἀνακάθιστοι. The dancers in a chorus reversed their course in the strophe and antistrophe, but something more complicated than this is indicated in the next words.

NOTES

276 d

Βασιλεία ἐστρέφει, 'began to give a double twist to his questions on 6 the same point.' Stallbaum refers to Aristoph. Thesmoph. 582 ἦκατερ οἱ προβολός διαλύεται χαῖρες κρίνεις. Cf. Hesych. διαλύεται ἀφριστοί εἴσος.

μαθάνουσαν καὶ ἐπιστήμη τὴν μὲν ἐπιστήμη τα. The same para-7 doxical question is brought forward in Meno 80 e: 'Do you see what an eristic argument this is which you are importing, that it is forsooth impossible for a man to inquire about either what he knows or what he does not know.' The solution depends on the double meaning of μαθάνιον as explained in Arist. Soph. El. iv. 526 and 529 μαθάνιον τῶν γράμματος, ἐπεὶ μάθανεν καὶ ἐπιστήμη.

ἐν' Β. Vind. The reading of all the MSS. seems to have been too hastily rejected in favour of ήμιν the conjecture of Stephanus, which is followed by Ficinus. But in the answer of Socrates there is a fine irony involved in καὶ λεγόμεν ἐφάνει, 'the former question was a fine revelation for you.' For this sense of ἐφάνει, indicating a wonderful or unexpected appearance, cf. 294 A καὶ καθήκοντα λέγεις καὶ γαθήκαν μέγα πεφᾶναι. Pol. 358 D ἔρραμον δέ ἐφάνη.

ὑποτέλεις ἐφήματα, 'in all our questions of this kind we leave no escape.'

ὁκ ἐπίσταται. In 276 d, ἡ μὲν ἐπιστήμη, there is merely a 9 supposition that the learners are ignorant. In the answer there is a definite assertion, which in direct oration would be μαθάνουσαν ὡς ἐπίσταται.

ὁκ ἐπιστήμην ὡς γράμματα: The ambiguity of the question is 277 noticed by Aristotle, Khet. ii. 24. 3 τὸν τα στοιχεία ἐπιστήμην ὅτι τὸ a το ἐπίσταται τὸ γάρ ἐπίσταται το αὐτό ἐστιν.

ἀρα σὺ(α) μαθάνουσα Π(Coslinianus) Routh, Heindorf: ΒΤ omit 6 α. From the antithetical clause τὸ δὲ μὲ ἐπιστήμην... μαθάνουσα it is evident that both αὐτό and αὐτή are necessary.

There is a similar confusion in Phaedr. 230 c, d, where αὐτή (CY) is twice corrupted into αὐτῷ (ΟΥ) both in B and T, also in 286 E αὐτῷ δ' ἐκεῖνος;

ἡ δ' ἦν. ἦκατο B Vind., εἶδος T. The origin of the corrupt εἶδος 8 is shown in Routh's ingenious conjecture ἦδ' ἦν.

NOTES

277 b  The game of passing the ball to and fro was called in Latin 'ludere datatim,' Plaut. Curculio, ii. 3, 17.

c 2  ἐὰν ὑμῖν ἔχουσιν, Burnet, 'ἔχουσιν huc transep. Badham: post ἔχουσιν, Schanz.' ἔχουσιν is certainly wanted in the question rather than in the answer.

d 1  ἐπὶ τὸ τρίτον... σφυρ. πάλαισμα. The victory in wrestling was not gained till the third fall. Cf. Aesch. Etinmis, 586 'Εν μέν τόδε ἴδο τὸν τρίτον πάλαισματος.' Plat. Pol. 583 b, Rhaed. 256 b τῶν τριών παλαισμάτων τῷ ὁ δὲ ἀληθος Ὀλυμπιακῶν.

καταβάλλει Heindorf, καταβάλει BT, om. Badham, Schanz. καταβάλλει cannot be omitted unless τῶν παλαισμάτων is omitted also (Cobet). If καταβάλλει is retained it can only mean 'after throwing the youth was once more setting out for the third bout.' But the future is better.


e 4  ἔδρας T, is much better than ἐδραία B Vind. which Winckelmann tries to defend.

7  τῇ τελείᾳ τῶν Κοροβίνων. Cf. Lucian, De Sallat. 272 Πρὶς τοῖς βασιλείς ήτο διαφέρειν τῇ τέχνῃ ἐν Φρυγίᾳ μεν τοῖς Κοροβίνων ἐν Κρήτῃ δ᾽ τοῖς Κοροβίνων ἀρχείσεις κελεύεις. Ibid. 277 Ἐδ λέγω δι᾽ ἐκείνης ὁδός ἑκείνης οὖν ἄρχων ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ οὖν ἄρχων. Ibid. 277 ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ δι᾽ ἐκείνης ἀρχαία οὖν ἥκοιν ἀνάμεσα ἄρχαία. Hence the phrase ἀρχείσεως τἀ μυστήρια. Cf. Eur. Bacch. 123; Hor. Od. i. 16, 7; Preller, Gr. Myth. 656; Lobeck, Aglaoph. 640, 1153; Verg. Aen. iii. 111; Ov. Met. iv. 282; Lucian, Tragoedia-Podagra 36:

παραπληγής δ’ ἂμφι βρόττρος
καλδαθύι Κρητι ῥυθμός
κόμνην Κοροβίνων εἴναι.


9  χορηγία BTV: χορηγεῖ τ, V marg. As it was the office of the Choregus (χορηγία) to supply a chorus for the dramatist, the use of the word here implies that the Sophists were providing a similar entertainment, and at the same time indicates the dramatic character of the dialogue.

εἰ ἔρα καὶ τετέλεσαν. In this use of εἰ ἔρα there is an

ellipses of the apodosis: 'as you know, if, that is, you have been initiated.'

τὰ πρῶτα τῶν ἴπτων, 'the first part of the Sophistic mysteries.'

There is a similar allusion to the greater and lesser mysteries in Ἰμηρίων. 210 A ταῦτα μὲν οὐκ ἔχετε ἰᾶσεις, δὲ ἱδρύσατε, κἂν ἐν μὴ βεβείχας τῶν ἰᾶσεων καὶ ἰᾶσιν, ἐν ἕκει τοῦτο, ἐν ἐκεῖ τὸ ὁρὸς μετί, οὐκ οὖσα εἰ οὖσα τρίτον εἴπειν.


4  ταῦτα μὲν οὐκ ἐν ἀνδρόποις ἐναντίος ἔχουσιν κέφαλον. The fallacy depending on the equivocal use of words is described by Aristot. Catag. i. 1 Ομοιώματα λέγεται δι᾽ ἄνθρωπος μόνον κακοῦ, δὲ ἐν κατὰ γενόμενον λόγῳ τὸ σωφρόν ἐπερετό, οἷον ζῷον ὁ τέλος καὶ τὸ καθαρμόν, i.e. ζῷον may mean either a living man, or a picture.

σκολλαθρία, 'stools': a word occurring only here in Plato. Cf. b 8 Ruhn. Tim. Lex. Σκολλαθρία ταυτων δύναται παρὰ τοῖς θεοσύλλοις, των δραμα καλοῦσι.

αὐτόν ομι BT. Winckelmann regarding the repetition of the c syllable ἐδ as a corruption conjectures αὐτῶν ἐδ, and the alteration is adopted by Schanz in opposition to the best MSS. The only change required is to correct the itacism ἐδοθὼν in BT into ἐδοθὼν, as Burnet does with many MSS.

ἐπιδείξεσθαι BT, ἐπιδείξεσθαι Steph. Schanz. The change to the 5 future is quite unnecessary; cf. Hdt. i. 53 προλέγοντας Κροίν... μεγάλην ἄρχον μην καταλάθην. Plat. Symposium. 193 δ λαθιάς παρέχεται... ἀθρετοὶ ψεύδοντες. Phaed. 97 b ἐπιλήθη ἔστω κατήμασθαι. Theoc. v. 22 εἴτε ἐφώνασα δεβάζων. Cf. Routh 'ἐπιδείξεσθαι Steph. Edit. veteri relictam sine idonea causa opinor.'

παιδί T, παιδί B, παιδί V. Cf. Rutherford, N. Phryn. p. 91;
NOTES

278 c

The Attic form was doubtless παίσαμα, as all forms with έ, like παίζει and πέταγμα, were unquestionably un-Attic, and should be removed, with manuscript authority, from such passages as Plato, Euthyd. 278 c.

νῦν έ μι δοκεῖ BT, νῦν έ, ἐμοί δοκεῖ Heindorf, Bekker, Schanz, νῦν δέ, μι δοκεῖ, Stallbaum, Badham, Burnet. Heindorf's dictum, 'Immo έμοί δοκεῖ, ut semper scribitur in hac formula (v. Reitz ad Lucian. de Astrolog. 9),' seems to have misled subsequent editors. In Lucian έμοί δέ δοκεῖ is at the beginning of a sentence, where of course the enclitic μι is impossible, and the pronoun in antithesis to τῶν άνθρωπων is necessarily emphatic. Stallbaum writes 'etiam μι ολιγα παράθεται, quasi multus aut multiplicatum.' It is better to leave the reading of BT unaltered, instead of inserting commas to make μι δοκεῖ into a formal parenthesis: cf. Menex. 236 b where all editors agree in writing δε μι δοκεῖ συντὸθε. See the note on 257 c ἐνοῦτο μι δοκεῖν.

d 1 πεπαιόθεν Τ: 'let there be an end of this sport;' a less discourteous phrase than πεπαιόθθα Β, 'let this be stopped.'

7 ἀνακαταχώσθαι Β, ἄν' αὐτὸ σχεδόνα Β, αναρατέσθαι Τ. The verb ἀνακαταχώσθαι is found both in earlier dialogues, Euthyd. 5 a, 16 a, Apol. 20, and in later Crat. 413 d, Phaedr. 235 b, as well as in Thucydides, Xenophon, and Aristotle. The compound with ἀρό meals to occur only in this passage, and, for the intensive force of ἀρό, may be compared with αναγαθαγούμενος Apol. 37 a, ἀνακατασχέτακα ibid. 31 b, ἀνασταλμῖον Pol. 503 b.

e 1 ἀναγκαστόν Τ: 'ἀναγκαστό' Β does not give the meaning required.

3 'Αρὰ γε πάντα . . . 289 b is used in an abridged form by Iamblichus, Protrept. C 5.

ἐπὶ πράγμα, 'to do well.' 'An ambiguous phrase. In its usual interpretation it would rather mean "fairly well" than "acting well." It occurs in the Gorgias of Plato, p. 507 c, in a way which seems to contain the transition between these two ideas—τολλί ἀνάγκη, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, τῶν όψεων, δότης διδασκόμενος, δίκαιον δυνά, καὶ ἄθρωπον καὶ ὅσιον ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἄθρωπον, τῶν ἀρά παράγεται μαθαίνει τοι καὶ εὐθυμίαν ἄνθρωπον τοι καὶ θυμία λατρεύει τοι καὶ κακὸς πράστασα διδώσει. Aristotle was at no pains to solve the ambiguity. Cf. Eth. vi. 2, 5. (GRANT, Aristot. Eth. I. 4, 2.)
the people,' includes all who practise any profession, trade, or craft for pay, from physicians to artisans.

διὶ BT Vind.; δὲ Iambichus. I have allowed the reading of d 4 the MSS. to stand, but without hesitation. It is more likely that διὶ should have been altered to δὲ, in order to make the construction regular, than the reverse. Cf. Aesch. Persae 188 τῶν τῶν στάσεως τῷ, ὥς ἡγὰ θοσοῦ ὀφθ., τέχνης ἐν ἀλλήλους: and Soph. Trach. 1236 δὴ ἄλλο ὡς ἄλλος, ὥς σεβάσθη, ὥς σεβάζων μαθήματι. But in these passages the infinitive follows ὡς ἄλλος, and the passages quoted by Winckelmann, to prove that it may precede, are not altogether convincing. More satisfactory, so far as poetry is concerned, is the passage Aesch. Pers. 564 τοιοῦτο ὡς ἑφαρμοι ἀνακριταὶ αὐτῶν ὡς ἀκούσας.

δὲ οἶδ' ὕβελος τῆς κτήσεως γίγνεται, BT. For δὲ Iambichus 6 has ἡ Προτέρησις οὐκ ἐνθαρρυ. c. v., which has been adopted by Routh, Schanz, and Burnet. Schanz, however, had previously written (N. C. P. p. 74): 'Amplecteri ergo Routhii conjecturam (?), ni artis palaeographicae rationem spretam viderem; nam permutationis verborum ζὴν ὡς nonnullum novi exemplum.' Stallbaum retains ὡς, laying an emphasis on τῆς κτήσεως, as does Ficinus: 'nihil enim solum possitius iuvat.' This is justified by the consideration that τῆς κτήσεως here, like τῆς τοιοῦτος κτήσεως in d 4, still connotes the negative idea expressed in χρήτω δὲ αὐτὰ μὴ καὶ μάργος κατηγοροῦσα. ἢ Αρ' οὖν οὕτω ἔνθεμος, D 7–281 A 1, quoted by Stobaeus, Florileg. 7103, 29.

κάτω τούτω ἱκάνον τ', Stob. This is strangely corrupted in B into e 1 the senseless δὶ τὸτά καλλιώ. ὡς means 'at once,' i.e. 'without anything more,' of itself.' Cf. Gorg. 486 ν ὡς οὐδὲ τοῦτω... ταύτῃ ὡς ἕτως αὐτῶν τότε τάνθων. On the various uses of ὡς in Plato cf. Lutoslawski, 106, 118.

καὶ ἦν μὴ; BT. καὶ, omitted by Stobaeus, is necessary to the 4 exact sense, 'an eliam si non recte?' (Ficinus). κακός γα, Stob., a necessary emendation of κακός δὲ, BTV. ἀθάνατον, 'harm,' is often used as equivalent to τὸ κακόν, in order 5 to avoid a word of ill omen. Cf. 297 τὸ πλαύν ἄλλα ἀθάνατον ποίησις, 'would do more harm than good.'

