PLATO'S REPUBLIC.

BOOK I. AND BOOK II. cc. i.—x.
THE PROEM
TO THE
IDEAL COMMONWEALTH OF PLATO
[AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LANGUAGE AND METHOD
OF THE 'SOCRATIC' DIALOGUES]

WITH INTRODUCTION
AND CRITICAL AND EXPLANATORY NOTES

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THE construction of the ideal commonwealth in the *Republic* does not begin till the eleventh chapter of the second book. The composition of the work as a whole is discussed in the following Introduction §§ 57 sqq., and it is there sufficiently shewn that we may either detach the first book as an independent dialogue, or divide from the remainder, as the 'Proem,' all the matter which leads up to the words γένεσα τοις τόλμας (Steph. p. 369 n). For the purposes of a modern educational book the latter division is preferable, inasmuch as the first ten chapters of Book II., intended by Plato to link his 'Socratic' discussion περὶ σκανέον to his more advanced Platonic philosophy of the state, are only an elaboration of arguments more briefly urged in Book I., and are still concerned purely with the subject of Justice. The μακρολογία of the speeches of Glaucon and Adeimantus is useful also as a lesson in Platonic style, of which the dialectic βραχύλογία of the first book affords but a partial notion. Whether for instruction in Greek or in Plato it is manifestly profitable for both portions to be studied together.

The present edition of what I have called the 'Proem' is primarily intended for the use of classical students in the Universities and the higher forms of schools.
For their purposes the analysis of the matter and the comments thereupon—which are, it is hoped, strictly relevant to the text—have been designed to serve as an introduction to the study of the 'Socratic' dialogues in general. The notes have also been written with the same intention in regard to Platonic Greek. Apart from their intrinsic value as classic monuments of thought and style, the books of Plato, as of other Greek writers, are read, and will continue to be read, for the study of Greek philology, and an editor of an educational volume can only use his best judgment in determining how far he may seasonably consult the interests of that study. It cannot be held that the last word has been said upon the niceties of either Greek in general or Platonic Greek in particular, nor, to judge from prevailing texts, are certain well authenticated points of grammar, form and usage so generally recognised as they should be. The notes, therefore, while dealing with exegesis in its various departments, do not neglect the discussion of such forms and uses as seem to be involved in the establishment of the exact text and the determination of Greek as Plato wrote it.

Meanwhile the contributions to textual criticism are addressed partly to the University student (who may be assumed to neglect no department of philological study), and partly to the consideration of more advanced scholars. The critical footnotes do not represent a full *apparatus criticus*, but only a selection of such matter as appears helpful to the critic of the special text or instructive to the general student of philology.

In the preparation of this book I have derived the usual help from Bekker's *variorum* edition of Plato and from Stallbaum. I have also had before me the recent suggestive work of Jowett and Campbell, and have found

the essays of Professor Campbell of much assistance. M. Lutoslawski's new *Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic* has aided in establishing views at which I had already arrived concerning the date of the first book. No one who has studied the work of Grote and Zeller can very well say how much he owes to them; nor, in the region of the text, is it easy to assess one's debt to Schanz. It would be ungrateful not to mention also the indirect help derived from a previous use of Mr Adam's scholarly editions of separate dialogues. His critical text of the *Republic* has come to hand only after the completion of my own work and in time to permit of no more than a brief mention at one or two points in the critical notes. I find that I differ from Mr Adam in respect of sundry forms adopted in the text, and that fact serves as a justification after the event for certain notes which might possibly have been thought superfluous.

I am much indebted to Dr Leeper, Warden of Trinity College in this University, for rigorously examining the proofs of the entire work and affording me the ready help of his ripe learning and taste. More than ordinary thanks are also due to the reader at the Cambridge Press, whose conscientious watchfulness has prevented no few inaccuracies, sometimes more than typographical, from appearing in the book.

University of Melbourne, 1900.
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INTRODUCTION.

I. THE FIRST BOOK OF THE REPUBLIC AND ITS CONTENTS.

1. The Republic is a narration by Socrates himself of a certain dialogue in which he bore the chief share.

   a. The Platonic dialogues are variously introduced. The author was naturally as desirous of avoiding a uniform machinery as of avoiding a monotonous style.

   (i) For the most part they are immediately, and without preface, dialogues, Socrates being merely one of the personae, who are distinguished for the reader just as they are in a drama, or in Landor's Imaginary Conversations, by prefixing the name of the speaker in each instance. This is the case with the Laches, Euthyphro, Crito, Meno, Gorgias, Phaedrus, Timaeus, Philebus, &c., and is therefore in itself no mark of either earlier or later production.

   (ii) The Republic, like the Lysis and Charmides, begins as a narrative told by Socrates. This device necessitates the frequent and rather embarrassing use of 'said I,' 'said he'; but, on the other hand, it allows of picturesque touches of personal description, and makes it possible to impart a background.

   (iii) In the Parmenides the device is varied. It is not Socrates who reports the dialogue, but a certain Cephalus, who repeats what was narrated to him by Antiphon. So in the Symposium Apollodorus relates how he told to a companion a Socratic dialogue which he had heard from Aristodemus.
INTRODUCTION.

(iv) In the Protagoras and the Euthydemus methods (i) and (ii) are combined. Each piece opens as a conversation between Socrates and a friend, but continues as a narrative, in which Socrates rehearses the discussion to his companion and enlivens it with dramatic touches.

(v) It is also possible to combine devices (i) and (iii). Thus the Phaedo begins as a conversation between Phaedo and Echecrates, which leads to the relation by Phaedo of a Socratic dialogue on the immortality of the soul. In the Theaetetus Euclid and Terpsion are conversing at Megara: Theaetetus is mentioned; and this recalls a dialogue which Theaetetus had once enjoyed with Socrates and had reported to Euclid, who wrote it out. Euclid does not, however, repeat the dialogue from memory, but has it read by a slave.

2. It may be added that in the first class, the dialogues pure and simple, there is a noticeable distinction between the regular custom of the earlier pieces (e.g. the Laches or Crito), in which the preliminary conversation is made to lead up to the discussion proper, and the abruptness of the later productions (e.g. the Philebus or even the Meno), in which the pretence of an excuse for the disputation is abandoned and the discussion opened without prelude of any kind.

THE FIRST BOOK OF THE REPUBLIC.

sent a slave to stop them. Polemarchus, Adeimantus, Nicias, and some others soon came up. After a playful threat of compulsion, followed by temptation in the shape of a reminder that there is to be a πάραγωγή and an opportunity of good talk with the young men, Polemarchus induces Socrates to accompany him home, where they find Lysias and Euthydemus (brothers of Polemarchus), Thrasyllus of Chalcedon, Charmantides, Clistophoros, and the aged Cephalus. The last named hus just been sacrificing in the court, where he is now comfortably seated amid a ring of chairs. [327 A—328 C]

A. a. The notion of the dialogue as the suitable form for philosophic writings (employed, we are told, by the Eleatic Zeno before it was used by Plato) arose from familiarity with the drama and with its development, the mime. Of the latter, which is drama (or dramatic sketches) in prose and dealing with ordinary life and character, Sophon of Syrascus (circa 450 B.C.) and his son Xenarchus were famous composers, and with these Plato is known to have made himself specially familiar. In the same city the comic poet Epicharmus had previously made a great step towards familiarising the reading world with philosophy in the form of dramatic dialogue, and the legend goes that Plato slept with the works of Epicharmus under his pillow. His own earlier compositions have much of the 'mime' character. The words of Aristotle (Poet. i. 7), rightly understood, imply his recognition of a decided similarity between τὸς Σωφρόνον καὶ Σωφρίνου μίσχος καὶ τῶν Σωφριστήν όλων.

A little social scene, with the picturesque accessories and accidents of real conversation, passes before the reader's eye. The figures of the dialogue are plainly visible, moving against a certain background and in a certain environment. Their various characters are sketched with that subtle economy of strokes which is part of the 'mime' genius, whether in the material of language or of form and colour, a genius of ἡσυχία in which Plato is inferior to none.

The opening of the Republic affords one example out of many of the 'mime' element in Plato. The closest analogies from a formal point of view are in the Charmides ('I went into the wrestling-school of Taureas &c.') and the Lysis ('I was going
from the Academy straight to the Lyceum...and when I came to the postern-gate &c.). Here the narrator gives us the picture, as Phaedo does in the dialogue of that name, or as Socrates himself again does in the Euthydemus. At other times the easy skill of Plato makes the components of the sketch come out incidentally in the conversation, as in the Laches or the Gorgias. The dramatic attitude of the parties, when it is not described in narrative, is sometimes indicated by the interlocutor. For instance, instead of ‘Polyus was reluctant to reply’ we have Socrates saying ‘Why don’t you answer?’ (Gorg. 468 c, d.)

For the perfection to which Plato could carry the art when he chose we must look to the Protagoras and the Symposium, with their exquisitely humorous touches and inimitable suggestions of the life-like. If the wedding of philosophy to the micro is anywhere complete, it is undoubtedly in these two dialogues.

b. In his later years the more dogmatic Plato comes to abandon the dramatic setting, and leaves us without any mise-en-scene or any opportunity of visualising the dialogue. In his earlier work he would generally delude us into believing that the conversation was actually held. ‘The place is there to this day to prove it.’ The persons who take part are living flesh and blood, so real and recognisable that the dialogue (it appears) must also have been real. Moreover the talk comes about so naturally, that it seemingly must have come about just in that way. This illusion Plato seeks to impress with his chance meetings ‘in the palaestra of Taurus,’ or ‘in the new palaestra near the postern’ (Lysis), or ‘in the house of Callias, son of Hipponicus’ (Protagoras), or ‘in the dressing-room of the Lyceum’ (Euthydemus), or ‘in the porch of the King Archon’ (Euthyphro), or in the prison of Socrates (Crito and Phaedo), or under the plane-tree by the Ilissos (Phaedrus). Sometimes, it is true, the place does not appear, as in the Laches or Meno; but these cases are exceptional.

Plato no doubt also appreciated the livelier interest which naturally attaches to the real, particularly in a small community like Athens, where the personality of every prominent man was familiar to the reader, or where, at least, the recollection of him was current. Talk, even fictitious, by well-known characters possessed an attraction which could not in all cases belong to an undisguised essay. The method of Socrates was invariably conversational, the method of dialectics. This was universally known, and in his Socratic period Plato had no choice but to adopt the form of dialogue. And if the dialogues were to be put in the mouth of Socrates, a historical personage, the other personage also should be historical. The question would then arise ‘Where and when was this conversation held?’, and it is by the touches above described that Plato imparts the required air of verisimilitude as well as the charm of vivacity.

b. It is, of course, hardly more necessary to believe that any such dialogue as the Republic actually did take place than it is in the case of an Imaginary Conversation of Berkeley or Landor. It is therefore futile to attempt to fix a date for its occurrence. Socrates, indeed, employed his dialectic upon so many occasions of which Plato may be supposed to have taken notes, that the early, or ‘Socratic,’ dialogues may be largely based in point of substance upon what Socrates really did at some time say, or, more probably, was in the habit of saying. Plato would certainly recall in fairly exact outline the Socratic arguments concerning justice, temperance, courage, friendship, piety and other ethical subjects. He would also naturally recall the humorous and ironical forms of expression and the dialectical tricks habitual to Socrates, together with certain incidents which had occurred during his disputations with well-known sophists and others. It may even be the case that Plato had knowledge how on some occasion at the Paesagus Socrates did discourse on the subject of justice, or even of an ideal τολομέα. This we may grant as possible, without admitting it to be in the least necessary. We can hardly go further. The art and style of Plato are his own, whatever Socrates may have suggested. If Socrates supplied the basis, the superstructure is Plato's.

In the elaboration of his work Plato exercises the usual artistic disregard of mere literal facts of chronology and environment. In this he resembles the dramatist, whose imaginative creation is ποιηματοσ ται σκωμαισκον εισαγωγας (Arist. Poet. ix. 3). To a certain

1 Compare the manner in which Thesagoras reports a dialogue to Euclid, while Euclid writes it out, fills it in, and obtains corrections from Socrates.
extent the artist, in his πίνακος must necessarily conceive of
time and place, a dramatic date and scene; but he is not
fastidious about maintaining every circumstance in strict
accord with historical fact. A gathering of the characters
precisely as described at the opening of the Republic can,
perhaps, hardly have occurred. There is no information
obtainable as to the year of the first recognition of Bendis-
worship, but, as regards the presence of the parties concerned,
Boeckh (Kleine Schriften iv. 437 seqq.) fixes upon n.c. 411 as
the date of which their meeting is most conceivable. Against
this we have, indeed, the doubtful authority of pseudo-
Plutarch (Vit. Orat. 17, p. 835) for the statement that
Cephalus was already dead by n.c. 448. Whether this be true
or not is of little importance, for, even if Plato did conceive
of a date as definite as n.c. 411 (which is highly unlikely), he
certainly did not think of it as any consequence whether
Cephalus was alive or not in that year, and whether the
speakers could or could not have made at that time certain
references which they do make in the dialogue. In n.c. 411
Socrates was in his fifty-eighth year—an age which the
Greeks called old. Yet his remarks to Cephalus imply that
he is still sufficiently remote from old age. On the other
hand, in n.c. 411 Polydymas had not made the name (Rep.
338 c) which he won in the year 408; and it was not till
n.c. 393 (six years after the death of Socrates) that Iasion,
the Theban (Rep. 336 a) became παλαιός and developed
power. Obviously there will exist anachronisms in the case of
any year upon which we choose to settle.
Nor are such anachronisms found only in the Republic. In
the Laches Socrates is young as compared with Nicias and
Laches. But the dialogue takes place after the battle of
Delium (n.c. 424), when Socrates must have been forty-six,
and Nicias can hardly have been much, if any, older. In the
Euthydemos the grandson of Alcibiades τοίς παλαιοῖς takes
part in the dialogue. But Alcibiades died, at the age of
forty-six, only five years before Socrates himself. In the
Gorgias, of which the dramatic date is n.c. 405 (since the
affair of Arginusae happened 'last year'), Nicias is spoken of
as still alive, though he died in n.c. 413. Pericles also is
lately dead.' In the Symposium, of which the dramatic
date is n.c. 416, reference is made to the way in which
Mantines was treated by the Lacedaemonians thirty-one years

1 It almost certainly is not. See the remarks on Cephalus below (C).
same fact is reported by Plutarch (De Esu Carn. ii. 4), by whom he is called Πολέμαρχος ὁ φιλόσοφος. It is not easy to see why Jowett ascribes to him ‘the frankness and impetuosity of youth.’ He is evidently a man of mature standing, inasmuch as he is not only the householder, but also speaks (328 ι) of going out ‘to talk with the young men.’ That the aged father should nevertheless speak of his sons as νεανίοι or even νεανίσκοι (328 νι) is an eminently natural touch. They are his ‘fads.’

LYSIAS (who takes no part in the dialogue) is the well-known orator of that name (458—378 B.C.). In the Phaedrus (328 ι) he is called δικαίωτας τῶν νῦν γράφεων, and a speech in his style, dramatically attributed to him, is given and adversely criticised (355 λ sqq.). From the views which Plato held concerning the values of rhetoric it is natural that he should entertain none too favourable an opinion of Lysias.

EUTHYDEMUS, the third son of Cephalus, is otherwise unknown. The sophist Euthydemus (brother of Dionysodorus), in the dialogue with that title, is a different person, a Chian.

CHARMANTIDES ‘of Paiania’ does not appear to be mentioned elsewhere. His position in the text would suggest that he was an adherent of Thrasymachus.

CLEITOPHON, ‘son of Aristonymus,’ interposes (in Rep. 340 λ, ι) in such a manner as to indicate that he is a partisan of Thrasymachus. That the latter should have his supporters in the company is in the manner of Plato, and is dramatically desirable.

Cleitophon lends his name to one of those dialogues of uncertain authorship which have been attributed to Plato. This brief piece begins in an un-Platonic style with the words ‘somebody told us lately that Cleitophon, son of Aristonymus, in conversation with Lysias, found fault with the Socratic discussions and could say nothing too good of talk with Thrasymachus,’ and continues with references to the Republic and its argument concerning Justice. Finally (410 c) Cleitophon complains that Socrates is not positive enough for him and that therefore πρὸς Ὀρασίμαχου, οίμαι, πορεύσαμοι καὶ ἄλλους ὑπὸ τῶν δύναμας, ἰδρυόμενοι.

GLAUCON, son of Ariston, is the brother of Plato and Adeimantus. His generosity with money (Rep. 337 ι), his courage both moral (357 λ) and physical (368 λ), and his talent (367 ν), are illustrated in the present portion of the Republic, but in 548 ν his character is more deliberately stated, under a pretext which shows that Plato was bent on complimenting a brother whom he admired. Plutarch (On Brotherly Love 484 ι) remarks on Plato’s desire to render his brothers famous by bringing their names into his finest works, ‘as Glaucon and Adeimantus in the Republic.’ In the passage mentioned Glaucon is contentious (φαλάκτως), but not stubbornly self-assertive (προδιδότας). He is cultured and a good speaker. Elsewhere we learn that he is a sportsman, fond of dogs and game-birds (459 ι), and that he makes love (474 ν). He is, in fact, a type of the καλὸς καγώδης according to the Greek conception, an Alcibiades qualified by philosophy. His name occurs again in the Parmenides (126 λ) and in Xen. Mem. iii. 6.

ADEIMANTUS is appealed to in the Apology to say if any harm has been done to his brother Plato by associating with Socrates. The context implies that he is an elder brother, and in the Republic the same suggestion arises from his greater composure of tone. He is mentioned with Glaucon in the Parmenides (init.).

NIGERATUS, son of Nicias, who takes no part in the dialogue, is mentioned by his father in the Laches (300 ι). He was put to death by the Thirty at the same time with Polemarchus. (Xen. Hell. ii. 3. 99, Lys. 18. 603.)

THRASYMACHUS of Chalcedon, the vulgar and blustering sophist of the Republic, was a personage of much higher repute than his treatment might lead us to suppose, and there can be little doubt that, through some special dislike, Plato has done him a certain injury. In the Phaedrus (261 c) he is mentioned with Gorgias and Theodorus as an authority on rhetoric, and Socrates styles him (267 c), in reference to his rhetorical commonplaces on pathetic subjects (the ἔλογον ascribed to him by Aristotle in Rhet. iii. 1), τὸ τὸν Καλακραθίου ἐθέλει, ‘the mighty man of Chalcedon.’ It is, perhaps, not without significance for the opening scene of the Republic that he is coupled with Lysias in Phaedr. 269 ν, and the appearance of the two at the house of Polemarchus may have been suggested by their common tastes, Lysias being an orator who practised the vices taught in the theory of Thrasymachus. To Plutarch (Symp. 616 ν) he was known as the writer of a treatise on ‘Eminent men’ (Ἡροδικαίοι).
increases as physical pleasures wane, and Socrates’ talk will also be good for the ‘fate.’ [328 C, D]

Socrates replies that he is fond of talking to the very aged. They can tell what it is like to be ‘upon the threshold of old.’ How does Cephalus find it? [328 D, E]

Cephalus will be candid. Old men, like ‘birds of a feather,’ often flock together to lament that their pleasures are over, or that their relatives slight them. The complaint is perverse. Many old men—Sophocles, for instance—rejoice to escape the tyranny of appetite. The real cause of the trouble lies in the character of the individual. [329 A—D]

5. ‘But,’ says Socrates, ‘you are rich, and that may make the difference.’ Cephalus retorts after the manner of Themistocles to the Seriphan. [329 E—330 A]

a. Most of the matter here is borrowed, though without mention of Plato, in the De Senectute of Cicero. His translation is tolerably close, and the continuity only slightly broken up, so that he makes no attempt to conceal his original. The words of the Republic 328 ν δεικεῖ γὰρ τὸν χρηματικὸν...δοξεῖς...ἀλλὰς; are abbreviated (De Senect. § 6) into 

Theodorus，《The first Book of the Republic》

...καὶ τῶν συνεργῶν κτλ. to 329 ν οἷς ὀσοὶ ἔξωσεν ἴσχους καὶ ἄλλας is translated with some adaptation (§ 7). The anecdote about Sophocles is then deferred to § 47. The next words (339 c) εἶ ὃς...ἀπελευθέρωσεν are not rendered. Cicero resumes (§ 7) the translation of Rep. 339 ν ἄλλα καὶ τῶν συνεργῶν κτλ. and continues (§ 8), after a slight and necessary omission, with Rep. 339 ο — 340 ι (fin.).

Again in De Senect. § 46 we meet with an imitation of Rep. 349 ν in the shape habeo senectuti magnam gratiam, quae mihi sermonis aviditatem auxerit, potionis at cibi instillat, a sentence much stiffened from the original. It may be worth while in

4. Cephalus welcomes Socrates, who should come oftener and make himself at home. Cephalus himself is too old to go to town. For his own part he finds that intellectual pleasure
passing to note Cicero's rendering of εὐολος as nec difficulties nec inhumanity, and of the difficult ιςυς by the flat sapiens.

6. 'But did you make your money or inherit it?' 'Something of both.' [330 B]

Socrates has asked the question because Cephalus is not in love with his money, whereas self-made men are as fond of it as poets of their own poems or parents of their own children. [330 C]

'What is the greatest blessing that Cephalus owes to wealth?' [330 D]

'One which might not seem the most likely. It is that wealth precedes the danger of committing injustices, and, as a guilty conscience torments with the fear of retribution in another world, so the consciousness of truth and fair dealing and of being out of debt to God and man is the greatest of boons.' [330 D—331 B]

7. Socrates catches at the mention of justice and the conception of it implied in the words of Cephalus.

'REST WHAT JUSTICE?'

a. The subject of the Republic is introduced at this point in an apparently casual manner, although, perhaps, the precise form of words with which Socrates turns the conversation into a discussion is marked by somewhat less ease than in some other dialogues. The conversational 'on-glide,' so to speak, is not quite so smooth as a cautious reader might desire. Cephalus has not used the word δικαιοσύνη. That, indeed, would be of little importance if a word cognate to δικαιοσύνη had occurred at the end of his speech. As it is, we are obliged to look back to 330 B, 3, for δίκαιομαι, δίκαιος, δίκαιομαι, assisted by the words δικαιος καὶ δικαις in 331 a. Nevertheless the speech as a whole is concerned with the clear conscience which comes of 'having done no injustice' by 'lying or cheating' or 'leaving debts unpaid.' This is enough to justify Socrates in asking 'But this 'justice' of which you speak—does it consist in the absence of lying and of unpaid debts?'

In the Charmides the discussion of σωφροσύνη is prompted by the observation of Critias that Charmides is σωφρονότατος τῶν νυμ. In the Laches the question 'What is Courage?' arises out of a talk about a certain form of instruction in the use of arms. In the Lysis the mention of the friendship of Lysis and Menexenus leads to a discussion of φήμι.

b. The device is familiar in the Socratic dialogues proper, that is to say, in the dialogues written when Plato was still endeavouring to reproduce as closely as possible the Socratic attitude and method, and before he arrived at the metaphysical and dogmatic stages of his development,—stages which are Platonian and not Socratic.

It can hardly be doubted that the proceeding adopted here was characteristic of the real Socrates in conversation, whether with the young, who had never seriously meditated upon the terms they used, with the matured citizen, satisfied with traditional morality in its practical effects, or with the sophist, who had arrived at some more speculative, often paradoxical, but mostly shallow notion concerning a question of ethics. In these conversations a remark might be dropped—often casually enough—containing a mention of 'justice,' 'temperance,' 'courage' and the like, and apparently taking for granted that the exact contents of the term needed no specification. Words like δικαιοσύνη, σωφροσύνη, ἀρετή, ὀκληρός were in everyday occurrence. They tripped readily off the tongue. Some of those who used them had never asked when, precisely, an action is or ceases to be δίκαιον οὐ σωφρόν. Whether these 'virtues' were all one or different, whether virtue was teachable or not, whether it was possible to make sure of being virtuous without possessing a definite and consistently applicable criterion of action—these were questions about which the generality of people did not concern themselves. In a rough and ready way, partly from training and partly from intuition, they entertained what seemed to be a fair working conception of the various virtues, and with this they were satisfied.

Of this vagueness of apprehension and therefore precariousness of conduct Socrates was sadly, if humorously, aware, and the casual utterance of the term was his opportunity for demonstrating with what ignorance it was used. At the same time there was current a series of sayings and maxims, chiefly drawn from the poets and other 'sages,' from Homer downwards, which might be taken as practical definitions of
moral ideas. Greece had its more or less recognised 'cate-
ychism.' The usual type of respectable citizen was prepared
to guide his conduct by the maxims derived from a sort of
'family Bible.' Sometimes it was the quotation of such a
saw which gave Socrates his chance to demonstrate its
inadequacy. More often appeal would be made to these
dicts, during the dialogue, by those whom Socrates was
pressing for the first degree of exactness.

There were, however, not wanting Greek minds of a more
speculative or sceptical bent, which pondered over the basis
of ethical conceptions and the origin of conventional
ethics. The sophists (of whom more will be said below) had
often prepared themselves to take up some positive attitude
in regard to such matters. This, to Socrates, was the worst
attitude of all, especially if the sophist 'taught'
others—unless the 'teacher' had, perchance,
really arrived at 'knowledge' and not simply
at dogmatic 'opinion.' To know is the key to right action;
to think one knows when one is ignorant must lead to wrong
action. Hence no sooner did a sophist let fall, in the presence
of Socrates, a remark implying knowledge in the domain of
ethics (including politics), than he found himself required
to stand and deliver before all the dialectical force of which
Socrates was capable. If his 'knowledge' proved sound,
none so grateful as Socrates to learn it; if unsound, none
should be so thankful as the sophist himself to be delivered
from the moral disease of a false opinion.

c. A comparison of the Memorabilia of Xenophon with the
plain indications of Plato's Apology shows
that Socrates frequently went out of his way
to provoke discussion with those who were not,
at the moment, particularly disposed for
it. In the Apology (31 C sqq.) he is made to
describe the way in which he went and cross-examined
statesmen, poets and craftsmen, and proved their ignorance.
His motives were naturally misconceived. They were too
high and sounded too irascible. Much of the ill-will raised
against him—an ill-will which was largely popular and
extended beyond any mere circle of discomfited antagonists—
was due to an inopportune and apparently gratuitous resolve
to exercise his powers of disputation. ἐκ ταύτης δὴ τῆς
ἐξετάσεως πολλάι ἀπέχθανε μοι γέγονεί (Apol. 29 C). That

he should 'spoil for a fight' with an inflated sophist—though
there is no reason to suppose that all sophists were inflated—
was natural in a community so intellectually keen, so leisureed,
and so personal as Athens. But Xenophon (Mem. iv. 2)
shows how deliberately he could plot a discussion, not with
the sophist, but with a youth still too young for the ἄγονδι,
the 'handsome Euthydemos,' whose fault consisted in his
having made a large collection of books of 'poets and
sophists' with the intention of becoming pre-eminent τῷ
δικαιωθείναι λέγουν τε καὶ πράττειν. Socrates waylays him, lures
him into a conversation, and sends him away crushed and
disgusted with himself. The defence for such conduct lies
in the honest 'mission' of Socrates and the beneficial results
which might follow, as they did ultimately in the case of
Euthydemos (Xen. l.c. § 40), though they failed in so many
others (ibid.). It is probable, however, that the fine tact of
Plato has divested the tone and practices of Socrates of
certain elements which often gave offence through being
misunderstood.

d. The aim of Socrates is the discovery of 'knowledge,' i.e.
the knowledge of things in their 'essence,'

The aim
the knowledge of their 'definition,' the know-
and 'mission'
ledge by which alone we can in all cases
of Socrates.

direct our action so that it is virtuous. So far, however, he
has only arrived at the knowledge that he is ignorant.
Others have manifestly not yet learned so much. They
mistake for knowledge what is only opinion (δόξα), unreasoned,
traditional, or sophistic. Until they are made aware of their
delusion and clear their minds for a new beginning, their
conduct must be inconsistent and perverse. His 'mission,'
therefore, is to disabuse men's minds, to convince them that
they are ignorant, and to get them to join with himself in
the search for ultimate truth. His method is dialectical,
the method of the διαλογις. He has, from the nature of the
case, nothing to teach. He is simply a fellow-student with
his opponents and interlocutors. They are assumed to have
a common object, the bringing to birth of the truth. Unspur-
ing dialectics are the proper obstetric instrument. 'Authority,'
to him, is nothing: his own opinion is nothing: what he
requires is that the interlocutor himself shall be made to
testify by his reason. Cf. Gorg. 472 b ἐγώ δέ, ἄλω μὴ σε
αὐτὸν ἕνα ὑπαμόρφωνα παράδοχωμαι ἐποιεῖτον περὶ ὧν λέγει,
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...οἵτινες ἓτοιμοι λόγου μοι παρεδόθαι περὶ ὅν ἦν ἡμῶν ὁ λόγος ἦ. Of the 'irony,' or mock modesty, contained in this attitude of Socrates more will be said immediately.

Is Justice no more and no less than 'truth and paying back what one receives'?

Or is this sometimes just and sometimes unjust? For instance, if a friend lent you weapons, afterwards went mad, and then demanded his arms, it would be unjust to restore them, or to tell him the exact truth?