Ἀλλὰ τί... ἡ ἐντεταλμένη; 'is that which effects the right use 281 anything else than knowledge of carpentering?'
Socrates here falls into the same fallacy as the Sophists by using πράττεν in two different senses, but the purpose and effect of his argument are totally different. Cf. Charmid. 172 Α. ἐν πάσῃ πράξει καλὸς καὶ ἐν πράττεν ἀναγκαῖοι... τὸ νῦν δὲ ἐν πράττενον ἐδήμους ἐστι. See Heindorf's note on that passage.

Πέτρων οὖν ἂν μᾶλλον ἄλλτοτο κτλ., 'In which case then would a 3 man be more likely to do fewer things, if he were poor or rich?' 'Cave μᾶλλον cum ἄλλτο coniungas, quod fecit Heindorffius' (Stallbaum).

ἐντίμος ἢ ἄτιμος; Cobet would substitute ἐντίμος, but Schanz, 5 N. C. P. p. 75, rightly argues that ἐντίμος and ἄτιμος are both referred to social as well as to legal honour, while ἐντίμος is limited to the latter.

ἀνάθεσις ἐν. The addition [καὶ σύφρων] seems to be inappropriate, 6 and is rejected by Badham and Schanz.

ἐν κεζαλαὶ κτλ. 'To sum up then, Céinis,' said I, 'as to all 2 things which we at first said were good, the argument probably does not turn upon this question, how they are by nature good of themselves alone.' In the beginning of the sentence σύμμαχος is the subject of καθοικίζει and of an infinitive dependent upon it, such as τῇ παρθένῳ ἐστι (Stallbaum); but Plato afterwards passes by an anacolouthon to τῇ παρθένῃ ἀ ποιητῆσθαι τοῦ (Stallbaum), a change of construction in consequence of the more convenient form of the continuation' (Engelhardt ap. Lutosl. 76).

πέρας ἡγιάσθαι [ἐναίνει]. There is no objection to the construction 5 πέρας ἡγιάσθαι, which occurs in Legg. 723 D, 870 b, but ἦγιασθαι is omitted in B Vind., and apparently added in T from Iambichus.

μίξα κακὰ ἐναίνει. The infinitive depends on ἦγιασθαι. Cf. Phaed. 6 70 c καὶ τοῦτο ἄτιμος ἦγιασθαι τῇ ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον τοῦ ἔστιν (Winckelmann).

ἐν. The participle is dependent on συμβαινεῖν, the effect of which 3 extends to the whole passage. The same construction is found in Pol. 450 c ἐπεδίδῃ προσήκον τούτῳ ἔστιν, and in Crat. 422 A, Mete. 237 c. The infinitive is, however, more usual, as in Phaed. 74 A, 92 b, Parmen. 134 A.

τὸ λατσόν, i.e. the conclusion that remains to be drawn.
begins by denying but ends by affirming that virtue can certainly be taught. Cf. Protag. 361 b.

οίον ἐπιθύμη τῶν προτερτίων λόγων εἶναι. In the reading of BT, ὁ οἶον ὑπὲρ τῶν προτερτίων λόγων τῶν προτερτίων cannot well stand without a substantive: Routh proposed to read οἶον and λόγων, and this emendation is accepted by Stallbaum, οἶον being regarded as a rather unusual form of attraction, 'my example of what I desire proterptic arguments to be': Schanz prefers the emendation found in Cod. Angelic. C. I. 4, a copy of B, οἶον ἐπιθύμη τῶν προτερτίων λόγων εἶναι. Cobet cuts the knot by omitting the whole clause.

ἀδικητικὸς εἰναι κτλ., 'unskilful perhaps and long and ill-ex pressed.'

ταύταν τοῦτο τέχνη πράττων ἐπιβαίνεται, 'give us a specimen of 8 treating this same subject according to rules of art.'

τὰ δὲ εἰς κτλ., 'show the youth what follows in order from the ἐκ 1 point at which I left off.'

ἡ δὲ λαβάντα εὐθαμονεῖ, 'which he must acquire in order to be 3 happy.' Cf. 289 c ἢ γὰρ κακιμένως ἡ ἡμᾶς εὐθαμονεῖ εἶναι. Pol. 427 b. In this construction δὲ properly applies to the notion of λαβάντα, κακιμένους, κτλ.

ἀφάντων Heindorf: ἀφάντων BTV. Schanz regards ἀφάντων as an 283 error in the original archetype. Cf. Xen. Conv. iii. 2. ἤγηνος ποιεῖν ν. 3 λόγων ιδεῖν τινα ἐπιθύμην, ἢ τινα ποιεῖν.

θαμπάσανοι ... ψευδαρσιοῦ. Plato seems to use either form in 7 differently both of things and persons: cf. Riddell, Digest, § 314.

κατάρχησαν λόγων. The accusative after the active voice of this b verb is unusual in prose: but see Pind. Nem. iii. 10 ἢ γὰρ δ' οὐκ ὁδοὶ πολύμεθα κρέστων, λόγους, διεκορύνον εἰς. Cf. Kühner-Blass, Gr. Gr. § 416, Anmerck 7. After the middle voice the accusative is not uncommon in poetry: Hom. Od. iii. 445 χρήσιβα τ' ἐν τοῖς τε καταρχαῖς. Eur. Hec. 683 κατάρχησαι νόμον ἔκχειν. Or. 949 κατάρχησαι στενωμόν. A poetical construction is not out of place in such a writer as Plato, after a formal invocation of the Muses, 276 D.
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4 Εἰπὼ, with a plural vocative, is found also in Protag. 311 D ἐπὶ μοι, οἴκος καὶ ἱππόπαρτος.
8 ψηφίσσαν ἂν, 'they supposed, as I thought;' ἂν refers to 278 ναίντα μὲν οὐκ...πεπιστεύσα τε ἡ μὲν καὶ ἡ λογικὸς έχει.
5 Τούτων; ἐφη. Schanz's conjecture ὧν οὖν is quite arbitrary and unnecessary.
7 οὐκον ἐφεξῆς γάρ τιν. Stallbaum quotes many instances of the separation of πον from the negative, Men. 72 D, 83 B, Pol. 434 D &c.
8 ἀλαζόν, 'untruthful,' one who wanders (ἄλων) from the truth; 'mendax' (Heindorf). Stallbaum, with Ficinus ('lacabundus') and Winckelmann, retains the more usual meaning as explaining why Cleinias does not claim to be σοφός, 'he says at least that he is not yet wise, for he is no braggart.'
4 ἐπολαβών... ἐφη, 'took me up and said.'
5 ἐπολαβών, 'to be dead, or 'destroyed.'
6 καῦσαν πολυτρον ἀν ἐξεικνύστειν. 'Very precious forsooth must such friends and lovers be!'
E 2 εἰ μὴ ἰδρομένῳ, ἐφη, ἂν οὖν, 'if it were not rather a rude thing to say.' The same phrase is used in Aphol. 32 D.
3 ζαλέω καθαρά, 'In caput tum tuum istuc recidit,' sc. το ἐπολαβών: 'On your head be it.' Cf. Aristoph. παρ. 525, 669, Pax 1063 Ν. ἃ μέλεις ἔργηται καὶ νησίων, ἢ τούτων ἐστιν, δὲ μὲν οὖν... ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὡς οὖσον οὕτων, 'for having taken it into my head not to lead a quiet life.' As the indirect form of τι μαθὼν the phrase must be written with the pronoun το τί, not with the conjunction ὅτι: cf. Hermann ad Viger, De Idiot. Gr. 758. The latter could only be justified if μαθών were ever used alone in this sense. Schanz, following Hermann on Viger, De Idiotism. 759 sqq., wrongly changes μαθὼν into μαθῶν. The two phrases are rightly distinguished by L. and Sc., Læx. μαθάων. 'Τι
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283 b

μαθὼν; on what belief or persuasion...? implying voluntary action—τι μαθὼν; on what compulsion? or, 'What aided you to do this or that?'
καταψεδίει... ἐξολοθρεύω, 'falsely charge me and the rest of us with a thing of which I think it wicked even to speak,—as that I should wish my friend here to be dead.'
Badham omits the latter part of the sentence, δὲ... ἐξολοθρεύω, but without reason,
οὖν τοῦτον ἡμεῖς καθάρα. Cf. Sophist. 236 ε 'How it is possible to speak anything false or to suppose that it really exists, and to say this without being involved in a contradiction, is difficult in the extreme. Why so? Because the statement has the boldness to assume that Not-being exists. But when we were boys the great Parmenides testified to us from first to last both in prose and in metre in these words—"For this you ne'er can learn that non-existent things exist." The fallacy depends on the ambiguity of the phrase λέγων τι, meaning properly 'to speak about a thing,' and only improperly 'to speak a thing.' The words spoken do exist as words, but are not true unless the thing exists, and exists as it is spoken of (Routh). Examples of the fallacy παρ ἄρμαθέων are given in the Soph. El. iv. 1 (527), among them ὅτι ἔστων δρόμον καὶ στήριξι τὸ βιόν 500 B.
Πάστροφος λέγοντος, 'by speaking or by not speaking the thing that may be in question?'
οὔκ ἄλλα λέγει τῶν ἄλον, 'he speaks no other existing thing than...'
284 that very thing which he speaks, τῶν ἄλον is bracketed by ά 2 Badham and Schanz, but rightly retained by Burnet. See the next note.
'Εν μὴ κακάτον γ' ἵστριν τῶν ἄλον. This καὶ proves that there is 3 a previous mention of τῶν ἄλον. 'Moreover that which he speaks is one existing thing, independently of the rest.'
τάλαμα rejected by Badham, so as to leave the statement, 'he 6 that speaks το θυ σπειρ αν ἡ ἄρα.' But the alteration is unnecessary. The extension of το θυ into καὶ το θυ is justified by the comprehensive phrase παρ ο ὑ το θυ λέγον. Ficinus renders rightly: 'Enim vero quicunque quod est quaeve sunt dicit, vera loquitur.'
Ναὶ, ἐφη ἄλλ' το θυ ταῦτα λέγων. Ctesippus admits that Diodorus θ 29
speaks truth, if he speaks that which is; but then immediately adds that this condition is not fulfilled in the present case. Stallbaum argues that ὁ ταύτα λέγων means Euthydemos, 'the present speaker'; but it is the falsehood of Dionysodorus that is under discussion throughout the argument, as is evident from C 5 ἀλλ' εἴπερ λέγει διάωνδόσωρος, τάλθη τε καὶ τά δόμα λέγει.

Plato is referring throughout the passage 283 E 7—284 C 6 to the doctrine of Parmenides, 'Only that which can be can be thought,' as stated in his Protag. 33-40, and more briefly in 43 Χρή το λέγειν τε νοεῖν τ' ἑν' ἐμμέναι, ἐτι γὰρ εἶναι, μὴν δ' ὅπερ εἶναι το ο' ἐγὼ φράσει σαῦ σῶμα. Cf. Mullach, Fragmenta Philos. Gr. i. 118, and Zeller, Pro-Socr. Philos. i. 584.

3 ἀλλ' μὴ δόμα κτλ. 'But is it not the fact that non-existing things are not?'

4 Ἀλλ' τι κτλ. 'Then non-existing things are nowhere existing?' The whole question and answer, Ἀλλ' τι... οἶδαμοι, are omitted by Badham, but only the second δόμα by Schanz: this δόμα, however, is supported by the following τα μηδεμίω δόμα.

6 ὅπερ καὶ εἶπα. This is Hermann's emendation of various corruptions in the MSS., δὲ γα' κλεινει φΒ, δο' δὲνλειον Τ, with the marginal conjecture δο' εκιν εκιν in T Vind. Kλεινει is certainly wrong, for CLeanias is not included among those of whom Ctesippus says in E 3 μνὸ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κατακτέοι. Also εκινει is very questionable as a repetition of ταῦτα τὰ μὴ δόμα, and at all events superfluous, whereas καὶ εἶπει adds much to the force of the passage: 'Is it possible that any one, whoever he may be, could do anything about these non-existing things so as to make the things that exist nowhere actually to exist?' Badham and Schanz bracket τα μὴ δόμα, as not absolutely necessary. The fallacy employed is that of the equivocal use of words, and, in this instance, of the word λέγων. He who speaks speaks about something cannot properly be said to speak the thing (rem loqui). The words which he utters in speaking have a real existence, but unless the things really exist in the mode indicated by the words, these are not true. Cratyl. 385 ὃς καὶ τὰ ἄλλα λέγει ὁτ' ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ὅ εἰν τοι ὅκεν ἐστιν, προεῖνεις; Ναί. 'Quod inuit quoque Ctesippus infra' (Routh). Cf. 283 E 7, note.

C 1 εἰπερ πράττοντι, καὶ ποιεῖται, 'if they do, they also make.' Cf. 30

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Charmid. 163 B ὃ ἰσότον καλεῖν τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πράττειν; Οὐ μένοι, ἐπι. Ποιητῶν πράξεων καὶ ἔργων αὐτοί ἐνέσχεν. Οὐκ ἔργα τὰ γε μὴ ἐντ' ἐφη λέγει αὐτοῖς. 'No one then, said he, 2 speaks what is not; for (in speaking) he would at once make something; and you have admitted that it is impossible for any one to make what is not.' In ποιεῖν ἔργα ἠν ἑπεὶ τι Ηνίνδορφ would either omit τι or substitute αὐτά, meaning τὰ μὴ δόμα. Cf. Sophist. 238 C οὕτω φυλάγονται δυνατὰ πολλά ὑπὲρ ὑπερ τειν οὕτω διανοηθήναι τὸ μὴ διὰ αὐτό καθ' αὐτό, ἀλλ' ἐκείνως διανοηθήναι το καὶ ἀρρητον καὶ δεδεκτον καὶ ἀλογον.

κατὰ τὸν σὺν λόγον TV: λόγον om. B. 'Huius ellipsis alterum 5 exemplum novimum nullum' (Stallb.).

Εἰςον μέντοι... 'Surely there are. Gentlemen, and those who δι say the truth.'

τοῦ γὰρ ὑπέρθοι... 'of the frigid they speak frigidly, and call θ τα κριτικοὶ disputants.' Cf. Aristot. Rhel. iii. 3, 1 τὰ φυσικὰ, 'faults of taste'; Isocr. Ad Nicos. 21 ισότον γὰρ ἐπὶ τὲ πολλά τοὺς μὲν σχετικοὺς ψυχροτέροι δόμα. Athen. vi. 40 ὑπερτρῆ καὶ ψυχροτέρος. Cic.

De clar. Orat. 178 'lentus in dicendo et paene frigidus.'

λοιπὸν, 'you are abusive': λοιπὸν ΒΤ, 'go on with your abuse'; but Ηνίνδορφ's correction has been generally accepted, the middle voice being as usual as the active, and confirmed here by λοιπὸν λοχοὶ 285 D 5. Cf. Charm. 154 A; Conv. 213 D.

ἀγριοτέρως... ἔχειν ΒΤ, 'to be rather savage': ἀγριοτέρως Ψ, 285 a 2 'rather rude,' perhaps adopted from 283 E 2 ἀγριοτέρων.

ἀπεσάντωσεν... ἔχειν ΒΤ, 'to be rather savage': ἀγριοτέρως Ψ, 285 A 2 'rather rude,' perhaps adopted from 283 E 2 ἀγριοτέρων.

δέξασθαι... δέξαται; ὅταν ἔλθων διδόνα ΒΤ. Badham would read δέξασθαι ἢ δέξικται διδόται, so as to express the proverb more neatly. Cf. Gorg. 499 C κατὰ τὸν παλαιὸν λόγον τὸ παρόν εἰ ποιεῖ, καὶ τότε δέξασθαι τὸ διδόμενον, 'to make the best of what you have, and accept what is offered.' Hdt. ix. 111 ὃς μὴ ἥκει τὸ διδόμενα δέξασθαι.

μὴ ὑπερτρῆς διαφεύγων, 'not to quarrel about a word,' sc. ἐξωλλοκοῦντες 283 D.

ἐκα τι καὶ παρ' ἄλλοι τοῦ ἐμαθείνων. This seems to be one of many 8 allusions in the dialogue to Protagoras, who is represented as boasting that those who became his pupils would grow better and better every day (Protag. 318 Α), and that he knew better than all others how to make men virtuous (ibid. 328 A).
is such a thing as contradiction?" Aristot. Tuf. i. 11, 4 gives as an example of a paradoxical opinion ὅτι ὅσι ὄντοι ἄνθρωποι, γιὰτί ἵνα ἄνθρωπον. Cf. Introd. p. 15; Zeller, Plato, note 94.

Οditou τοῦ γ' ἄν. ἐκεῖνος ἀποδίδει τὸν οὗτος ἀκούσας αὐτ. 'You do argue upon the supposition that there is no such a thing as contradiction.' Aristot. Tuf. i. 11, 4 gives as an example of a paradoxical opinion ὅτι ὅσι ὄντοι ἄνθρωποι, γιὰτί ἵνα ἄνθρωπον. Cf. Introd. p. 15; Zeller, Plato, note 94.

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The doctrine of Protagoras based upon the assumption that sensation is knowledge is criticized by Plato, *Theaet.* 152-172. See especially 160 C, D: 'Then my perception is true to me, for it is always inseparable from my own being: and according to Protagoras I am the judge to myself of what is and of what is not to me... How then, if I never err (ψεύδη μδ) and never trip in my conception of things being or becoming, can I fail of knowing that which I perceive... Then you were quite right in affirming that knowledge is only perception, and the meaning of knowledge turns out to be the same, whether with Homer and Heracleitus and all that company you say that all is motion and flux, or, with the great sage Protagoras, that man is the measure of all things' (Jowett in part). This theory (well summarized by L. Campbell, n. 16) is then criticized by Socrates. Cf. Diog. L. xi. 8, 51; Sext. Emp. *Hyphgr. 1* 216.

και οτι οι παλαιοι διενεργουν. Cf. *Theat.* 152 η εισι μεν γαρ οίδεισιν 3 οίδεις, αλλα γινόμεναι, και περι τοιούτου πάντων έξεσθαι οι σοφοί πληρο Παρμενίδου ξυμφόρους, Προταγόρας τε και 'Ερακλείτος και Ερακλείτης κτλ. *Cratyl.* 429 D' άρα δι' ές ζευγδήν έχει το παπάν πού έσται, αμα τοιούτου σοι δύναις στάσιν ο λόγος; συχνοι γαρ τινες οι λέγοντες, δι' άφέλε Κρατιλόκη και νῦν και πάλιν. This mention of Protagoras in connexion with Heracleitus points to the fact noticed by Schleiermacher in his Introduction to the *Theaetetus* (Dobson, p. 91): 'The dialogue begins with showing that the Protagorean denial of a general standard of knowledge and the Heraclitean theory of the flux of all things, and of Becoming alone remaining to the exclusion of all Being, as well as the principle here tried throughout which sets up Perception, and Perception alone, for knowledge, do all refer to one another, and form one system.' Cf. *Pater, Plato*, p. 100.

ἀναφηκαν και αϊτε τοιούτο. When Antisthenes invited Plato to hear him lecture περι τοι η μεν είναι αντίλεγων, Plato asked how he could write about this doctrine, and showed that it could be turned round and destroyed itself (διδοκοτος δι' ενεργείαις, Diog. L. 111, 35). Cf. 288 A 4.

άλλο τι πεφευγει λέγειν ούκ έστιν;—τούτο γαρ δύναται ο λόγος; γαρ; δ The statement that it is impossible to contradict is here declared by Socrates to be equivalent to saying, 'It is impossible to speak falsehood.' The phrase ποιώ δύναται είναι λόγος occurs in *Cratyl.* 429 D, quoted above on c 3.

ψευδή λέγειν μεν Vat, Θ., Bekker, Badham. 'Vulgamem ordinem, d ψευδή μεν λέγειν, immutandum fuisse nobis plane persuasimus' (Stallbaum).

*στοι τοι τον διάλογον, *the misrepresentation of things.* The preceding statement concerning ψευδή δέξεα gives to ψευδεσθαι a meaning inclusive of false opinion as well as false statement. Stallbaum refers to *Aphel.* 22 D και τοιουτο μεν ούκ εφευρέθη: Lysias 156, 2, καλλίν εφευρέθη τής οδίας, i.e. Το περι τοι η μεν είναι.
about many men’s property’; with which compare Antiph. Or. v. 134. 40 καὶ ὥτι δὲ ᾐν πευσθῆτε τὸλμοῖς, κατὰ τὸῦτο ἀπάλλημαι.
11 Ἀλλὰ ἔννοια, διότι οὐ, 'for form’s sake.' Cf. Lach. 156 C ὅραμεν μὴ Νικᾶς ὕπαται τὸ ἔργον καὶ οὐ λόγον ἔννοια τοῦτο ἕργον. Σητοὶ 46 D οὐ δὲ καταδροῦ ἢρ σῆνετο (ὁ λόγοι) ὅτι ἂλλως ἔννοια λόγου ἕργου.
Τὰ δὲ ἄστορον λέγετι, 'in order to state a paradox.'

e 1 Ἀλλὰ σὺ, ἐφι, ἐγέρσον. 'Nay, it is for you to refute me.'

5 οὐδὲ ἄρα ἐκεῖνος, ἐφη, ἐγὼ νῦν θά, ὁ διὸνοσόδωρος ἐξέλαβε ΒΤ. This reading of the best MSS. has been altered very much for the worse by recent editors into οὐδὲ ἄρα ἐκεῖνος, ἐφηγον ἐγὼ διὸ νῦν ὁ διὸνοσόδωρος ἐξέλαβε. For the order of the words in ΒΤ compare 289 C Ὅπως αἶμα, ἐφη, ἐγὼ, ὁ διὸνοσόδωρος ἐξέλαβε. Translate therefore: 'Neither then did I,' said Dionysodoros, 'did you just now to refute me.' οὐ δὲ refers to e 1 Ἀλλὰ σὺ, ἐφι, ἐγέρσον. See also 287 B 2, 207 A 5, and the examples collected by Riddell, Digest, § 288, of 'Clauses intermingled by Hyperbaton.'

6 (29 ὁ ἐκεῖνος) δὲ δὲ κεῖνος; Vind. marg., οὐδὲ κεῖνος B, Vind., om. T, Stalbl. On the frequent corruption in B of ov for σον see note on 277 A 6. The question is put by Socrates, who pretends to be confused and in doubt which of the Sophists had hidden him, just as in 290 E 7 he pretends not to remember whether Cleinias or Ctesippus had been speaking. The emphatic position of δὲ shows that a different person, not Dionysodoros, is now addressed: 'Was it you that were bidding me? For, Euthydemos,' said I, 'I do not at all understand these clever arguments, even not those that are right, but I have only a dull sort of idea.' The imperfect ἐκεῖνος is better than κεῖνος, as corresponding to ἐκεῖνον in e 5.

287 ἄλλα τοῦ σοῦ ἔξουσίως ἔχωνταν ἄστον; 'Is it not impossible even to make α 2 a mistake?'

8 τίνος διδάσκαλος ζητεῖ; Cf. Theaet. 161 C: 'For if truth is only sensation, and one man's discernment is as good as another’s, and no man has any superior right to determine whether the opinion of any other is true or false, but each man, as we have several times repeated, is to himself the sole judge, and everything that he judges is true and right, why should Protagoras be preferred to the principle of wisdom and instruction, and deserve to be well paid, and we would
appropriate meaning: ‘It is this phrase of yours (σου) that is so difficult to deal with.’ Dionysodorus tries to shift the discussion from his own phrase, οὐχ ἦσαν ὁ πιθήκος, which he finds too much like οὐκ ἦσαν διὰ τοῦ χρύτου, to that of Socrates, νοεῖ τούτο τὸ ρῆμα, which he says ‘is not at all difficult to deal with,’ as he tries to show, B 7.

d 1  oδή ἐν ΒΤ: ἀν is omitted by Badham and Schanz, but defended by Ast, Lex. Plat., and Stallbaum, on the ground that the indicative, present, or future may stand in the same sentence with ἄν, provided that ἄν is not joined with the verb, and does not make the whole sentence conditional, but affects only an accessory word or phrase.

e 4  ἐγὼ μὴ ἐξήματον. On this passage Lutoslawski remarks (211): ‘To the right belief explained in the Meno Plato adds in the Euthydemus (284 a, 287 e) his explanation of error and wrong belief, whose existence is proved by the Sophists by the hypothetical method taught in the Meno.’

288 ἐν ταύτῃ InstanceState. Cf. Phaedr. 86 B ἐρώτησεν ὁ ἅγιος τὸν αὐτόν ὁ λόγος εἶναι, ‘It appears to me that the argument remains just where it was’, i.e. has made no advance. Theoel. 200 A οὐκεὶν μακρῶν περιελθόντες πάλιν ἐκ τῆς πρὸς τὰ πάρασην ἀσφάλειαν. Ibid. C εἰς ταύτῃ περιπέτειας μετακάμπεων σεβόμενοι πάλιν ποιεῖται.

4 ἀπὸ τὸ παλαιὸν, i.e. in the time of Protagoras and earlier, 286 c 2.

καταβάλλων πίεστον. Cf. 286 C 4 τούτος τὸ ἄλλος ἀνατρέπει καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτόν.


b 1  εἰς ὑπόδει καὶ στὶς κτλ., ‘or from whatever place and in whatever way you like to be named.’


C 1  Μενέλαιον μιμομάθημα. Cf. Od. iv. 455:

Δελ καὶ τοῦ πρώτου λέον γένετο ἠγώνεες, αὐτὰρ ἐπήρα ἄριστον καὶ πάρασης ἢν μέγις σις, γένετο δ’ ἐνεργὸν καὶ ἐκεῖνον ὑποτήτου. ἡμεῖς δ’ ἀντετυπώκαμεν εἰρήνει τελεῖον ὑμᾶς.

38

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ἐκφθαρμένος ἐφ’ ὃ αὐτή σπουδάστησεν. Cf. C 5 ἐκφθαρμένα, ‘to show 2 themselves.’ Translate: ‘Until they let us see the object about which they are themselves in earnest.’ Cf. Pto. 497 C δῆλος δὴ ὁ ὤν ἐν δὶ μὲν τοῦτο ἐφέστησεν.

ὁμαὶ γὰρ το γαύτων πάγκαλον φανέραθα, ‘for I think that something very splendid in them will appear.’ Cf. Apol. 17 A μάλιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν ἐπὶ μᾶλλον (Stallb.).

ἔγιν ὁν μιὸ δοκιμ. ‘I am inclined therefore myself to indicate 5 again the character in which I beseech them to appear.’ For ὑποθήσισα Heindorf proposes ὑποθέσισα, and Schanz changes καὶ into καὶ, but neither is necessary: ‘Vult enim Socrates statim et e vestigio uno aliquo commonestare exemplo quales sibi illos apparebere cupiat: unde recte utitur aoristo, quem etiam librum tuentur omnes’ (Stallb.).

ἐάν τοσοῦ τά, πώς ὅπως ΒΤ: ‘Nisi putas critici esse elegantis d lectiones captarte recipies quae boni libri tibi praebent’ (Schanz, N. C. P. p. 78).


ἡ δὲ φιλοσοφία κρίσεις ἐπιστήμη. ‘While in the Protagoras the 8 word “philosophy” was still used in the meaning of love of wisdom (335 D, 342 D), here we see it defined as acquisition of knowledge (288 D), and the dialectician, who had received his first rules in the Meno, becomes the highest judge of every particular knowledge (290 C)’ (Lutoslawski, p. 210).

δ’ ὁ τοῦτο μὴ ἀπλοῦνι; Cf. Pto. 545 E ἢ τὸιο μὴ ἀπλοῦν; ‘absque c ulla exceptione validum’ (Ast).

ὁ ἐσποταιμάθημα γυνόσκαμεν περιστάντης, ‘if we knew how to go about 2 and learn.’

ἐξήκλησαμεν, ‘we fully proved.’ Cf. Phaedr. 273 b; Thuc. 5 iii. 64 δ’ ἢ ἡ φώνη ὑπὲρ ἠξηλοίτησεν, ἐξήκλησεν ἢ ἔξηκλητος. But in our present passage the idea of refutation remains, for what is proved is the negative proposition ἢ τοῦ ἄλλου πλεον κτλ. Cf. Thaet. 166 C ἐξήκλησεν ὅσοι οὕτω οὐδὲν τι σ每一τερον ἡμᾶς γένονται.