To this Cephalus agrees. [331 c]

B. Then this is no definition of Justice—'telling the truth and paying back what one receives' (διηθή τε λόγων καὶ ἄν λάβῃ τις ἀποδέδωνος)?

a. The characteristic—and new—feature of the philosophy of Socrates lay in his search for general conceptions. In other words, in regard to any ethical idea, he sought for a 'definition' (δήσος or λόγος), which should describe its essential nature, its τὸ ἐστίν, that which makes it what it is amid all the variety of particular applications. Hence Aristotle (Met. xx. 4. 1078 b) says of him Σωκράτους δὲ ποίησε ἡ �金沙 κατ' ἐργατικοίς καθαροῖς ἐστὶν. ὡς γὰρ σωκράτης άποδεῖ τὸ τό εἶστιν...δόο γὰρ ἰσθανέται τός καθαρός. Σωκράτης δικαιώσεως, τοῦ τί ἐπικτικοὶ λόγοι (i.e. 'inductive reasoning') καὶ τὸ διήθησις καθάλον ('general definitions'). The inductive reasoning is his method of arriving at the definition, i.e. by exploring from particular cases the general conception. Xenophon dwells upon this resolve to discover τί ἐκαστός ἐστιν τῶν ἔρωτας in Mem. iv. 6. 1, and gives frequent illustration of it in other parts of his Socratic Memoir. Socrates has not, it is true, reached scientific soundness in the application of his own method, inasmuch as his particular cases are anything but exhaustive. Nevertheless he deserves all credit for the method itself. For more on this question see Zeller Socrates and the Socratic Schools c. v.

b. In the 'Socratic' dialogues (e.g. the Euthyphro, Lysis, Charmides and Laches) we generally find a series of definitions tested and thrown aside, and these regularly advance from the popular to the more philosophical. Thus the first definition of 'courage' attempted in the Laches is 'remaining at one's post,' but gradually we progress to 'understanding of what deserves to be feared' (see Jowett's Introduction to that dialogue). Also (as will be found in the first book of the Republic) the result is simply destructive, no definition being reached.

Polemarchus interjects. 'The definition is correct, if we are to believe Simonides.'

Cephalus seizes the opportunity of handing over the discussion to his son, whom Socrates playfully assumes to be his heir.

Cephalus retires to attend to the sacrifice. [331 d]

a. The retirement of Cephalus, while dramatically desirable, is gracefully made. Cicero had observed the gracefulness of the proceeding and imitated it. In Epist. ad Att. iv. 16 he observes quod in eas libris, quis laudatur, desideras personam Scævolam, non cenam deditam quasi fecei idem quod in Polyeucto esse ille nostre Plato. Cum in Piraeum Socrates venisset quod Cephalum, locupletem et festivum senem, quod primus ille sermo haberetur, adeo in disputando sene; deinde, cum ipse quomod commodisse locutus esset, ad illum dicimus didicisse se esse discipulos, neque postea repenitimus. Credus Platonem eis pastase satis conferre fore, si hominem id actatis in tam longo sermone dictum retinuisset.

Not only would it be inartistic to ask the aged man to remain through the discussion. He is too old to be troubled about questions of 'the new morality,' and it would obviously be bad taste to submit so amiable and venerable a person to the rather mortifying dialectic of Socrates. He has nothing to learn by remaining, since he must soon die in the faiths in which he has lived, and he can play no part in the dialogue.

In the Laches the aged Lysimachus, and with him Melesias, similarly withdraws from the discussion after the preliminary (though in that instance much longer) conversation. They sit by and listen, however. Lysimachus himself offers the excuse (Lach. 189 a) ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐσπαραγωγόμενος ἓτο τὰ πολλά ἄδικα τῷ γλίσθαι ὅπως ἐν διανοίᾳ έρεβοι καὶ αὐτὸ ἄν ἰδέοις. ἐὰν δὲ μεταξὺ ἄλλων λόγων γένεσται, οὐ πάνω μέμηται.
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9. Socrates turns upon Polemarchus. ‘What are the words of Simonides which you find so true?’

‘That to return to each what is owing is just’ (ὅτι τὸ τὰ δικαίωμα ἱκάντα ἄπο-
διδόναι δικαίων ἔστω). [331 E]

a. It will be observed that this is no ‘definition’ of justice on the part of Simonides. He does not say that ‘Justice consists in rendering to each his due,’ but that ‘rendering to each his due is just.’ Yet Socrates does not remark upon the point. The laxity belongs to Plato, whose logical aperfections and coherence—matters upon which more will be said later—leave much to be desired. Logic was in its infancy, and neither the correct forms of propositions nor the necessary distinctions of meanings were readily apprehended. It is a misconception to suppose that the ‘inexperience of Polemarchus in dialectic is thus indicated’ (Boisnaut & Companion to Plato’s Republic p. 42). Plato’s own slips are too numerous for us to believe that he would think his readers sufficiently nimble logicians—without further comment on his part—to detect a point so subtle to them, if so patent to us. Moreover cf. 332 c, where Socrates himself is the speaker.

10. Soc. One cannot readily quarrel with an inspired sage like Simonides. But I fail to grasp his meaning.

a. Both the appeal to the authority of a poet-sage and the spirit in which Socrates meets the citation are characteristic. The ethical are characteristic. Sophia was an attribute of authority of the great poets, epic, gnomic, lyric or dramatic. Sophia was, indeed, a standing epithet of poets. Their writings, together with the sayings of the recognized ‘sages,’ formed for the Greeks not only a kind of Bible, as a body of moral teaching, but also a summary of practical wisdom, largely available in the shape of ‘proverbs.’ As here Simonides is quoted, so in the Meno (77 b) ‘a poet’ is cited for a definition of ἦκτος ὁ μαθητὴς καὶ ἀλήθης. ‘As Homer says,’ ‘as Hesiod, Simonides, Pindar say’—these expressions corresponded among the cultivated Greeks not merely to the modern expressions ‘as Shakespeare says,’ ‘as Goethe says,’ but also to ‘as Solomon says,’ ‘as St Paul says.’ There is, of course, the difference that a special sanctity is attached to the Bible which was never attributed to the Greek poets. Nevertheless even to the latter there was paid a greater and more universal deference than is offered to the corresponding writers in modern literature. They represented not only thought expressed by genius, but also doctrine approved and ratified by the consent of generations of the Greek world.

That poetry is primarily teaching was a view widely held in antiquity, and is not yet defunct. According to Plutarch (De audi. Poet. 1) ἡ παιδεία τῶν ποιητῶν. Even contemporary poets claimed respect on that score (Ar. Ran. 1009). [See Professor Butcher Aristotle’s Theory of Poetry and Fine Art Cap. v.]

b. The outward attitude (ironically adopted) of Socrates himself to the poets and sages is one of respectful admiration—they are ‘wise and divinely gifted’—but he does not surrender his judgment to their dictation. When their sayings are found to be untenable, he is reluctant to declare them in the wrong, but ‘they cannot mean what we think they mean.’ In his heart he was assured that the ignorance of true conceptions which he found in average humanity was shared also by the poetic ‘sages’ whom it quoted. This proverbial moral was not based on ‘knowledge,’ and was therefore a stumbling-block in the path of sound ethical practice. Socrates is compelled to demolish it. It would, however, have appeared highly presumptuous, and would certainly have been impolitic, to treat the established authorities with the rigour with which he handles the contemporary sophist. Moreover Socrates apparently, and the earlier Plato certainly, entertained a genuine admiration for the finer literature.

As Plato develops he makes his Socrates bolder in discrediting poetic wisdom. In the Protagoras he objects to the poets being brought into philosophic conversation because ‘we cannot put them questions on the subjects of which they speak, and, for the most part, in quoting them people differ as to the poet’s meaning: one says he means this, and another says he means that, and, all the time, they are talking about a thing which they can neither prove nor disprove’ (οὐδὲν δέονται...ποιητῶν, οὐδὲν ἀκριβοῦς ὃν τῷ...ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οὐ μὲν τὰ τάχα παραγεῖναι τῶν ποιητῶν νομιμότερον, οὐδὲν γὰρ ποτὲ πράγματος διαλεγόμενα δ ἐναι, ἐξελέγχος 347 ε). He even makes Protagoras claim (316 b) that ‘Homer, Hesiod and Simonides’ were sophists who ‘put on poetry as a dis-
guise'; and, though this should not be pressed as representing exactly the opinion of Plato, there is little doubt that he regarded their opinions as intrinsically worth no more than those of the sophists. When in a later part of the Republic (Bk. n. ad fn.)—composed long after the first book—Plato boldly finds fault with Homer, Hesiod or Aeschylus, it is on the ground of the moral injury done by their fictions concerning the gods and the bad examples which they thus propose to men.

c. We may add the remark that the study and exegesis of poets tended, in the hands of a certain type of schoolmen whom we have always with us, to become sophistical and hair-splitting. See the treatment of a passage of Simonides in the Protagoras (339 a sq.), where Socrates, if he is not acting a parody, is as great a sinner as the rest. Cf. also Charm. 161–163.

d. Of the poets Simonides enjoyed a special reputation. He was αὐτὸς almost par excellence, the fact that, with less fervour and imagination of Simonides, than Pindar, he was the better suited to express moral sentiments, high but practical, in a finished form which brought them into general appreciation and currency. Moreover his width of sheer knowledge (which was especially valued in poets and included in their άφθονη, just as it was expressed in the Roman epithet doctus) had remained an imposing tradition.

Suppose a man deposits something with another, loses his senses, and then asks for the return of his deposit.

The deposit is 'owing' (ὅπερ ἄποιδον) ?

But by no means to be 'returned' (ἀποδίδων) in such a case?

P. No.

S. Then Simonides means something else?

P. Of course. He thinks friends 'owe' to friends a good service, never the contrary.

S. Then when by 'returning' you hurt a friend, you do not 'return' what is 'owing'?

P. That is what Simonides means.

S. But must we 'return' to an enemy also what is 'owing' to him?

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It is well to check the gradual shiftings in the meaning attached to words during the discussion.

(iv) of a concrete thing which does not belong to the holder, but is the property of some one else, and so 'owing';

(ii) of that which is morally 'due,' (Cf. the sense of the English 'ought' derived from 'owe'.) Ambiguity in a certain relation.

(iii) of literally 'returning' a thing which is not one's own;

(ii) of 'paying' 'rendering' certain conduct which is morally demanded by the situation. (Cf. 'to pay reverence'.) (iii) of 'rendering' in the arts (339 c) that course of procedure which the purpose demands, i.e. bestowing upon them the 'due' procedure.

The Greek admits of an equally natural use of ὅπερ and ἀποδίδων in these several senses (see note to the text on ἀποδίδων 339 c), but English varies its terms. To 'pay back,' to 'pay,' to 'render' cover only a portion of the sense respectively. For the argument here the shiftings are of little consequence, but there are many instances in which Greek reasoning was entirely confounded by the ambiguous or multifarious meanings of the terms employed. Cf. notes on ἐδίδον and ἐπὶ πρᾶξις 335 π. ε.

P. Certainly. And the return 'owing' is, in the fitness of things (ἵνα καὶ προσήκῃ), some mischief. [331 E—332 B]

f. From this point it is assumed that Simonides himself asserts the duty of injuring enemies. Socrates makes Polamarchus read that meaning into the words of Simonides as a corollary, but it is not at all certain that the poet would have admitted that injury to enemies was an ἀποδίδων or even a προσήκον. The ordinary Greek view of our duty towards our enemy was, indeed, unlike the Christian (see note on 339 π ὅπερ καὶ προσήκον), but Socrates himself can rise superior to it (335 d), and, logically at least, it cannot be forced upon the poet. Hence the remarks in 335 π., 356 a are based on a needless assumption.

11. S. Then Simonides apparently talked in riddles. He used 'owing' for 'fitting' and meant 'to return to each what is fitting' (τὸ προσήκον ἐκάστῃ ἀποδίδων) ?

By 'owing' Simonides means 'fitting.'
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12. S. Then helping friends and hurting enemies is justice, according to Simonides?
   Is justice helping friends and hurting enemies?
   a. i.e. according to the assertion unwarrantably forced upon him (§ 10f.).
   P. Apparently.
   S. Now the physician can help and hurt sick men in regard to health, and the navigator people at sea in regard to the dangers of the sea. How can the just man help and hurt? In what circumstances and in regard to what function?
   P. In war, for or against. [332 E] In war.
   13. S. But, as the physician is useless in the case of people not sick, and the navigator in that of people not at sea, is the just man useless in the case of people not at war?
   P. Assuredly not.
   S. Then justice is useful in peace also? In peace.
   As agriculture is useful for the acquiring of produce, what is it for whose use or acquisition justice is useful?
   P. For contracts (ξυμβάλλεια).
   a. Cases are ignored in which there may be justice applied to reputations, social claims &c. The whole trend of the discussion is towards an undue narrowing of the functions of justice.
   S. That is to say, partnerships (κοινωνίματα)? [333 A]
   Now in draughts a good and useful partner is the draught-expert, and in building the builder, rather than the just man.
   What is that partnership in which the just man is a better partner than the harpist, as the latter is the better in a partnership of striking notes?
   P. A money-partnership.
   S. Hardly so, when money is to be used? In buying or selling a horse, the expert in horses is the better partner; in the case of a ship it is the nautical expert?
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b. But justice is 'useful' in these cases. Even the ἴσιμος and ἀρετής need to be just. Socrates, however, would say that he is thinking of a partner who, being ἴσιμος, acts simply qua ἴσιμος, i.e. acts with a single mind, solely as ideal practitioner of his art. Cf. 340 a, b. Nevertheless the exercise of justice is involved, and cannot be eliminated.

In what joint use of money is it the just man who makes the best partner?

P. Where depositing and safe-keeping are concerned.
S. That is, when the money lies idle?
Justice then is useful in the case of money (καλον) only when the money is useless?
When money or any instrument is in use, it is other arts which are useful? [333 B—D]
In that case justice can be of little consequence.

C. i.e. in time of peace. The whole department of ἐμπόριον καὶ ἱματαφέρων, mentioned in 332 B, is here ignored.

14. S. Let us see. In a fight the shrewdest (δοκιμάζοντος) to hit is also the shrewdest to guard himself?
Similarly the shrewdest to guard against disease is the shrewdest to implant it?
That man is a good (ἀγάδος) guard of an army who is shrewdest at 'stealing' (ἀλέσας) the enemy's plans?

P. Yes.
S. Then whatever a man is clever at guarding he is clever at stealing?
a. This universal conclusion based upon one or two instances is, of course, without warrant, even if we admitted the instances themselves.
b. The whole of this discussion is hardly to be taken seriously. In the early days of logic there was a natural delight in the exercise of sheer ingenuity, and the Platonic Socrates enjoys the mischievous fun of entangling opponents who make too ready admissions. To moderns trained in logical processes there is a certain puillarity in much of this and similar exhibitions of nascent dialectics. The Euthydemus is cari-

c. Of course, the answer is that the ἠμαριός is a 'good' guardian only in the sense of being incorruptible. He will do the right thing by the deposit in his hands, but he need be possessed of no particular shrewdness. Indeed, the strictly just man is apt to be the last to comprehend the wiles of knavery.

There is the frequent (by no means necessarily conscious) trickery with Greek words. Thus ἠμαριός (i) a 'terrible man to' and that, and in this sense the just man is ἠμαριός φθοράτων ἀγγέλων in virtue of his tenacious fidelity: (ii) 'clever' or 'shrewd' at this or that; and in this sense Socrates here uses it, though it is manifestly unwarrantable when applied to mere justice in guardianship, apart from other qualities.

Similarly ἀναθέματος is either (i) 'good' in the sense of 'trustworthy' or (ii) 'good' in the sense of 'able.' φθοράτων, throughout, is treated as if identical with φθοράτων. ἀγγέλων, again, is either (i) 'to steal' in the literal sense, or (ii) 'to get knowledge of and forestall.' It is only by the use of these words without regard to their fluctuating senses that the egregious conclusion is reached.

So the just man turns out to be a thief.

For this Homer no doubt is your authority, in what he says of Autolycus, and you are in good poetic company in saying that justice is a sort of art of stealing, though for the benefit of the just.

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one's friends and the injury of one's enemies. [333 Ε—
334 Β]

d. For the ironical politeness shewn towards both Homer and
Polemarthus see notes on 334 Α (fin.), 334 Β.

15. P. I don't know what I meant. But I still believe
that justice helps friends and injures enemies.

a. The same result of the Socratic dialectic appears in Alcib. 1.
127 Β ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς θείας, ἢ Σάκρατες, οὖθεν
ἀφότερον ἐν τῇ λέγει. That it was generally
Polemarthus is not recognised appears from Meno 80 Α ἢ Σάκρατες,
ἀφότερον μὲν ἐγὼν πρὶν καὶ συγγενεῖσαί σοι, ὥσπερ ἢ ὁδόρο ἢ
ἀφότερον τὸ ἀπορεῖ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιεῖ ἀπορεῖν. καὶ κινήτηριον
ὡς μὲν διὰκόσμητες, γεγονέναι μὲ καὶ χαρακτήτες καὶ ἀπερίκολο
καταπετάζει, ὡς τε μετὰ ἁρπαγμένας γεγονότα.
καὶ διὰ τὴν κακίαν, ἄλλωσπερ εἶναι τὸ τε ἐκεῖνο καὶ τὸ ὅλον τὸ
πλατάνος ἑκάστη τῇ διαλεκτία. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὴ τὸν ἅπαν ἀποδείκτασθαι
καὶ ἀπερίκολον ναρκάτων ποιεῖ.
καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ μοι τῶσον τε ἐπιτιθείναι τι προφυλάκειν, ναρκάν.
ἄλλον μέν ἐγὼν καὶ τὴν τιθημεν καὶ τὸ στάμα ναρκά, καὶ εἰκὲ ἔχει τοι ἂν προφυλάξειν σοι.

Polemarthus is, naturally enough, not satisfied. He cannot
but feel that there has been something wrong somewhere. So
Callias in Gorg. 518 εἰ δύναται μοι τὸν δοκεῖν τὸν
λόγον, ἢ Σάκρατες, πάνω δὲ τὸ τὸν πολλοῦς φάνοντα, εἰ πόσον
σοὶ πέμβαμε.

s. By 'friends' and 'enemies' do you mean those who
seem so, or those who are so?
P. One naturally makes friends of those
whom one thinks good (χρηστούς), and hates
those whom he thinks the contrary (πονηροί).

b. The answer introduces a new consideration, which, properly
considered, is irrelevant to the argument.

The question is whether the 'friends' (φίλοι)
are those who are 'thought to be,' or those
who 'are.' A φίλος is one who acts with φίλος, and Simonides
might retort that φίλος are simply those who φίλουσιν, and
that whether they are χρηστοί or πονηροί—in the sense which
Socrates attaches to these words—is not in point. The
only essential matter is that they should be friends. Plato, like
Aristotle (Eth. VIII. 3), may, indeed, have conceived that
ideal friendship can exist only between good men, inasmuch

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as a basis of sterling character is necessary for its con-
tinuance. Nevertheless that very arguable assumption has
no right to appear here. Yet upon it, thus awkwardly
introduced, the whole discussion turns.

It is hard not to believe that Plato was himself aware of the
fallacy in the argument of Socrates here. Otherwise it is not
readily explicable how he came to substitute ἄριστον and
πονηρόν immediately below for χρηστόν and πονηρόν. The latter
words, as used by Polemarthus, may denote respectively
'soundness' and 'unsoundness' ('good and true' and the
contrary) in friendship itself. But Socrates takes the words
in their familiar acceptation of 'good' and 'bad' in the
general moral sense, and Polemarthus does not pull him up,
as he obviously should have done.

s. But we are fallible, and often misjudge in choosing
our friends.

In such cases the good (ἄριστον) are made enemies and the
bad (πονηρόν) friends?
P. It would then be just to help the bad and hurt the good?

s. It appears so. [334 C]

s. But the good are just and do no injustice?

c. That the 'good' are 'just' is an axiom which Socrates is
content to borrow from the traditional morality. Even
though he 'does not know what justice is,' he does not
question that the ἄριστον are those who practice ἀρετή, and
πονηρόν is one form of ἀρετή.

Thus it is just to hurt those who do no injustice. [334 D]

16. P. We cannot allow that.
s. Well, then, it is just to hurt the unjust and to help
the just?
P. That is better.
s. Therefore, when people have misjudged character (in
choosing their friends), it is just to hurt their friends (seeing
they are bad) and to help their enemies (seeing they are good).
We thus come to the exact opposite of the statement we
attributed to Simonides. [334 E]

a. Though the words 'the statement which we attributed to
Simonides' instead of 'the statement of Simonides' are

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meant to be ironical, they are more literally accurate than
Socrates appears to suspect (v. sup. § 10 f).

17. P. Logically it is so. But let us readjust our

notion of friend and foe.

Instead of making the friend him who seems good (χρηστός), let us say ‘him who not only seems, but is, good’; and similarly with an enemy. [334 E, 335 A]

S. Then the good (ἀγαθός) will be a friend and the bad (πονηρός) an enemy?

You require an amending addition to our statement of justice; thus—‘it is just to help a friend, if he is good (ἀγαθός), and to hurt an enemy, if he is bad (κακός)?’ [335 A]

P. I am satisfied with that.

18. S. But is it right for a just man to hurt anybody at all?

P. Certainly: men who (as we now sup- pose them) are both bad and enemies.

S. But horses and dogs, when hurt, become worse; that is, worse in their excellence (ἀξιος) as dogs and horses?

Is it not the same with men?

P. No doubt.

S. But justice is a human excellence (ἀξιος)?

And therefore men, when injured, become less just? [335 B, C]

P. That seems quite true.

20. S. Then if anyone says that it is just ‘to return to each what is owing’; and if this means that harm is owing to enemies and help to friends, he is no ‘sage’?

We will therefore make common cause against ascribing such a saying to Simonides or Bias or any other sage? The saying cannot come from Simonides.
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s. I fancy it was said by Periander or some other wealthy and powerful person.

Justice, then, is not this. What else can it be? [336 A]

21. Meanwhile Thrasymachus had been burning to break in. At this pause he was upon them like a wild beast.

A. a. The character of Thrasymachus is very unamiable delineated, and it is impossible not to feel that he had incurred the special personal dislike of Plato. If our knowledge of him were gathered only from the Republic it would appear incredible that he could have been a man of the high repute indicated by other writers (see above § 3 c). That his manner was conspicuously offensive is tolerably certain; otherwise Plato would hardly have cared or dared to give us the present representation of the sophist who ‘had to be held back’ from interfering, who ‘wanted to show off,’ who ‘sprang upon us like a wild beast,’ who gives vent to a ‘sardonic cackle,’ who berates Socrates with disingenuousness, sneers at his ‘mock modesty,’ accuses him of picking other people’s brains without a thank-you, calls him a ‘gross buffoon’ (βασιλιάς) and a pettifogger (συνοδάρης) and ‘my good fool’ (συνθέσατας), tells him he ‘drives,’ grows sulkily and refuses to do more than nod his head, gets into a perspiration, and blushes ‘for the only occasion on which I ever saw him blush.’

He is not only rude, but vulgar; not only dogmatic, but snarling. His is not simply the overbearing behaviour of a Dr Johnson, who, ‘when his pistol missed fire, knocks you down with the butt.’ He is not merely arrogant and irritable. Plato meant to make him ‘no gentleman,’ and to contrast him the more forcibly with the suavity of Socrates.

b. No doubt ‘the mighty Chalcedonian’ actually had these faults, however much Plato may have coloured them. In the dialogues the sophists are as distinctively individualised as the rest of the characters. They were historical personages, and, as Plato sought to impart every element of verisimilitude to his conversations, he had no choice but to give recognisable outlines, even in a caricature. The pen-and-ink sketches of

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Protagoras, Hippias and Prodices in the Protagoras are too delightful and convincing not to have been essentially true.

In the dialogues which bear their names Protagoras and Gorgias are treated by Plato with personal respect, however unmeritfully their views may be impugned. If the little fables of Protagoras and the atmosphere of admiration in which he moved are lightly satirised, and if he is made to grow slightly ruffled in the debate, he is all the time drawn as a man of polish and real ability, and as a chivalrous antagonist. In the Gorgias the special art of the sophist, rhetoric, is attacked and its vicious emptiness exposed, but, beyond a certain excess of vanity, there is nothing in the man himself to take from our esteem. He is as courteous as Protagoras in his bearing towards the vexatious Socrates. To these, who were men of real eminence and character, Socrates is deferential. It is clear that Plato, while disapproving of the sophist, esteemed the man of talent and breeding.

Hippias, whether in the dialogues of that name (one of which may be spurious) or in the Protagoras, meets with delightful treatment, principally on account of his inordinate conceit. Polus (in the Gorgias) has much of the insolence of Thrasymachus, which is tamed in a similar manner. Euthydemus and Dionysodorus are meant to be frivolous and amusing impostors.

c. Plato is sometimes accused of positive misanthropy. The charge is not borne out by the dialogues. It gains colour only from his treatment of the sophists and other wiseacres. To these his attitude is one of general antagonism. He followed Socrates in his onslaughts on the ‘conceit of knowledge’ passing itself off for knowledge. But he found this everywhere around him, both in the teacher (whether of rhetoric, ethics, or general savoir faire) and in the so-called practical man, who proposed legislation or directed affairs. Congenitally, no doubt, Plato was of a highly critical and somewhat supercilious turn of mind. In addition to this his culture was high, and, as an ‘apostle of culture,’ he looked from a superior eminence upon those who were not in a constant condition of self-criticism. The world, as viewed from his standpoint, was apt to consist of men of crude views or narrow views, of pretenders or Philistines. It needed sweet-
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ness and light. Light was wanting even in the best cases, in a Protagoras or a Gorgias. Sweetness these did possess. But all the contempt of Plato's nature and style—at least in his earlier days—was bestowed on those who, lacking light, were obtusely lacking in sweetness. Of these Thrasymanus was the worst offender.

Whether the general attitude of Plato is a justifiable one is a question which we need not here discuss. It will be enough to point out again that the Socratic dialogues have a purpose—the examination of existing views, preliminary to the possible establishment of a sound basis for conduct. These existing views found expression chiefly in the professional sophists, second in the 'sages,' third in the representative citizen with his strict morality. The sophist, sage, representative citizen and man of affairs are therefore the natural personae whom Plato sets up for Socrates to assail. Truth to life in some cases, the requirements of literary vivacity in others, and the 'minxie' character of the dialogues, necessitate a lively handling in which personal idiosyncrasies play their part. The pieces are both philosophic dialogues and also little dramas of 'the humours.' It is by no means necessary to suppose that Plato, any more than Aristophanes, hated and despised his fellow-citizens in the ordinary intercourse of life.

[For a discussion of the relations of Socrates and the Sophists, with a defence of the latter, see Grote Hist. Gr. P4 xi. c. xvii.

Vol. 3 of the 12 vol. edition of 1899, and compare therewith the remarks by Jowett in his Introduction to the translation of the Sophistes pp. 378 sqq.]

'What is the use' cries Thrasymanus 'of this foolish and disingenuous complaisance to each other? If you are in earnest, stop this perpetual asking and confuting, and give us something positive.'

A usual objection to Socrates was that he merely created difficulties to be left unanswered. Of. Meno. Negative 80 a οὖν δὲν ἄλλο ἡ αὐτός τε ἀπόρεστι καὶ τούτις ἀδικεῖς ἀπορεῖν. His wholly destructive procedure was reputed to come of a mischievous or captious spirit. Xen. Mem. vi. 4. 9 των ἄλλων ψυχαί, ἐρωτών μεν καὶ ἐκλέγοντο πάνται, αὐτός δὲ οὐδὲν ηδύλλων ἐτέχαν λόγων οὐδὲ γνώμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι περὶ ὁδοίες. The same expres.

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sion τῆς ὤλθης ἀποφαίνεσθαι is used by Plutarch, Quaest. Plat. 999 s.

Most people imagined that Socrates must be in a position to be positive in matters in which he could confute others. Apol. 23 οὗτοι γὰρ με εὐδοκοῦσιν εἰποντες ταῦτα ὧν ἐστὶν σοφὸς, ἄν οὖν ἄλλον ἐξεχώρησο. If he pleaded ignorance and inability it was put down to his mock-modesty. A sophist like Thrasymanus, failing to comprehend the honesty of Socrates' attitude and irritated at it, was anxious to have it appear that he refused to be positive simply to avoid being himself subjected to cavil.

And don't tell me that justice is 'obligation' ('τὸ ὁμοιου) or 'the salutary' ('τὸ ὁμοιομοιοῦ) or 'the best policy' ('τὸ λυκεταῖο) or 'the profitable' ('τὸ καταλείπον) or 'interest' ('τὸ ἐκμάτριον). I shall accept no such rubbish.

C. These definitions, most of which are practically synonymous, had apparently been enunciated in certain quarters and were in some vogue. Grote's remark (Hist. Gr. vol. viii. p. 235) that the answers offered to Socrates in the dialogues 'purported to be the explanation or definition of a term...given by one who had never before tried to render to himself an account of what it meant' cannot apply to sophists and their pupils. As a fact these were much concerned with rendering to themselves 'an account of what it meant,' as Thrasymanus' own definition immediately shows. Attempts to analyze justice had, of course, been made, and some had come to the conclusion that it was simply 'the best policy.' This notion is elaborated in Glaucon's speech in Book ii.

But Socrates had 'seen the wolf first.' He therefore still had the use of his tongue.