τὸ πάν ὡμιν χρυσόν γένοτο, ‘all the gold in the world should 6 become ours.’

NOTES

is so proud of his acquired certainty of knowledge that he would not give it up even for immortality, if not accompanied by knowledge how to use it (Euth. 289 b).


7 Λυρομοσοῦν δὲν ἦν Ἔινα. Heindorf, Badham, Burnet. For δὲν we have δεῖστατοι in BT, δεῖστατοι Heusde, δεῖστατοι ἄντας Winckelmann, Schanz. This last reading gives the sense:—'It is far from being the case that, if we are clever lyre-makers, we are also in possession of any such knowledge as this which we are seeking.' Heindorf's reading is simpler: 'It is far from being the case that we ought to be lyre-makers and possessed of any such art as this (lyre-making).'

There is, I think, no force in Winckelmann's assumption that such an indefinite phrase as τοιαύτα τοιαῦτα must refer to the same kind of art here in B 4. On the contrary its reference is determined by the nearer context (λυρομοσοῦν), and confirmed by εἰσαθα to γὰρ following.

C 3 θηράτης δὲ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πάλιν, δὲ is omitted in T. The omission of the whole clause by Schanz is quite arbitrary and unjustifiable. 'The art which makes the lyre is separate from the art which uses it, but though distinct they refer to the same thing.'

5 ἀλλὰ πρὸς θεῶν, ἔφην ἔγω, 'But seriously, said I.'

7 οὐ δὲ κεκτημένοις κτιλα, 'which we must acquire in order to be happy.' Cf. 282 E 3 οὐ δὲ λαθόντα εὐθαμοῦνων.

8 οὐ δὲ τοιαῦτα ἔφη, ἔγω, ὁ Κλαύδας. For the like order compare 286 E 5.

C 2 λυρομοσοῦν. Cf. Ammonius, De Diff. Voc. λογογράφος μὲν ὡς τὸ δικαίωσεν λόγου γράφων λογομοσοῦν δὲ τὸ λόγου τις καὶ μᾶθος αὐθεντεῖ. The two meanings are, in fact, common to both words; but λογογράφος more frequently means a 'chronicler' or 'prose writer,' as in Thuc. i. 21 ὥστε ὅσπις κατὰ μνήμην . . . ὥστε ὅστις λογογράφος συνεργείον. The λογομοσοῦν, or λόγων ποιητής, is distinguished from the ἰδιώτης who delivered the speech, Isoc. Aēn. Soph. 17 τοῖς δὲ κατακεκτησάντων τῷ φύσιν ἑξοντας ἑκατοντάς μὲν ὑμαῖσιν ἴδων ποιητῆς οὐκ ἦν ἀποτέλεσεν. 4 ἀλλὰ καὶ . . . ἀποτέλεσα D 5, omitted by Winckelmann and Schanz against the authority of the MSS.

NOTES

θεσσαλία τε, 'inspired as it were.' So in Theaet. 151 b, Prodicus e 4 and others are spoken of as σοφοίς τε καὶ θεσσαλίαις ἀνθρώποις.

κῆρυς τε καὶ παρακλήσει τυγχάνει σῶς, 'a charming and soothing.' 290 in Protag. 315 A the great Sophist is described as κῆρυς τῆς φωτᾶς A 4 δύστερον ὄρθριον. Cf. Pol. 358 B δύστερον δύστερόν ὄρθριον. Phaedr. 261 A τὸ μὲν ἄλογον ἄλογον δὲν ἔνε τέχνη γυμνασίου τε διὰ λόγους, 271 C ἐπειδή λόγους δύστερον τυγχάνει γυμνασίου σῶς, a passage of which there may be a reminiscence in the same phrase τυγχάνει σῶς.

ἐμείς οἱ θηράτην. The personal pronoun marks the antithesis: 9 Kleinius having confessed his ignorance, Socrates exclaims: 'I think I have found it.' Cf. Hom. II. xiii. 269 οὐδεὶς γὰρ οὗτος ἐμείς φιλολογίμον ἐμμενει ἀλήθεια. Soph. 175 C, Pol. 400 C.

Οὐδεμία, ἐφός, τῆς θεοτυκῆς αὐτῆς ἐπὶ πλείον ἐστιν. For αὐτῆς, BT, b many changes have been proposed: 'διὸς Αἱνοράδ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθείας ἔσται ἄθλον.' Soph. 128 (Schanz). Schanz himself marks αὐτῆς as corrupt, but Routh, Winckelmann, Stallbaum, and Burnet rightly leave it untouched. Ficinus gives a mere paraphrase: 'Nullus sane venationis opus ulterius purgatis quam,' &c. Routh's translation is much better: 'Nulla pars, inquit, ipsius artis venatoriae latius patet, quam ut,' &c.: but he gives no explanation of the construction, which is in fact quite simple. Οὐδεμία agrees with τέχνη understood from the preceding context: τῆς θεοτυκῆς is a substantive, as in Pol. 289 A γεωργικὴ δὲ καὶ θεοτυκή καὶ γυμναστικὴ καὶ λατρευτικὴ καὶ μητορικὴν ὑποτείνεις ὁρισθένης ἀπόφασον τῇ τοῦτοι. Thus αὐτῆς marks the distinction between 'actual' hunting, and the metaphorical hunting of the geometers, astronomers, and dialecticians.

οὐ γὰρ ποιεῖται τὸ διαγράμματα, 'for they are not the makers of c 2 the geometrical figures.' This is explained by the passage in Meno 82 B, where Socrates shows that the uneducated slave has in himself the ideas of the geometrical figures.

τὰ ὁστα ἀναφέρουσα, 'they discover the existing realities.' Cf. 3 Pol. 527 D τὸ γὰρ ἐὰν δέντο ὡς γεωμετρικὴ γνώση ἄνωτα τὸι διαλεκτικοὶ. Lutoslawski, p. 331, argues that 'dialekτική meaning metaphysical science (is) never used before Plato, and by
NOTES

Plato first in Ref. vii, cf. Phaedr. 275 B; dialektikós meaning, not as in the Cratylus, Euthydemus, and in Xenophon, one who knows how to ask and answer questions, but the philosopher able to discover unity in the variety of particulars, Phaedr. 266 B. But in this passage tois dialektikois must indicate in the higher sense the metaphysicians to whom the geometers hand over their hypotheses to be traced up to first principles. In the full description of Plato's 'dialectic' Pol. 531 B–536 B compare with our present passage especially 533 B, C: 'And the remaining arts which, as we said, have some small apprehension of true Being, such as geometry and the arts connected with it, we find that though they dream about real Being, they are unable to behold it in a waking state, so long as they leave the hypotheses which they use unexamined, because they are unable to explain the reason of them ... Therefore the dialectic method alone proceeds in this way,—it carries up its hypotheses to the first principle of all, in order to establish them firmly.' Cf. Dr. H. Jackson's excellent articles on the Republic in The Journal of Philology, vol. x. p. 143, and Lutoslawski, p. 302.

tois ὀργυγοτρόφοις, 'the quail-breeder,' who bred and trained the birds to fight. Cf. Ov. Amor. ii. 6, 27 'Ecce coturnices inter sua praecilia vivunt.'

'Αλλα ἄρα, δ θρόνος Διός; 'But then, I wonder, was it Ctesippus?' Socrates pretends to have forgotten: for a similar ironical profession of doubt see 286 E 5, note.

291 Ποῖος Κτήσιππος; 'Ctesippus indeed?' In this idiomatic use of a Ποῖος the interrogation is equivalent to an indignant denial. Cf. 304 Ε Ποῖον, ἐδικησθα, ὑποτεθα, δ μικρώτερος;

μὴ τοῖς κρεατίνοις 'Was it some superior being that was there and spoke thus?' Crito perhaps means Socrates himself. 'Vides ad Deum auctorem solita ironia ... eum referre ea quae ipse dialectica quasi obstetricia arte in iuvene egregiae indolis effecerat: vide Theas. 150 C, D, E.'

τῶν κρεατίνοιν μένοι τε ἦμοι δοκεῖ. 'It was indeed some superior being, it seems to me, and very superior.'

Πῶθεν ... ψηφοφορεῖ. 'Find it, my good fellow? Nay, our case was quite ridiculous.' Cf. A 1 Ποῖος Κτήσιππος; Pol. 330 A Ποίος ἐπηκεικησάμενος;

κορόδους, 'crested larks.' Schol. in loc. Κόροδοι ὄρνιθες ὄρνιτες.
NOTES

BT. 'Recte Stephanus et Bekkerus Διοσκόρῳ ... Nilh durius quam ἑπικαλομένος sine accusativo positum; neque sōna alīunde quam a δήμους pendere potest' (Badham). Cf. Rutherford, The New Phrynichus 310 'Διασκορῆ, ὥρθοτερας Διασκορῆ, γκάλας οὖν τοῖς σόν γάρ γι λέγοντα. Lobbeck's note on this article is in his best style: "Nimirum natura ita comparatum est ut dualis numeri longe maior sit usus, apud veteres praesertim, quam plurativi nominis. Διοσκόρῳ Eur. Or. 465; Arist. Pax 285; Eccles. 1069, &c." The mention of the Dioscuri (nauntis 'optatos Tyndaridas,' Propert. i. 17, 18) shows the origin of the preceding phrase πάντα φωνάς ὀφέιναι.


2 ἰσχυρὸ Διοσκόρῳ, 'ἀριστ. Marcinum 184' (Schanz); διοσκορέων 44.

NOTES

293 a

BT. 'Recte Stephanus et Bekkerus Διοσκόρῳ ... Nilh durius quam ἑπικαλομένος sine accusativo positum; neque sōna alīunde quam a δήμους pendere potest' (Badham). Cf. Rutherford, The New Phrynichus 310 'Διασκορῆ, ὥρθοτερας Διασκορῆ, γκάλας οὖν τοῖς σόν γάρ γι λέγοντα. Lobbeck's note on this article is in his best style: "Nimirum natura ita comparatum est ut dualis numeri longe maior sit usus, apud veteres praesertim, quam plurativi nominis. Διοσκόρῳ Eur. Or. 465; Arist. Pax 285; Eccles. 1069, &c." The mention of the Dioscuri (nauntis 'optatos Tyndaridas,' Propert. i. 17, 18) shows the origin of the preceding phrase πάντα φωνάς ὀφέιναι.


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NOTES

293 d

οἴτις. Winckelmann quotes examples of a similar usage from Plato, Polit. 273 b, 284 a, Phileb. 26 a, Legg. 783 e. The conjecture of Abresch. καλὰ δὴ ποταγίς, adopted by Stallbaum, Badham, and Schanz, has no support from MSS., nor from any passage in which ποταγίς is so used, the usual phrase being φθέγγεσθαι, as in Theocr. 179 D τὸν φερομένον ταῦταν οὖσαν δια- κρίνοντα ἄτι ὕπαι ἑτο σαμοῖν φθέγγεσθαι. The reading of BT is rightly retained by Burnet. The quotation of the passage in Hesych. καλὰ δὴ ποταγίς; καλὰ λαλεῖ is regarded by Heindorf as a corruption of καλὰ δὴ πάντ' ἄτις.

5 ἡς, 'since sooth.' Stallbaum refers to the same ironical use of ὅς ἢ in Pol. 337 C Elius, ἥπιον ὅς ἢ ὅμοιον τοὐτὸ ἔκειν; Gorg. 486 e, 492 b, Protag. 542 c, in all which passages the ironical sense is evident.

8 ἀρὰ σωτῆς πάγεως. 'Is that your argument, and that your wise invention?'

2 εἰ ὅς, . . . σὺ ὡς πέσωσα κτλ. 'What then, are not you in this same plight? For whatever I might suffer in company with you and our dear friend Dionysodorus here, I certainly should not be so aggrieved.' On φῆσαν κεφαλής cf. Hom. II. viii. 281 Τάκεις, φῶλα φοίβος. Phaedr. 264 a θείας, φῶλα φοίβος. Gorg. 513 c.

294 a καὶ σὺ γέ πρὸς. 'Yes, and you too.' On this absolute use of πρὸς see Protag. 331 D πρὸς δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς φιλικά σοβρῆ ἣν. Gorg. 469 b καὶ ἔλευσον γε πρὸς. In 298 D καὶ πρὸς . . . is corrupt.

9 ἀλλὰ τί; 'But what then?' The complete question represented elliptically by τί may ask either for a reason, 'Why?'; or, as here, for an inference, 'What then?' Cf. Phaed. 89 b, Euthyphro 14 b, Pol. 357 b; Aristoph. Ran. 489, and see Riddell, Digest, § 20; Jelf, Cl. Gr. 880, Obs. 2.

b δὲ μέλα οὖσα προκαλολαμάψας. 'I could hardly incite you.' Schanz suggests a corruption in στοπβάκας.

6 νευροφαράξας, 'to do stitching;' as a part of 'shoemaking,' αικονο- τομίν (εἴκονικα), distinct from κατέργε τίνας, as sole': cf. Xen. Cyr. viii. 2, 4 ἐτεὶ δὲ ἔνθα καὶ ὕποδηματα δὲ μὲν νευροφαράξας μάλαν τρέφεται, 6 δὲ σχίζει.

8 τοὺς ἀστέρας ὅπως εἰδώ, καὶ τὴν ἁμος; Cf. Hdt. i. 47 Οἶδα δ' ἔγω 46.

NOTES

294 b


ὁπόσοις ὁδόντας ἔχει. Cf. Aristoph. Plat. 1057 πῶς χείρις σὶς ὁδόντας. Aristot. Rhet. iii. 5, 4 τέχνη γὰρ ἄν τις μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς ἄριστοι κοριμοὶ ἄρτα ἤ περίως εἶπαν μᾶλλον ἡ πύξα ἤφη. Lysias, Fr. 2, 8 μούνοι τοὺς ὁδόντας ἀρθρωμένους ἀνατρέψατε τῇ τῆς χειρός δικλιτοῦτο. This last is the game to which Cesippus alludes, the modern 'Mora,' or 'How many fingers do I hold up?' Aristotle says that 'Even or odd!' ('Ludere par imper') is easier.

μὴ θάμος, 'do not say so.' Cf. Phaedr. 234 b, Mem. 236 c.

7 φαντασμα ἐγώντι, 'be found to have known by my counting.'

9 πάνω ἀποκαλλήστες, 'Cesippus without any reserve whatever.' D 3 went on asking anything and everything, at last even the most indecent things,—did they know them?'


οἱ καρποὶ . . . ὄμοιοι ὁδοιποιοῦν. Cf. Xen. Cyr. i. 4, 11 οἱ δὲ καρποὶ, ὁ ὅπως τοὺς ἄνθρωπος ποιεῖ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ὀμοίοι ἑρμηνεύουν. ['τὸν Εὐθύδημον.'] Either this name, or ὁ Διονυσόδορος, must be omitted, as is proved by δὲ following; and τῆλεκοντο ὃν applies better to Dionysodorus as being the elder.


ἐν τῷ προκεῖ ψαλίσθαι. Routh finds a description of this gymnastic 3 feat in Xen. Conon. ii. 22 δὲ θαμοὶ πώς εἰς τοιοῦτον καρπυτῶμεν προκοπὰς ἡμετέρας, ἐκεῖνο ταῦτα εἰς τὸ ἐμπροεικοῦς ἐπικαίρως μείζων προκοπὰς ἐπιτεκνόησε. But the τοὺς προκαὶνες can only mean 'to be whirled round upon a wheel,' and this meaning is found in a later passage of Xen. Conon. vii. 3 διὸ οὐκ οἷόν τι καὶ μᾶλλον 

μαχαίρας κυβίσταν κυβίσταν ἐπίκειτα χαῖνα, δαμαστὴν οὕδην προσήκε, καὶ μᾶλλον
NOTES

294 c

'to yge žyv to τροχων δώμενός γράφειν τε καὶ αναγράφοσκεν θάμα μέν ίσος τι ἑστιν, ἡδονή δε οibaba δύναμισ γυναι τίξ ἐν παράχαξι.
3 ἡςτιν τώρα σφάλας Ἰμαμ. The separation of this from the former part of the sentence is rightly removed by Winckelmann, Badham, and Burnet. ὅσον inserted before ὅσον by Schanz is quite unnecessary. 'Surely, said I, you do not also know how to turn a somersault into the midst of swords, or to be whirled round on a wheel at your time of life, having attained to such skill as that?'
11 ἔβατιν ἤμα αὐτοτίμονα. 'They both affirmed it together.' Schanz adds a second πάντα before ἔβατιν without authority.

295 a 3 Πιλάν γ' Ἒτι (ἤμ β') ἐμαύ... 'Yes (I cannot believe), except that you are likely to be wise. ἦ β' omitted in the MSS. was added by Stephanus from Cornarius. Schanz thinks ἀποστά should be inserted after ἐμαύ: but 'I do not believe that you are likely to be wise' is very unlike the ironical courtesy of Socrates. A better word than ἀποστά would be ὑμῶν or something similar. Then ἐλθεν γ' ἵνα ἐμαύ (ὁμών) κτλ., 'Yes, except in so far as I think you are likely to be wise.' Either ἐμαύ must be omitted or a verb supplied.
6 Ζηστά τάτα ἔμελχοναι, 'I am delighted to be refuted on these points.'
9 ἄλλα μή... A certain correction of ἄλλα μῆ... adopted by all editors, except Winckelmann, whose attempt to explain ἄλλα μή is not satisfactory.
10 'Τοκολαμβάνει, 'of course you understand something (as the meaning) of what I say.'
4 ἄλλη ἐρωτήσα διανοούμενως, 'ask a question intending it in one way, and I take it in another way.'
6 μηδεν πρὸς ἐνας, 'nothing to the point.' Cf. Philol. 18 τι τέρον ἐπεσ αὐ ταύτ' ἑστιν; The phrase became proverbial, as in Lucian, Philologus, 29 οὗτον πρὸς ἐπαίνετο ταύτη, φασιν. A similar phrase is ὀφείλειν τοῦ λόγου, Philol. 33 B, 42 E (Heindorf).
7 Ἔλογον κτλ. 'It will satisfy me, but not you, I imagine.' For a like arrogant speech cf. 295 B ὅδικοι ἤμα γ' τῆς ἄλλης εἴπερ, στ.
10 Οἶκ ἐπισκεπτέω. The future was rightly restored by Dekker, as repeating scornfully Socrates' refusal to answer. 'You will not answer what you understand from time to time (to be meant), because you are continually talking nonsense, and are too much of a dotard.'

b 9 διασπασθα λα τὰ λεγόμων. Cf. Aristot. Soph. El. xvii. 15 'Ἐν μέν ὅσον δὲ τοῖς κυρίοις λεγόμων ἄμαμα ἀναγράφεσθαι ἢ ἀνάγκη διακρίνεσθαι ἢ ἀπάξω τῷ διαφορέρμονα. When words are used in their proper sense, we must answer either simply "yes" or "no," or by drawing a distinction.' ibid. ἄλλαν ὅσον ἢν ἤν ἄρα αὐτῷ τὸ προειρημένον οἷς συνοχρημένον ἄρτις.

9 ὁ φράτος τὰ τάμα προστίμονα, 'to entrap me in his verbal toils.' 2 ἔλογον κτλ. Ὡδικ., 'I had determined,' better than ἐλευθήρων T. 5
9 ὁ χορός αὐτοῦ, ἔφη προστιμορίαιναι. 'Here again the fellow answers more than is asked.'

a 1 Ἀς, ὡς ἐπίσταμαι. Socrates foresees the fallacy involved in 7 'Ας meaning either 'at all times' absolutely or 'at each time.'

8 παῖσει παράμεροις; 'again will you not cease from superfluous qualifications?' In Plutarch, Mor. 169 D παραπεταγμένοις is 'to speak aside,' and in Polybius xviii. 15. 13 'obiter dicere.'

9 σφάλη BT Vind., the old reading σφάλη was altered by Heindorf 9 to σφάλη, but there is no reason for rejecting σφάλη.

7 τεταρτον, 'There it is again! The same superfluous qualification.'

9 μῆν ἐν... ἐκφάνης. The Sophist arrogantly tells Socrates that he need not withdraw his qualification, meaning himself to ignore it entirely, as he does in his next question.

295 b 9 διάκρισιν καὶ πάντα ἐπίσταμαι...; The question is framed on the C I assumption that Socrates had admitted ἐπίσταμα, and which qualification δ' ἐπίσταμα is disregarded.

10 εὶ μή πάντα ἐπίσταμα. 'The word used at the beginning of the argument was πάντα, but Socrates in his answer ἐπίσταμαι is used, seemingly without intending to make a distinction between these two words. But in fact πάντα means 'all severally' (καθ' εἶνας ἐκκατον 294 D 2), while ἐπίστασθαι (= ἡμι πάντα 296 C 10) means 'all together.' The Sophist takes advantage of the distinction to frame a question which can only be answered without qualification (ἀκλίπως); and the answer τέρον γῆρ ἂν εἴη is equivalent to a simple 'No.'

296 a 1 ἐπίσταμα γῆρ ὑμολογεῖ ἐπίστασθαι. The Sophist is exultant: he 4

extenuates 49
seizes upon ἄπνωσ (B 5) and entirely ignores the limitation. His argument would run thus in a formal syllogism:

You cannot know ἄπνωσ without knowing πάντα:
You admit that you know ἄπνωσ:
Therefore you know πάντα.

6 Αἴσχος... ἐπίστημα. 'So it seems, said I, since the limitation "what things I know" has not any force, but I know all things.'
The last clause is still dependent on ἐπίστημα.
7 οὗτ' ἐπίστημα ἐστὶ ἐπίστημα. Again the Sophist declares his contempt for all limitations such as Λ 7 δεῖ... ἐπίστημα.
8 καὶ ἢμα πάντα. Cf. B 3 δεῖ δ' ἐπίστημα... πάντα; When δεῖ πάντα is taken with the absolute sense of δεῖ, it necessarily implies ἢμα πάντα. This absolute δεῖ he next proceeds to develop.
9 ἐστιν ἤγγινον καὶ :host the time of your birth, and at that of your begetting.' The climax requires this sense of ὑγία, which might otherwise mean 'growing up' (Jowett).
10 οὗτος is condemned by all editors, but no satisfactory correction has been found: οὗ Schanz, οὗ Ast, εὗ Schanz, οὗ Σταλबαμ, εὗ οὗ Schanz. Possibly oὗς, which is certainly superfluous, may be only an erroneous repetition from oὗς γείσησα just above. Without it the sense is quite clear.
12 'should be willing to help': cf. Legg. 718 τὸ πολυτιμῆτος τοῖς.
13 ἐκ τούτου... ὑπό ἡγία οὗ πάντα ἐπίστημα. 'As to other points I know not how I could argue with men of such prodigious wisdom as you that I do not know all things.' Cf. Charm. 169 E Οὗ τοῦτο... ἐμμησθῆτω, δι' ἂν... ὑπὸ οὗ οὕσαντα. Parmen. 135 A ἐμμησθῆτων δὲ καὶ ἦν ἤτοι τὰ τῶν. Pol. 476 D.
14 τοποθετούσων. On Plato's frequent use of adjectives in -άδες and εὗρος see Lutoslawski, p. 113.

On the separation of the a 5 nominative from ἐφ' compare 286 E, note. Euthydemos is represented as sharper than his elder brother, and so is made the chief speaker throughout.

50.

NOTES

297 Διαφθείρας, ἐφ' τῶν λόγων, ἡ Ἐθούδης. On the separation of the

51

NOTES

297 A ἦς τοῦ ἐν ἀριστερᾷ. Cf. 271 B 6 ὅ δὲ παρ' ἐμὲ καθήμενος ἐξ ἀριστερᾶς 6... Δυσορθωτοῖς.

Δυναμικοὶ καὶ διάκονοι. Cf. Apollod. ibid. ἐξορθίζει δὲ καρκίνος τῇ ὑπέρ ἄρτερ κάκων τῶν πίθα. Βοθύν ἐπεκάλουσα. Apollod. ibid. ἐπεκάλουσα καὶ αὐτὸς βοθύν 7
NOTES

297 C

τῶν Ἰδαν. Apollodorus (circular b.c. 140) seems to have followed Plato’s description very closely.

d 1 δ’ ἐπὶ ἅπα Ἱδαν [Πατροκλῆς] ἐλ θόα. Patroclus was the nephew (ἄδελφοντος) of Socrates, being the son of his half-brother Chaerephonus (E 7). But the insertion of his name here is probably due to a marginal gloss. δ’ ἐπὶ ἅπα Ἱδαν means little more than ‘my helper’: ‘Iolaus pro auxiliatore vulgo accipi ostendit Erasmus Chelides, p. 93 (Routh). The author of the gloss failed to see in the words ἰδαν ἄν θάνατον ὥσπερες the allusion to Ctesippus and his fierce retorts upon the Sophists.

θόκα. Heindorf thinks that this cannot refer to Ctesippus who was present without some such addition as ἐς βορθέαν οἱ βορθέοι. But this idea is already implied in δ’ ἐπὶ ἅπα Ἱδαν, ‘my helper’; and ἰδαν is used in the same indefinite way without any addition in Protag. 310 c 5, 335 c 5.

3 ὡπότε σου ταῦτα ἵμηραν, ‘whenever you have finished this song.’ ‘Ὑμνεῖν, like the Latin cantare and our English ‘canting,’ is often used in the sense of ‘harping upon’ a thing. Cf. Pol. i. 329 B καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ δὴ τὰ γήρας ὑμοῦνα, δοσιν κακῶν σφίς αὐτῶν. Pol. viii. 549 B ἀδα καὶ οὐ πυτίων αὐτοῖς γνώμης περὶ τῶν ταύτων ἄρον. v. Ruhnke. Tim. Lex.

e 2 παραπλησίον μὲν τοῦνομα Ἰδανῆς. But paraplethos is preferred by Schanz, as at one time by Heindorf. The neuter is the reading of B T, but the construction is doubtful, for it is not clear, as Heindorf once thought, that because we find ἄν αὐτῷ δομος Ἰδανῆς we may also write paraplethos τοῦνομα Ἰδανῆς. An example of such usage is wanted.

6 αὐτούς ὑματητοὺς γας. Socrates tries to add the proper limitation to the undistributed term ἄδελφους, as again 298 A 2 τοῦ πατρός: Τοῦνομος γάρ, ἵππω.

8 Πατῆρ δ’ ἢ, ἵππ. Dionysodoros, without noticing the objection of Socrates, passes at once to another question.

298 A 2 ἂρι’ οὖν πατήρ ἢ ἐτεροὶ ὥν πατρός; See the note on B 2 ἐτεροὶ ὥν πατρός οὐ πατήρ ἐστιν.

a 2 τῇ λίθῳ, ‘the (proverbial) stone’: see the next note.

3 μὲν φανῶ ὡς σοῦ δ’ αὐτός. To be like a stone was a common expression of contempt. Cf. Gorg. 494 A δὲ ὁ δαστρι λίθον ὅρι: . . . μίτε χάριτους μίτε λυπημένους: ibid. B Χρασίτου τινα ἀν ὁ βλέπων λέγετι, 52

NOTES

298 a

ἄλλ’ οὖν μεταροώ ὀδὴ λίθων. Sympos. 198 C μὴ ἀυτός μὲ λίθον τῇ ἁμόρρῃ ποιήσει. The Sophist chose λίθος cunningly, as Socrates would gladly admit that he was not a stone. Cf. Soph. El. iv. 528.

ὑποκόν . . . ἐτεροὶ δὲ πατήρ ὥν δὲ πατήρ ἑστιν. τ. ἐν πατήρ ἑστιν. B. 8 Schanz writes ὡκουμ, omits οὐκ ἐστι, and reads ἑστιν. These many changes are quite unnecessary.

ἐτεροὶ δὲ πατήρ ὥν πατήρ ἑστιν. ‘Fallacia est Accidentis’ (Routh), b 2.

Cf. Aristot. Soph. El. v. ‘Paralogisms which arise from accident are when anything is asserted to be equally true of the subject (τῆς πράγματι) and of its accident (τῆς συμβατικῆς). For since the same subject has many accidents, it is not necessary that the same should all be present to the predicates and to the subject of which they are predicated; for in this case all things would be the same, as the Sophists say. Such a fallacy is the following: If Coriscus is different from a man, he is different from himself, for he is a man. Or, if he is other than Socrates, and Socrates is (a) man, you have acknowledged, say they, that he is other than man, because it happens that he is other than one who is (a) man.’