'Nay, Thrasymanus: if we had been looking for gold we should not have been pretending, and justice is worth far more than gold. Clever men like you should pity our incompetence, not be angry.' [336 B—E]

22. Thrasymanus (with a sardonic guffaw). 'The usual Socratic mock-modesty (εἰπότερ) Anything' rather than answer!'
a. For the exact meaning of εἰρωνεία see the note (337 A) and the passage of Cicero there quoted. It appears in Apol. 37 x, where Socrates pleads ‘If I say The ‘irony’ that it would be disobedience to the god to let people alone, you will disbelieve me of εἰρωνευόμενον’ (i.e. think I am pretending to humbler motives than I possess).

The passage to the modern sense of ‘irony’ is not difficult to trace. An air of ignorance which seeks to be taught goes with an implication that the person addressed is in a position to teach. To depreciate oneself in comparison with others is correspondingly to exalt those others. If the air of ignorance or the self-deprecation is only assumed, the ascription of knowledge or superiority to the other parties is equally a pretence, and therefore a disguised expression of contempt. Socrates was εἰρων in both the Greek and the modern sense. His acknowledgment of ignorance, indeed, was genuine so far as it implied that he knew he had not arrived at true knowledge. But his modest request for instruction from others was a pretence, and therefore ‘irony’ in the modern sense. He was perfectly satisfied that the sophists did not know and could not teach, and he was conscious of his own superiority over them. In the Apology he finds the oracle to be true that Socrates is the wisest of men, on the ground that he is aware of his own ignorance, while others—sophists, poets, politicians, craftsmen—are not.

To us there is pure ‘irony’ in the passage of the Laches (186 b) ἦν μὲν ὁμ ἐπὶς πρὸς τὸν θεού πέτρος ἡγεμόνες ἐκ τῆς διδασκαλίας μοι ὁδέοις τούτοις τῷ πέτροι. καὶ οὐκ ἐπὶ τῆς θεοῦ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἀκόμα. ἅλλα τοι ἔπειτα ἐκ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἀκούσας ἐπεφέρετο ἐν τοῖς μοι ἀνάμεσα καὶ μεταξὺ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. εἰπε μὲν δὲ τοῖς τῆς πράγματος δοκεῖς ἔτι Καὶ τοιούτως, καὶ τῶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων δοκεῖς ἔτι Καὶ τοιούτως. To Socrates’ opponents there was ‘mock modesty’ in such language, but they also smacked under the ‘irony’ implied.

The extent to which Socrates actually practised this characteristic εἰρωνεία was perhaps excessive. In Symp. 216 x it is said of him εἰρωνευόμενος διὰ καὶ πᾶντα τῶν μεταξύ τῶν οὐκ ἔχει τῶν ἀνθρώπων διακρίνει, and probably anyone who reads the Socratic dialogues of Plato continuously, rather than in portions at different times, will occasionally find himself tiring of a device which is so entertaining in separate instances. After he had acquired celebrity, this uniform profession of ignorance in debate was usually construed as
The sophists, on the other hand, were avowed teachers. They professed to have something to impart, and they received payment for imparting it. Had Socrates been assured that the sophists were really dealing in a genuine commodity, he would not have shrank from recognising their claims to remuneration, any more than he would those of a schoolmaster or of any ὁμιλητής, whether as practitioner of the learned profession of medicine, the fine arts of painting and sculpture, or the crafts. As a fact their fees, to his mind, were obtained under false pretences. This is curtly expressed by Aristotle Sophist. Elench. ι ὁ σοφιστὴς ἐργάζεται ἀν διδασκάλης σοφία ἀλλ’ ὁ διδάσκων.

b. But apart from the reasoned Socratic view there was also the popular objection. In any case the Greek view of 'liberal' professions was very narrow. Sophistry was allowed to be 'liberal,' but a military engineer (μηχανολόγος), for instance, was not (Gorg. 512 c). For sophists there was a special contempt, based partly upon the unanalysed notion that it was illiberal to charge fees for helping one's fellow-citizens to wisdom and virtue, and partly upon the impression that sophistical instruction resulted in a confounding of words, and a fondness for 'making the worse appear the better reason.' The former consideration is expressly stated in Gorg. 550 ἐπὶ περὶ δὲ γε ταύτῃ τῆς πράξεως, διότι ἐν τινα πράξεως ὡς βίλλετωσιν εὖ καὶ ἄρσεν τὸν αὐτὸν ἀν δικαιῶσιν ἡ πόλις, αἰσχρὸν ν εκθέσεται μὴ φάναι συμβουλευζέων ἐνα μὴ τις αὐτῷ ἀργότερον δῆ. For the latter, the immoral ability was naturally dreaded by the Athenian public, since the practical exhibition of it would be in the assembly and the courts. The Athenian youths sought teaching of this kind not from a love of learning in the abstract, but with the same view as that with which young Romans studied rhetoric,—to fit themselves for a life of affairs.

A specially instructive passage may be found in the Meno (91 a seq.), where Socrates, speaking to Anytus on behalf of Meno, who 'wants to learn that wisdom and excellence by which men successfully administer their households and their states' and treat parents, fellow-citizens and strangers 'in a way worthy of a good man (ἀγαθός ἀγαθῶς),' suggests (ironically, of course) that he should go to τῶν σοφῶν τῶν ἐπισκευασμένων ἀρετῆς διδασκόντων εἶναι καὶ ἀρκητοῖς.

In the Protagoras Hippocrates is eager to pay money to that sophist in order to be σοφός (810 d–e). Thereupon Socrates asks him what he expects to be made into by Protagoras, in the way in which he would be made into a sculptor by Pheidias. 'It would naturally be a sophist,' and Hippocrates blushes at the confession. Upon Socrates asking πῶς θεών, οὐκ ἂν αἰσχύνομαι εἰ τοῦ Ἔλληνας σωτηρίαν σαφῆνες παρέχοι; he is obliged to admit that he would be ashamed. This agrees with the popular attitude towards the profession. The Socratic objection is then pressed. The particular object sought by Hippocrates is to become ἐκεῖνος λέγειν. But that, says Socrates, involves knowledge of the subjects on which one speaks; and what is that περὶ οὗ οὗ τῇ ἐπηρεάσει αἰτίαν ὁ σοφιστής καὶ τὸν μαθητὴν τοῦ; Hippocrates cannot tell. Protagoras, however, is not ashamed of being a sophist (817 b–c). He thinks frank 'confession is better than denying the fact.'

Long after philosophy, largely deriving from Socrates, had produced its special schools and systems, the payment of fees provoked expressions of contempt from writers like Lucian.

Glaucus and his friends are ready to club together to provide the fee, and Socrates, who cannot be positive 'because he does not know or pretend to know,' implores Thrasymachus to be liberal with his instruction. [337 D—338 A]
24. Thrasymachus is eager to show off, but makes a pretense of preferring to hear Socrates.

"Socrates goes round picking other people’s brains without so much as a ‘thank you.’"

S. Nay, I pay my meed of praise, as you will find, when you give the answer. [338 A, B]

T. Listen then. Justice is simply ‘What is the interest of the stronger’ (τὸ τῆς ἐξουσίας κρείττου εὐμφέρον).

Why don’t you praise?

a. The same definition, equivalent to the modern expression that ‘Might is Right,’ and the same line of argument which is pursued immediately by Thrasymachus, occur Legg. 714 c sq. In all probability, therefore, it was a definition in current repute. The sophists and men of the world largely held that an abstract ‘justice’ had no existence. Justice was not φόινος but φόινος, and the φόινος was determined by the governing power in its own interests, or else (what amounts to the same thing) by the majority (αὐτὸ τῆς κράτους), which makes compacts and passes self-denying ordinances for reciprocal protection. Cf. the remarks of Gallicus in Gorg. 493 b sq., and especially 493 b–d οὕτω τὸ δικαιὸν κέκριται, τὸν κρατὸς τοῦ εὐττοσος ἄρξειν καὶ πλὴν ἔχειν.

S. I will praise, when I understand.

Polydamas, the athlete, is stronger (κρείττως) than we are. A beef diet is to his interest (εὐμφέρει). You don’t mean that the same diet is to the interest of, and just for, those less strong? [338 C]

b. Thrasymachus had not said that the interest of the stronger is ‘the interest’ of the weaker also, but only that it is ‘justice.’ According to Thrasymachus τὸ εὐμφέρον τῶν κρείττων is τὸ δικαιὸν. In the crude ad absurdum illustration of Socrates τὰ βέβαια κράσια τῶν κρείττων εὐμφέρον. The only logical inference would be that, therefore, τὰ βέβαια κράσια represent what is δικαιον τοῦ εὐττοσε. Nothing can be said of this being εὐμφέρον also.

25. T. Another of your malicious tricks, Socrates!

Some states are under a despot, some under a democracy, some under an aristocracy.

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That which is ‘the stronger’ (ἐπαρεῖ) in each is the ruling power.

Each form of rule makes laws adapted to explaining the interest of the stronger (εὐμφέρον). In this shape this ‘interest’ is declared ‘just’ for the subjects, and its violation is punished.

Thus ‘the interest of the stronger’ is justice everywhere. [338 D–339 A]

S. Now I understand. Whether you are right, remains to be seen.

You forbade me to say that ‘interest’ was ‘just.’

a. The thinking (and therefore the expression) is lax. Thrasymachus had said ‘do not tell me that justice is τὸ εὐμφέρον.’ He had not said ‘do not tell me that τὸ εὐμφέρον is just.’

True, you add ‘of the stronger.’

T. A slight addition, no doubt!

S. I do not know yet. I agree that justice is some sort of ‘interest,’ but your specification needs examining. [339 A, B]

T. Proceed.

26. S. You say, of course, that it is just to obey the ruling power?

But ruling powers are fallible?

First, the laws may be false.

They therefore sometimes make laws against their own interests?

Yet the subjects must obey, and that is ‘justice’?

Therefore justice may be the opposite of the interest of the stronger. [339 C, D]

The point thus scored startles Thrasymachus, and Socrates briefly reviews and drives home the argument. [339 D, E]

a. Plato is aware that the point here made is a really good one and sound enough to secure universal approval. He is, therefore, evidently pleased with it and enjoys tasting it over.
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27. A slight diversion occurs in a small passage of arms between Polemarchus (supporting Socrates) and Cleitophon (supporting Thrasymachus).

Cleitophon ends by trying to make out that Thrasymachus meant ‘what the stronger thinks to be his interest.’

Socrates will consider that view if Thrasymachus chooses.

[340 A—C]

28. Thrasymachus disowns it.

a. Of course Thrasymachus cannot be represented as novice enough to accept so elementary a correction. He may not possess προθεσία in the Socratic sense; he may be superficial; but his superficiality is not so patent as this. He adopts a nimble resource of experienced sophistry.

T. Do you think I call a man ‘stronger’ when he is going wrong?

S. I did, when you admitted that rulers were not infallible.

T. A quibble, Socrates!

Do you call a man a ‘physician’ when he is making a mistake in medicine? Is he a physician για that mistake (καρ' αὐτὸ νοῦ τοῦ ἰαματίατος)? Loosely, no doubt, we say so; but strictly—and you are stickler for strictness—no craftsman or artist makes a mistake. The mistake occurs where knowledge fails, and at that point the practitioner is no craftsman.

Thrasymachus adds: ‘The interest of the ruler, who, while really ruler, can make no mistakes in his laws.’

b. It is difficult for Thrasymachus to extricate himself, and he does it badly with a quibble. He had incautiously acknowledged that ἀρχων make mistakes as to their own interest. He does not frankly confess that he would not have made the admission if he had foreseen the consequences, but explains that he used the word ἀρχων in the lax popular sense (i.e. of persons actually exercising ἀρχή). But, as a fact, the ἀρχων, while ἀρχηγός in the ideal sense, makes no mistake in his ruling. When he does make a mistake, he is not an ἀρχηγός for the time being. He becomes another character. It is only his legislation in the real character that we are to consider.

If he must quibble, it would have been easier for him to say that the ἀρχηγός, when making a mistake, is not really ἀρχηγός. But that way of putting it would not have suited Plato’s purpose.

29. s. So you think I quibble?

T. I know it; but it is useless with me.

s. Let us avoid the danger of it.

Do you henceforth mean by the ‘ruler,’ i.e. the ‘stronger,’ the ruler in your strict sense?

T. Yes. Now quibble, and do your worst.

s. I should as soon think of bearding a lion.

But enough of banter. [341 A—C]

30. Your physician—in the strict sense—is not a money-maker, but a healer of the sick? Your navigator is a ruler of sailors, not a sailor (though he is that incidentally).

There is an ‘interest’ (ἐνεργεία) in each case?

The essential purpose of the art in each case is to look after that ‘interest’? [341 C, D]

T. Granted.

s. Has each art any other ‘interest’ than its own ideal perfection?

T. How do you mean?

s. It is not enough for a body to be a body. It must be sound. The art of medicine is required to look after the ‘interests’ of the body.

But is the art of medicine itself unsound or defective, requiring some further art to look after its soundness (its ‘interests’) and so ad infinitum?

Or is not every art—while it is what it pretends to be—complete and without defect?

Has it any other interest to look after than the interest of that which is the subject of the art?

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T. I suppose not.
S. Then the art of medicine, having no deficiency of its own, looks after the ‘interest,’ not of the art of medicine, but of the body, and so on? [341 D—342 C]
T. Apparently.

31. S. Well, the arts ‘rule’ over and are ‘stronger’ than that which is the subject of their exercise?

[Thrasymachus was very reluctant to grant this.]

Then no science (ἐπιστήμη) looks after the ‘interest of the stronger,’ but after that of the weaker and the subject?

[Thrasymachus spared for a time, but was compelled to give in.]

Therefore no physician, no navigator, no other kind of ‘ruler,’ so long as he is strictly ‘ruler,’ looks after his own interest, but after that of the subject upon which his art is exercised? [342 C—E]

a. The arts are supposed to stand to those upon whom they are practised as government and superior strength stand to the governed and the weaker. A sophism of Socrates.

The ‘subjects’ of the arts obey the prescriptions of those arts. Consequently the practitioner of an art is in the same position relatively to those upon whom he exercises it as an ἀρχων and κρίτων is relatively to the ἀρχέας καὶ κριτοπότης.

The analogy is, of course, skilful; but for its application to prove that an ἀρχων, in so far as he is an ἀρχων, considers the good of his subjects only, it is obviously fallacious, unless we beg the whole question by assuming for ἀρχων the sense of keeping a thing in good condition as manager and director. This is what Socrates actually does beg. Cf. inf. 345 τὸ ἀρχεῖον τε καὶ θεραπευτικόν.

The perfect ‘art’ of ἀρχον, in the literal sense, and the sense meant by Thrasymachus, might rather be defined as the perfect art of keeping others in subjection. The perfect ‘art’ of being κρίτων is simply the perfect art of keeping other people down. There might be a perfect art of poisoning, and, so far as the poisoner was a poisoner and nothing else, he would consider only the perfection of his art. He might not, indeed, be considering his own ‘interest,’ but it would certainly not be the ξυμφέρον of his ‘subjects.’ It would be simply the most effectual way of exercising his art upon his victims.

Arts are not all beneficent, and if, indeed, the most strict and single-minded application of a beneficent art necessarily means the greatest ξυμφέρον of the ‘subject,’ the most strict and single-minded application of the contrary kind would mean his greatest injury. The ‘subject’ (ἀνδρὸς ἐπί τινα) may be a victim instead of a patient, and the assertion that no sort of επιστήμη aims at the advantage of the stronger is therefore one against which Thrasymachus might have made a better stand. And is the mere art of ‘being lord and master’ beneficent?

32. Thrasymachus, seeing the result, suddenly says:

‘Where is your nurse? You are drivelling.

You cannot tell sheep from shepherd.’

T. Why, precisely?
S. Thrasymachus makes a speech.

Ruler is to rule as shepherd to sheep. He looks for the good they can do to himself.

[343 A, B]

(Here Thrasymachus enters upon a set speech.)

Now rulers stand to ruled as herdsmen to their herds.

‘Justice’ is the interest of the stronger, i.e. the ruler. It is the subject’s loss and another’s gain (ἀδικών ἄγον).

Injustice is the contrary. It rules, and the ‘just’ obey, all for the good of the ruler.

In private contracts and in public dealings a panegyric upon injustice.

The just man always gets the worst of things and the unjust man the best.

The just man in office neglects his affairs and offends his friends by his probity: the case of the unjust man is just the contrary.

Take the most consummate injustice, ideal in form and opportunity—despotism (τυραννία). It can rob, enslave, and so forth, with impunity, and win the envy of men.

Men do not shrink from doing, but from suffering injustice.
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Given injustice on a large scale, it is a stronger (ἰσχυρότερον), finer-spirited (δυναμικότερον) and more masterlike (διστηρωτέρον) thing than justice.

And so justice is the 'interest of the stronger,' while injustice is to one's own interest. [343 Β—344 Α]

33. After this shower-bath of words Thrasymachus rose to go, but the company insisted that he should stay.

a. For the μακρόλογια of the sophists as opposed to the question and answer of Socrates see § 41 a.

Socrates reminds him of the importance of the subject, which involves the whole question how to live.

'They will all be grateful if he will pity and help them with his knowledge.'

b. For my part, I am not convinced. I cannot think injustice—even with a free hand—more profitable (κερδολέωτερον) than justice.

Show me my error.

t. What more can I do? Am I to cram the argument into your mind?

34. First keep to your premises, or, if you shift your ground, do it openly.

Observe. You first defined your physician as a physician 'in the strict sense.' When it came to the shepherd, you forgot 'the strict sense,' and you turned him into a feaster or a money-maker, fattening sheep for his own interest and not for that of the sheep.

But this is not the business of the 'art of shepherding.'

a. It is perhaps scarcely worth while to treat all this seriously. The art of shepherding might, indeed, be defined as the art of making sheep most nearly realise the ideal sheep. But Repeition of second Elenchus.

'Ve must keep to the ruler in the strict sense.'

35. Do you think your 'true rulers' in the different status rule voluntarily?

T. I am sure they do.

s. But no one voluntarily 'rules' in the other forms of rule (the arts). Men require payment, which implies that the benefit of the art goes to the subjects of it?

a. This would certainly not be admitted in modern, nor, we may suppose, in ancient times. The practice of art for the love of art is independent of any other reward than the glow of satisfaction in the exercise of an ability.

Now each art differs from others in having a special faculty (δόματα)? It provides a special benefit (ἀφέλεια), and not the same in all cases?

As the art of medicine provides health, so it is the 'art of pay-getting' (μισθοθροφεῖ τι) which provides pay?

b. Such an art is, of course, not easily conceivable. A special iteration of the way to obtain pay in every 'The art of circumstance in which pay comes into the question, and therefore applicable on scientific (μισθοθροφεῖ τι). principles to all occupations and professions, is an idle abstraction which Socrates finds it necessary to conjure up. The notion is that an ἱερέας, for instance, while acting as ἱερέας and nothing else, is exercising the art of ἱερεύς, the aim of which is simply to heal (ἰάσως) the subject of its exercise. This is the particular ἀφέλεια in the case, and it is conferred on the 'subject.' Whether the ἱερέας is paid or not, has nothing to do with ἱερεύς itself. The getting of pay out of his exercise of ἱερεύς is a secondary or simultaneous occupation of the ἱερέας in another character. To do this in the best way requires an 'art.'
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But the ἀρετή in that case is the rewarding of the practitioner, and, while Socrates was erecting the obtaining of pay into an art, he might have been asked whether this art, at least, does not seek the advantage of him who practises it.

The fact that incidentally you earn pay while practising the art of medicine does not make medicine an art of earning pay (μορφογραφοῦ)!

Each art (we said) works a special benefit. Therefore any benefit which accrues to all practitioners of the arts must come from the common use of something else in addition to their proper art?

Thus the earning of pay comes from the additional use of the art of pay?

[Thrasymachus assents with reluctance.]
Thus each art, in itself, attends to its own function, and benefits that which is the subject in its department?

An art without pay is of no benefit to the practitioner, though it is just as beneficial to the subject?

Therefore no one, as practiser of a given art and of no other, considers any interest but that of the subject of his art?

[346 E—347 A]

37. More important is the assertion by Thrasymachus that the life of the unjust man is preferable (ὑπερτύχω) to the life of the just.

It is of little use to count up and contrast the list of advantages on either side. It will be better to proceed by the previous method of reciprocal admissions. [347 E—348 B]

Come, Thrasymachus. Do you say that complete injustice is more profitable (νυντελεκτέραν) than complete justice?

T. I have given my reasons.
S. One of the two is an excellence (ἀρετῆ) and one badness (κακία)?

Justice is, of course, the ἀρετῆ and injustice the κακία?

T. A likely thing! Quite the contrary.
S. What! Justice is κακία?

a. It is unfortunate for the argument, when translated, that there are no English words sufficiently free to correspond to the Greek senses of ἀρετῆ and κακία. ἀρετῆ is not properly 'virtue' as we understand it. In the Gorgias (Meaning (492 n, ε) it can even be discussed whether of ἀρετῆ and the satisfaction of sensory desires is ἀρετῆ κακία.)

ἀρετῆ implies excellence and desert, while κακία implies imperfection and demerit. Moral excellence and desert are equivalent to 'virtue,' moral imperfection and demerit to 'vice.' Nevertheless 'virtue' and 'vice' cover but one department of ἀρετῆ and κακία. ἀρετῆ may embrace intellectual or practical excellence, and κακία the opposite qualities. ἀρετῆ may correspond to that which evokes admiration of any kind, e.g. strength of character (even if the exertion of it is not strictly 'moral'), while κακία may denote weakness and foible. Hence (inf. ε) κακία and αἰσχρῶν are set by chiasmus against καλῶν and ἴσχυρῶν. Cf. 444 ἀρετῆ μὲν ὑγιὲς τέ τις ὄν εἶναι καὶ καλὸς καὶ ἠσθία ψυχῆς, κακία δὲ ὒσοι τε καὶ αἰσχροὶ καὶ δαστρεπτικά.

For these reasons Thrasymachus, regarding the practice of justice as serving the interest of the stronger, can go on to declare that it is 'egregious good nature,' which is a form of weakness and foible and therefore κακία; while the practice of injustice, being the serving of one's own interest, is εὐθυμία and a mark of strength, and therefore ἀρετῆ.
Nevertheless the sense of ἀρετή and κακία tended early towards that of 'virtue' and 'vice,' and some confusion arose. For this reason Thrasymachus, though he at first promptly grants that, of justice and injustice, one is an ἀρετή and the other a κακία, is not altogether prepared to call justice daily κακία and injustice ἀρετή. He is for substituting milder terms, until driven to take up an uncompromising attitude (inf. n). Had he kept the wider and narrower senses of ἀρετή and κακία distinctly apart, his position would have been easier.

T. No, but right royal good-nature (simplesness, quixotism, εὐθεία).

s. Then injustice you call 'bad-nature' (κακοθεία)?

b. For the half-truth in this retort see note on κακοθεία 348 β.

T. No, good sense (judgment, εὐδοκία). [348 B, C]

38. s. Do you regard the unjust as possessed of wisdom (φρόνιμος) and excellence (ἀρετή)?

a. The adjectives correspond to σοφία and ἀρετή respectively (inf. n), and must be understood according to the senses attaching to those nouns (sup. § 37 a). The φρόνιμος is 'practically wise,' the ἀρετή is a man of ἀρετή, of parts and quality, without necessary reference to 'moral' acts.

At the same time, since to the Socratic mind all virtue is knowledge, it would be quite conceivable that a man conventionally known as δαίμων should turn out to be in reality the possessor of superior wisdom, and therefore of virtue.

T. Yes, when their operations are large. I am not thinking of pickpockets.

s. Of course. But do I really understand that you treat injustice as excellence (ἀρετή) and wisdom (σοφία), and justice as the contrary?

T. I do.

s. Your position has grown more stubborn. If you had called injustice 'profitable,' but 'weak' or 'disgraceful,' my task would have been easier.

But of course you will call it also fine (καλῶς) and strong (ἰσχυρῶς)?

b. Since ἀρετή necessarily implies these qualities.

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39. s. Well, let us proceed. Would the just man be willing to have advantage over (or overreach) the just man?

a. The following piece of argumentation, however specious it might have appeared to the Greek mind, is perplexed for us, and its weakness betrayed, by the impossibility of representing πλέον ἔγετο and πλούσιος consistently by any adequate term. Remarks upon its meaning and the fallacies which it involves are best reserved till the close of the argument (inf. § 40 g (i)).

T. No.

s. Nor the just performance (or circumstances, πράγματα)?

T. Not even if just.

s. But would he think it fair to overgo (πλούσιος) the unjust man?

T. He would, if he could.

s. Whereas the unjust man would seek advantage over both just and unjust?

T. Yes.

s. Then the just man takes advantage over his unlike; the unjust over both like and unlike? [349 A--C]

T. Quite so.

40. s. Now the unjust man has wisdom (φρόνιμος) and excellence (ἀρετή), and the just man neither?

The unjust man is like the wise and excellent; the just man is not!

T. If you are so-and-so, you must be like the people who are so-and-so.

s. Well, each of the two is of the same kind as those whom he is like? [349 D]
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9. (ii) The whole of the preceding discussion is puzzling and almost meaningless through the want of fixity in the terms in which it is couched. The meaning of 'over-going' and 'over-reaching,' The mean-
point chiefly turns upon the floating sense of πλέον ἐγχει, which literally = 'to have more,' 'to come off better,' but which generally
commoves an unfairness in the distribution. Where two persons have the same claims, but one fares better than the other, the one πλέον ἐχει, the other δικαιο. πλέον thus
means 'too much' as well as 'more.'

That the δικαιο should be unwilling πλέον ἐχει τοῦ δικαιο is
so far clear. That he should think it right to have an
advantage over the undeserving δικαιο is an axiom of equity.
But it is not so evident how he could πλέον ἐχει τοῦ δικαιο πράξευ.
Of πράξειs it must be remarked that it includes both
'doing' and 'forcing' (cf. 332 a). In the latter sense 'to
have an advantage over the just state of affairs' is intelligible
enough. In the former, 'to have an advantage over the just
action' does not mean 'to get more out of a situation than
just action permits' (a sense apparently simple enough, but
not in keeping with the application to the arts in 349 ε sq.),
but 'to do (in the way of justice) more than the claims of
exact justice warrant.' In other words ἡ δικαιο πράξειs is
action which is just: there can be but one really just form
of action in a given case: all δικαιο, so far as they are δικαιο
in the absolute sense, will perform that same act in the same
degree: so long as it is just, it cannot be more just: the
δικαιο will not, therefore, think of such a thing as being
more just than the just action.' Jowett very aptly quotes
Shakespeare King John iv. 2. 28

'When workmen strive to do better than well,
They do confound their skill in covetousness.'

Hence Thrasymachus—who for Plato's purposes is assumed
to have readily understood all this intricate train of thought—
replies 'οὐδὲ τῆς δικαιας νομ, not even than the just (action),' i.e.
however just the action (and it might look as if one could
not get too much of a good thing), the just man does not
want to be more just (than the true point). This is by no
means the same as if he had said ὅπως τῆς δικαιας πράξεως,
although commentators seem not to have been sufficiently
alive to the fact. πράξεως could not be omitted unless δικαια
bore all the emphasis.

Later the same πλέον ἐχει is brought into the usual analogy
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of the arts, where, corresponding to πλέον ἐχει τῆς δικαιού
πράξεως (as above explained), it is asked (449 a) if a musician
ἀρχιτέχνης ἀρχήν will be ready to 'overreach' τῆς ἐπιτήδευσι καὶ
ἀκεί τὸν χρόνον (which is a μοναχὴ πράξιν). The notion
entertained is that the μοναχὴ, ἀρχιτέχνης, can only seek
to tighten or loosen his strings to the proper point
required by the art of μοναχῆς. There is only one such point,
and all μοναχοί, as such, will seek that point and no more.
There is no 'more' or 'less' in the matter. All real artists will
therefore do and prescribe, and expect all other real artists to
do and prescribe, precisely the same things in the same cases.

On the other hand the ἄκος will always seek to over-reach
(πλεονεξεῖ). He will try for (unfair) advantage over the
δικαιος and the ἄκος alike. Also he will seek to go beyond
an ἄκος πράξιν by action still more unjust. As for the ἄκος
πράξιν, it cannot be said that he will endeavour πλέον ἐχειν
in the manner above explained for the δικαιος, but he will,
in another sense, try to get an advantage beyond 'what is
warranted by a just course of conduct.'

It is evident that the expression πλέον ἐχειν fluctuates between
the meanings 'to have more' (i.e. an advantage rightfully)
and 'to have too much' (an advantage wrongfully). In this
fluctuation is involved a quibble, which might easily be
intentional. This, however, is not the only sophism in the
context.

(ii) There is a certain speciousness in the whole argument,
which we may thus summarise: Sophisms
You say that the unjust man, being φόρμας in the argu-
kai ἄγαθος (431 b), is like the φόρμας καὶ
ἄγαθος in general, while the just man is not. Well, we are to
understand that the just and unjust are respectively of the
same description as those whom each resembles. We will
accordingly take resemblance as the criterion. I go on to
prove that the ἐπιτήδευσι in the arts (who is σοφός and
ἄγαθος) has no desire to overreach his like, while the ἐπιτή-
δευσιν, who is ἀμάθης καὶ κακός, has that desire. But the
ἄκος desires to overreach, and is therefore like the ἀμάθης καὶ
κακός, while the δικαιος has no desire to overreach, and is
therefore like the σοφός καὶ ἄγαθος. But to be like implies
(as we have said) to be of the same description. Therefore
the ἄκος is of the same description with the ἀμαθῆς καὶ
κακός. In other words, he is himself ἀμάθης καὶ κακός.'

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But the 'overreaching' of the unjust man is, to begin with,
harshly commensurable with the overreaching of a craftsman
in his craft. It is impossible to attach consistent meanings
to the same word. If we attempt consistency, we are ap-
parently led to something which Socrates would by no means
desire, viz. this—An artist, qua artist, tries simply to attain
to an ideal exercise of his art. Granted. But then is not the
business of the ἄκος, qua ἄκος, to attain to an ideal exercise
of his art of injustice, which involves overreaching everybody?
If the analogy of the arts is to be brought in, the μοναχῆς,
largē, δικαιος and ἄκος are all φόρμας καὶ ἄγαθος in their
own departments.

Again, if the μοναχῆς is φόρμας καὶ ἄγαθος, it is only in
regard to knowledge and excellence in music that he can
claim those titles. He is σοφός and ἄγαθος in regard to his
ἐπιτήδευσιν. This being so, why may not the ἄκος be equally
σοφός καὶ ἄγαθος in his particular ἐπιτήδευσιν? Further there is
practically no meaning in the remark that the ἐπιτήδευσιν will
'overreach' both the ἐπιτήδευσιν and the ἐπιτήδευσιν. If
it has a meaning at all, it is a pure assumption.

(iii) Even if we gave to the argument about 'overreaching'
more value than it deserves, the fact that the 'wise and good'
do not overreach, while the just man also does not overreach,
would merely shew that in that one respect he resembled the
'wise and good.' It would not prove that he himself was
σοφός, i.e. wise and good. Because A is never B, and C
also is not B, it does not follow that C is A.

41. All these admissions were wrung from Thrasy-
machus, who was perspiring, and, for this occasion only,
blushed.

Socrates resumes:
'In the next place you said that injustice was strong
(ἀρχηγον). You remember it?'

T. I do. But I am not satisfied as far as we have gone.

If I speak, however, you will say I am making a speech.

So ask what you like, and I will nod or shake my head.

[380 D, E]

a. The objection of Socrates to long speeches during discussion
is amusingly illustrated in the Protagoras. The μαστο-
λογία of sophists.
been 'spell-bound' by it. He ironically pretends to be waiting eagerly for more: 'but when I perceived that he had really done, I, as it were, gathered myself together.'

He complains that Pericles or some other demagogue might speak in that way, εἰ δὲ εἰκαστήριον (τι) πεῦ τι, πάντες βιβλικοὶ ὁμώς οὖσοι οὖσε ἀναπληρωθῆ ὁμώς αὐθεντικά, ὅλη ἡ ἡ τό καὶ συμφώνησαν ἀποτελεί τῶν ἴμμην, ἄλλο τὸ χαλεπὰ πληγοῦσα μακρὰ ήκεί καὶ ἀποτελούσα εὐνή ἐπιλαμβάνα τι, καὶ οἱ βόρειοι συνάντησαν ἐκάθεντες ἐκαστείας τῶν Λόγων (529 Α). But 'Protagoras is equally capable of either making fine long speeches or of dialectic question and answer κατὰ βραχέ, and Socrates desires him to carry on the discussion in the latter way. At 334 a Protagoras drops into oratory again, whereupon Socrates plaintively observes that he has 'a poor sort of memory' καὶ ἐὰν τίς μαι μακρὰ λέγῃ, ἐπιλαμβάνομαι πρὶς ἄι αὐτῷ λόγον. 'It is so easy for Protagoras to speak καὶ ἐν μορφωσεί καὶ ἐν βραχείᾳ. At last, though after a struggle, Protagoras is induced to try alternate rather than oratio.

The same position is taken up in the Gorgias (449 b, c), where Socrates asks for question and answer instead of τὸ μεῖον τῶν λόγων τούτο. Polus (471 a) is well trained ἐν τῇ ἡμεραιᾷ, but has neglected τὰ διαλέγεσθαι.

The objection, of course, is based on the difficulty of checking each link in the argument during the course of a long speech, and the consequent opportunity for sophisms, or, at any rate, for getting wide of the point by imperceptible degrees. In the dialectic process this danger appears to be avoided, and perhaps is largely so in real discussion between men of real intelligence. But in the Platonic dialogues the interlocutors assume so readily to palpable fallacies that their 'answers' do little towards keeping the discussion on sound lines.

In one amusing case, in the Gorgias (505 b), Callicles asks Socrates whether he can't just as well ask and answer his own questions. Thereupon Socrates proceeds to interrogate himself as if he were Callicles. Later in that piece, however, he is led, as he confesses, to make a long speech because he finds nobody to answer him. In the later dialogues Socrates himself indulges freely in μορφωσία.

It may further be remarked that Plato is fond of reproducing or parodying the individual styles of speech employed by particular sophists. This is manifestly the case with the
Therefore the unjust man will be the enemy of the gods and the just man their friend? [351 A—352 B]

d. Of Alcib. r. 184 c—x. Philob. 39 e (διακοιτέρα καὶ εὐθυμία καὶ ἀμαθία πάντως ἔρα ἐνθαύμαση ἑστι): The absoluteness of this truth is questioned in the popular view stated by Adelmarus in Bk xi., where it is urged that the gods may be bribed with offerings.

T. Go on till you are satisfied. I do not want to get myself disliked.

s. It is now clear that, if the unjust do transact anything jointly, it is in virtue of a tincture of justice. They are only ἐπιμελὴς ἀνθρώπου. [352 B—D]

42. Our next business is to find out whether the life of the just is the happier, or not.

The matter is of such importance that we cannot assume this, even now.

T. Proceed.

s. A horse has a function (ἡγομονία)?

A thing’s function is that which can be done only, or best, with that thing?

For instance, the function of the eyes is seeing; of a pruning-hook, pruning.

T. So far, so good.

s. And everything which has a special function has a special excellence?

That excellence is essential to the proper performance of the function?

T. I am satisfied.

s. But the soul (ψυχή) has its special function, such as ruling, planning &c.? a.

If another had said this, Socrates would have asked for a more specific name for the function of the soul.

And is not life a function of the soul?

b. ‘Life’ is, however, either ‘living’ (which of course requires ψυχή, ἀνάμια, in one sense) or ‘the conduct of life’ (which depends on ψυχή, ‘living well’ is living happily, and living well implies ἀρετή in the soul. But it is justice which is ἀρετή.

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the mind, in another sense). The two meanings are confused in the argument which follows.

And will that function (living) be properly performed by the soul, if the soul lacks ἀρετή?

But we granted that justice is ἀρετή?

T. We did.

s. Then the just soul and the just man will live ‘well’ (ἐκ μικρίας), and the unjust not?

And he who lives ‘well’ (ἐκ ζῶν) is happy (μακάριος καὶ εὐδαιμόνες)?

c. Early Greek logic was under the domination of ambiguous expressions like ἐκ ᾿της, ἐκ πράξεως. Reasoning The argu-

was indeed ἄρα τοις in an unfortunate sense, bigness of Students trained in logic and alert to the ἐκ ᾿της.

various renderings which the same Greek expression requires in a modern tongue according to the context, readily detect the non sequitur in passages like the present. It would, however, be by no means obvious to those who themselves habitually used the one expression in several senses. ἐκ πράξεως in ‘acting rightly’ (= ἄρα τοις πράξεως) and also ‘faring well’: ἐκ ᾿της is ‘conducting life properly’ and also ‘living well’ (i.e. in comfort and happiness). The former depends on a condition of mind, the latter largely on external circumstances.

In Charm. 172 ι we have the same ambiguity utilised as here, ἀμαθίας ἐκείμης, ὀφθαλματὸς ἐκ ᾿της ἐκ κύλιντος ὀφθαλματὸς, ἀκούσιος καλὸς καὶ ἐκ πράξεως τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς διακειμένω, τοῖς ἐκ ἐκ πράξεως εὐδαιμονίας ἐκ. So 173 a ἀναγκάσθητος ἐκ πράξεως ἐκ ᾿της κατακόρυφας καὶ εὐδαιμονίας. Cf. Alcib. r. 116 c ἄρα τοῖς ἀκούσιοι καλὸς πράξας, ὀφθαλμοῖς καὶ ἐκ πράξεως; ὀφθαλμοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς: Gorg. 507 c, Prot. 344 x, 351 b (where ἐκ ᾿της is treated as interchangeable with ἐκ πράξεως). The Platonists used ἐκ πράξεως for ἀκούσιος in salutations by letter. Aristotle still tolerates the ambiguity Eth. r. 4. 2, and τι 2. 5 (ἐπορεῖα).

Therefore the just man is happy and the unjust miserable? But to be miserable is not ‘profitable’? Therefore injustice is in no case more ‘profitable’ than justice. [352 D—354 A]
43. T. I hope you have enjoyed your feast of Bendis.

a. It is probable that this should be read as a reproach. The occasion is festive. Socrates has turned it into a meeting for debate; and Thrasymachus, who is fond enough of 'showing off,' now pretends to disapprove of this way of celebrating the feast of Bendis.

s. Yes, thanks to you.

We have, however, been merely tasting a number of dishes in passing.

We set out to discover the nature of justice: then I left that question to consider whether it is weakness and ignorance, or wisdom and excellence.

Next there came up the argument that injustice was more profitable than justice, and I attacked that.

The result is nil.

If I do not know what justice is, I cannot tell whether it is a virtue (excellence) or not, nor whether its possessor is happy or not. [354 A—C]

b. The dialogue which, in its original form, probably ended here, is one of the earlier Socratic tentative dialogues. (See below §§ 57 sqq.) The setting up and demolishing of definitions has proceeded as in the Euthyphro, Lysis, Charmides and Laches. Similarly to the present case the Lysis ends with the remark ὅπως ὑπὲρ ὅ τι ἕστη ὁ φίλος ὃ σὺ τε ἐγκαίρως ἔστηθεν.

It might, perhaps, have seemed as if Socrates had actually demonstrated that justice is ἀρετή and the source of happiness. But he himself regards the whole discussion as so much dialectics destructive of the definition and assertions of Thrasymachus. He has arrived at no definition for himself, and yet such a definition is essential. His conclusions have not come from a knowledge of the τε ἐστί of justice.

II. THE REMAINDER OF THE PROEM.

(Book II. to 369 B.)

44. Socrates thought discussion was over. It turned out to have been merely the prelude. Glaucus was not satisfied. 'Socrates, you have not really convinced us that it is better to be just.' [357 A, B]

45. G. There are three species of good things (ἀγαθά), viz.:

(i) Things welcomed for themselves, without an eye to their consequences—harmless pleasures;

(ii) Things welcomed both for themselves and their consequences—e.g. health and sanity;

(iii) Things welcomed for their consequences, but in some themselves—e.g. money-making, practising or taking medicine &c.

In which class is justice?

s. I should think it is in the best class, the second.

g. Most people think otherwise. They place it in the third.

s. That is the position of Thrasymachus. But I must be a dunce. [357 B—358 A]

46. G. Thrasymachus gave in too soon. I want to hear what justice and injustice are in their essence, in the soul itself, apart from all question of rewards and results. [368 B]

Glaucus will therefore take up anew (ἐπαναλαμβάνεται) the argument of Thrasymachus.

He will maintain as uncompromisingly as possible

(1) the current allegation as to the nature and origin of justice:

(2) that it is practised unwillingly, as a necessity and not as a good:
(8) that such conduct is natural, since the life of the unjust is much to be preferred.
Not that Glaucon himself holds these views, but he wants to hear how Socrates will meet them. [358 C, D]

47. First, then, as to the nature and origin of justice.
To do injustice (δικαιον) is a good thing; to suffer it (δικαιοθετημαι), a bad thing.
But the harm in suffering it is greater in proportion than the advantage in committing it.

Hence, when committing injustice entails suffering it, men make covenants (συμβάσεις) and laws (σωματεία) to prevent both.

This preventing by law and covenant is called 'legality and justice' (υπόθεσις καὶ δικαίωμα).
Hence justice is a compromise between the best (doing injustice with impunity) and the worst (suffering injustice without redress).

A man would be a madman to make such a compromise if he could do as he chose. [358 E—359 B]

48. Second, as to justice being practised from compulsion only.
If we gave a 'just' and an 'unjust' man a free hand, and then watched them, we should find that they would seek the same selfish objects.

Let us suppose each to have a 'ring of Gyges.' No one would be found to be above temptation. With full power to take, to slay, and so forth, there would be no 'just' man.

For no one believes in justice as intrinsically preferable.
The praise of justice is a piece of cant and mutual deception. [359 B—360 D]

49. Third, as to which is the preferable life of the two.
Let us assume the 'just' and the 'unjust' man to be perfect examples in their respective departments (τῆλεν ἐκέρατον εἰς τὸ ἐμφύτευμα ἐπικρήσιμον), i.e., let the unjust man know how to work

Third—the unjust life is superior.

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his will, and never to be found out, but actually to secure the best possible reputation for justice;
and let the just man be absolutely immovable in his principles, but let him gain the worst possible reputation for injustice.

Our just man will be flogged, tortured and impaled, and will learn that it would be better to 'seem' than to 'be' (just).
Meanwhile the unjust man, who is wise after the Aeschylean standard in 'being' (unjust) without the 'seeming' will do what he chooses and to whom he chooses. His ill-gotten gains will enable him to help friend and hurt foe, as well as to propitiate the gods with offerings. His life will therefore be the more prosperous and desirable. [360 E—363 C]

Socrates was preparing to reply, when Adeimantus joined in: 'You surely don't think the position has been adequately stated?'

Adeimantus supplements Glaucon's speech.

3. Why not?
A. The most important point has not been made.
3. Then 'A brother to the rescue!'—though I am overwhelmed already. [362 D]

50. A. Men praise justice and blame injustice. On what grounds? Parents and guardians preach justice, not for its own sake, but for its effects on the reputation. A good reputation brings the powers and advantages which Glaucon has described.

But these preachers of justice do not stop here with the effects of reputation (δόξα). The praise of justice always dwells on the advantages of a just reputation, not on the advantage of justice in the abstract.

They describe, after the manner of Homer and Hesiod, the blessings which heaven showers on the just. Museus and Eumolpus go further still; they reward the just with an afterlife of feasting and everlasting carouse. The unjust, on the contrary, in their afterlife, are buried in mud or made to carry water in a sieve; and, in the present world, fall into ill odour and meet with the penalties which Glaucon has imagined for his misjudged just man.
Such are the grounds on which justice is preached up and injustice preached down. [362 E—363 E]

51. Take another set of traditional statements. Whether in ordinary talk or in poetry, the chorus is that justice and temperance are fine things, but difficult and irksome, while injustice and intemperance are easy and pleasant, and only made displeasing by convention. Unjust deeds are admitted to be generally more profitable. Praise and compliments are given to the rich and powerful, while the honest man, if weak and poor, meets with contempt: laudato et alget. [364 A]

Most astonishing are the views expressed about the gods and their relations to virtue. The gods, it is said, often reward men in life quite contrary to their deserts. Religious mendicants persuade rich men that, with a little expenditure of money, they can conjure the gods into granting indulgences and pardons for acts of injustice. [364 B, C]

For all these assertions the poets are quoted; Hesiod to show that vice is easy and virtue hard, Homer to show that the gods are bribable, the Orphic bards to show that expiatory rites will make the wrongdoer comfortable both in this life and in Hades. [364 C—E]

52. Here we have a number of statements which must affect the minds of intelligent youth. A young man asks 'Am I to entrench myself in justice or in deceit? Justice without its reputation is useless: injustice with a good reputation means a splendid life. All depends on appearance. I must therefore practise hypocrisy. It may be hard to escape detection, but faint heart never won anything great. I must make myself friends, and use persuasion where I can, and force where persuasion fails. Of course the gods are not amenable to deception or force. But how do we know if there are gods, and if they trouble about us? Only from the

Justice is called honourable, but irksome.

Just the gods do not necessarily reward it.

Evidence is quoted from the poets.

Intelligent youths will therefore combine injustice with hypocrisy.

They will deceive men and bribe the gods.

53. What argument is left to support a man of power and ability in choosing a life of justice?

If the position we have represented is wrong, it is at least so natural that one may be forgiven for taking it up and acting upon it. Only a godlike nature or some deeper insight can save a man from such a view. [366 B—D]

The reason of this attitude lies in the fact which has prompted Glaucon and myself to press you in this way, Socrates. All of you who have preached justice, from the demi-gods down to our present prose and poetry, have praised it for its reputations, rewards and smuglike consequences. But what is it in itself, existing in the soul, unknown to gods and men? How is it essentially the greatest good, while injustice is the contrary?

If we had been enlightened as to that, we should have practised justice, and shrunk from injustice, spontaneously. [366 D—367 A]

55. I have represented the case as strongly as I could, not from my own convictions, but from the standpoint of Thrasymuchus and others.

It remains for you, Socrates, to strip justice of all its accidental and exterior consequences, and to show us what it is and what it does, in and by itself, perceived or unperceived, in the soul of its possessor. How and why is it a good thing, when so considered? [367 A—E]

56. Socrates greatly admires the gifted brothers. They must have remarkable turns of mind if they can speak so forcibly against justice and yet think otherwise in their hearts.
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For his own part he hardly knows what to do, but he cannot stand by and see Justice maligned. [367 Ε—368 ζ]

One way out of the difficulty occurs to him. If we were bidden to read small writing at a distance and our sight was indifferent, we should welcome the hint that the same writing existed elsewhere in a larger form and on a larger ground, and that we could first read the latter and then compare it with the former.

So in a state (πόλις) justice exists on a larger scale and in a more distinguishable shape.

Suppose, therefore, that we try to see justice coming into existence while a state is coming into existence? [368 δ—

369 Β]

This proceeding is agreed to, and from this point the construction of the ideal πόλις begins.

III. THE COMPOSITION OF THE REPUBLIC.

Relation of the First Book and of the whole Proem to the remainder.

57. Probably every reader who has made himself conversant with both the matter and the style of the dialogues of Plato is struck with a peculiar phenomenon in the case of the Republic. It is that, while the work as a whole is made to rise out of matter discussed in the first book, and takes as a text the occurrence of a disputation on justice, the first book itself is separable from the rest as an entirely independent dialogue. In other words, if all the remaining books had been lost, the first book of the Republic would have been accepted as a complete and typical dialogue in Plato's earlier or Socratic vein. No sequel would have been looked for, and, though it could not then have borne the name of the Republic, it might well have borne that of the Thrasymachus, with Justice as its subject-matter. The title Ἡροδώτης (ἡ περὶ

δικαίου) would have been as satisfactory a heading as Ἐθνική (ἡ περὶ ὀνόματι) and the like.

58. That the dialogue would be occupied with purely destructive criticism and end with a confession Early character of the first book.

of ignorance, would place it along with the Lysis, Charmides, Laches and other short pieces of Plato's Socratic period. The 'mimic' or dramatic setting, the reiterated Socratic 'irony,' the malicious delineation of the sophist, the delight in dialectics for dialectics' sake, the logical fallacies and sophisms in which the Socratic dialectic itself indulges, together with the absence of any allusion to the characteristic elements of the later philosophy of Plato (such as the doctrine of 'ideas' and of ἀναμνήσεις) and the complete absence of anything didactic or dogmatic, go to mark this book as composed at the same stage of development and in the same disposition as the earliest dialogues. In the later books the dramatic environment of the feast of Banis and the 'going out to talk to the young men' are quite forgotten, the disputation becomes a discourse, and Socrates is metaphysical and expository in the most mature manner of the emancipated Plato.

59. With students of Plato these considerations of manner, method and result could not count for little even if they stood alone. They are too strongly in evidence, thrusting themselves upon the reader without the necessity of any of that detective work in which the critic sometimes unhappily confounds himself while testing dates and authenticities. But, as has been indicated, they do not stand alone. Even if we set aside these distinguishing marks of early views and early treatment in the first book, there remains the remarkable fact above-mentioned, that it is clearly separable, as no portion of any other Platonic work is separable. It is true that other dialogues sometimes appear to blend the treatment of two different subjects, so that it becomes difficult to decide which is the real theme. But in no case can a portion be cut off at such and such a page and
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left to exist as a complete dialogue in itself. Yet this can be
done in the Republic.

60. The next observation which naturally occurs to the
reader as he reviews the Republic is that later
reference to the first book practically ceases
with the speeches of Glaucus and Adeimantus
in the second. They think Thrasymachus
'gave in too soon,' and they re-state his position, though
more strongly. This done, Socrates begins the construction
of the ideal πόλις, and the whole of the previous matter is so
little involved in the eight-and-a-half books which are to
come, that critics, endeavouring to establish a close organic
unity in the whole work, have been at a loss to discover more
than one or two places where there seems to be a faint
reminiscence of something said in this earlier portion.

61. Arguments based upon linguistic data, though they
can hardly be conclusive, are not without
great value. Elaborate attempts have been
made to determine the chronological order of
the Platonic dialogues by criteria of language, in the depart-
ments of both words and their arrangements, in the avoidance
of hiatus &c. Observations have been made upon changes
which apparently came over the style of Plato in the course
of years, and upon the relative frequency at different periods
of one class of words and phrases as compared with another
class, e.g. of τελεύτης as compared with μισθος, καθάσεως as
compared with ἂσπορ &c. For the application of these principles
of 'stylometry' the student may be referred to Cap. III.
(pp. 64—193) of the 'Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic'
by W. Lutoslawski, where typical statistics are illustrated
with a more scientific spirit and method than has usually
been the case in this class of investigations. Of the Republic
the writer says that 'the earlier part has always fewer
peculiarities of later style,' and of the first book in particular
that it is marked 'by a surprisingly early style, having less
than half as many peculiarities of later style as the first
sixteen pages of the fifth book, even fewer than the Laches,

THE COMPOSITION OF THE REPUBLIC.

which is inferior in size.' When, however, he proceeds to say
that the first book of the Republic 'must have been revised,
emended and corrected in order to be absorbed into the larger
work' he is travelling beyond the record, inasmuch as there
is absolutely nothing in the book as it stands to indicate that
it need ever have had any other shape in any one expression.
The later portions are linked to the first by the speeches of
Glaucus and Adeimantus, but nothing whatever is done to
adapt the first book to what is coming or to absorb it in any
larger scope.

62. It thus appears that the first book, approached
whether from the point of view of (a) the philosophy, (b) the
handling, or (c) the language, implies a composition both
early and independent. The internal evidence for this view
is complete in every particular.

63. External evidence of a trustworthy character is
lacking. Aulus Gellius, indeed (xiv. 3), gives
the story that 'Xenophon in loco ullah operi
Platonis, quod de optimo statu vidisce administraendas scriptum est, lectus ex eo duobus
fere libris, qui primum in vulgus exerunt, opposuit contra conscriptis quos diversarum regiae administrationis
genius, quod Πανδησις Κῦρον inscriptionem est.' Aulus
Gellius.
The story is not likely to be true in any
case; but at least the 'two books' could not have been the
same as our first two books, since they obviously included
the treatment of education. Moreover our division of the
books did not come from Plato, but from the Alexandrians.
Even if we give the utmost credit to the story, it would
prove no more than that the magnus opus per Πανδησις
came out in sections. It has no bearing upon the question
whether the first book may not have had an independent
existence and title before it was made introductory to the
magnus opus.

More importance on the other side might be attached to
the pseudo-Platonic dialogue of the Cleitophon. This was
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evidently written after the appearance of the first book of the Republic, and from a dissatisfaction with it. Thus (410 A, B) καὶ εἰς τοὺς δικαιώματα εἰς καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἵκονως διεκπέμπει, τοὺς δὲ φίλους εἰς ποιεῖν ὑπερτερον δὲ ἐπάθος διαπέμπει γε οὐδέποτε δ ἢ ποιοτητα κατ. κ.λ., cf. 407 D, and the reference to Thrasymachus (410 C). In the same piece (409 D) the words ἀπεκρίβη τις...τῶν σου ἔραυνος, ὡς ἦν καμπαύσατα ἐδεικνύει, ὥστε τούτως εἰς τὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης έτοιμον ἐργαν, τοῦ ἄλλων ὑστεροῦσα, φιλον ἐν ταύτῃ πόλεως ποιεῖν may allude to the Platonic notion, already developing, that justice might best be investigated in a state. But, if the portion of the Republic dealing with the question of justice and the state had been actually published, it is hard to believe that the Crito or the Crito, on whichsoever composed, would have passed it over so lightly, or have contained the same reproaches against Socratic results. One may hazard the conjecture that the Crito was written by an inferior spirit, contemporary with Plato, who had read the Socratic dialogue (perhaps called Θαρσίμαχος) which is now Book I. of the Republic, and who chooses Crito as the support of Thrasymachus, for his mouthpiece in expressing dissatisfaction with the outcome of the disputations. The general criticism of Athenians may have been similar, and Plato, who was elaborating and enunciating in lectures his notion of justice and the state (and who may be the very ἔραυνος referred to), thereupon completed the larger work as we have it.

64. It seems difficult, after pondering the whole work, to avoid the conclusions that—

(i) The first book was originally an independent Socratic dialogue of the exhoratory (γυμνοστικός) division of the inquiring (ζυγτικός) type upon an ethical subject (in this case, Justice), and ending in the usual deadlock.

(ii) At a later period Plato, having formulated more positive opinions, and having recognised how great and natural was the logical difficulty of preferring justice on

abstract grounds, was dissatisfied with the apparent fatuity of the discussion.

(iii) He thereupon took up the early dialogue, expressed through the mouths of Glaucis and Adeimantus both his own and the popular dissatisfaction, and set himself to arrive at something positive.

(iv) The speeches of Glaucis and Adeimantus are a very dexterous and artistic device for re-opening the case and introducing his essay.

(v) Apart from his inquiries into justice pure and simple, Plato had also developed views as to an ideal commonwealth, and seizes the opportunity of 'watching justice growing in a growing state' to ventilate those views at great length.

(vi) Thus the consideration of the ideal state comes to preponderate in the work, and, whereas the first book was wholly concerned with τὸ δικαίον ὡς τὸ πολίτη ἐτείν (354 B), and the later books nominally so, the dialogue as a whole comes to be concerned apparently with a 'commonwealth,' and so earns the name Πολιτεία.

(vii) The work, constructed into a unity long after the proem, was probably composed in different parts at different times, Books V.—VII. being chronologically the last.

IV. THE TEXT.

65. The MSS of our portion of the Republic are numerous. Chief among them stands A (or Par. A), a MS of the 9th century now in the Bibliothèque Nationale of Paris. The first hand is denoted by A, that of the corrector (θησαυρομενή) by A².

The representative of a second class is

II (or Ven. II), a MS of the 12th century in the library of St Mark at Venice. II² denotes corrections by a somewhat later hand.
Typical of a third class is M, a MS of the 12th or 13th century in the Malatestan library at Cesena.

Others of the MSS more frequently quoted are K and q, 'edited' or 'learned' copies related to Π, and Ε, an 'edited' or 'learned' copy cognate to M.

Of these MSS A is indisputably the best, but is far from invariably sound.

66. The present text follows A as closely as possible. Apart from one or two changes of accent in the case of pronouns which seem to demand emphasis (e.g. 329 η γείσαβι ας for γείσαβι σε of MSS and 338 α όμω γάρ σε for όμω γάρ σε), one or two modifications of the punctuation (e.g. 329 c, 364 c, 368 d'), which involve new views of the construction, and the substitution of true orthographies for those which are incorrect in MSS, the new elements introduced for the first time here are in the following much-vaunted passages:

MSS.

330 Β
...ἡ ἐπεκτήσω; Ποι' ἐπεκτήσησας, ἐφι, ἦ Σάκρατες; μέσος τις κ.τ.λ.

330 Ε
καὶ αὐτὸς ἦσαν ὑπὸ τῆς γῆς ἄνθρωπον ἦ καὶ ὁ πάπρος ἤδη ἐγενέτο, ὥστε τοὺς τῶν ἐκκ. μάλιστα τις καθοριστικά, ὑποθετικά δ' οὖν κ.τ.λ.

337 Β
πώς γάρ ἦν, ἐφην εγώ...τις ἄποκρισιμον πρῶτον μὲν μή εἰς ἀλλ' ἐρωτων εἰς ἤδη, ἐπετα, εἰ τι καὶ οὔτε πριν τούθαν, ἀπερημένον αὐτῷ ἦν κ.τ.λ.

The present text.

351 κ—352 λ
...οὐκοῦν τοιαῦτα τινὰ φαίνεται ἐχοντα τὴν δύναμιν, οὖν, ἦν ἐγένετο...πρῶτον μὲν ἄλλωνταν αὐτῷ ποιεῖ (ποιεῖν Π) πράττειν κ.τ.λ.

358 ε
περὶ τούτου ἄκουε, τί δὲν τε καὶ ἄδειν γέγονεν δικαίωσιν [τι ὡς τε Π, τί ὡς τε θησ.]

365 δ
οὐκῳν, εἰ μὲν μῆ εἰσιν ἡ μήδεν αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων μέλει, καὶ ἡμῖν μελητόν τῶν λαθέων.

[τι καὶ ἡμῖν...; καὶ ὡς ἡμῖν θησ.]

In 351 κ—ο [ροφία] is bracketed as the easiest means of restoring construction with sense. In 333 κ θαλεῖν is obelised in order to indicate the probable seal of error.

Of emendations previously made it has seemed well to incorporate Stahlbaum's bracketing of [φοβε] in 339 β, Bekker's τούτοις in 330 β, provisionally Bekker's οὖν γε σο in 336 b, Mädvig's punctuation in 339 Ε, φαίμεν from Stephanus in 335 Ε, Hermann's bracketing of Γέγον in 359 c, and μεφ' from Muretus in 368 Α.