The passage in the Euthydemus put into a syllogism would run thus:

Chaerephon is not Sophroniscus:

Sophroniscus is a father:

.: Chaerephon is not a father.

There is evidently an illicit process of the minor, ‘father’ being particular in the premiss but universal in the conclusion.


οῦ ταύτα ταύτα πένθεσθε; ‘And is not your father in the same plight?’

Οὐκ ἐν συμβατικαίς, ‘I should not wish that,’ or more plainly, ἀν ε重要因素. ‘I should be sorry if he were.’
298 c

NOTES

5 μὴ γὰρ ... συνάπτεται. For the construction cf. Alcib. ii. 139 D ἄλλα ὧν ... μὴ οὐκ ὤντος τοῦτο ἐκεῖνον. Laches 156 C ἄλλα ἄριστον μὴ Νυκίδες οὐκειτί τι λέγειν. Theaet. 145 B ἄλλα ὧν μὴ πάσχων νέονεν. In this sense, 'whether,' μὴ may also be used without ὧν or any similar verb: cf. Protag. 312 Α' ἄλλα ὧν μὴ οὐκ ὤντος καὶ τῆς τῆς ὑπολογίας, 'Perhaps then you do not suppose.' So, in our present passage, 'Perhaps, as the proverb is, you are not joining like with like,' i.e. the cases which you compare are not similar. See Riddell, Digest of Idioms, § 138.


d 4 καθὼς ... Cf. Athen. 106 ε ἔφεσι τευθύνεται, καθὼς καθάτηκε, 'With turnips cuttle-fish, with gudgeons shrimps.' For καθὼς T, the more usual word διάτρησις has been substituted in B.

5 (Κάρπος) Badham, Kai πρὸς ΒΤV. 'Quod καὶ πρὸς κάρπος invitus omnibus libris mutavi, audacius sans factum est; sed quum ex altera parte sordes et tenebras conspicis ex altera lucem et nitorem, difficile est religionis non alienando ob livissi' (Badham).

e 4 πατήρ ἦν ὅσον ἦν, ἐστε ὅσον πατήρ ἦγεν. 'Fallacia haec est quae vocatur compositions, i.e. cum coniunctum accipiantur, quae erant accipienda divisim' (Routh). Cf. Aristot. Soph. Επ. 214, where as examples we find ἄρ' ἡ αἰτία σῶν ἐστὶν ἐργον, ὡς ὅσον κέιμα πατήρ; and the solution ἄρ' τοῦτο ἐστὶν ἐργον, ἀν' τοῦτο ἐστὶν ἐργον, ἐστίν ἐστὶν ἐργον. ἡ ἡ κτίμα ἡ πράγμα ἡ ἀλλα τι. See note on 298 B 2.

299 πατήρ τιπτομαί. BT, πατήρ ἦν τιπτομαί. Sauppe, Burnet. dicoi-
a τερελ ἦν Ἀστ. Schanz. But ἦν is not necessary: see 292 E 5 ποιήσει, note.

2 δὲ τι μαθὼν, 'that he was so foolish as to beget such wise sons.' Cf. 283 E.

ἄλλο ἦν ποιεῖν, ironical. 'But I suppose the father of you two and of the puppies has gained many good things from this wisdom of yours.' Cf. Soph. Αἴας 1088 ἦν μὲ τῆς ἐκλεξίας, σῶσα πατήρ ἐρῶ InBackground ὡς, ἢ ἐφευρόσεις ἤ τε τῆς ἄστατος.

b 4 Σὺ ἄριστα ἔσοι, 'You will know best,' i.e. when you have heard what I am going to say.

54

NOTES

299 b

τούτω (τὸ) ὃς ἐφάβειν. 'Articulum τὸ e cod. Par. addidit' (Heinдорf). τὸ is omitted in BT Vind., having probably dropped out after the preceding τοῦ.

καὶ καλὰς ἐκεῖ ἐξ, 'in that case it will be well.' 'Cf. Theaet. 172 B ἄλλες ἐκεῖ, οὗ λέγειν, ἐν τοῖς δικαίων' (Badham). Schanz reads ἐκάνει, and Heinendorf thinks that ἐκένει is an interpolation arising out of the following ἐξεί.


ὁ ἄνδρες ὁ ἐν Δαλφοῖς. Pausanias (Lib. x.) gives an almost empty list of statues at Delphi, but does not mention any one of unusual size. Probably the statue here meant was that of Apollo himself, as the Greeks who fought against the king of the Persians erected a brazen Zeus at Olympia, and an Apollo at Delphi, after the battles of Artemision and Salamis' (Paus. 553).


Βραδεῖος. Cf. Apollod. i. 1, 1: Ησε. Νεοθέου 149 Κότος τε Βραδεῖος τὸν Γιρφήνα, οὐχιλλαχανά τεκνά τῶν ἐκατόν μὲν χαίρεις ἂν ἄστοι ἀπαστομο δὲ ἔκαστο πεντήκοντα.

καὶ τὰ ἔρωτα τὸν Ικτωρὶ. This clause is rejected by Schanz, ap-7 parently without sufficient reason.

τὰ πρότερον ἀποκεκλείμενα. The previous answers of Ctesippus d r had reference to the advantage, in some cases, of having many shields and spears.

The following argument is intended to ridicule the greed for money which is so severely satirized by Aristophanes in the Plutus, which was acted in its second form, as we now have it in 388 B.C.

〈χρήμα τε〉 Badham. 'Librarium quum ad loci rationem minus 4 attenderet XHNAEAEI in XHMAPTAIEI corrupt' (Badham).
NOTES

4 Σαφών... αυτή τοις ευσεβεστέρων εξουσιών. Cf. Hdt. iv. 65 (Rawlinson): ‘The skulls of their enemies, not indeed of all, but of those whom they most detest, they treat as follows. Having sawn off the portion below the eyebrows, and cleaned out the inside, they cover the outside with leather. When a man is poor, this is all that he does; but if he is rich, he also lines the inside with gold: in either case the skull is used as a drinking-cup. They do the same with the skulls of their own kith and kin if they have been at feud with them, and have vanquished them in the presence of the king. When strangers whom they deem of any account come to visit them, these skulls are handed round,’ &c. Cf. Strabo 300.

5 τοίς άλλοτε. Ctesippus meets the Sophists with their own weapons: as Dionysodorus had argued (298 E 4) πατήρ ὑμῶν ἄμβολον ἔστιν, δει τοις πατήρ γίγνεται ὁ κόσμος, so Ctesippus calls the skulls which the Scythisans had taken ‘their own,’ and so ‘they drink out of their own gilded skulls,’ and ‘hold their own head in their hands and see inside it.’

300 τὸ δυνατὰ ὑπάρξῃ. The phrase has two meanings, corresponding to the active and passive senses of δυνατός: (1) δύναται ὑπάρξῃ (2) δύνασαι τοὺς ὑπάρξει. The former is common and needs no illustration; for the latter sense cf. Aesch. Agam. 97 ὁ τι καὶ δυνατόν καὶ δεόμεν αὐτῷ. Xen. Anab. iv. 1, 24 δυνατὸν καὶ ἐποιείσθαι παρείσθαι ὁδόν. The fallacy therefore may be regarded as belonging either to the class para τὴν ὁμοιότητα οὐ παρὰ τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν, on which see Aristot. Soph. Ei. iv. 526 and 527: as an example of the latter Aristotles gives ὡρα ὁ ὁρα ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁρᾶ ὡρα ὑπὸ τὸ ὁρᾶ, διὸ δὶ τὸ κόσμον, διὸ δὶ τὸ κόσμον.

3 Κάλα, scilicet ὑπάρξῃ τὸ δυνατὸ ὑπάρξῃ. The Sophist seems to have acted like Antisthenes when he turned out the rags of his cloak for Socrates to see, Diog. Laert. vi. 8.

5 Τί σφ.; . . . Μὴ θεί. In the φθοράντες ἢ (Hdt. iv. 65) διὰ τοῦ ὑποκατάστας ἔπεισαν Θεόδωρον καὶ Θεόδωρον, διὰ δὲ μηδεὶς μηδεὶς ἄλλη καθήκονται αὕτη πάροικη περὶ αὐτῶν. I have completed the quotation.

6 οὕτως ἡδέ οὖς, ‘sweet innocent as you are.’ Cf. Gorg. 491 D, 56

NOTES

300 a

Pol. 337 D, Ruhnke, Tim. Lex. Ἡδὺς εὐθυγράμμως καὶ ὑπέροχον. Suidas: Ἡδὺς εὐθυγράμμως καὶ ὑπέροχον. Suidas: Ἡδύς εὐθυγράμμως καὶ ὑπέροχον. εὐθυγράμμως καὶ ὑπέροχον. ὅπως καθόθων ἐπεικομενήθωσα, ὅπως καθόθων ἐπεικομενήθωσα, to have fallen asleep with your eyes open. Cf. Lucian, Alex. 255 λαμβάνων γὰρ τὸ βιβλίον ἐπικομιστὸν, ὅπως καθόθων, ὅπως καθόθων.

συγωντα λέγει, ‘a speaking of the silent.’ Cf. Aristot. Soph. Ei. b 1 iv. 528 Παρὰ τῷ ἄμφιβολῳ οὐ τοιχίθη λέγει . . . ὃς ἐστι συγωντα λέγει; Δεύτερον γὰρ καὶ τὸ συγωντα λέγει, τὸ τε τὸν λέγοντα σκοτών καὶ τὸ τὸ λέγοντα σκοτών. Ibid. x. 528 δὲ ἐν τῷ συλλογισμῷ ἔστι τὸ αἴτιον, ἐν τῇ ἀντιφάσει (προσκυνεῖσθαι γὰρ δὲ τῇ ἀντιφάσει), ὅτι ἐν ἀμφιθείαν, ἡ ἡμεῖς καὶ τοίς τοῖς συγωντα λέγεσιν ἐν τῇ ἀντιφάσει, οὐκ ἐν τῷ συλλογισμῷ. 8 συγωνομεν . . . λέγεται, ‘the iron, if anybody touch them, are 5 spoken of as roaring and crying aloud.’ For λέγοντα, BT, Ast conjectured λέγεται. But the passive is right in answer to οὐ συγωνομεν λέγεται:

σοῦ μὲν ὧτα σοφίας ἠλλαθες οὐδὲν ἔποι, ἐν τῷ συγωνομεν λέγεσιν, ‘in this your wisdom has made you unwittingly talk nonsense.’

λέγοντα συγων, ‘to be silent in speaking.’

8 ἐπικρατούμεν, ‘to be over anxious on account of the boy.’ Cf. c 1 Charm. 162 c 1 Καὶ οἱ Κριτίαν δήλος μὲν ἔν τι καὶ πάλαι ἄγανον καὶ βαλλόμενος πρὸς τὸν Χαριμάδον καὶ πρὸς τὸν παράγαν ἔχων.

τὸ λέγοντα, a necessary emendation of τὸ λέγοντα BT, adopted 4 by all editors (except Winkelman) before Schanz, who bracketed τὸ λέγοντα.

τὸ ὡς δήμου λέγοντα. Euthydemos himself tries to limit the 6 universal term τὸ πάντα by a distinction such as he would not allow Socrates to use, 295 B 4, 296 A 1 οὗ γὰρ ἐγγενεῖ ἐρωτά δῆπτι, ἄλλ' ἐπικριται τῷ.


ἐξημοθείρων τῶν λέγοντων. For the explanation of this phrase 4 Winkelman rightly refers to Pol. 479 C τοῖς ἐν τοῖς ἐπίσκεψισι, ἐξημοθείρωσαν τῇ τῶν παῖδων αἰνήματα τῷ περὶ τοῦ κειμένου τῆς θηλίς περὶ τῆς νυκτερίδος, δὲ καὶ ἐφ' ὧν ἀκώσαν αἰνήματα ἐξημερεύετον βαλείαν. The riddle itself is preserved by the Scholiast on that passage.

57
The point of comparison is that one who ‘is and is not a man’ strikes that which ‘is and is not a bird,’ &c. Upon this Plato by the mouth of Glaucon remarks that we cannot form a positive conception of such things either as being or not-being (καὶ οὐκ ἐπιστανείται γίνεται πάντως νόθην). Winckelmann also refers (Proleg. xxxii. note b) to an anecdote about Menedemus in Diog. Laert. ii. 135 Ἁλεξίου ποτὲ ἔρωτιστον καὶ πάνιναν τόν πατέρα τύπωσεν, ἀλλ᾽ οὕς ἐτύπωσεν, φάναι, όπετέματα. Πάλαι γὰρ ἐγκαίνιον λόγιον ἔχει ἐξαστάτα καὶ ἢ οὐ λόγος τῷ ἀναζωοῦν, Πλάνον, ὀποῖον, τι ἐπὶ ἀκατάστασις ὑπάρχει, ἐξόν ἐν πάνταις ἀνθρώποις.

Our Sophists in the Euthydemus had insisted on the same rule that the answer must be given categorically ‘Yes’ or ‘No’; and Ctesipus shrewdly turns their own chief weapon against them: ‘That is not what I ask, but “Do all things keep silence or speak?”’ This is exactly the ‘Fallacia plurium interrogationum, quando plures quaestiones velut una proponuntur’ (Aldrich ap. Mansel, Artis Logicae Rudimenta, App. 139, Whatley, Elements of Logic, Bk. iii. 9). Cf. Aristot. Soph. El. ν. 11 ἢ πάλαι, διὰ τὰ μὲν ἐκείνες ἀγάδες τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἀγάδες, πάντα ἀγάδες οὐκ ἀγάδες; δύο γὰρ ὅποις ἐστι, οὐκ ἐστιν μόνον ἡ σκέψις ἡ προφθονίμου δισεμελωμένη διάκειται καὶ τούτη τὸ γὰρ φαίνεται τῶν μὴ ἀγαθῶν τι εἶναι ἀγαθὸν τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὶ μὴ ἀγαθὸν προφθονίμου. Ibid. xxx. Πρὸς δὲ τούτου τὰ πλεῖστα ἐρωτήματα ἐν ποιούσαις εἴδοσ ἐν ἀρχῇ διοικήσεως ἔρωτισμοι ἐπὶ μία, πρὸς ὅτι μία ἀρχὴν ἐτύπωσε ὅστις δέ τι πλεῖστος καθ' ἐνός ὅστις ἐν καθ' ὅστις πλεῖστος ἀρχὴν ἀρχὴν ἀρχὴν.