On the other hand τῷ δικαίῳ has been retained in 363 λ.

One or two suggestions are offered for what they are worth in the footnotes to 328 c (οὔ δὲ), 336 b, 341 b, 346 b (<τῷ> πλεῖν), 359 δ—ε (<προκείσθαι>), 366 Β δο. In 333 Β I find that αὐθεῖν has been anticipated by Salvini.
CHIEF SIGNS OR ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE
NOTES OR TEXT.

• Α, Π &c. = the first hand of Α, Π &c.
• Α2, Π2 &c. = the second hand of Α, Π &c.
• Α cor., Π cor. = a correction in Α, Π.
• Α+, Π+ &c. = Α, Π &c. supported by other ms evidence.
• mg. or marg. = a reading recorded in the margin.
• om. = omitted by the ms in question.
• ej. = ejected by the editor in question.
• vulg. = the common reading in texts not further specified.
• corr. = the reading in texts other than that specified.
• [ ] enclosing words of the ms which were probably not written by Plato.
• < > enclosing words not in the ms which should probably be supplied.
• * marking a new reading other than the above.
• † marking a reading of the ms which probably still requires emendation.

J. and C. = Jowett and Campbell’s edition of the Republic.
L. and S. = Liddell and Scott’s Greek Lexicon.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑ.

A.

1. Κατέβην χθές εἰς Πειραιὰ μετὰ Γλαύκωνος

ΠΟΙΗΘΕΝ. For the orthography of ποίηθεν, ποιῆθος see
Meisterhans Gr. Att. Ins. § 16 a). Since comedy says indifferently
ποιΗθεν, ποιῆθεν, and since the omission of i before η can hardly have
been more than optional, we gain nothing by writing ποįηθεν.
ΠΛΑΤΟΝΟΣ

άδελφος καὶ Νεόκρατος ὁ Νεόκρος καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς, ὡς ἀπὸ τῆς ποτηρίας. ὁ οὖν Πολέμαρχος ἔφη, ὁ Ἡνίων Ἀριστοτέλης, ὅπως ἄκουστές μοι πρὸς ἄστυ ἀφμήσθαι ὡς ἀποντές. Οὐ γὰρ κακῶς δοξάζεσθαι, ἢ ὅτι ἐγώ. Ὄρος ὁν ἡμᾶς, ἔφη, ὅσοι ἐσμέν; Πᾶς γὰρ οὗ; Τῆς τοιῶν τούτων, ἐφη, κρείστους γένεσθαι ἢ μὲνεται αὐτοῦ. Ὄεκους, ἢ δὲ ἐγώ, ἢτι ἐλεύθεται τὸ ἢ ἄνεισομεν ὡς, ὅτι χρὴ ἡμᾶς ἀφεῖναι; Ἡ καὶ δύναται δὴ ἢν, ἢ δὲ ὡς, πεῖναι μὴ ἀκοντοῖς; Οὐδέμος, ἔφη ὁ Πλαύκους. Ὅς τοιῶν μὴ ἀκοινοποιεῖτο, οὕτω διανοοῦσθε. καὶ ὁ

328 Ἀδείμαντος, Ἀρά γε, ἢ δὲ ὦς, ὦδὲ ἢστε ὅτι λαμπάτα ἄντε τὸ πρὸς ἄσπεραν ἄφῃ ἵππον τῇ θεῷ; Ἀφὶ ἤππον; ἢ δὲ ἐγώ· καίνων γε τούτο. λαμπάδια ἐχοντες διαδόσοντων ἄλληλοις ἀμφιλοχοῖς τοῖς ἵπποις; καὶ τῶν λέγεις; Οὕτως, ἔφη ὁ Πολέμαρχος, καὶ πρὸς την παννυχία, ἠξίων δὲ ἢσιν καθαρῆς. ἑξαναστηγομένης γάρ μετὰ τὸ δείπνου καὶ τὴν παννυχία θεασόμεθα καὶ ξυνεσομένη τῷ πολλοῖς τῶν νέων Β αὐτῶθι καὶ διαλεξόμεθα. ἀλλὰ μὲντες καὶ μὴ ἄλλους ποιεῖτε. καὶ ὁ Πλαύκους, Ἐοικεῖν, ἐφε, μενετῶν εἶναι. Ἀλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ, ἢ δὲ ἐγώ, ὅτι χρὴ ποιεῖν. Ἡ. Ἡμεν οὖν οὐκαδε εἰς τοῦ Πολεμάρχου, καὶ Δυστάν τε αὐτόθι κατελάβομεν καὶ Ἐβδομάδα, τοὺς τοῦ Πολεμάρχου ἄδελφοὺς, καὶ ἤ καὶ Θρασύμαχον τῶν Καλχηδονίων καὶ Χαρμάθην τῶν Παλαιάτων καὶ

327 C. ὡς ἀπὸ τῆς ποτηρίας Α + Μ+ ὡς om. Π+. See note. The omission was probably quite accidental.

οὗτος ass. ἐνκακές (κοίνη) is preferable; εἰργό is out of place.

ἐὰν ἐλεύθεται Α + Π + Μ. ἐὰν ἐν λειτουργία Μ marg. +, gr. Α’ marg. Each reading is capable of having been derived from the other (ΕΝΑ for ΕΛΑ or vice versa), or both may be from ΕΛ.

328 B. Καλχηδόνων Α correctly. See note. Χαρμάθην τοῦ Παλαιάτων Π+. The mistake Καλχηδόνων Μ+ is not rare.
ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ Α.

μνὸν δὲ οὐδὲ ξύντες. ἕνιοι δὲ καὶ τὰς τῶν οἰκείων Β προσπήλαξες τοῦ γῆρως ἀδύνατον, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ δὴ τὸ γῆρας ὑμνοῦσιν δυσὶ κακῶν σφῶν αἰτίων. ἔρωι δὲ δωκόνων, ὁ Σώκρατες, οὗτοι οὐ τὸ αἰτίον αἰτιάσατοι. εἰ γὰρ ἦν τοῦτο αἰτίου, κἂν ἔγιν τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐπετύφθη ἔνεκα τῆς γῆρος καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ὃσι τοῦ τούτου ἤλθον ἡλικίας. μνὸν δὲ ἐγένετο ἡδὴ ἐνεττύχηκα οὐχ οὗτος ἔχετο καὶ ἄλλοι, καὶ δὴ καὶ Σοφοκλεῖ ποτὲ τῷ ποιητῇ παρεγενομένῳ ἐρωτημένῳ ὑπὸ τούτοις. Πῶς, ἐφι, ὥς Σοφόκλειος, ἔχεις πρὸς οὐκ ἑκατοδία; ἐπὶ οἶος τε ἐκ ἐρωτημάτων συγγένεσθαι; καὶ ὡς Ἔυφημε, ἐφι, ὥς ἀνθρωπος ἀσμενόστατα μέντοι αὐτὸ ἀπέφηγον, ἀσπέρ λυττόντα τις καὶ ἀγρῖον δεσποτῆς ἄρρητον ἀποφυγον. εἰ δὴ μοι καὶ τῶτε ἢδεῖχαν ἐκεῖνοι εἰπέναι καὶ μὲν οὐχ ἢττον. παλαιτασιν γὰρ τὸν τοῦτον ἐν τῷ γῆρα πολλή εἰρήνη γίγνεται καὶ ἐλευθερία. ἐπειδὴ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι πάντωσιν κατατείνουσαν καὶ καλάσωσιν, παντάπασι τὸν Σοφοκλέους γίγνεται, δεσποτῶν πάνοις πολλῶν D

329 Β. ἐπετύφθη ΑΠ. ἐπετύφθην vulg. v. sup. 328 c.
329 Α. ἀσμενόστατα Δ + Μ+. ἀρμενόστατα Π. Both forms being in use, we may follow the best xs. Etym. M. p. 31. 17, indeed, quotes ἀρμενόστατα from Plato ὑφ αἱ πολεμικῶν, but from what άστε? In 616 a there appears to be no variant to ἀσμενόστατα. αὖτα ἀπέφηγον εἰς. αὖτα Clem. Alex. Pasd. 10, Strom. π. 8. The textual value of ancient quotations is slight. αὖτα goes better with the following singular and is in Plato's style ('that sort of thing'). Cf. Symp. 192 c. ἀποφυγον om. Clem., while ἀποθαρρᾶ is substituted in Theon Progymn. p. 74. ἐπετύφθην αῇ ΑΠ. ἐπετύφθη γὰρ αἱ Μ+. The accidental omission of γὰρ is much less likely than its deliberate insertion. Cf. lat. 851 a. See note. J. and C. would have done better to punctuate at εἰρήνη. So Adam.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

[ἔστι καὶ μανωμένων ὀπηλλάχθαι. ἄλλα καὶ τοὐτον πέρι καὶ τῶν ἡ πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους μία τις αἰτία ἕστιν, οὐ τὸ γῆρας, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἄλλ᾽ ὁ τρόπος τῶν ἀνθρώπων. ἄν μὲν γὰρ κόσμῳ καὶ ἐκείνῳ οὕσιν, καὶ τὸ γῆρας μεταίριος ἕστιν ἐπίπτωσιν· εἰ δὲ μὴ, καὶ γῆρας, ὁ Σώκρατες, καὶ νεότης ἀλληλή τοῦ τοιούτου ἐξεμβαίνει.

IV. Καὶ ἐγὼ ἀγαθεῖς αὐτὸν εἰπότος ταῦτα, βουλόμενος ἐτὶ λέγειν αὐτοῦ ἐκώνων καὶ ἐχθιν. Ὁ Κέφαλε, οἷς οὐκ ἐτύπωσεν, ὃν ταῦτα λέγει καὶ ἐχθιν. ἦν ἐν ἘκτεNICᵃ οὐκ ἀποδέχομαι, ἀλλὰ ἠγείρασι ζητοῖς τοῦ γῆρας ἡμέρες νῦν διὰ τὸ τρόπον ἂν λέγοι τῆς ὑπάρχουσαν τοῖς γὰρ τοὺς πλατύνους πολλαὶ παραμυθία φασίν εἶναι. Ἀληθῆ, ἐφθαί, λέγεις: οὐ γὰρ ἀποδέχομαι, ἀλλὰ λέγοι μὲν τι, οὐ μένοις γε διὸν οἴσθαι, ὃ τὸ τοῦ Θεοτοκεῖους εὑρεῖ, ὃ τῷ Σερφίῳ λεοντομέαν καὶ λέγοντι, ὃν οὐ δι᾽

339 αὐτοῦ ἄλλα διὰ τὴν πόλιν εὐδοκιμοῦν, ἀπεκρίνατο ὅτι οὔτ᾽ ἂν αὐτὸς Ἀρείος ὃς ἀναμικτός ἐγέγονεν ὅτι ἐκεῖνος Ἀριστοκλῆς, καὶ τοῖς δὴ μὴ πλατύνοις, χαλεπτοῖς δὲ τὸ γῆρας φέρουσιν, εὖ ἔχει ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, ὅτι οὔτ᾽ ἂν ὁ ἐπιεικὴς πάντι τοῖς ἁρδεύοντος γῆρας μετὰ πινακίας εὑρέγοι, οὐδὲ ὁ μὴ ἐπιεικής πληροφόρεται εὐκόλος ποτὲ ἂν εὐαίτη γένοιτο. Πάτερον δὲ, ἂν δὲ ἐγὼ, ὁ Κέφαλε,

329 D. [ἐστι] Stallbaum. The word follows μανωμένων in K. If it is retained, there must be fuller punctuation at γέγονεν.

329 E. ἠγείρασι se miss. But the emphasis is clear: 'your case is a special one.'

330 A. εὐδοκιμοῦν see note.

τάν...ἐπιεικής om. ΠΚ (homooeoteleuton).
τάν τι Α. τάν τοι vulg. The confusion is of the commonest.
Cf. 331 ν, 392 ν, 358 c.

ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ Α.

ἂν κέκτησαι τὰ πλεῖόν παρέλαβες ἢ ἐπεκτῆσω; 'Οποῖον ἐπεκτήσαμην, ἐφθαί, ὁ Σώκρατες, μέσος τὸς Β
gέγονα χρηματιστής τοῦ τε πάστρου καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς.

330 Β. οὖς Π2+ vulg. With question at Σώκρατες.

For the conjecture in the text see note.

Ἀποκείσθαι τοῖς Ἀριστοκράτοις, τὰ αὐτῶν ποιήματα καὶ ταῖς παίδας, χαλεπτοῖς δὲ τὸ γῆρας φέρουσιν, εὖ ἔχει ὁ αὐτός λόγος, ὅτι οὔτ᾽ ἂν ὁ ἐπιεικής πάντι τοῖς ἁρδεύοντος γηρας μετὰ πινακίας εὑρέγοι, οὐδὲ ὁ μὴ ἐπιεικής πληροφόρεται εὐκόλος ποτὲ ἂν εὐαίτη γένοιτο. Πάτερον δὲ, ἂν δὲ ἐγὼ, ὁ Κέφαλε,

υπερ Α+ for ἦπερ.

πλέω Α+. But εἰ is required before the long vowel. Meisterhans § 58. 17.

330 Β. οὖς Π2+ vulg. (with question at Σώκρατες).

For the conjecture in the text see note.

Ἀποκείσθαι τοῖς Ἀριστοκράτοις, τὰ αὐτῶν ποιήματα Α, which often has the breathing wrong in the reflexive (Campbell).

τάτη τε δὲ...καὶ κατά τὴν χρεῖαν Α+Π2+ but for some reason the sense was missed at an early date. Hence καὶ οὐ κατὰ τὴν χρεῖαν some inferior ms and Filolus. These ms keep τε, however.
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D  V. Πάνω μέν οὖν, ἂν δ' εγώ, ἀλλὰ μοι ἢτι τοσάδες εἴτε· τί μέγιστον οἷό εἰς ἀγαθὸν ἀπολελαυκέναι τοῦ τολλήν οὐδ' κατέσθησαι; "Ὅ, ἂν δ' ὦ, ἦσος οὐκ ἄν τολλοὺς πείσαις λέγων, εὖ γὰρ ἵναι, ἡφ' ὁ Σόκρατες, ὅτι, ἔπειδ' ἦν τὰς θέργος ἂν τοῦ ἀλήθεια πελετάσθησιν, εἰσέρχεται αὐτῷ δέος καὶ φροντίς περί ὧν ἐμπροσθεν ὦν εἰσήγε. οὖ τε γὰρ λεγόμενοι μὴδεν περί τῶν ἐν "Ἀδιόν, ὡς τὸν ἐνναίαν ἀδικήσαντα δεῖ ἐκεῖ διδάσκει δίκαιη, καταγελόμενοι τέως, τότε δὴ ἔστερον αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν μὴ ἀληθεῖς χάρω, καὶ αὐτὸς ἦσθι ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν γηρῶν ἀδελφείας ἢ καὶ ὅσπερ <el> ἦδη ἐγγυτέρω ὡς τὸν ἕκα καλλὰ τι καθορὶ αὐτά, ὑποθένα 8' οὖν καὶ δεικτοὶ μεστοὶ γίγνεται καὶ ἀναλογίζεται ἢδη καὶ σκοπεῖ τε, τινὰ τι ἡδέηκεν. ἤ μὲν οὖν εὐθησκοῦ ἐπαυτῷ ἐν τῷ βίῳ τολλὰ ἀδικήσατο καὶ ἔκ τῶν ὑπων, ὅσπερ οἱ παῖδες, θαμά ἐγερόμενον δειμώνει καὶ ἦγε μετὰ καθῆς ἐπετὸς.

331 τοῦ δὲ μηδὲν ἐπαυτῷ ἀδικὸν ἐξενεῖδτο ἢδον ἐπίς αἱ τάρστι καὶ ἀγαθὸν γνωριτρόφος ὁς καὶ Πάγαρος λέγει. χαριέταις γὰρ τοι, ὁ Σόκρατες, τοῦτο ἠκένος εἴπει, ὅτι δ' ἂν δικαιός καὶ δόσοι τῶν βιῶν διαχώρη, γνυκεῖδα οἱ καρδίαι ἀτάλλοτες γνωριτρόφος συναιρᾶ ἐπίς, ἢ μάλιστα βνήτοις πολύστροφοι γνώμας κυβερνᾶ. εὖ οὖν λέγει θυμαστόις ὡς σφόδρα. πρὸς δὴ τοῦτο ἐγγυε τίθημι τὴν τῶν χρήσματος κτήσεως πλείστου ἄδικων εἰσά, οὐ τε ἢδηκεν.

330 Β. ἐστερ ἢδη μ. See note. Either ἐστερ <el> ἢδη or ἐστερ εἰ δὴ will restore grammar and sense; but ἢδη should be retained.

ἡδείκης Α. ἡδείκης ΠΙ+ and Justin Martyr (Cohort. ad Gr. 26). But the perfect better expresses the abiding guilt.

331 Α. οὖτοι for οὗ τι appears in inferior copies. Cf. 330 Α. Stobaeus (Serim. xon. p. 512) has οὗτοι τινα.
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Ε VI. Δέγε δή, εἶπον ἐγώ, σὺ ὁ τοῦ λόγου κλη-ρονόμος, τί φῆς τὸν Σιμωνίδην λέγοντα ὅρθος λέγειν περὶ δικαιοσύνης; "Ὅτι, ἦ δ’ ὅστις τὸ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ἐκάστῳ ἀποδίδοναι δικαίως ἄστι· τοῦτο λέγει δικεῖ ἐμοί καλῶς λέγειν. Ἄλλα μέντοι, ἦ δ’ ἐγώ, Σιμωνίδης γε σὺ ὁ ἱέρων ἀπιστεύεις σοφὸς γὰρ καὶ θεός ἄντρε· τοῦτο μέντοι ὃ τί ποτε λέγει, σὺ μέν, ὃ Πολέμαρχος ἣς γιογοπότησες, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀνύπολος. Δὴ βοή ὡστὶ διὰ τὸ τὸτέ λέγεις, ὡστὲ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, τὸ τῶν παρακαταθέμενον τὸ ὁρόφον μὴ σωφρόνοις ἀπαίτοτοι 332 ἀποδίδοναι· καίτοι γε ὀφειλόμενον ποὺ ἐστὶν τότῳ, ὃ παρακατέθειν· ἡ γὰρ; Ναὶ. Ἀποδοτέν τὸ γε ὧδ’ ὁπωσοῦντον τότε, ὡστὶ τῷ ἵλλῃ σωφρόνους ἀπαίτοτι; Ἀληθῆ, ἦ δ’ ὅστις. Ἄλλο δὴ τι τι τοιοῦτον, ὃς ὑσσεν, λέγει Σιμωνίδης τὸ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα δίκαιον ἑυαὶς ἀποδίδοναι. Ἄλλο μέντοι νῦν Δι’, ἐφ’ ὅστις γὰρ φίλους ὑστείς ὡστε ὥστεν τοὺς φίλους ἄναβον μὲν τὶ δρᾶν, κακῶν δὲ μηδὲν. Μανθάνω, ἦ δ’ ἐγώ· ὅτι 333 ὡστί τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ἀποδίδοντω, δὲ ὅν τῷ χρυσὸν ἡ ἀποδοθέω παρακαταθέμενος, ταύτῃ ἡ ἀπόδοσις καὶ ἡ λῆψις θαλαβρὰ γίγνεται, φίλου δὲ ὅστιν τὸ ἀπολαμβάνω καὶ ὁ ἀποδίδοντος· οὐχ ὡστὶ λέγειν φ рекл τὸν Σιμωνίδην; Πάνω μὲν ὁν. Τὶ δὲ· τοὺς ἑχθροὺς ἀποδοτέν, ὃ τὶ ἄν τυχῇ ὀφειλόμενον; Παντάτασι μὲν ὁν, ἐφ’ ὅτι ὡστε ὅστεν αὐτοῖς, ὡστε ὅστεν δὲ γε, ὁμία, παρὰ γε τοῦ ἑχθροῦ τῷ ἑχθρῷ, ὡστὲ καὶ προστίθει, κακῶν τι.

VII. Ἡμιβάτι ἄρα, ἦ δ’ ἐγώ, ὡστε ὑσσεν, ὁ 331 Ε. ἀνήρ Ἀ+Π+. ὁ ἀνήρ the old texts (gu. with what authority?). ἀνήρ Stallbaum. Cf. Phaedr. 266 c, where the answer βασιλεῖκον μὲν ἄνδρες appears in ms as ἄνδρες. See note, however; 332 A. ἄναρτοι ms. See 330 λ. note.

ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ Α. 11

Σιμωνίδης ποιητικός τὸ δίκαιον δ’ εὐθ. διενεκτικὸν μὲν γὰρ, ὡς φαίνεται, ὅτι τοῦτ’ εἰσίν δίκαιον, τὸ δ’ προσήκον ἐκάστῳ ἀποδίδοιμα, τοῦτο δὲ ἀνωμάζειν ὀφειλόμενον. Ἄλλα τι τί εἶπε; ἐφ’ ὃ. Ω. πρὸς Δίος, ἦ δ’ ἐγώ, εἰ ὁν τοῖς αὐτῶν ἤρετο· Ο. Σιμωνίδης, ἦ τις οὖν τὶ ἀποδίδοις ὀφειλόμενοι καὶ προσήκον τέχνη ἱσαρικὴ καλεῖται; τι ὃν οἷος ἦμιν αὐτὸν ἀπο- κρίναται; Δήλου ὃτι, ἐφ’ ὅτι, ὁ σώματος φάρμακα τε καὶ σύλια καὶ τοτά. Ἡ δὲ τίνα τὸ ἀποδίδοις ὀφειλόμενοι καὶ προσήκον τέχνη μαγειρικὴ καλεῖ- ται; Ἡ τοῦ δηλοῦ τὰ ἡδύσματα. Εἴεν ἦ δ’ ὅστις τί πρὸς τὸ ἀποδίδοις τέχνη δικαιούσην ἄν καλοῖτο; Εἰ μὲν τι, ἐφ’ ὅτι, δεῖ ἀκολουθεῖν, δ’ Σώκρατες, τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν εἰρημένοις, ἢ τοῖς φίλοις τε καὶ ἑχθροῖς ὀφελέσαι τε καὶ βλάβας ἀποδίδουσα. Τὸ τοῖς φίλοις ὑπάρχειν καὶ τοὺς ἑχθροὺς κακῶς δικαιούσην λέγει; Δοκεῖ μοι. Τὶ οὖν δυνατότατον κάρμωσαι φίλους εἰς πολεμεῖ καὶ ἑχθροῖς κακῶς πρὸς νόσουν καὶ ἴημεν; Ἰατρός. Τὸς δὲ πλεοντα πρὸς τὸν τῆς Εὐαλάτης κίνδυνον; Κυβερνήτης. Τὶ δὲ ὁ δίκαιος; ὃ τι νεῖται καὶ πρὸς τὶ ἐφ’ ἐρέτο δυνατότατον φίλους ὀφελεῖν καὶ ἑχθροῖς βλάπτειν; Ἡν τῷ προπολε-
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μείν και [ἐν τῷ] ξυμαχεύει, ἐμοῦνε δοκεῖ. Ἐλευ. μὴ κακομοῦνε γε μὴ, ῥ. φιλε Πολέμαρχε, ιατρός ἄχρηστος. Ἄληθει. Καὶ μὴ πλέονει δὴ κυβερνήτης. Να. Ἡ ἥρα καὶ τόσο μὴ πολεμοῦνεν ὁ δίκαιος ἄχρηστος; ὡς πάνω μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτο. Χρήσιμον ἄρα καὶ 333 ἐν εἰρήνῃ δικαιοσύνῃ; Χρήσιμον. Καὶ ἕταρ, γεφρείας ἢ ὁ; Να. Πρὸς γε καρπὸν κτήσει. Να. Καὶ μὴ καὶ σκυπτομακικῇ; Να. Πρὸς γε ὑποθαλάτων δὰν, οἴμαι, φαίης κτήσει. Πάνω γε. Τί δὲ δή; τήν δικαιοσύνην πρὸς τίνος ἥρας ἢ κτήσει ἐν εἰρήνῃ φαίης ἄν χρήσιμον εἶναι; Πρὸς τὰ ἔμβολα, ὁ Σώκρατες. Ἐμβόλα θα θείοι καὶ κοινωνίματα, ἢ τι B άλλο; Κοινωνίματα δῆτα. Ἡρ' οὖν ὁ δίκαιος ἄγαθος καὶ χρήσιμος κοινωνίς εἰς πεπτωκός θέας, ἢ ὁ πεπτω- τικός; ὁ πεπτωτικός. Ἀλλ' εἰς πλοῦτος καὶ δίδω κτήνως ἄγαθος ὁ δίκαιος χρησιμώτερον τε καὶ ἀμείωτων κοινωνίς τοῦ ὁικοδομικοῦ; Οὐδὲνει. Ἀλλ' εἰς τίνα δὴ κοινω- νίαν τίνα δίκαιος αμείωτων κοινωνίας τοῦ κηδεμοσίως, ὁστόρ ὁ κηδεμοσικός τοῦ δίκαιον ἐς κρωμάτων; Ἐς ἔργωρους, ἐμοῦνε δοκεῖ. Πλὴν γ' ἵσωσ, ὁ Πολέ- μαρχε, πρὸς τὸ χρήσεα ἐργαφή, ὅταν δὲν ἐργαφή C κοινή πράσσει οἱ ἐπηκούς ἐπικούς; τότε δὲ, ὅσ' ἐγὼ σώματι, ὁ ὑποκούς; ὁ γὰρ; Φαίνεται. Καὶ μὴν ὅταν γε πλοῦτος, ὁ ναυτηρός ἡ ὁ κυβερνήτης. "Εξουσ. Ὅταν οὖν τί δὲν ἐργαφή ἡ χρηστία κοινή χρήστει, ὁ δίκαιος χρησιμώτερος τῶν ἄλλων; Ὅταν παρα- καταθέτει καὶ σῶν εἶναι, ὁ Σώκρατες. Οὐκοῦν λέγεις, ὅταν μηδὲν δὲν αὐτῷ χρήσει άλλα κεφαλαία; Πάνω γε. Ὅταν ἄρα ἄχρηστον ἢ ἄργωρον, τότε D χρήσιμον ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἢ δικαιοσύνην; Κυδινεύετε. Καὶ 332 Ε. καὶ ἔμμαχει Ἐ. καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμμαχει Ἐ. +Π+. See note. καὶ ἐν should be καὶ in any case.
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tῶν πολεμιῶν κλέψαι καὶ βουλεύματα καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πράξεις. Πάνω γε. "Οταν τις ἄρα δεινός φιλάξ, τοῦτο καὶ φόρο δεινός. Βακκέα. Εἰ ἂρα ὁ δίκαιος ἀργύριον δεινός φιλάττειν, καὶ κλέπτειν δεινός. Ὡς γοῦν ὁ λόγος, ἐφι, σημαίνει. Κλεπτής ἄρα τις ὁ δίκαιος, ὡς ἕοικεν, ἀνατέφασαι· καὶ κυνικοῦν τὸν, ὁμήρωσαν μεμαθηκέναι αὐτῷ, καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος τὸν τοῦ Ὀδυσσέας πρὸς μητέρας πάππον

Β Αὐτόλυκον ἀγαπᾷ τε καὶ φησίν αὐτὸν πάντας ἀνθρώπους κεκάσθαι κλεπτοσῶν τιθ' ὅρκῳ τε. ἔοικεν οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ κατὰ σὲ καὶ καθ' Ἐρμην καὶ κατὰ Σιμώνιδην κλεπτική τις εἶναι, ἡτ' ὀφελεῖα μέντοι τῶν φιλῶν καὶ ἐπὶ βλάβη τὸν ἐχθρὸν. οὐχ οὕτως ἐλεγεῖ. Οὐ μᾶ τὸν Δή, ἐφθ', ἀλλ' οὐκέτι οἶδα ἐξορκίζεται τῇ ἐλέγεσι· τοῦτο μέντοι ἐμοι τοικεῖ ὡλοκαίρῳ τοῦτω. ωφελεία μέν τοῖς φιλῶν ἡ δικαιοσύνη, βλάπτει δὲ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς. Φιλοὺς δὲ λέγεις εἶναι πότερον τοις δοκοῦνται ἐκείνοις κριτῶν εἶναι, ἡ τούς ἄντας, ἐὰν μὴ δοκός, καὶ ἐχθροὺς ὡςαυτόν; Εἰκὸς μὲν, ἐφθ', οὖς ἂν τις ἤγγιται κριτῶν, ϕιλεῖν, ὅσις δ' ἂν ποιητοῦς, μεσεῖν. Ἀρ' οὖν ὁι ἔμαρτανον οἱ ἀνήρομοι περί τοῦτο, διὰτε δοκός αὐτοῦς οικλούν μὲν χριστῶνς εἶναι μὴ ἄντας, πολλοὺς δὲ τοῦτον; Ἀρματάνουσιν. Τούτους ἄρα οἱ μὲν ἁγάδοι ἐχθροί, οἱ δὲ κακοὶ φίλοι; Πάνω γε. Ἄλλ' ὅρας δικαίων

334 Β. κεκασθαι (Π ς ς. Θ) for κεκασθαι is instructive as is the fate of rare words.

ὡφελεία: n. sup. 332 p.

ὡφελεία...βλάπτει (a piece of editing) Π+

334 Α. φιλοὺς δὲ λέγεις εἶναι Α+Π+Μ+. εἶναι om. Θ. Φ. Ψ.

In view of the second ἐναὶ the sentence would be more elegant without it. There may, however, be emphasis, ‘do you say they are...?’

334 Ε. καὶ τῶν ἄτοχρων μεσ. τὸν om. Ast, Bremi &c.

See note.

335 Α. ἄλλο interpol. before προσθέασα in one or two inferior copies. Cf. inf. 347 d.
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IX. Ἐστιν ἀρα, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, δικαίου ἀνδρὸς βλάπτειν καὶ ὠπτικοῦ ἀνδρόποτοι; Καὶ τὰν γε, ἡφη, τοὺς γε ποιητοὺς τε καὶ ἔχροις δεῖ βλάπτειν. Βλαπτόμενοι δ' ἵπται βελτίστους ἁρείους γύρονται; Ἐστερά. Ἐστι τῆς τῶν κυνῶν ἀρετῆς, ἢ εἰς τῆς τῶν ἱππών; Εἰς τῆς τῶν ἱππών. Ἐστι τῶν ἤπται. Ἐστιν, οὖν καὶ κύκλοι βλαπτόμενοι χείρος γύρισθαι εἰς τὴν τῶν κυνῶν, ᾧλ' οὖν εἰς τήν τῶν ἱππών ἄρετης; Ἀνάγκη.

ο' Ἀνθρώπους δὲ, ἢ ἡταίρε, μὴ οὕτω φῶλειν βλαπτομένους εἰς τὴν ἀνθρωπείαν ἄρετήν χείρος γύρισθαι; Πάνιν μὲν οὖν. Ἀλλ' ἡ δικαιουσία οὖν ἄνθρωπεία ἄρετη; Καὶ τοῦτ' ἀνάγκης. Καὶ τοὺς βλαπτομένους ἁρα, δ' ἠφιλε, τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀνάγκης ἀδικατέρους γύρισθαι. "Εἰσκεν. Ἀρ' οὖν τῇ μοισυκῇ οἱ μοισυκῇ ἁμόσμοις δύνανται ποιεῖν; Ἀδύνατον. Ἀλλ' ἡ ἄρετή οἱ ἱπποκοὶ ἀφήπτους; οὐκ ἔστιν. Ἀλλ' τῇ δικαιουσίᾳ δὴ οἱ δίκαιοι ἀδίκους; ἡ καὶ ξυλλησθὴν δ' ἄρετη οἱ ἀγαθοὶ κακοὶ; Ἀλλ' ἄδικοι ἀδίκοι. Οὐ γὰρ ἀθρότητος, οἷα τῇ ἅρμον ψύχες, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἑναντίου. Ναὶ. Οὐδὲ ἑθρότητος ὄγχαρες, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἑναντίου. Πάνιν γε. Οὐδὲ δ' ἦν τοῦ ἁθείου βλάπτεσθε, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἑναντίου. Λάβουτης. ἦ δ' ἐγω δίκαιος ὀγάθος; Πάνιν γε. Οὐκ ἁρα τοῦ δικαίου βλάπτετε ἔργον, οὐ νόμορφη, οὔτ' ἄλλον ὄντων, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἑναντίου, τοῦ ἁδίκου. Παντάποτι μοι δοκεῖς ἀληθής ἐλεγες, ἐφη, ὁ Σάκρατες. Ἑλ ἁρα τὰ ὄθεντα μέν ἐκάστοτε ἀποδίδεις φθορὰς τις δίκαιων εἰναι, τοῦτο δὲ δὴ νοεῖ αὐτῷ τοὺς μὲν ἔχροις βλάβην ὄθεντας

336 D. οὐκ άρα τοῦ δικαίου βλάπτεσθε ἔργον A. Π. δ', ἐργον βλάπτεντες B. ἔργων ομ. M. Αλλ', after the break caused by the last question and in summing up, ἔργων is better expressed (in the absence of ἐστὶ).
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δεξίων, επειδήν τίς τι ἀποκρύνονται, ἐγνωκός τοῦτο, ὃτι βάδου ἐρωτῶν ἡ ἀποκρύνεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπόκρυναι καὶ είπε, τι φησί οὖν ἡ δίκαιον καὶ ὧν αὐτὸς

μὴ ἔρεις, ὅτι τὸ δέον ἐστὶν μηδὲ ὅτι τὸ ὅφελον μηδὲ ὃτι τὸ λαυτελθοῦν μηδὲ ὃτι τὸ κερδοῦν μηδὲ ὃτι τὸ ξυμφέρον, ἀλλὰ σαφῶς μοι καὶ ἀκριβῶς λέγει ὃ τι ἄν λέγης· ὅσσον οὖκ ἀποδείξεις, ἐὰν ὅθεν τοιούτους λέγης. καὶ ἐγώ ἀκούσας ἔξπλαγνης καὶ προσβλέπω μοι τῶν ἐφοβόμην, καὶ μοι δοκεῖ, εἰ μὴ πρῶτος ἔσχάξῃ αὐτὸν [ἡ ἐκείνως ἔρε], ἀφανὸς ἀν γενέσθαι. νῦν δὲ ἦνεκα ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου ἱρχετο

Ε ἔξαγριανεθαὶς, προσέβλεψα αὐτὸν πρῶτος, ὡστε αὐτῷ οὖν τ' ἐγενομένη ἀποκρίνασθαι, καὶ έποιον ὑποτρέψων, 'Ω Θρασύμαχε, μὴ χάλετος ἡμῖν ἱστι· εἰ γάρ ἐξαρατάτομον ἐν τῇ τῶν λόγων σκέψει ἐγώ τε καὶ οὐ, εἴ τις ὅτι ἀκούσας ἀμαρτάτωμεν. μὴ γάρ δὴ οὖν, εἰ μὲν χρισάλλως ἔσχάξεις, ὥσσον ἄν ποτε ἡμᾶς ἀκούσας εἶναι ὑποκατακλίνεσθαι ἀλλὰς ἐν τῇ ἔξησει καὶ διαφθείρει τῶν εὐθείων αὐτῶν, διακαίωσυνήν δὲ ἐς τὸν τόμον, πράγμα πολλῶν χρισάλλων τιμώτερον, ἐπεὶ οὖν ἄν οὕτως ὑπείκεις ἀλλίτους, καὶ οὐ σπουδάζεις ὃ τι μάλιστα φανερά αὐτῷ. οὖν γε

336 D. οὖν μοι μὴ ἔρεις. <μαζι καὶ μὴ ἐρέεις> best MSS. μοι om. Κ[τ]. The pronunciation of μαζι and μὴ had become practically identical.

tὸ δέον Π+ for τὸ δέον, by a slip.

ξερέσον A. ἀναρέσον vulg. See 332 c note.

ἐς κείνων Π+ appears to be an interpolation.

336 Ε. εἰ γάρ ἐξαρατάτωμεν Α+Μ+ εἰ γάρ τι εἶ. Π+.

There is little to choose.

μὴ σπουδάζεις one or two edited MSS. But the construction is μὴ οὖν ἠρᾶς οὐ-σπουδάζεις.

ὁμοί τὸ οὖν Α+Π+Μ+ μὴ οὖν οὗ Κ[τ] Stallbaum δέο. καὶ οὐν σφ. οἷον γε τοῦν Η οἷος. After φαθοῆναι, a manifest conjecture. Bekker's οἷον γε σφ is provisionally accepted, though see note.

ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ Α. 19

σὺ, ὃ φίλε· ἀλλ', ἀμαί, οὐ δυνάμεθα· ἐξεοίσεις οὖν ἡμᾶς πολύ μᾶλλον εἰκός ἄτιν που ὑπὸ υμῶν τῶν 337 δεινῶν ἢ χαλεπαίνεσθαι.

XI. Καὶ ὃς ἀκούσας ἀνεκάγχασε τε μάλα σαρ-

δάνοι καὶ ἔπειτ., 'Ω Ἰράκλεις, ἔβηκε, ἀρχὴ ἐκδοθεῖ ἡ εἰσχύλλη εἰρενεῖα Σωκράτους, καὶ ταὐτ' ἐγὼ ἤδη τε καὶ τούτοις προβληγεν, ὅτι σὺ ἀποκρύνεσαι μὲν οὖν ἐθέλησος, εἰρενεύσοις δὲ καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ποιόν ή ἀποκαρμουμενε, εἰ τίς τί σε ἐρωτᾷ. Σοφὸς γὰρ εϊ, ἐγώ, ἐγώ, ὃς Ἐρασίμαχε· εἴ οὖν ἢδησα ὅτι, εἰ τῶν έρων ὁπότας ἔστι τα δώδεκα, καὶ ἐρασίμαχος προείνεται αὐτῷ. Β

Ὀτώς μοι, στ' ἀνθρώποι, μὴ ἐρέεις, ὅτι ἔστι τα δώδεκα διε ἐξ μηδὲ ὅτι τρεις τέσσαρα μηδὲ ὅτι εξάκις δύο μηδὲ ὅτι τετράκις τριά· ὅσον ἀποδέξομαι σου, εἰς τοιαῦτα φλαγγάρις· ἢλπι καὶ ποιήσας, οὖν ἂν ὅτι οὐδέποτε ἀποκρυμοῦτο τῷ οὕτως ποιησμένῳ. ἀλλ' εἰ σοι εἴπετι· 'Ω Ἐρασίμαχε, πώς λέγεις; μὴ ἀποκρύνομαι ὃν προείνετε μυρίζειν; πότερον, οἴχω, οἴχω, μηδὲ εἰ τούτων τι τυχάναι δυν. ἀλλα' ἐπετεύχθω τι τοῦ ἀληθοῦς; ἢ τῶς λέγεις; τι ἄν αὐτῷ εἴπετε πρῶς ζ ταῦτα· ἔβηκε, ἔφη· οὐ δὲ ὅμως τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο. Οὐδὲν γε κολύει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· εἴ δ' οὖν καὶ μὴ ἔστων ὅμως.

The sense seems to be satisfied with o.g. <καὶ ταῦτ' ἐπετεύχθω> οὖν γε σφ (οὐκοδ).  

337 A. ἀνεκάγχασε A. A recent hand has erased γ. See note. σαρδάνοι ΑΠ+ Σαρδάνοι ΔΕΚ+. See comment. A frequent form is σαρδάνος Ε.


ἐξέπλαγες Ωτ+, but these are not consistent in their treatment of the following future optatives.

337 B. τί om. Ε+ in εἰ τούτων τι τυχάναι δυν. The gen. of the class might stand, but the loss of τί was easy.
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faĩntαι δὲ τὸ ἐρωτηθέντι τοιοῦτον, ἦττον τι αὐτὸν οἷεὶ ἀποκρινεῖθαι τοῦ φαινόμενον ἑαυτῷ, ἕαν τε ἡμεῖς ἀπαγορεύωμεν ἕαν τε μὴ; "Ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἐφη, καὶ ἐν οὗτο ποιήσεις; ὅν ἐγὼ ἀπείτων, τοῦτον τι ἀποκρίνεις; Οὐκ ἂν βαριάσασί μν ὅ τι ἐγὼ οἱ ἐμοὶ σκεψαμένο οὕτω D δόξειν. Τι οὖν, ἐφη, ἂν ἐγὼ δείξητο ἐπάρκειαν παρά πάσας ταύτας περὶ δικαιοσύνης βελτίως τούτων; τί ἄξιον παθεῖν; Τί ἄλλο, ἂν δὲ ἐγὼ, ἢ ὅπερ προσήκει πάσχειν τῷ μὴ εἴδοτε; προσήκει δὲ τοιν μαθεῖν παρὰ τοῦ εἰδότος. καὶ ἐγὼ οὖν τοῦτο ἄξιον παθεῖν.

HIPPOCRATES, E. Οὐκ οὖν τοῦτο ἄξιον παθεῖν καὶ ἀποτεισθαι αργίριον. Οἴκους εἰπειδικοὶ ἀργίριον, ὁ Ὡσιοποίησιν. πάντες γὰρ ἠμῖν ἔστω. ἄλλα πρὸς τὸν μαθεῖν καὶ ἀποτεισθαι αργίριον. Οἴκους εἰπειδικοὶ ἁμάλιον, ἔστω. Τάπας γὰρ εἰ, ἐφη, ἅλλα πρὸς τὸν μαθεῖν καὶ ἀποτεισθαι αργίριον. Οἴκους εἰπειδικοὶ ἁμάλιον, ἔστω. Πάντες γὰρ εἰ, ἐφη, ἅλλα πρὸς τὸν μαθεῖν καὶ ἀποτεισθαι αργίριον.

337 A. τοιοῦτον rather than τοιώτον is the Platonic form. Schanz Proleg. to Laws p. vi. So τοιώτον are. 

ἀποκρίνει (Α'), not ἀποκρίςῃ, has the best ms authority in Plato (see Stallbaum's crit. note). Meisterhans § 61 a) says that the 2nd pers. medio-passive in -εῖ appears to have been established from the 4th cent. through identity of pronunciation. Yet originally it was -ει (the contraction of -εια). Brugmann Grundzüge §1047. We cannot decide whether the change had been effected in Plato's day. Cobet (Var. Lect. pp. 39 sq.) is not sound upon this point.

337 B. ἄπότισον κοιν. ἄπότισον alone is correct. See note. 337 Τάπας, εἰ ἂν καὶ μοί... εἰ ὣς om. Ast. Bremi also. It is just possible that Plato wrote the ungrammatical passage. See note. I venture, however, to amend ἠπείτη αἰ, <&> τὶ καὶ...

ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ A. 21

ἀπειρήμενον αὐτῷ εἰη, ὅποιος μηδὲν ἔρει δὲν ἦγεται, ὅποι εἰρήκα τὸν μαθητή τοῖς λέγειν; σὺ γὰρ δὴ φής εἰδενά καὶ ἔχειν εἰπεῖν. μὴ 338 οὖν ἄλλωσ τοιείν, ἄλλα ἐμοὶ τὸ χαρίζειν ἀποκρινομένον καὶ καὶ φθονίσης καὶ Πλατόνων τὸν διδάξαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλοχος.

XII. Ἐπιτόντος δὲ μοι ταῦτα ἢ τοῖς Πλατόνων καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐδόθη ταῦτα αὐτῷ ἃ γὰρ λέγεις, καὶ ὁ Ὡσιοποίησιν ὑπεραρχότας μὴν ἢ ἐπιθυμούσιν ἐπίθετα, ὃς εἰσδοκιμάσθησιν, ἐργούμενος ἐχειν ἀποκρινομένον παρακάλημα προσεποιεῖτο δὲ φιλονικεῖν πρὸς τὸ ἐμὲ εἶναι τὸν ἀποκρινομένον. τελευτών δὲ ἐνικηφόρουν, καστεῖα, Ἀδητὴ δὴ, ἐφη, ὁ Σωκράτης σοφία, αὐτὸν μὲν μὲν θεόν ἐδίδοντα καὶ παρὰ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων περιοῦσα μαθωμένων καὶ τοιοῦτον μὴν τρέχων ἐποδηδώναι. "Ὅτι μὲν, ἂν δὲ ἐγὼ, μαθητῶν παρά τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλὰς εἴπετε, ὁ Ὡσιοποίησις ὃς ὅτε δὲ τοῖς μεθ᾽ ἐμὲ φήρ᾽ ἐκτείνωσιν, ἐκτείνωσι χαρὰ δὴν δύναμις. δύναμις δὲ στὴν ἐκτείνωσιν μόνον. χρήσθαι γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει. ὅταν δὲ προβύῃ τοῦτο ἐθνική τοῦ καίντο ἐρώτα, ἤτο τῷ δεικτεῖχε ἐκτείνωσιν, ἐκτείνωσιν δὴν μᾶλλα, ἐπεῖδην ἁμάλιον εἴπειν. οὑμία γὰρ σὲ ἡτὶ ἐρώταν. "Ακούει δὲ, ὃ δὴ ἀποκρίςῃ, φημί γὰρ ἐγὼ εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον οὐκ ἄλλο τι τί ἡ τοῦ κρείττονος ἐξυφέρεσο. ἀλλά τί ὣκιν ἐκτείνωσιν; ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐπείδησις. Ἐὰν μάθω γε ψεύτων, ἐφη, Τί λέγεις; νῦν γὰρ ὀπιστὸν ἀλλὰ τοῦ κρείττονος φήμη εὐφέρεσο δίκαιον εἶναι. καὶ τούτα, ὁ Ὡσιοποίησις, ἃ ποτὲ λέγεις; οὐ γὰρ ποιν τὸ
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γυ τοιούτω φής· εἰ Πολυδάμας ἢμῶν κρέττων ὁ παγκρατιαστής καὶ αὐτῷ ἐμφάνει τά βδελα κρέα

ΠΡΩΤΟΣ ἔτι αὐτοῦ τοῦ σώματος, τοῦτο τὸ σύνομον εἰναι καὶ ἦμιν τοῖς ἦττου ξυμφέρουν ἄμα καὶ δίκαιον. Ἡθελορὸς γὰρ εἶ, ἐφπε, ὁ Σύκρατες, καὶ ταύτη ὑπολαμβάνεις, ἦν κακοπεργίσιας μᾶλλον τῶν λόγων. Ὁδειδμός, ὁ ἀριστε, ἦν δὲ ἐγὼ· ἀλλὰ σαφείστερον εἰπτε τί λέγεις. Ἐπεί δὲ εἶδος, ἐφπε, ὅτι τῶν τόκλων αἱ μὲν τυραννουνται, αἱ δὲ δημοκρατοῦνται, αἱ δὲ ἀριστοκρατοῦον. Πῶς ἐγὼ σὺ; Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο κρατεῖ ἐν ἐκάστη τόλμει, τό ἄρχον; Πάνω γε. Τίθεται δὲ γε γε τοῦτο νόμων ἐκάστη ἡ ἀρχή πρὸς τῷ αὐτῷ ξυμφέρουν, δημοκρατία μὲν δημοκρατικοίς, τυραννίς δὲ τυραννικοὺς, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι εὖτος· βέβαια δὲ αὐτὴ ἐπείπῃ τνοῦ δίκαιον τοῖς ἀρχαγένες εἶναι, τὸ σφάτι ξυμφέρουν, καὶ τῶν τοῦτον ἐκβαίνοντα καλόξων ὡς παραμονοῦντα τα καὶ ἄδικοντα. τοῦτον ἐντός, ὁ βέβαιος, ταύτη τοῦ κρείττουν. Σμακρά

339 A. Πολυδάμας best mss. Πολυδάμας is an Atticised form.
339 B. δίκαιον πι+ μ+ καὶ δίκαιον φης A.
339 C. The second οὖν τι καὶ ἀρματεῖν om. Ε+. But the preceding question was a double one.
339 D. οἰκουμένον δὴ A+. δὲ Μ+ Υ+. 'Come, let us...
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δ' ἔκειναι προσέταξαι· ἄρα τότε, δ' σοφότατε Θρασύμαχε, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον συμβαίνειν αὐτὸ οὕτωσιν δίκαιον εἶναι ποιεῖν τούπωταν ἢ σφι λόγοις; τὸ γὰρ τοῦ κρείττωνος ἄξιομαρφόν ὡς προστάτηται τοῖς ἤττοσιν ποιεῖν. Ναὶ μᾶ Δί', ἐφθῇ, δ' Σῶκρατε, δ' Πολέμαρχος, σαφεστάτα γε. 'Εκὼς ἡ γ', ἐφθῇ, αὐτῷ μαρτυρήσῃ, δ' Κλειστοφόρον ὑπολαβὼν. Καὶ τῷ, ἐφθῇ, δεῖται μάρτυρος; αὐτὸς γὰρ Θρασύμαχος ὁμολογεῖ τοὺς μὲν ἄρχοντες ἐνίστε ἐαυτοῦ κακὰ προστάτευε, τοῖς δὲ ἀρχομένοις δίκαιον εἶναι ταῦτα ποιεῖν. Τό γὰρ τὰ κελευομένα ποιεῖν, τὸ Πολέμαρχε, ὑπὸ τῶν ἄρχοντων δίκαιον εἶναι ἔθετο Θρασύμαχος. Καὶ γὰρ τὸ τοῦ κρείττωνος, δ' Κλειστοφόρον, συμφέρον

Β' δίκαιον εἶναι ἔθετο. ταῦτα δὲ ἀμφότερα θέμενος ὁμολόγησεν αὐτὸν ἐνίστε τοὺς κρείττων τὰ αὐτοῖς ἄξιομαρφος κελεοῦσιν τοὺς ἤττους τε καὶ ἀρχομένους ποιεῖν. ἐκ δὲ τούτων τῶν ὁμολογίων αὐτοῦ μᾶλλον τὸ τοῦ κρείττωνος ἄξιομαρφόν δίκαιον ἄρα εἰ διὰ τοῦ μὴ ἄξιομαρφόν. 'Αλλ', ἐφθῇ οἱ Κλειστοφόρον, τὸ τοῦ κρείττων ἄξιομαρφόν ἄξιομαρφόν ἄξιομαρφόν ἄξιομαρφόν ἄξιομαρφόν· τοῦτο ποιήσει εἶναι τῷ ἤττου, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτο ἔθετο. 'Αλλ', σὺς ὁς ὁτοὺς, ἢ διὸ ἡ δ' Πολέμαρχος, ζέλεσθον. Ὅδεν, ἢ διὸ ἢ εὐγενές, δ' Πολέμαρχος, διαφέρει, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς οὕτω λέγει Θρασύμαχος, οὕτως αὐτόν ἀποδεχόμεθα.

XIV. Καὶ μαί εἰτε, δ' Θρασύμαχε· τοῦτο ἂν δὲ ἐβουλοῦν λέγειν τὸ δίκαιον, τὸ τοῦ κρείττωνος ἄξιομαρφόν δίκαιον εἶναι τῷ κρείττου, εἰς τῷ ἄξιομαρφόν· ἢ τῷ μή·

339 Ε. Editors punctuate variously, (1) after ἦν, (2) after ἦν, (3) as in the text (after Madvig).

340 Α. αὐτὸς Θρασύμαχος (without γάρ) Μ.

340 Β. ὃ γάρ Α+Π'. The vulgar ἢ γάρ is a mistake. See note.
XV. Ἐλευθερίαν, ἣν δ’ ἐγὼ, ὁ Θρασύμαχος, δοκῶ σοι συνοφραστέντι; Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. Οἰκείοι γὰρ με δὲ ἐσθίον ἔρριβη ἐν τοῖς λόγοις κακουργοῦτα σε ἐρέσθαι ἢ ἡρῴμην; ᾿Ε ὡς μὲν οὖν οὔτε, ἐφή· καὶ οὔτε γε σοι πλέον ἔσται· οὕτε γὰρ αὐτῷ με λάθος κακουργᾶν, οὕτε Β μὴ λαβόντων βιάσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ δύναι. Οὖθεν οὖν ἐν ἐπικεχερθήσαιμι, ἣν δ’ ἐγὼ, ὁ μακάριε. ἀλλ’ ἣν μὴ αὐθέν ἢμι τοιούτοιν ἐγγέννηται, διόρισαι, ποτέρος λέγεις τῷ ἀρχοῦτα τε καὶ τῶν κρείττων, τόν ὁς ἐποίησεν ἢ τῶν ἀκριβεῖ κλόνης, δ’ νῦν δὲ ἔλεγες, οὗ τὸ ἔξωφερός κρείττων ὁδός δίκαιον ἦσται τῷ ἡπτούν ποιεῖν. Τῷ τῷ ἀκριβεστάτῳ, ἐφη, λόγῳ ἠρχοῦσα δυνα. πρὸ ταῦτα κακούργησαι καὶ συνοφράσθε, ἐλ τὶ Σ δύνασαι· οὐδὲν σοι παριέμαι· ἀλλ’ οὐ μή οὖν τ’ ὑμί. Ὅλει γὰρ αὐτῷ, καὶ εἰσὶν, οὕτω μανῆοι, ὡστε ἑρώτειν ἐπικεχείρησαι λέοντα καὶ συνοφράστειν Θρασύμαχοι; Νῦν γὰρ, ἐφη, ἐπικεχείρησας, οὐδὲν διὸ καὶ ταῦτα. "Αδην, ὁδ’ ἐγώ, τοῖς τοιούτοις. ἀλλ’ εἶπεν μοι· τῷ ἀκριβεία λόγῳ λατρύν, δ’ ἄρτοι ἔλεγες, πάτερον χρησιμοτητής ἦστιν ἢ τῶν καμιὼν τῆς ἀρετῆς; καὶ λέγει τῷ τῷ ὑπὶ τῶν λέγειν. Τῶν καμιωτῶν, ἔφη, τῆς ἀρετῆς. Τί δὲ κυβερνήτης; ὁ ὅρθως κυβερνήτης

341 A. ἔρεθεν Κ. The common accentuation is ἔρεθε. See Schanz Plat. Vol. v. Prol. § 8 and cf. ἔρεβεσθαι 343 E. So ἕρεθεσθαι, ἐλεύθεραι are apt to be treated as presents by the later Greeks. A present ἐραστεῖ is not provable for classical Greek, ἐραστεῖ being in regular use.

341 B. The trouble of Ast &c. with οὔτε μὴ λαθὼς is due to missing the sense. See note.

341 C. δ’ νῦν δ’ ἔλεγες 335, except that A shows δ over an erasure. ἐν νῦν δὲ ἔλεγες Benedictus, Hermann, J. and C. δ’ might, of course, lose its τ through the τ’ following, but the erasure in A is more probably due to δ acquiring a false τ’ from the same cause. See note.
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tή τέχνη ὑπὸ τοὺς πονηροῖς, καὶ δεῖ αὖ ἑκατὸ τέχνη
ἀλλης τέχνης, ἂτι αὐτὴ τὸ ξυμφέρον σκέψεται, καὶ
τῇ σκοπουμένῃ ἑτέρας αὖ τοιαύτης, καὶ τοῦτ᾿ ἔστιν
B ἀπάραντος; ἢ αὐτὴ αὐτῇ τὸ ξυμφέρον σκέψεται; ἢ
οὔτε αὐτῆς οὔτε ἄλλης προσεδέεται ἐπί τὴν αὐτής
πονηραίαν τὸ ξυμφέρον σκοπεῖν· οὔτε γὰρ πονηρία οὔτε
ἀμαρτία οὐδεμιᾶ τέχνη πάρεστιν, οὔδε προσῆκε
τῇ τέχνῃ ἄλλῳ τὸ ξυμφέρον ζητεῖν ἢ ἐκεῖνο o ὁ τέχνῃ
ἔστιν, αὐτὴ δὲ ἀβλαβῆς καὶ ἀκέραιος ἔστιν ὅρθη
ὀνα, ἐσωπερ ἢν ἡ ἐκάστη ἄκριβης ὡλὴ ἦπερ ἔστι; καὶ
σκόπει ἐκεῖνο τῷ ἄκριβείς λόγῳ· οὕτως ἢ ἄλλως ἔχει; Οὕτως, ἐφ᾿ ὑπερετεί. Οὐκ ἄρα, ἤν δ᾿ ἐγὼ,
C ἰατρικὴ ἰατρικὴ τὸ ξυμφέρον σκοπεῖ ἀλλὰ σώματι.
Ναὶ, ἐφ᾿. Οὐδὲ ἐπιπειρ ἐπιπειρ ἀλλ᾿ ἐπιπειρ· οὐδὲ
ἄλλῃ τέχνῃ οὐδεμιᾶ ἐστιν, οὔτε γὰρ προσεδέεται, ἀλλ᾿
ἐκεῖνο o ὁ τέχνῃ ἔστιν. Φαινεῖται, ἐφ᾿, οὕτως. Ἀλλὰ
μή, ὁ Ἐρασίμαχε, ἀρχουσί γε αἱ τέχναι καὶ κρατοῦσιν
ἐκείνου, οὐδέρ εἰσι τέχναι. Σκέφθηκαν ἐνταῦθα καὶ
μάλα μόνης. Οὐκ ἄρα ἐπιστήμη γε οὐδεμιᾶ τὸ τοῦ
κρατετοῦνος ξυμφέρον σκοπεῖ οὐδὲ
D ἐπιστάτησε, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦ ἠττονος τό καὶ ἀρχομένου ὑπὸ
ἐστὶν. Ἐξωπολογήσεις μὲν καὶ ταῦτα τελεῖον,
ἐπεχέρει δὲ περὶ αὐτὰ μάχεσθαι· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐμολογήσειν,
Ἀλλο το οὖν, ἢν δ᾿ ἐγὼ, οὐδὲ ἰατρὸς οὐδεις,
καθ᾿ ὥσιν ἰατρός, τὸ τοῦ ἰατροῦ ξυμφέρον σκοπεῖ οὐδὲ
ἐπιστάτησε, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦ κάρμουτο; ὡμολογήσεις γὰρ ὁ

δεῖ αὖ δεῖ αὑτῆς, for αὐτῆς κ.τ.λ. Cf. sup. 390 c.

ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ Α.