In the present case, however, where both sides of the dilemma are to be denied, Dionysodorus might have escaped, if instead of answering ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ he had been allowed and contented to answer simply Obdēteron; but ‘by adding ἁμοῦθερα he has ruined his argument.’ (Explicationes τῶν λόγων).

ἔπος ἐκάκλη τῇ καὶ ἠττητα τῷ ΒΤ, ’η he is beaten and done for. ‘Prodidit’ (Ficinus), ἀπολάβετο (Heindorf). ‘Quid reponendum sit non exputo’ (Badham). The objection that the weaker word comes first is hardly a sufficient reason for tampering with the text of BT. πλεῖον ἢ δικαιολόγοι. Ἀριστιδ. Oral. Sacr. i. 494 Ἡδύ μὲν τις καὶ δ ἄλλος χρηστὸς τινας αὐτῷ συμβάντος καὶ βουλόμενος ἐνδείξαςα τὴν ἡγομεν ἐνός ὅτι ἢ αὐτί πλεῖον ἢ δικαιολόγοι γεγονός (Heindorf).

ὅ δὲ μόι ΒΤ, γρ. δὲ δὲν μου ἢ ἢν ἢν, δὲ δὲν πολλοί Badham, Schanz. ἡ The reading of ΒΤ δὲ μόι πανούργοις δὲν, δὲ δὲν πολλοί, has been rightly retained by Bekker, Winckelmann, Stallbaum, and Hermann: μοι is what is called the dativus commodi, frequently used to express the interest or opinion of the person speaking (Jell, Gr. Cr. 600, Obs. 2): if any change were to be made, the best would be μοι δοκεί (Burnet), used parenthetically: ‘And he, methinks, rogue that he was, I mean Ctesippus, had overheard this very trick from these men themselves, for there are no other men living that have such wisdom. But cf. Sophist. 216 D τού μέντοι ἔξων ἢμίν ἢδον ἐν πνευματείᾳ.


῾Αρα ἑτέρα ἤντα τοῦ καλοῦ; ‘Were they other than the beautiful?’ 301 Ἡδύ ἤντα τοῦ καλοῦ; ‘Were they other than the beautiful?’ 301 ‘In these words I see not merely, with Steinhart, “a close a1 approximation to the doctrine of ideas,” but the actual enunciation of this doctrine’ (Zeller, Plato 126, note). Stallbaum more correctly sees here only the logical doctrine of universals as held by Socrates, upon which Plato afterwards founded his metaphysical doctrine of Ideas.’ Cf. Meno 73 D ἐπίτη ἐν γέ τι γέτοις κατὰ πάντων. 74 A πάλλει αὐτής ἡ πρόκειται μίας ὡς οὕτως . . . τὴν δὲ μίαν, ἢ δὲ πάντων τούτων ἐκείνην, ὃς δυνάμεις διενεργεῖ. Parmen. 130 B. Aristot. Metaph. i. 6, 2, and see note on 301 A 4 σάρκες καλοῦ.


in all the rest, like workmen whose business it is to finish each his proper work, you also seem to me to finish in very beautiful style the practice of discussion."

ρίνα χαλκεόν προσθηκή, 'whom it befits to forge copper.'  'Dicit 7 ρίνα non ρίνα, ut statim ambiguitas sermonis masticatur' (Heindorf).

τὰ δὲ, κεραμεύνει; 'Well again, whom to make pots?' The alteration of τὰ δὲ into τὰ, with some inferior MSS., is unnecessary.

τὰ μερὰ κρία ... ὅπταν, 'and cut up and boil and roast the small 9 pieces.' Badham reads τὰ κρία σμερὰ κατακόφαντα, 'to cut up the flesh into small pieces': but τὰ μερὰ κρία depends on the principal verbs ὑπὸ καὶ ὅπταν as much if not more than on κατακόφαντα.


ἐπιτίθεντο Schanz: ἐπιτίθεντο B, ἐπιτίθεντο T. Cf. Rutherford, New Phrynichus, cxx. 'The authority of Porson (ad Eur. Or. 141) has induced many scholars to prefer ἐπὶ δὲ and τίς τοῖς τις and τίς τοῖς. Bruck, on Aristoph. Lys. 895 and Soph. Phil. 992, took the opposite view to that of Porson, and in this case the verdict of the great English critic must be reversed. The authority of the MSS. is wholly on the side of Bruck. Thus in Aristoph. Lys. 895 the Ravenna exhibits διατίθενται, and on ἐγν. 717 ἐπιτίθεσι. In Soph. Philoct. 992 Jebb reads τίς τοῖς against the authority of the MSS.

ἐπιτίθεαι ἐν αὐτῷ ...; 'Should you recognize it?'


σοὶ βοῦς καὶ κράσας, ἀρ' ἔν ὕπο τόσα στὶ σα σα σα. On this use 3ος of the nominative to introduce an object without regard to the α:
construction that follows see Bernhardy, Gr. Syntax. p. 68; Jelf, § 477; Kühner-Blass, § 356, 2.

5 ἀνακύψωτο τῶν ἱροτημάτων Β, ἀνακύψω το τῶν ἐπ. Τ. ‘I knew that some fine result would pop up from their questions.’ For the future middle see Aristoph. Αν. 147 ἀνακύπτεται λεγήτη ἔγωγ’ ἐσκεπτέν ἢ Σαλομών.

b 3 ἤφωνων πάντων ἔσωσαν, ‘after pausing with a very ironical air.’

Cf. Symph. 218 1 ἔδοξαν μιλα ἄφωνος καὶ σφόδρα ἑαυτὶ ἐσώσως. Στρατ. 384 λ ὄστε ἀπεσιευθεὶς ὄδης, ἀρνοντεῖται τι πρὸς με, προσοποπομονός τι αὐτὸς ἐν ἐαυτῷ διαφωτίσαται.

6 ἄδορον πιὰ στροφῆν ἐφευροῦν, ‘I tried to escape by some desperate dodge, and began at once to twist about as if caught in a net.’ Cf. Pol. 405 ε πάνω μὲν στροφῆς στροβισθαί.

7 Οὐκ ἦσσιν. Socrates tries to elude the coming attack of Dionysodorus by what he himself describes as ἄδορον πιὰ στροφῆς, ‘a helpless kind of twist.’ The title Ζεὺς Πατρός was used in two senses, (1) as he was the ancestor of an individual or of a race, (2) as he was the guardian of piety towards parents. For (1) cf. Plat. Pol. 391 ε (with Adam’s note).

Οἱ θεοὶ ἄγχοστοι
οἱ Ζεὺς ἐγγόνι, ὃν καὶ ἰδίον πάγων
Δίας πατρός βαρούς ἐστ’ ἐν ἀδείῳ.
*Soph. Trach. 287 ε ἐν ἄγια θύματα μείζη πατρός Ζεὺς. ibid. 754 ἑνδα πατρός Διὶ βαροῦς ὄριζε τεμεῖα τε φυλλάδια. Ασ Τανταλός καὶ Ηρακλῆς both were sons of Zeus, the title πατρός is rightly used in reference to them in sense (1). (2) Aristoph. Νυκτ. 1468:

ΣΤΡ. Ναὶ, Ναὶ, καταδέχεσθι πατρός Δία.

ΘΕΙΑ, ἵδοι γε Δία πατρός, οὐ δράχυς εἶ.

Eur. El. 675 ὁ Ζεὺς πατρός, where Zeus is invoked by Orestes as ‘the god who avenges the outraged name of Father’ (Paley). Plat. Legg. 831 ο ἄδος ἀνεχοῦσθα Δίας δραχαίνοι καὶ πατρόν κατὰ νόμον. Observe also that neither Tantalus, Heracles, nor Orestes was an Athenian, so that the Tragedians in these passages do not contradict what Plato says here. Thus Socrates imitates the logical tricks of the Sophists by denying in one sense what was true in another. Cf. Lobeck, Aglaphl. p. 770.

c 2 ‘Εα, . . . εὐφήμη τε, Ἀ! said I, speak reverently, and do not harshly lecture me too soon.’ Cf. Aesch. Prom. 688 εα, εα, ἵππης.
302 d
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3 Ἀθήνα παραστάτη. Under this title Athena was worshipped together with Zeus at the Λυτροφόρος, an annual festival of the phratriae, Xen. Hell. I. 7, 8 in ois o τα πατέρες καὶ οἱ συνγενεῖς σύνεται σήμερον αὐτοῖς. Cf. Hdt. I. 147.

8 τι γὰρ πᾶθον; ‘For what can become of me?’ Cf. Eur. Phoen. 395 τὸ μέλλων ἐν χρή πεισματίκη νὰ τι γὰρ πᾶθον; Ανδρ. 313, Fr. 513, with Paley’s note, Hom. Od. v. 465 δέ μοι εὖ, εἰ πᾶθον; τι νῦ μοι µέρισθαι γένεται;

5 θύσια (ἡ) Schanz, θυσίαν αὐτῷ. dn, which was omitted by Stephanus and Heindorf, was brought back by Winckelmann and Stallbaum, but changed by Schanz into ἥν. The uncial ΔΘ is very easily mistaken for ΑΝ.

303 Πυππάδι ἡ Ἱράκλεια, ἦ ἡ, καλῶς λέγουν. ‘Bravo, by Heracles!’


7 Ἡ Πυππάδι. Dionysodorus turns the adverb into a proper name.


3 δύον παρετάθησαν, ‘were almost killed with laughing, and clapping, and rejoicing.’ Cf. Lyc. 204 καὶ παρετάθησαν ψαλία τοῖ ἱερέων ἄνδρας λέγοντας. Synph. 207 B τοῦ λινοῦ παρετάθομεν. Xen. Mem. iii. 13, 6 παρετάθη βραχύν ἄνδρας πολεμεῖτε.

6 άν καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ἐμπρόσθεν ἐστὶν ἰδιότης τοῦτο. ‘Over the former victories the admirers of Euthydemus alone shouted gloriously over each and all.’ ‘Tingendum haud dubiue ἡδὼν ἰδιότης τοῦτο, quod nescio cur Winckelmannus recte fieri posse negaverit. Nam ἐκαστα 64

303 b
NOTES

πάντα sunt singula quaeque’ (Stallbaum). On Plato’s use of πάντα or its compounds with ἐκάστος see Walke aph. Lutoslawski, p. 126.


παντάπασι καθαυτοβινθες κτλ., ‘being altogether overpowerer by C 2 their wisdom I took to praising and extolling them.’

τι μακρόν ἀφοῦ, ‘O happy pair, what wonderful genius, that you have brought so great a subject to perfection so readily and in so short a time!’

ἐν δὲ τοῖς καὶ τοῦτο μεγαλαπρεπότατον ET, ‘but among them just 7 this is especially magnificent.’ ‘Utrum magnolaprepstorum?’ STEPH. ‘Ita vererat ante Stephanum Cornarius. Sed comparativus mihi magis placet, dum sonat quiddam plus quam solito magnificum’ (Routh). The change to μεγαλαπρεπον was very easily suggested by the well-known use of τοῖς τοῖς with a superlative, to which it gives additional emphasis (Thuc. iii. 81 ἐν τοῖς πρώτη ἐγένετο: Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 140, 4; Donaldson, Gr. Gr. § 416 (cc)). But as in that idiom the two words seem never to be separated not even so slightly as here (ἐν δὲ τοῖς), it is safer to regard τοῖς simply as the demonstrative looking back to πολλά . . . κακά, and used here instead of τοῖς because of τοῖς immediately following. The comparative is maintained by Winckelmann and by Bernhardt, Gr. Synol. 436, who refers to this passage, and apparently by Ficinus, ‘in quibus id praecipue magnificum est.’

τῶν πολλῶν ἅρπασόν κτλ., ‘for the mass of mankind and for 8 men of importance indeed and of great repute you care nothing at all.’ Both words, σωμάτων καὶ δή, are constantly used in irony. For δοκοῦσιν εἰναι τι cf. Georg. 472 A. S. Paul, Gal. ii. 6.

πάντα μὲν ἐν ἄλλα τοῖς ἄνθρωποι διὸ πολλάς φομῇ. ‘very few would be so satisfied, and those men like yourselves.’

οὗτοι υἱοί αὐτοῦ B Vind., ‘have such a notion of them,’ so 9 conceive of them’: cf. Pol. 508 ὅτι τῶν τοῖς καὶ τῆς φυσικῆς νόημα, ‘thus conceive of the soul also’: Phaedr. 246 ὅτι άνθρωπος άνθρωπὸς νοησάτε θέου. The various reading οὗτοι ἄροιον Τ has given rise to many needless conjectures.

δημοτικόν τι καὶ πρόν, ‘a popular and kindly feature,’ πρόν ἐν EUTHYDEMUS 65
for discussion in public." The addition in T of τοῦ σφόν after σφόν may possibly, as Stalbaum suggests, have arisen from σφόν itself.

άνωθεν προς ἀλήθειαν μένων. Cf. Cobet, Var. Læct. 111 'Alterum indicium eiusdem interpolations (μένων) est in Platonis Euthydemos p. 504 A... ubi si μένων in margine apponetur, pristinam sedem et iustam recerpet.' Recent editors rightly retain μένων, as adding force to αἰτέω, according to a very common usage: cf. Gorg. 500 b; Theaet. 202 A; Legg. 657 b.

τὸ γὰρ σφόν... τίμον. Cf. Plut. Mor. 826 b τὸ τίμον ἐν τῷ b 3 σταυρὸν τίμεον.

ἀνείπωτο... ὅπως... παραθετοῦμαι. After ἀνείπωτο, which involves the 4 notion of exhorting or inciting, ὅπως with the future indicative has its original meaning ὅπως τρέψῃς, quod facto as below B 7 σκέψια ὁμως ὅπως συμπυθήσητε: cf. Xen. Cyr. i. 2, 3 ὁ Περσικὸς νόμος ἔιπελεται ὅπως τὴν ἀρχήν μὴ τουτέστω ἔστων οἱ πολίται. Jelf, Gr. Gr. 811.