ἀκριβῆς ἰατροῦ σφαμάτων εἶναι ἄρχον ἄλλ᾿ οὐχ ὁρισματικῆς. οὐκ ὡς ὁμολογηταί· ξυνάψε. Οὐκοῦν
καὶ ὁ κυβερνήτης ὁ ἀκριβῆς ναιτοῦ εἶναι ἄρχον ἄλλ᾿ οὐ
ναύτης; Ὡμολογηταί. Οὔκ ἄρα ὃ γε τοιοῦτο τὸ
κυβερνήτης τοῦ καὶ ἄρχον τοῦ τοῦ κυβερνήτης ξυμφέρον
σκέψεται τοῦ καὶ προστάταιε, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦ ἁρμόνιον
τοῦ τοῦ ἁρχομένων. ξυνάψεσο μόνης. Οὐκοῦν, ἢν δ᾿ ἐγὼ,
ὁ Ἐρασίμαχε, οὐδὲ ἄλλος οὐδεὶς εἰν οὐδεμιᾷ ἁρχῆ,
καθ᾿ ὥσιν ἄρχον ἔστιν, τὸ αὐτοῦ ξυμφέρον σκοπεῖ
οὐδὲ ἐπιστάτησε, ἀλλα τὸ τοῦ ἁρχομένων καὶ ὅ ἂν αὐτοῦ
δημοσία, καὶ πρὸς ἑκεῖνο βλέποι καὶ τὸ ἐκεῖνο
ξυμφέρον καὶ πρῶτον καὶ λέγει ὁ ποιεῖ ἀπάντα.

XVI. Ἑπειδὴ οὖν ἐνταῦθα ἦμεν τοῦ λόγου καὶ 343
πάντα καταφέρι οὐ, ὅτι τοῦ δεκάοιος λόγου εἰς
τοιαύτην περιεισθείη, ὁ Ἐρασίμαχος ἀντὶ τοῦ
ἀποκρίνεσθαι, Εἰπέ μοι, ἐφ᾿, ὁ Ἐρασίμαχος, τίθηθι σοι
ἔστιν; Τί δε; ἢν δ᾿ ἐγὼ· οὐκ ἀποκρίνεσθαι χρῆν
μᾶλλον ἢ τοιαύτα ἐρωτάς; Ὅτι τοι τα, ἐφ᾿, κο
ρείξοιμαι περιορά καὶ οὐκ ἀπορότερε δεόμενον, ὃς γε
αὐτῇ οὐδὲ πρόβατα οὐδὲ ποιμένα γνωρίσσεις. Ὅτι
δὲ τὶ μᾶλλον; ἢν δ᾿ ἐγὼ. Ὅτι δὲ οὔ τοις ποιεῖς,
ἡ τοῦ βουκόλου τὸ τῶν προβάτων ἢ τὸ τῶν βοσῶν
ἀγαθὸν σκοπεῖ καὶ παχινίσει αὐτοῖς καὶ ὀμφατεῖ,
πρὸς ἀλλό τι βλέποντας ἡ τὸ τῶν διστάσων ἀγαθὸν
καὶ τὸ αὐτῶν, καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῖς ἐν ταῖς πόλεισιν
ἀρχοντας, οἴ οἳ ἀλήθεις ἀρχοντας, ἀλλος πως ἤγει
διανοεῖσθαι πρὸς τοὺς ἁρχομένους ἢ διατεῖ ἢ τοῖς

342 B. πρὸς ἑκεῖνο βλέποι best ms. εἴκοσι πτ; but τὸ
ἀρχομένον is neuter.

343 A. ἀποκρίνεσθαι χρῆν Α. χρὴ Π. The former is
more idiomatic.

343 B. διανοεῖσθαι ms. διακατείχει Faschi; but see note.
πρὸς πρόβατα διατεθείη, καὶ ἄλλο τι σκοτείν αὐτοῦ διὰ νυκτὸς καὶ ἡμέρας ἢ τούτο ὅθεν αὐτοὶ ἀφελήσονται. 

καὶ, καὶ οὕτω πάρροι ἐπεὶ τε τοῦ δίκαιου καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ αἰδίκου, οὔτε ἄγνοια, οὔτε ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν τῷ ὧτῳ, τοῦ κρείττονος τε καὶ ἄρχοντος ξυμβρέφον, οἰκεία δὲ τοῦ πειθομένου τε καὶ ὑπηρετουόντος ξύλῳ, ἢ δὲ αἰδία τοῦνατίον καὶ ἀρχὴ τῶν δικαίων εὐθύκιον τε καὶ δικαίων, οἷς ἀρχόμενοι ποιοῦσιν τὸ ἐκείνου ξυμβρέφον κρείττονος ὅπως, καὶ εὐδαιμονον ἔξειν ποιοῦσιν ὑπηρετούντες αὐτῷ, ἄνωτος δὲ οὐδ’ ὑποστεούσιν. σκοτεβίας δὲ, ὡς ἐφθέγγαυτε Σάκρατε, οὔτως χρῆ, ὅτι δίκαιος ἀνήρ ἀδίκου πανταχοῦ ἐξαιτοῦ ἔχει. πρὸτον μὲν ἐν τοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἁμαρτωλοὺς ἡμᾶς ἡμᾶς ὑπερασπίζεται, ὅπου ἄν ὁ τοιούτος τοῦ τοιοῦτον κοινωνική, οὕσαμεν ἐν τῇ διαλείπεσιν τῆς κοινωνίας πλοῦτος ἔχειν τὸν δίκαιον τοῦ ἀδίκου ἀλλὰ ἐλεητοῦν ἔπειτα ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, ὅταν τε τινες εἰσφοραὶ ὑμῖν, οἱ μὲν δίκαιοι ἀπὸ τῶν ἵσον πλέον εἰσφέρει, οἱ δὲ ἐλεητοῦν, ὅταν ταὶ λήψεις, οἱ μὲν οὖν, δὲ πολλὰ κερδαίνει, καὶ γὰρ ὅταν ἄρχει τινα ἄρχῃ ἐκάτερος, τὸ μὲν δικαίον ὑπάρχει, καὶ εἰ μιᾷ ἡμείᾳ ἀλλὰ ἡμεία, τὰ γε οἰκεία δὲ ἀμέλεια μοχθροτέρων ἕχει, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἐντομού μηδὲν ἀφελεύσατε διὰ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τοῖς ἀρχοῦσιν τοῖς τοῦ οἰκεῖος καὶ τοῖς γνωρίσις, ὅταν μὴν ἐδέχθη αὐτοὶ ὑπηρετεῖν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον. τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ πάντα τοῦτον παντα τοῦτιν ἀναπαυτὰ 

ξυμβρέφονται Μ++. The substitution of these analogical forms is frequent. 

343 C. ἀδίκου τε καὶ ἀδίκος vulg. τε om. A, II. Cf. 329 a. 
See note. 

343 E. ἀπέχθεσαν μᾶς (except for ἀπεχθάνεσαν q +). For the accentuation see comment. and cf. sup. 341 a.
πόστε, ἐφι, σὲ πείσω; εἰ γὰρ οἷς νῦν δὲ ἔλεγον μὴ πέπεται, τί σοι ἐτί ποίησα; ἢ εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν φέρων ἐφθαν τὸν λόγον; Μᾶ Δ', ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, μὴ σὺ γε; ἀλλὰ πρῶτοι μέν, ἢ ἂν εἴπης, ἔμμενε τούτοις, ἢ ἂν μετατιθῇ, φανέρας μετατίθεσκα καὶ ἢμᾶς μὲ ἐξεπάτησαν. νῦν δὲ ὁρᾶς, ὁ Θρασύμαχος, εἰς ίφ χα τῷ ἐμπροσθεθεὶς ἐπισκεφθομένῳ, ὅτι τὸν ὅσον ἄλλως ἰσαρτό τὸ πρῶτον ὄρισμιν τῶν ὅσον ἄλλως ποιήσαμεν οὐκ ἐτί φῶν δεύσατο ἀρείβως φυλάξατα, ἀλλὰ πιάνες οἰς αὐτοῖς τὰ πρᾶβατα, καθ' ὅσον ποιήσας ἄστιν, οὐ πρὸς τὸ τῶν προβάτων βελτιστον βλέποντα, ἀλλ' ὄστος διατυμῶν τών καὶ μέλλουται ἑστιάσεσθαι, πρὸς τὴν εὐφορίαν, ἣν ἀν πρὸς τὸ ἀποδώσθαι, ὅπερ χρηματιστῷ ἀλλ' οὐ τοιοῦτο. τῇ δὲ πηνυμεκῇ οὗ Θ ἄγον τῳ ἄλλῳ τοῦ μέλεω ἢ, ἐφ' ὅ τετάκται, ὅπως τούτῳ τὸ βελτιστον ἐκπορεύεται; ἐπεὶ τὰ γε αὐτής, ὅτσ' εἶναι βελτίστη, ἰκανόν δότου ἐκπορεύεται, ἢς ἦν ὥσιν ἐφθαν τῷ ποιημένῳ εἰναι, ὅπως δὲ ἡμῖν ἐγγέγονεν τῷ ὅσον ἁναγκασθαὶ ἔρισαν ἄρχοντες, καθ' ὅσον ἄρχον, μηδείς ἀλλ' τὸ βελτιστον σκοπεῖαι ἢ ἐκεῖσθι τῷ ἄρχομαι τῷ καὶ θεραπευμένῳ, ἐν τῷ πολιτικῷ καὶ ἰδιωτικῷ ἁρχῆς. Εὐ δὲ τῶν ἄρχοντων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, τοὺς ἄλλους ἄρχοντας, ἔκοιντος οἰς ἄρχοι; Μᾶ Δ' οὖν, ἐφι, ἀλλ' εὐ ὁδίᾳ.

ΧVIII. Τῇ δὲ; ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, ὁ Θρασύμαχος, τὰς ἄλλας ἄρχας οἷς ἐννοεῖς ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἔδει άρχειν ἑκαί, ἀλλὰ μισθὸν ἀλτοῦσιν, ὡς οὐχὶ ἀυτοῖσιν

344 D. ἀθάνα is the regular form in A, and (according to Aristarchus) was more Attic than ἀθάνα. On irregularities of the spiritus asper in Attic see Meisterhans §§ 32 and 37.
344 E. ἵκω Ἀ.1 for ἔκω, by confusion of Ν and Η. ὅσον ἦ τῇ ήτοι. The point of ήτοι was missed.
345 A. οὕτε πείθει Μ. οὐ πείθεις Ficinus. See comment.
345 C. παιδείας A rightly. παιδεία (a gloss) in a few inferior copies. παιδείας Π + Μ + Α² mg. See note and the remark sup. 333 s.

PL. REP.
345 Ε. ὁφελίαν ἐσομένην ἐκ τῶν ἀρχείων ἄλλα τῶν ἀρχα-

346 μένων; ἔτει τοσόνδε εἰπέ; οὐχὶ ἐκάστην μένειν

φαμέν ἐκάστοτε τῶν τεχνών τοὺς ἔτεραν εἶναι, τῷ

ἔτεραν τὴν δύναμιν ἔχειν; καὶ, ὁ μακάριε, μὴ παρα-

δόξαν ἀποκρίνων, ἢν τε καὶ περαιώνωμεν. Ἀλλὰ

τοῦτο, ἔφη, ἔτερα. Οὐκοὶ δὲ ἄφιλοι ἐκάστη

ἴδια τινα ἡμῖν παρέχεται, ἀλλ’, οὐ κοινὴν, οἷον

ιατρικὴ μὲν ὑγίειαν, κυβερνητικὴ δὲ σωτηρίαν ἐν τῷ

πλεῖν, καὶ ἂν ἄλλα οὕτω; Πάνω γε. Οὕκον καὶ

Β μισθωτικὴ μισθῶν; ἄτη γὰρ αὐτῆς ἡ δύναμις,

ἡ τὴν ιατρικὴν οὖ καὶ τὴν κυβερνητικὴν τὴν αὐτὴν

καλεῖς; ἡ δὲ ἄπευρη βούλη ἀκριβῶς διορίζειν, ὡσπερ

ὕπνῳ, οὐδὲν τι μάλλον, ἐὰν τις κυβερνῶν ὑγιής

γίγνεται διὰ τὸ ἄλφαμερον αὐτῷ πλεῖν ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ,

ἐνεκα τοῦτο καλεῖς μαλλον αὐτὴν ιατρικὴν; Οὐ

δήτα, ἔφη. Οὔδέ γ’, οὐκαί, τὴν μισθωτικὴν, ἐὰν

ὑγιαίνῃ τις μισθωρίδων. Οὐ δήτα. Τί δέ; τὴν

ιατρικὴν μισθωρίδως, ἐὰν ἰόμενοι τις μισθωρίδως;

C Οὐκ ἔφη. Οὐκοὶ τὴν γε ὁφελίαν ἐκάςτης τῆς

τέχνης ἴδιαν ὁμολογήσαμεν εἶναι; "Βοῦτα, ἔφη.

"Ἀντικα ἄρα ὁφελίαν κοινή ὁφελοῦσθαι πάντες ὦ

δημοσίονντον, ἴδην ἢ δια τινὴν αὐτὴν προσχε-

μενον ἢλε ἐκείνῳ ὁφελοῦσθαι. Ὁ οἰκεῖον, ἔφη. Φαμέν

dε γε τὸ μισθών ἁρμωμένων ὁφελοῦσθαι τοὺς δη-

345 Ε. ὁφελίας ἐσομένης θά. The accusative absolute was

346 less familiar.

346 διά τι ἄλφαμερον αὐτῷ πλεῖν Α + Π + Μ+. ἄλφαμερον

Εἴση is an emendation. The participle is probably due to the

frequency of τὸ ἄλφαμερον in the discussion. Otherwise we might

suggest διά τὸ ἄλφαμερον αὐτῷ <του> πλεῖν.

μισθωρικὴ Μ+. 346 Κ. τὸ μισθῶν Α+. τῶν μισθῶν of many ιςς illustrates

the common error of false adaptation.

346 Β. διά τὸ ἄλφαμερον αὐτῷ πλεῖν Α + Π + Μ+. ἄλφαμερον

Εἴση is an emendation. The participle is probably due to the

frequency of τὸ ἄλφαμερον in the discussion. Otherwise we might

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μισθωρικὴ Μ+. 346 Κ. τὸ μισθῶν Α+. τῶν μισθῶν of many ιςς illustrates

the common error of false adaptation.

πολιτείας Α. 35

μισθωτικὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ προσχεθαὶ τῇ μισθωτική

tέχνη γίγνεται αὐτῶν. Ξυνήφη μόγης. Οὐκ ἄρα

ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῶν τέχνης ἐκάστῳ αὐτῇ ἢ ὁφελεία ἑστὶν, D

ὁ τοῦ μισθοῦ λήφης, ὅλῃ, εἰ δεῖ ἀκριβῶς σκοπεῖται,

ἡ μὲν ιατρικὴ ὑγίεια ποιεῖ, ἢ δὲ μισθωρίδως

μισθῶσθαι, καὶ ἢ μὲν ὀλοκληρωμη ὀκίσκοι, ἢ ἐς μισθω-

ρικὴ τὴν ἐπομένη μισθῶν καὶ ἂν ἄλλα πάσα

οὕτως τοῦ αὐτῆς ἐκάστῃ ἔργον ἔργαζεται καὶ ὁφελεῖ

ἐκεῖνο, ἐφ’ ὃ τέτακται. ἐὰν δὲ μὴ μισθὸς αὐτής

προσφέγγηται, ἐσθ’ ὃ τε ὁφελεῖται ἡ δημοσία ἀπὸ

τῆς τέχνης; Οὐ φαίνεται, ἔφη. "Αρ’ ὅνω οἴδ’ ὁφελεῖ

tότε, ὅταν προίκα ἔργαζητα. Οἴμαι ἔγοιν. Οὐκοῦν,

ἔδέ Θαραιμαχε, τοῦτο ἦδ’ δήλου, ὅτι οὐδεὶς σπέρ

οὐδὲ ἄρχη τοῦ αὐτῆς ὁφελέμαν παρασκευάζει, ἀλλ’,

ὅτερ πάλαι ἐλέγομεν, τὸ τῶν ἀρχιμένων καὶ παρα-

σκευάζει καὶ ἐπιτάττει, τὸ ἑκείνου ἄλφαμερον ἢττόνος

ὅτονος σκοποῦσα, ἀλλ’ οὗ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος. διὰ ὅτι

ταῦτα ἐγογγε, ὅ φεμε Θαραιμαχε, καὶ ἄρτι ἐλέγου

μηδένα ἐθελεῖ ἐκεῖνα ἄρχειν καὶ τὰ ἀλλ’τρια κακὰ

μεταχειρίζεσθαι ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ μισθῶν ἀιτεῖν, ὅτι

ὁ μέλλων καλὸς τῆς τέχνης πράξεων οὐδέποτε αὐτὸ

τὸ 347 βιοτιστὸν πράττει οὐδ’ ἐπιτάττει κατὰ τῆς

tέχνης ἐπιτάττον, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀρχιμένῳ ὅ, ὅ ἐν ἑκεῖνα, ὅς

346 Β. ὁ τοῦ μισθοῦ λήφης om. Μ1. It adds clearness,

however.

μισθωρικὴ Μ+. Reversely οἰκοδομητικὴ in some inferior copies.


347 Α. οὖδ’ ἐπιτάττει om. some inferior copies (after πράττει) through homoeoteleuton.

Δ’ δ’ ἐρεκά Μ. oὐ Π. ὥσ oὐ (by conflation) Π. ὅ A (which

is probably due to -ω of the last word). It looks as if ὥς had

been lost after ὅ, and then the passage corrected variously.

3—2
πόλις ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν εἰ γένοιτο, περιμάχων ἂν εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἄρχειν, ὁπτέρῳ νυν τὸ ἄρχειν, καὶ ἐνταῦθ’ ἂν καταφαίνει γενήσαι, ὅτι τῷ ὅτι ἀληθινῷ ἄρχον οὐ πέφυκε τὸ αὐτῷ ἄρχειν οὐκ ἐξετείναθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῷ ἄρχομένῳ· ὅστε πᾶς ἂν ὁ γραφόσκοποι τὸ αὑτὸν ἔλοιπον ὑπ’ ἄλλῳ ἢ ἄλλον ἀφελών πράγματα ἔχειν· τότε μὲν οὖν ἔγγορευ ὑδαμῇ συνχρὼν Ὁρασύμαχος, ὡς τὸ δικαίου ἄκτιν εἶναι τοῦ κρείπτους ἄρχειν· ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν δὴ καὶ εἰσαθῆς σκεφτείνα· πολὺ δὲ μοι δοκεῖ μεῖζον εἶναι, ὃ νῦν λέγει Ὁρασύμαχος, τὸν τῶν ἀδίκων βίων φάσιν ἂν εἶναι κρείπτως ἂν τοῦ τῶν δικαίων· ὅπως πτέρως, ἂν ὃ ἐγώ, ὃ Γλαύκων, αἴρει καὶ πτέρων ἀληθετέρως δοκεῖ σοι λέγεσθαι· Τὸν τῶν δικαίων ἔγγορευ, ἐφ’, λυστελέστερον βίων εἶναι· Ἦκοςε, ἂν ὃ ἐγώ, ὃ ὁμα ἀρτί Ὁρασύμαχος ἀγαθὰ διήλθη τῷ 348 τῶν ἀδίκων; Ἔκοψα, ἐφ’, ἂλλ’ ὑπ’ πείθομαι. Βοῦλεί αὐτῶν αὐτῶν πείθομαι, ἂν δυναμεῖ τῇ ἕξερειν, ὃ εἰ ναθή λέγει; Πῶς γὰρ ὑπ’ βούλεμαι; ἂν ὃς. Ἀν μὲν τοῖνοι, ἂν ὃ ἐγώ, ἀντικαταστάντες λέγωμεν αὐτῷ λόγον παρὰ λόγον, ὅσα αὐτό ἂν ἀγάθῳ ἔχει τὸ δικαίου εἶναι, καὶ αὕτως εἰσίν, καὶ ἄλλων ἡμέρας, ἀριθμεῖ δεσεῖ τῶν θαλαμεῖ καὶ μετέρως ὑπ’ ἐκάστως ἐν ἑκάστῳ λέγωμεν, καὶ ἢμ δικαστῶν τῶν τῶν 347 Β. διακρινοῦντων δεσμῶθαι· ἂν δὲ ὁπτέρῳ ἀρτί ἀνωμαλοχοῦσαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους σκοτώμεν, ἀμα αὐτῶ τε δικασται καὶ ἡμῖν ἐστὶν· Πάγοι μὲν οὖν, ἐφ’, ὃπότεροι οὖν σοι, ἂν ὃ ἐγώ, ἀρέσκει. Οὐτάς, ἐφ’.

347 Β. πτέρως...ἀπεί 388, followed by πτέρους ὑπ᾽ ἀληθετέρως (Α.Π.++) αὐτῶν ἀληθετέρως (Μ.++)· Ast, Hermann also read πτέρου...πτέρως. See note.

348 Β. ὁπτέρως οὖν, except for the intended correction πτέρως Vind. F.
ΠΙΛΑΤΟΝΟΣ

XX. Ἡθι δή, ἡν δ’ ἐγώ, ὁ Θραντάρχης, ἀποκρινεὶ ἡμῖν ἢ ἐν ἄρχης; τὴν τελεόν ἄδικαν τελεόν σώφρον σκιναισθησίας λυσιτελεστέραν φής εἰναι. Πάνω μὲν ὁ σωφίκαι καὶ φημι, ἐφή, καὶ δι’ ἥ, ἐλείρεια. Φερε δή τὸ τοιὸν περὶ αὐτὸν πῶς λέγει; τὸ μὲν που ἄρεθνη αὐτὸν καλεῖ, τὸ δὲ κακίαν; Πῶς γὰρ; οὖ; Οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν δικαιοσύνην ἄρετήν, τὴν δὲ ἄδικαν κακίαν; Εἰς εἰς τ’ ἐφή, ὅ ἤδηστο, ἑπείδη καὶ λέγω ἄδικαν μὲν λυσιτελεῖ, δικαιοσύνην δ’ οὐ. 'Ἀλλὰ τί μή; Τοῦτοντίον, ἢ δ’ ἄρ. Ἡ τὴν δικαιοσύνην κακίαν;

D Όὐκ, ἀλλὰ τὰν γενναίαν εὐθείαν. Τὴν ἀδικίαν ἀρα κακοθείαν καλεῖς; Όὐκ, ἀλλ’ εὐθείας, ἐφή. Ἡ καὶ φρονιμοὶ σοι, ὁ Θρασύμαχε, δικοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀγαθοὶ οἱ ἄδικοι; οὐ γε τελεόν, ἐφή, οὐ γε τέλεον, τέλεος τε καὶ ἐθνὸν δυνάμενον ἀνθρώπων ὑπ’ ἀντίκεισθαι. οὐ δὲ οἷον μὲ ἑαυτὸν τοῖς τὸ βαλλάντια ἀποτέμωντας λέγειν. λυσιτελεῖ μὲν οὖν, ἢ δ’ ἀρα, καὶ τοιαύτα, ἐντετελείν· ἐπεὶ δὲ οὖκ

Ε ἐξία λόγον, ἀλλ’ ἢ νῦν δὴ ἐλεγον. Τοῦτο μέντοι, ἐφη, οὐκ ἀγνόω δ’ ἡ βούλει λέγειν· ἀλλὰ τὸν ἐθνὸν ἐθναίμασα, εἰ ἐν ἀρετής καὶ σοφίας τίθης μέρει τὴν ἀδικίαν, τὴν δὲ δικαιοσύνην ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτοῖς. Ἀλλὰ πᾶνω σωφίκαι νόμος. Τοῦτο, ἤ δ’ ἐγώ, ἦδη στερεώρευν, ἢ ἐταίρε, καὶ οὐκέτ’ ῥάδιον ἐχείν δ’ ἐν τίς

348 D. ὅποι λειτοῦργοι some inferior copies. See note.

βαλλάντια A·Π·. The variant βάλλαντα Ἔκαστός was tolerably sure to appear, as in 575 ε. There is nothing in which sss are less to be trusted than in the double λ. Cf. inf. 358 ά (θραντάρχης) and 359 Ε (ἐβαλλόμενος). The Ravaens ws of Aristophanes has βαλλάντσαμεν and in Ran. 772 the best reading points to βαλλαντο-νίκοις as metrical. The quantity at least is long. Cf. Simon. Ψυγ. 161 (Ἑρώτ. 60) ἐμφανος καὶ φυρμης τώ οὖν βαλλαντας σὺν.

348 B. βίων (baiv) ws, except for βίων κ. The preceding comparative may have caused hallucination, but in any case

ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ Α. 39 εἰπη. ἐν γὰρ λυσιτελεῖ μὲν τὴν ἄδικίαν ἐτίθεσα, κακίαι μεντοί ἢ ἀισχροὶ αὐτὸ ἄμμολόγες εἶναι, ὀστερὸν ἄλλοι των, ἐλέγουσαν ἐν τῷ λέγειν κατὰ τὰ νομικόμενα λέγοντες τῷ δὲ δήλοις τα ἡτίνες αὐτῷ καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀσθενῶν εἶναι καὶ τᾶλα αὐτῷ πάντα προσθήκης, ἀ ἡμεῖς τῷ δικαίῳ προσετήθηκεν, 348 ἐπιείδης, ἐν καὶ ὕποτῆς αὐτὸ καὶ σοφία ἐδῆμπες θείαι. Ἀλληθείητατα, ἐφή, μαντείες. Ἀλλ’ οὐ μεντοῖ, ἢ δ’ ἐγώ, ἀποκρινέσθως εἰς τὸν λόγον ἐπεξεξελεύθην σκο-ποῦμενον, ἐποῖ καὶ ἑν τῷ ὑπολαμβάνον λόγεν ἕπερ διασεί. ἐμοὶ ἄγαρ δοκεῖν σὺ, ὁ Θρασύμαχε, ἀνεχόμενος γίνε τῷ λόγῳ ἐπεξεξελέυθην σκο-ποῦμενον, ἐποί καὶ ἑν τῷ ὑπολαμβάνον λόγεν ἕπερ διασεί. ἐμοὶ ἄγαρ δοκεῖν σὺ, ὁ Θρασύμαχε, ἀνεχόμενος γίνε τῷ λόγῳ ἐπεξεξελέυθην σκο-ποῦμενον, ἐποί καὶ ἑν τῷ ὑπολαμβάνον λόγεν ἕπερ διασεί. ἐμοὶ ἄγαρ δοκεῖν σὺ, ὁ Θρασύμαχε, ἀνεχόμενος γίνε τῷ λόγῳ ἐπεξεξελέυθην σκο-ποῦμενον, ἐποί καὶ ἑν τῷ ὑπολαμβάνον λόγεν ἕπερ διασεί. ἐμοὶ ἄγαρ δοκεῖν σὺ, ὁ Θρασύμαχε, ἀνεχόμενος γίνε τῷ λόγῳ ἐπεξεξελέυθην σκο-ποῦμενον, ἐποί καὶ ἑν τῷ ὑπολαμβάνον λόγεν ἕπερ διασεί. ἐμοὶ ἄγαρ δοκεῖν σὺ, ὁ Θρασύμαχε, ἀνεχόμενος γί

349 B. πλεον ἐχείν Α, but πλεον is the only form. Meisterhans § 53. 17.

ὁδὲ τῆς <προσέρχεσθαι τῆς> δικαίας Ἀδαμ. See note.

ἀείον ἐν πλεονεκτέων ἉΦ. ἀείοι vulg. ν. συν. 330 λ. All give ἀείοι in the next instance, but that might be indicative.
πράξεως: Πώς γὰρ οὖν; ἐφι, ὥς γε πάντων πλέον ἔχειν ἄξιοι. Οὐκόνοι καὶ ἄδικοι αὐθρώποι τε καὶ πράξεως ὁ ἄδικος πλεονεκτήσει καὶ ἀμελλήσεται αὐτὸς τῶν πλείστων αὐτὸς λάβῃ;· "Εστι ταῦτα.