τοῦ χρηματιζόμενον. BT. If we retain this reading of the MSS. c 4 we must, with Winckelmann and others, make a parenthesis of ὃ δὲ καὶ σοὶ... οὐδὲν, which for convenience of translation we may transpose to the end; 'and (they say) that no limit of capacity or age excludes any one whatever from easily acquiring their wisdom, and what it most concerns you to hear, they say that there is nothing to hinder a man from money-making.' If we adopt the conjectural emendation of Stephanus τὸ χρηματιζόμενον, or that of Routh, τὸ τοῦ χρηματιζόμενον, the construction is even simpler: 'and (they say) that they exclude no kind of capacity or age, and, what it most concerns you to hear, that not even attention to business at all hinders any one whatever from easily acquiring their wisdom.' Crito seems to have been very keen about his profits from agriculture: cf. 201 E ἐς ἀμηθηρία τῆς λέγειν.

λαβάνωμεν B, λάβωμι T. The present is the better tense, as the 7 learning would not be confined to one single act.

καρδιώτατο... εἶναι. 'Yet I fear that I too am not one of those who are like Euthydemos, but of those others of whom you were yourself speaking just now, those who would rather be refuted than refute others by such arguments.'

ἄ γάρ λέγειν, 'what was said to me just now.' The use of the d 3 imperfect is like that of ἔγειρεν just above.

τοῦτο μὲν ᾧν τοῦ πράγματος σφόν. 'This part then of your business a 1 is excellent in regard to its rapid transmission, but not expedient

66
In some places: 'I am quoting, says Crito to Socrates, the very words this person used... This is an intimation that some one in particular is meant, and that the reader is expected to recognize the author by his style' (Thompson, Phaedr. p. 181). Cf. Introduction, p. 18.

'Αλλα μήν ταῦτα καθιστάμενοι, 'But surely philosophy is a fine sort of thing,' 6 Ποιον, ἐφικτόν; 'Fine indeed? said he.' Cf. 291 Α Ποιος 7 Κρῖτος; the μακρὰς, 'my blessed fellow,' a polite mode of expressing strong disagreement: 'mein Lieber,' vel 'Bester' (Astr.). εὐδοκεῖσθαι μὲν οὖν ἔξω; 'Nay rather, good for nothing.' 

ταυτόν παρέχειν, 'to lend himself' as a tool. Cf. Euthyphrod. 3 D 3 οὐ μὲν δοκεῖς σπάνιον σεαυτὸν παρέχειν. Μετὰ 95 Α παρέχειν αὐτῶν διδασκάλους τοὺς νέους.


ἀλλὰ γὰρ, 'But the fact is'; cf. Riddell, Digest. 182. 

τὸ πράγμα αὐτὸ καὶ οἱ ἀνθρώποι. The distinction between philosophical discussion in itself and the men who make a bad use of it is introduced for the sake of what follows, τὸ πράγμα ὅταν οὐκ ὄρθις ψήνει.

οἱ ταὐτόν ἄνδρες, 'Wonderful fellows are the men of this class,' b 4 i.e. such as the critic you mention, ἀνήρ ὅλων πάντων ἐστὶν σοφός. 

δὲ τι μᾶλλον ἱκανόν, 'what I am to say.' Cf. Gorg. 455 Β ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ τοιαύτα πῶς δύναμαι κατανοεῖν δεῖ τί λέγω. In μέλλω the notion of what is about to be done is combined with that of what ought to be done: cf. Politi. 291 C et μέλλομεν ἔτι άναργυροι. 

ῥήμα τούτο. The title 'rhetor' or 'orator' is thus appropriated to 7 those who actually speak in the law-courts or assemblies of the δῆμος, in distinction from those who composed speeches for others to deliver. Cf. Xen. Mem. ii. 6, 15 ἔφορον γὰρ, ἐφὶ δὲ κρατισθεὶσα, ῥήματα τε φαίνεσθαι ἀγαθὰς διηγημάτως φίλους ὄροις. The more powerful of the διηγηματίους were called διηγηματίων: cf. Schömann, de Com. Athen. p. 109; Valckenar, Diatrib. de Aristob. xxiii. 251 sq.
NOTES

but also to be so regarded among very many, so that there are none but the philosophers to stand in the way of their universal reputation.' The reading of the chief MSS. τὸ ἐναί must either be altered, as by Stallbaum, to the dative, or altogether omitted, as by Schanz. In this latter case τὸ ἐναί must be regarded as a marginal gloss intended to form a construction for πρὸς, the absolute use of which was not understood: cf. Hom. II. v. 307 θάνατος δέ οἱ κοσμημαὶ πρὸς δὲ ἀμφότεροι τέκναντε. Hdt. i. 71 πρὸς δὲ οὐκ οὖν διαχρίσεται. Eur. Hēl. 110 καὶ πρὸς γ' Ἀχαίοι.

ἐνδοκείμενοι ἐμπόδιον σφένον ἐναί. Verbs or phrases expressing hindrance are followed by an infinitive either with or without μοι or τοι, which Stephanus added in this place. Heindorf refers to Plat. Pol. 407 c ὡςτε, ὅπερ αὕτη, ἀρετὴ ἀνεκτείναι διὰ δουλεύειν πάντα ἐμπόδιον. Thus: i. 16 ἐπεγέγρατο... καλύπτα τι μη αἰσθηθήναι.

τοῦ γὰρ φιλοσοφόν τιθομένου. The addition of ἀνθρώπου, which d 1 is otherwise unnecessary, is intended to express contempt. Cf. Philos. 268 c ἐστὶν ἄν, οὖν, ὥσπερ ἄνακτεσθαι καὶ δοκεῖσθαι πάντα ἐμπόδιον. Thuc. i. 16 ἐπεγέγρατο... καλύπτα τι μη αἰσθηθήναι.

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NOTES

305 d

The loose rhetoric which was uninterrupted in a forensic speech was easily refuted by the sharp dialectic of the Sophists: cf. 305 εἴτε δὲ ὅσα κυνίκων καὶ διάφωνων.

πάνω εἰκότως, 'quite naturally': Stallbaum spoils the rhythm of the sentence by his punctuation πάνω εἰκότως, both here and 287 B. In Plato and in other authors far most frequently πάνω precedes the word which it strengthens, as below πάνω εἰκότων λόγου.

8 μετρίως μὲν γὰρ φιλοσοφίας ἔχων, 'for they think that they are moderately acquainted with philosophy.' Cf. Gorg. 484 c φιλοσοφία γὰρ τοῦ ἑστών, ὁ Ὀμφάτων, χαρίζει, ὡς τις αὐτοῦ μετρίως ἄρχεται εἰς τῇ ἡλικίᾳ. ibid. 487 c. 'The middle position, which Isocrates himself aimed at, is shown to be untenable' (Zeller, Plato, p. 132). In these words 'we are inevitably reminded of the description of Isocrates in the Phaedrus as one in whose genius ἐνεστὶ τις φιλοσοφία' (Thompson, Phaedrus, Append. ii. 181).

καρπούσαθα τὴν σοφίαν. The finishing touch in the picture (ἐκείνη δὲ... σοφίαν) agrees perfectly with the account of himself and his own way of life, which is given by Isocrates with no little self-gratulation in the Antidosis (Thompson, ibid.).

3 οὖ γὰρ τοῦ ἄλλα, 'for it cannot be denied that.' Cf. 286 c, note.


εὑρίσκοντας μᾶλλον ἡ ἀλήθειαν, 'plausibility rather than truth': cf. Phaedo 92 a μετὰ εἰκότως τινὸς καὶ εὑπερτίας.

306 a δὲ μεταξὺ τινῶν δυοῖν κτλ., 'all other things that are halfway between some two and partake of both, if compounded of evil and good, are made better than the one and worse than the other, but if of two things good for different objects, they are inferior to both in reference to any object for which either of those component parts is useful.' This notion is not contrary to Plato's conviction that true statesmanship must be based upon a sound philosophy: cf. Gorg. 581 D.

NOTES

306 a

ἔστα δὲ ἐκ δυοῦν κακῶν κτλ., 'but all intermediate compounds of 6 two evil things not having the same object, these and these only are better than either of those things of both of which they participate.'

μετέχοντας BT: Hirschig's conjecture μετέχει, adopted by Schanz, b 2 is unnecessary. The thought is really directed, both at first and throughout, not to things neuter but to men, as immediately appears from the next sentence.

ἡ πολιτικὴ πράξις, 'the business of statesmanship.' Cf. Gorg. 484 D εἴπεριν ὅσδ' ἐλθοῦν ἐν ταῖς ἑνὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ πράξις.

οὖν δὲ ἄρφωντές μετέχοντες. Stallbaum takes ἄρφωντές as 3 masculine, i.e. τῶν φιλοσοφῶν καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν: but the close relation to ἤκατόρια shows that it should be referred rather to ἡ φιλοσοφία καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ πράξις. Cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. x. 9, 18 τὴν πολιτικὴν πράξιν μὲν διδάσκειν οἱ σοφισταὶ κτλ.

ἄρφωντες γὰρ εἰς φαντάσματα. Stallbaum's explanation of ἄρφωντές is properly applicable to this second occurrence of the word.

οὖν δὲ τὰ λέγοντες ἁλήθεια, 'in this case there would be some 6 truth in what they say.' If philosophy and statesmanship are both bad, those who have but a little of each are better than those who have much of either.

πρὸς ἄρφωντα, πρὸς δὲ τὴν πολιτικὴν κτλ., 'for either object, for c 3 which statesmanship on the one hand and philosophy on the other are important.' The conjunctions τε καὶ are here used dijunctively: cf. Xen. Hier. i. 2 τὴν διαβοῦν ὑπὸ τυποὺς τε καὶ ἡ ἰδιωτικὸς βίον. Plat. Laws 831 D; Jelf, Gk. Gr. 758, 1; Donaldson, Gk. Gr. § 554. συνηγγόνοις... αὐτοῖς... τῆς ἐπιθυμίας. This use of the 6 genitive after συνηγγόνοις appears to be very rare. The accusative occurs in Eur. Androm. 840 συνηγγόνατοι σοι τῷ ἀδριατών πολέως.

πάντα γὰρ ἄληθεν χρῆ ἄγαντ, 'we ought to be satisfied with any 8 man.' Cf. Cratyl. 391 c τα τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἄληθείᾳ ἐλπίδωτα ἄγαντον ὡς τοῦ ἄξιον έχομεν'. έχομενον φρονήσεων, 'bordering on good sense': cf. Pol. 496 οὗτος γρήγορος οὔτε ἄξιον οὔτε φρονήσεως ἡλπίθη έχομενον. 'Isocrates calls his own philosophy a φρονήσεως in Antid. § 290' (Thompson, ibid. 182).
NOTES

306 d

περὶ τῶν ὀλίων. Cf. Diog. Laert. ii. 13 καὶ οἱ παιδεῖς δὲ αὐτοῦ (Crít¯on) διήκουσαν Σωκράτην, Κριτικοῦ, Ἑρμήνευσε, Ἐπιγείης, Κρήνηστρος, quorum e numero eximendos esse et Hermogenem et Ctesippum vel hic Platonis locus declarat (Heindorf).

ὑλών B, ὑλῶν Schanz (1880). In the Appendix to the Phaedrus (1882) Schanz writes: 'In hoc dialogo semper est ulla in BT, et semper vincit.'

Κριτικοῦ. Cf. Apol. 38 Β Πλάτων δὲ δὲ, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίων, καὶ Κριτικοῦ καὶ Κριτικοῦ καὶ Ἀπολλοδόρου κελεύσατο με τρίκαλα μονὸν τιμήσασθαι, ὁποῖο ἐγγύσασθαι.

ἵλικαν ἠξε, 'is grown up.' This description of his age agrees with the fact of his offering ball for the fine which Socrates proposes to pay. Cf. Men. 89 Β ἄλλα ἐπειδὴ ἀφέναι ἐστὶν τὴν ἁλίκαν, χρήσιμοι γίγνονται ταῖς πόλεσιν. Chrys. 154 Α οὖσα εἰς ἁλίκα ἦν. Lys. 209 Α.

διὸς αὐτὸν ὄνησε, 'who will be of use to him,' i.e. as a teacher.

ἐπὶ ἑαυτὸν ἐπὶ... B, ἑαυτὸ μοι Τ. Cf. 278 C 7, note.

πολὺς ἑαυτῶν ἔπει τιμιδέα. The position of αὐτῶν makes it emphatic, 'to take no care of the boys themselves in the matter of education.'

Κριτικοῦ. Schanz does not attempt to apply the rule about ἑαυτὸ, 278 C 7, because there is no possibility here of making μοι δοκεῖ a parenthesis. Why should it be made formally in the other passages?

πάντα ἄλλοκοτος, 'quite unfit for the task.' Cf. Ruhnks. Tith. Lex. 1 Pherinichus Praeparaec. Σαφιστ. MS. 'Ἀλλόκοτος σημαίνει μὲν κυρίως τὸ παραλλαγέντων τὴν καθεστώτος διαίης καὶ τρόπον; ekl.'

διὸ γε πρὸς αὐτὸ τὴν ἔφθασε, 'to tell you the truth between our-elves.' Cf. Pol. 595 B ὡς μὲν πρὶς ἡμεῖς ἔφθασθαι, οὐ γὰρ μοι κατερεῖν, 'speaking as between ourselves, for you will not tell of me.'

1 ἵκνον τὸ ἐργον ΒΤ: 'τῶν ἐργῶν Aristides, probavit Heindorf' (Schanz). Cf. Phaedr. 274 Ε ἐπὶ ἱκάστῳ τῆς τέχνης.

8 ἄλλα τὸ πράγμα, 'the thing itself,' i.e. philosophy.

3 τὸ λεγόμενον δὲ τοῦτο. Cf. Laurus 804 D τὸ λεγόμενον, πάντα ἄνδρα καὶ παιδά... παῖδευτέον ἐξ ἀνήγαγος. Pol. 372 Β κατακλυσμένοι ἐπὶ στράτευσαν ἑσταρμένους μιλακί τε καὶ μυρίας, ἑωξηχοῦσαν αὐτοῖ τε καὶ τὰ παιδία.

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