XXI. 'Όδε δὲ λέγωμεν, ἐφι: ὁ δίκαιος τοῦ μὲν ὁμοίου οὐ πλεονεκτῆσαι, τοῦ δὲ ἄνομοιο, ὁ δὲ ἄδικος $D$ τοῦ τε ὁμοίου καὶ τοῦ ἀνομοίου. "Αμαστά, ἐφι, εἰρήκας. "Εστών δὲ γε, ἐφι, φρόνιμος τε καὶ ἀγαθὸς ὁ ἄδικος, ὁ δὲ δίκαιος οὐδέτερα. Καὶ τούτῳ, ἐφι, εὖ. Οὐκόνοι, ἴν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἦσκε τῷ φρόνιμῳ καὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ ὁ ἄδικος, ὁ δὲ δίκαιος οὐκ ἔσχεν; Πώς γὰρ οὖν μέλλει, ἐφι, ὁ τοιοῦτος ὁ οὐ καὶ ἐπικέναι τοῦ τοιοῦτος, ὃ δὲ μὴ ἐσκέναι; Καλῶς, τοιοῦτος ἄρα ἑστὶν ἐκάτερος αὐτῶν ὕστερον ἔσχεν. 'Αλλὰ τί μέλλεις, ἐφι. Εἰς, ὁ Θρασύμαχος· μουσικῶν δὲ $E$ τίνα λέγεις, ἔτερον δὲ ἄμοινου; "Εγώγαγα. Πότερον φρόνιμον καὶ πότερον ἀφρονία; Τῶν μὲν μουσικῶν δύστοι φρόνιμοι, τῶν δὲ ἄμοινον ἀφρονία. Οὐκόνοι καὶ ἄστεροι φρόνιμοι, ἀγαθοὶ, ὁ δὲ ἀφρόνια, κακοὶ; Ναί. Τί δὲ ιατρικῶν; οὔχ οὕτως; Οὕτως. Δοκεῖ ἵνα οὖν τις σοι, ὁ ιατρός, μουσικὸς ἄνθρωπος, ἀμοιροτόμησαν λύφαιν ἐθέλειν μουσικοῦ ἀνδρός ἐν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ αὐτίκει τῶν χαρδῶν πλεονεκτῶν ἡ ἄξιοι πλέον ἔχειν; Οὔκ ἔμοιγε. Τί δὲ; ἄμοινος; 'Αμαστά, ἐφι. $349$ Τί δὲ ιατρικῶς; ἐν τῇ ἐοιδῇ ὥστε έθέλειν ἂν τί ιατρικοῦ πλεονεκτῶν ἢ ἀνδρός ἢ πράγματος; Ὡδ ἑτῆς. Μὴ ἰατρικῶς δὲ; Ναί. Περὶ πάντας δὲ ἄρα ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ ἀμελλήσεις, εἰ τίς σοι δοκεῖ $349D$.
τὴν δὲ ἀδίκιαν κακίαν τε καὶ ἀμαθίαν. Εἰπεν, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, τούτο μὲν ἦμιν οὐτω κείσω: ἔφαμεν δὲ δὴ καὶ ἵσχυρον ἦμιν τὴν ἀδίκιαν ἢ οὐ μὲν μίσης, ἢ Ὁρασύμαχε. Μέμνημαι, ἐφη, ἀλλ' ἐμού γε οὗτοι νῦν λέγεις ἀρέσκει, καὶ ἐχω περὶ αὐτῶν λέγειν. εἰ οὖν Ἐ λέγομεν, εβ' ὅτι δημηγορεῖν αν με φαίνεις, ἢ οὖν ἔστε με επιτείν αὐτα βούλομαι, ή, εἰ βουλεῖς ἑρωτάν, ἐρωτά ην πού δέ σου, δόστε ταῖς ἱμαστὶν ταῖς τοὺς μύσους λεγούσας, εἶνεν ἐρω καὶ κατανεῦσεμαι καὶ ἀνανεύσεμαι. Μηδαμίων, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, παρὰ γε τὴν σαυτοῦ δόξαν. Ὡστε σου, ἐβη, ἀρέσκειν, ἑπεδήπερ οὖν ἐς λέγεις. καίτοι τί ἄλλο βουλεῖς; Οὔδεν μά Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, ἀλλ' εἴπερ τοῦτο ποιήσεις, πολείς ην ἐγώ δ' ἐρωτήσομαι. Ἐρωτά δη: Τούτῳ τούν ἐρωτῶ, ὅπερ 351. ἀρτί, ἵνα καὶ ἐβης διασκεδασμὸς τοῦ λόγου, ὅποιον τι τυχά τινες δικαιοσύνη πρὸς ἀδίκιαν, εὐλήθη γάρ του, ὅτι καὶ δυνατοτέρων καὶ ἵσχυρότερων εἶναι ἰδίκια δικαιοσύνης, νῦν δὲ γ', ἐβης, εἴπερ σοφία τα καὶ ἀρετὴ ἐγὼν δικαιοσύνης, ἐβης, εἴπερ σοφία. καὶ ἵσχυρότερον ἰδικεῖαι, ἑπεδήπερ ἐτίνα ᾿αμαθία ἢ ἰδικεῖαι: οὓδεν δὲν ἔτι τοῦτο ἀργονομεῖεν. ἀλλ' οὐ τοις ἄτοις ἄπλωις, ὁ Ὁρασύμαχε, ἐπειδή έπιθύμησε, ἀλλ' τίδεν τη πη σκέφθσθαι πόλιν βαίνης ἡν ἰδίκιον εἶναι καὶ Β άλλας πόλεις ἐπιχειρεῖν δουλούσα ντίκικο καὶ κατακεχεύλασθαι πολλάς δὲ καὶ ὑφ' εαυτ' ἔχουν δουλωσάμενην; Πῶς γάρ οὖν; ἐβης καὶ τούτῳ γε ἡ ἀριστή μάλιστα ποιήσει καὶ τελευτάτη αὐτα ἀδίκως. Μανθάνω, ἐβης, ὅτι σύς ὀντος ἦν δ' ἐλώγος. ἀλλ' 351 A. ἐβης, εἴπερ Α + _MISSΙON+. ἐβης, εἴπερ γε. 'In A the breathing of εἴπερ has absorbed the sign — for ν' (Campbell). package γούν οὖν Π, objecting to the asyndeton. Cf. sup. 329 α, τηδ' ἐπισκέπτονται Π+ for τηδε τη σκέφτεσθαι, by itadism.  

351 B. εί μὲν, ἐβης, ως συν ἄριτς έχεις ἡ δικαιοσύνη σοφία best ass. έχεις for ἐχεις of Π is an obvious correction. έχεις, <ει> Baiter, Stallbaum. See note. I bracket sōphía as descript.  

351 D. διαφέρομει Π+ Σ, διαφέρομεν ΑΜ. The middle is proper in this sense. Cf. 352 λ (διαφέρονται).
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τινα φαίνεται ἑξουσια τὴν δύναμιν; [οἶνα] φ' ἂν ἐγκέψῃς, ἐπεὶ τούτο τιν ἐπεὶ ἦνες ἐπεὶ εἰσεῖται στρατηγὸν τὸ μὲν ἀδιάνυστον ἀυτὸ ποιεῖ πράττειν μεθ' αὐτοῦ διὰ τὸ στασιάζει καὶ διαφέρεισθαι, ἐτι δ' ἐχθρὸν εἰναι ἐαυτῷ τε καὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ παντί καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ' ὧν ὁμοίως; Πάντως γε. Καὶ ἐν ἐνὶ δῆ, οἷμα, ἑνοῦσα ταῦτα πάντα ποιῆσει, ἀπερ πέρικειν ἐργάζεσθαι; πρῶτον μὲν ἀδιάνυστον αὐτὸν πράττειν ποιῆσαι στασιάζοντα καὶ ὡς ὁμοίως αὐτὸν ἐαυτῷ, ἐπειτα ἐχθρὸν καὶ ἐαυτῷ καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις· ὡς γὰρ; Ναὶ. Δίκαιοι δὲ ἦν εἰσὶν, ὁ δὲ, Β καὶ οἱ θεοί; Ὅντων, ἐφὲ. Καὶ θεοὶ ἀρὰ ἐχθρὸς ἔσται ὁ ἄδικος, ὁ Ἡρασίμαχος, ὁ δὲ δίκαιος φίλος. Ἐνδιάφορος τὸ λόγον, ἐφὴ, θαρρῶν· ὃς γὰρ ἐγγορεύω καὶ ἐπαινεύως, οὐ μὴ τοίοῦτο ἀπεθανοῖμαι. Ἰδ'/ δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγα, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ μοι τῆς ἐστιάσεως ἀποπληρωσῶν ἀποκρινόμενος ὡσπερ καὶ νῦν. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ καὶ σοφότεροι καὶ ἀφίλοι καὶ δυνατότεροι πράττειν οἱ δίκαιοι φαίνονται, οἱ δὲ ἄδικοι οὐδὲν πράττειν μετ'

351 Ε. 352 Α. οἶνα...τοιμὲν Ἀ + Μ++. ποιεῖν Π++. I bracket ὁμοίως, and make the sentence with ἀνασχηματίζων ὑποθέσεως, after the manner of Plato. ΟΙΑΝ arose from ΟΙΑΝ. See note.

352 Α. ἐστισθανοὺς ΜΣ. ἔστις Schanz (on με evidence. Plat. Vol. xii. Proleg. § 17). For ὑπομενοῦν (on epigraphic evidence) see note.

352 Β. δικαιοὶ Αα for δὴ καὶ οἰκο, partly by itacism, partly by association of ἱδεῖς.
πολιτείας Α.

Μάλιστα γ’, ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀρετὴν φαμέν των ψυχῆς εἶναι; Φαμέν. "Αρ’ οὖν ποτέ, ὁ Θεοσύμμαχε, Εἰ ζωή ταύτης ἔργα εἰς ἀπεργάζεται στεροῦμεν τὴς οἰκείας ἀρετῆς, ἡ ἀδύνατον; 'Αδύνατον. 'Ἀνάγκη ἄρα κακῆς ψυχῆς κακῶν ἄρχειν καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, τῆς ἀγάθης πάντα ταύτα εἰς πράττειν. 'Ἀνάγκη. Οὐκοῦν ὁ ἀρετὴν γε συνεχορήσαμεν ψυχῆς εἶναι δικαιοσύνης, κακῶν δὲ ἀδίκιαν; Συνεχορήσαμεν γὰρ. 'Ἡ μὲν ἄρα δικαία ψυχῆ καὶ ὁ δικαίος ἀνήρ εἰς βιώσεται, κακῶς δὲ ὁ ἁδικός. Φαίνεται, ἐφη, κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον. 'Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ γε εἰς ξύλων μακαρίως τε 354 καὶ εὐδαίμονον, ὁ δὲ μὴ τάναυτά. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; 'Ο μὲν δίκαιος ἄρα εὐδαίμονος, ὁ δ’ ἁδικὸς ἄθλος. "Οντων, ἐφη. 'Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἁθλίον γε εἶναι οὐ λυστελεῖ, εὐδαίμονα δέ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; 'Ονείρσον ἄρα, ὁ μακάριε Θρασύμαχε, λυστελεστερον ἀδίκια δικαιοσύνης. Ταῦτα δὴ σοι, ἐφη, ὁ Σακρατεὺς, εἰστιάσθη ἐν τοῖς Βεροδίοις. 'Τῶν σοῦ γε, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, ὁ Θρασύμαχε, ἐπειδὴ μοι πρῶτο ἐγένος καὶ χαλκεταῖς ἐπάσω, οὗ μὲντοι καλὸν ἡ οἰστίαμαι, δε` ἐμαυτόν, ἀλλ’ οὖ Β διὰ σὲ` ἀλλ’ ὁστὲρ οἱ λέχροι τοῦ αἰτὶ παραφρομενον ἀπογίνονται ἀρπάζοντες, πρὶν τοῦ προτέρου μετρίως ἀπολαθοῦνται, καὶ ἐγώ μοι δοκῶ οὖσα, πρὶν δ’ τὸ πρῶτον

354 Α. ἐστοιχία Μοισ. v. sup. 352 λ.

Βεροδίος ΑΠ Π. Βεροδίοις vulg. Names of festivals are more regularly formed in -αι attached to the stem (Διονύσω, Διάσω, Παρασκευάσω). εἰς νομος of Proclus and Origen (see note on 327 Ι concerning Beneda) have Bevidien, but εἰς is not to be trusted in ε and α. The name of the temple, on the other hand, is naturally Bevidien (Xen. Hel. ii. 4. 11).

354 Β. καὶ ἐγώμαι δοκῶ Α + Π + Μ +, καὶ ἐγώ μοι δοκῶ Τ. The error was probably caused by the general sense of the clause obtruding on the copist’s mind, viz. ‘so I think...’

353 C. ἀπεργάσαμεν ἢς (except for ἀπεργάσασθά Θ, -ώνται Ψ). No correction to the singular is required. See note.

353 D. ἰδία εἴδον Εξ by editing. See note. ψυχῆς φήσομεν best ass. öδ ψυχῆς ψ. three Florentine copies (by editing) and Stobaeus.
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εσκοπούμενεν εὐρείν, τὸ δίκαιον ὃ τί ποτ' ἐστίν, ἀφέ-μονον ἐκείου ἀρκάσαι ἐπὶ τὸ σκέψοφαι περὶ αὐτοῦ, εὑτε κακία ἐστίν καὶ ἀμαθία ἐστε σοφία καὶ ἄρετὴ, καὶ ἐμπεσόντος αὐ τὸν ἀστερόν λόγου, ὅτι λυσσελέστερον ἢ ἀδίκα τῆς δικαιοσύνης, οὐκ ἀπεσχέμην τὸ μὴ ώς

C ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἐλεύθερον ἀπ' ἐκείου, ἦστε μοι νῦν νόμον ἐκ τοῦ διαλόγου μὴν εἰδέναι ὅποτε ἡμᾶς τὸ δίκαιον μὴ οὔτα ἢ ἐστὶν, συχνὴ εἰσόμει ἐπὶ ἄρετὴ τις οὐκ ἴσχυν ἔστε καὶ οὐ, καὶ πάτερον ὃ ἐχουν αὐτοῦ οὐκ εὐδαίμονον ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαίμων.

B.

357. I. Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα εἰπὼν φίλην λόγου ἀπηλλαχθαίν, τὸ δὲ ἢν ἁρὰ, ὅς ἔοικε, προοἴμοιμον. ὃ γὰρ Γλαύκιος ἂν τὸ ἀνδρεύτατος οὐκ ἐπεχάνει πρὸς ἀπαντά, καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε τὸν Ἡρακλέα τὴν ἀπόρρησιν οὐκ ἀπεδεῖξε, ἀλλ' ἐφὶ, ὁ Ὀμίρρατες, πάτερον ἡμᾶς βουλεῖ δοκεῖν πεπεδείκνεται, ἢ ἡ ἀθλοθή

B πείσεται ὅτι παντε τὸ ἀρετήν ἔστιν δίκαιον ἐστιν καὶ ἀδίκων τὸν ἠλιθών, ὑπὲρ ἐπεξερευνήσεως, ἐκ τούτου ἐφῃ, πεῖν ἀρκεῖ. Ὑπὸ τούτου, ἐφή, πεῖν ἀρκεῖ. ἲκέρα γὰρ μοί ἁρὰ σοι δοκεῖ τοῦνδε τοῦ ἐμὰν ἀγαθὸν, ὁ δειαμέθ' ἵνα ἔχειν οὐ τῶν ἀποβασιασμῶν ἐφείμων, ἀλλ' ἀυτὸ τοῦ ἐνεκα ἀπαχαζομενοὶ οἷον τὸν χαίρειν καὶ αἰ ἡδονα δοσε θάλαμας καὶ μηδὲν εἰς τὸν ἐπετεί χρόνον διὰ ταῦτας γένεται ἄλλο ἡ χαίρειν ἔχεται.

357 A. τοῦ λόγου ἀπηλλάχθη Κ, which makes a different sense. See note.

357 B. καὶ μηδὲν...γέγραται all best mss. εἰ καὶ...καί + (by editing). καί...γέγραται Stallbaum and all texts.

ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ Β.

"Εμοῦν γὰρ, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, δοκεῖ τε ἐκεῖνον τοιούτων. Τι δὲ: ὁ γὰρ τὸν ἐπετείχον, ἀναμνήσαμεν καὶ τῶν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἑγουμένων; οἷον αὐτὸ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ ὅραν καὶ τὸ ἔγνωκεν: τὰ γὰρ τοιαύτα ποτ' ἀμβάτερα ἀσταξά-

μεθα. Ναὶ, εὐπορον. Τρίτον δὲ ἀρᾶς τί, ἐφῇ, εἶδος ἀγαθοῦ, ἐν δὲ τὸ γυμνάσσεσθαι καὶ τὸ κάμυματα ἰσαρέσθασθαι καὶ ἱστρεφόσθαι τε καὶ οἷος χρησιμο-

σμάς; ταῦτα γὰρ ἐπίσημον φαίμεν οὖν, ὀφελεῖν δὲ ἡμᾶς, καὶ αὐτὸ μὲν ἕκαστῶν ἕνεκα οὐκ ἀν δεξαίμεθα οἱ ἑστειρεῖν τοὺς γὰρ μεθενόν τοις καὶ ἔκαστῶν ὅσα ἑγερναί ἀπ' αὐτῶν. Ἐστιν γὰρ οὖν, ἐφη, καὶ τοῦτο τρίτων. ἀλλὰ τί δή; Ἐν ποίῃ, ἐφῇ, τοῦτον τὴν δικαίωσιν τὴν τίθης; "Εγὼ μὲν αἵρει, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, ἐν τῷ 358 καλλίστῃ, δὲ καὶ δὴ αὐτό καὶ διὰ τὸ γυμνόμεναι ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἀγαπητέον τοῦ μέλλοντι μακαρίῳ ἔσσεσθαι. Οὐ τοιῶν δοκεῖ, ἐφῇ, τοῖς τολλοῖς, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐπι-

τόπου εἰδοὺς, ὁ μισθῶν ἔνεκα καὶ εὐδοκιμήσεως διὰ δόξαν ἐπιπέδειτε οὖν, αὐτὸ δὲ δὴ αὐτὸ φευρεῖν ὡς ἐν χαλεπῶν.

ΠΙ. Οἶδα, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, ὅτι δοκεῖς οὕτω, καὶ πάλιν ὑπὸ Ἡρακλέους ὧν τοιούτων ἐν φέγγεται, ἀδίκῳ δ' ἐπαινεῖται. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ τοῖς, ὧν ἐστίν, ὧν ἐστίν. "Θέ δή, ἐφῇ, ἀκούσαν καὶ ἐμού, εἶναι σοι ταῦτα δοκεῖ, Β Ἡρακλέας γὰρ μοι φαίνεται προδρόμων τοῦ ἔλεους ὧν τοῦ σοὶ ὄψεις ψηφισθήσων, ἐμοὶ δὲ ὀπέκατα κατὰ νοεῖν ἐπίθεις γέγονεν περὶ ἑκατέρου.

357 C. φαίμεν made from φαίμεν Α. Cf. sup. 352 έ.
358 A. ἐγὼ μὲν, οἴμαι; ἢ τι ἐγὼ μὲν οἴμαι; See note.
353 εἰ δὲ ἐπανεῖσθαι om. Α+ through homoeoteleuton. The words are not strictly necessary.
358 B. ταῦτα δοκεῖ ΠΞ for ταῦτα δοκεῖ. But τάτο would be required.

PL. REP.
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τον Θρασυμάχον λόγον, και πρῶτον μὲν ἐρῶ δικαιοσύνην όν εἰναι φασίν καὶ θέλε γεγονέναι δεύτερον δε ἦτοι πάντες αὐτὸ ἡ ἐπιτηθεοῦσα ἀκούσει ἐπιτηθεοῦσαν ὡς ἀναγκαῖον ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὡς ἀγαθὸν τρίτον δε ἦτοι ἐκεῖνος ἀὐτὸ ἑρώτων· τολὴ γὰρ ἀμείνου ἄρα τοῦ ἀδίκου ἢ τοῦ δικαιοῦ βίος, ως λέγουσιν. ἔτει ἔρμονε, ὡς Σώκρατες, οὐτός δοκεῖ οὔτος· ἀπορῶ μέντοι διατεθρυμημένοι τὰ ἄτα ἀκούν Θρασυμάχον καὶ μωρῶν ἅλλαν, τόν δὲ ὑπὲρ τῆς δικαιοσύνης λόγον.

ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ Β.

Πεφυκέναι γὰρ δὴ φασίν τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖν ἀγαθὸν, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖσθαι κακὸν, πλέον δὲ κακὸ ὑπερβάλλειν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἡ ἀγαθὸν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι· ὡς τε ἐπειδήν ἀλληλοὺς ἀδικοῦσι τα καὶ ἀδικοῦσι καὶ ἀμφοτέροις γενοῦνται, τοίσι μὴ δυναμέοις τὸ μὲν ἐκφράσῃ τὸ δὲ 359 αἰρέσι δοκεῖ λυσιτελεῖν ξυνθεῖσθαι ἀλληλοὺς μητ’ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ ἐνεπεθὲν δὴ ἀρξασθαι νόμοις τίθεσθαι καὶ ξυνθήσας αὐτῶν, καὶ ὀμοιόμασι τὸ υπὸ τοῦ νόμου ἐπίταγμα νόμοιν τε καὶ δικαίων καὶ εἶναι δὴ ταὐτὴν γένεσιν τα καὶ ὀνόμα τις δικαιοσύνης, μεταξύ οὖσαν τὸ μὲν ἀριστὸν ὄντος, εάν ἀδικοῦν μὴ διδῷ δίκην, τοῦ δὲ κακίστου, εάν ἀδικοῦμενς τιμορεῖσθαι ἀδικωτοὺς ἥ τ’ τὸ δὲ δικαίον εἰνέργει τοῦ ἀμφότερος ἀγαπᾶσθαι οὐχ ὡς ἀγαθὸν, Β’ ἀλλ’ ὡς ἀρροστὴ τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι επεί τοις δυνάμεοις αὐτὸ τοιεῖν καὶ ὡς ἀριστὸς ἀνδρὰ οὐδ’ ἄν ἐνι ποτὲ ξυνθεῖσθαι τὸ μήτε ἀδικεῖσθαι μητ’ ἀδικεῖσθαι· μάνεωθεὶς γάρ ἄρα. ἡ μὲν οὖν δὴ φύσις δικαιοσύνης, ὡς Σώκρατες, αὕτη τε καὶ τοιαύτη, καὶ εἰ ὅν πέρικε, τοιαύτη, ὡς ο λόγον.

ΠΛΗΘΟΣ C. οὖσι δοκεῖ οὕτως qβ. ν. sup. 330 λ.


ΠΛΗΘΟΣ Ε. τι δὲ τε καὶ άνω γέγονεν Α + Μ +. τι οὖν τε Π +. οὖν τε Π +. τι οὖνται qβ (followed by γεγονέ τις δικαιοσύνης), an obvious correction. See commentary for the suggestion in the text τι τ’ ἔστι (sc. ἐστί) κ.τ.λ. ὅπο δέ τ’ Αλφαν.

πλέον Α+. πλέον Πλωτ’. γέγονα τ’ for γεγονέ τα α’ illustrates errors ‘of general resemblance.’

ΠΛΗΘΟΣ Α. άριστως δοκεῖ miss. δοκεῖν Asb, but see note.

ξυνθήσας αὐτῶν Α. αὐτῶν vulg. αὐτῶν qβ (edited). See comment.

ταῦτα τὴν γένεσιν δΚ, an easy and frequent mistake, spoiling the sense.

4—2
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dικαίος καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ, ἐπὶ ἐπακολουθήσαιμεν θεώμενοι, ποῖ ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἐκάτερον ἀξίη. ἐπὶ αὐτοφόρον οὐν λάβομεν ἢ τὸν δίκαιον τῷ ἀδίκῳ εἰς τὰ τούτον λόγου διὰ τὴν πλεονεκίαν, δὲ πᾶσα φύσις διόκειμεν πέφυκεν ὡς ἀγαθόν, νόμον δὲ βία παράγεται ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ισον τιμής. εἶδο δὲ ἢ ἡ ἐξουσία ἢ λέγω τούτῳ μᾶλλον, εἰ αὐτῶν γένοιτο οἰκίαν ποτὲ φασιν δύναμιν τῷ [Γέγον]

D τοῦ Λυδίου προγονὸς γενέσθαι, εἶναι μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ποιμένα θητεύοντα παρὰ τῷ τότε Λυδίας ἄρχοντι, ἀμβρούς δὲ πολλοὶ γενομένου καὶ σεισμοῦ μαγεύεται τῇ τῆς γης καὶ γενέσθαι χάσμα κατὰ τὸν τόπον ἢ ἔθεμεν. ἢδοτα δὲ καὶ βασιλέας καταβηκαί καὶ ἰδεάν ἄλλα τε δὴ μυθολογούσιν βασιλεῖα καὶ ἰππὸν χαλκοῦ κοῖλον, πυρίδας ἔχοντα, καθ' ὡς ἐγκύψαται ἰδεάν ἐνότα νεκρῶν, ὡς βαίνεσθαι, μείζον ἢ κατ

Ε ἀνθρωποῦ τούτου δὲ ἄλλο μὲν ἔχειν οὐδέν, περὶ δὲ τῇ χειρὶ χρυσοῦν δακτύλιον, ὡς περιελάμβανον εἰσέβησαν, συνάλογον δὲ γενομένου τοῦ ποιμένα εἰσόδος, ὡς ἐξαγγέλλοντες κατὰ μήνα τῷ βασιλεῖ τὰ πολύμνα, ἀφίκεσθαι καὶ ἐκεῖνον ἔχοντα τὸν δακτύλιον, καθήμενον οὖν μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων τυχεῖν τήν σφενδόναν

359 C. τοῦ τε δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου might be bracketed by the school of Cobet.
νόμῳ δὲ βίας A. τ. δ. καὶ βίας II+Μ+, a mistaken emendation. τῷ Γέγον best ms. τῷ Γέγον x Flacinus, without grammar. Hermann ejects the word, τῷ <Γέγον τῷ> Γέγον ἄδαιm. 359 D. μυθολογοῦσιν A+. τ. μυθολογοῦσιν II+Μ+, a mistaken correction.
359 D-E. τοῦτον δὲ ἄλλο μὲν ἔχειν οὐδέν II+Μ+, ἔχειν om. A+. Its place is taken in Ε by βίας (παραβίας) after δακτύλιον, an evident attempt to make grammar in the absence of ἔχειν. The archetype almost certainly had no ἔχειν. Perhaps e.g. τοῦτον δὲ ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν <παραβίας>, περὶ δὲ... ὡς om. Jackson (without ἔχειν), but the case of δακτύλιον is questionable.

360 A. καὶ αὐτῷ δὲ οὐν ξυμβαίνειν θῇ. 'Always' is sufficiently implied.
τῶν ἀνθρώπων τῆς βασίλειας ομ. A1, supplied by A2 marg. The words are not indispensable, but A1 is guilty of omissions.
360 B. δὲ δεξίων ms. ἄν add. Ast, without reason. See comment.
360 C. ἀποκτησάτως γς ms. the usual form of the present in the Platonice ms, though ἀποκτητησάτως is sufficiently warranted. Schans Plat. Vol. vux. Prolog. § 3. In 517 A we have εἰ τῶν ἐν τῇ χειρὶ δύνατον λαθεῖν καὶ ἀποκτῆθειν, ἀποκτηθῆναι ὡς; (though not without variation).
οῦδεικνύοντος ἤσθενον ἄντα. οὕτω δὲ δρόμῳ οὐδὲν ἂν διάφορον τοῦ ἐτέρου ποιοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ ταῦτα ἤσθεν ἄρμαυτος. καὶ τοιούτου τούτο τεκμηρίου ἂν φαίη τις, ὅτι οὖν εἰκών δίκαιος ἀλλ' ἀναγκαζόμενος, ὥστε οὖν ἀγαθοῦ ἴδια ἄντων, ἐπεί ὅπως ἦν ἄν ἦγεται ἐξακοστὸς ὅς τε ἔσσεθαι ἀδικεῖν, ἀδικεῖν. Λυσιτελεῖς γὰρ δὴ δὲ Ο ὀνείρα πάντων μᾶλλον ἴδια τὴν ἀδικίαν τῆς δικαιοσύνης, ἀλήθη οἴμοινος, ἃς φύσει ὁ περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου λόγου λέγων ἐπεί εἰ τοῦ τριάδος ἐξουσίας ἐπιλαβόμενος μηδὲν ποτὲ ἥθελοι ἀδικήσαι μηδὲ ἄφατο τῶν ἀληθρίων, ἀδικώτατος μὲν ἄν δέξεις εἶναι τοῖς αἰσθανομένοις καὶ ἀνοιγτότατος, ἐπαινοῦν δὲ ἂν αὐτῶν ἀλλήλων ἐναντίον ἐξαπατώντας ἀλλήλοις διὰ τὸν τοῦ ἀδικεῖναι φόβον. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν δὴ οὕτω.

IV. Τὴν δὲ κρίσιν αὐτῆς τοῦ βίου πέρι ὧν Ε λέγομεν, ἐὰν διαστησόμεθα τὸν τε δικαίωτατον καὶ τὸν ἀδικώτατον, οἷον τ' ἐσόμεθα κρίνεις ἄρθρος· εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐ. τὸν οὖν δὴ ἡ διάστασις; ἢδε μὴν ἀφαιρέσθων μήτε τοῦ ἀδικοῦ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀδικίας, μήτε τοῦ δικαίου ἀπὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης, ἀλλὰ τέλευον ἐκάτερον εἰς τὸ εαυτοῦ ἐπιτήθειμα τιθῆμεν. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δὲ ἀδικοῦς ἄστερ οἱ δεινοὶ δημιουργοὶ ποιεῖτο· οὐν κυβερνήσθη γὰρ ἑτρός ἢ ἱερός ταῦτα ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ καὶ τὰ δυνάμεις διασωθάνεται, καὶ τοῖς μὲν 351 ἐπισκεπεῖ, τὰ δὲ ἐδ' ἐπὶ δὲ ἐδ' ἄρα τῇ σφαλῇ, ἱερὸς ἐπαναφθάσθηκεν. οὕτω καὶ ἢ ἄδικος ἐπισκεπτομένος ὁρόθος τοῖς ἀδικήμασιν λαυνόμενοι, εἰ μέλλει σφόδρα ἄδικος εἶναι τῶν ἀδικώμονον ἢ φάθον ἢγετίνων· ἐσχάτη γὰρ ἄδικαι δοκεῖν δίκαιον εἶναι μὴ ὄντα. ὅτεν οὖν τὸ τέλεον ἄδικον τὴν τελευταίαν ἀδικίαν, καὶ οὐκ ἢφαιρετέον, ἀλλ' ἕαστον τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικοῦντα τὴν μεγαλύτερην δοξάν αὐτῷ παρασκευάζειν εἰς δικαιοσύνην, καὶ ἐδ' ἄρα σφάλλεσθαι τι, ἐπαναφθάσθαι δυνατῷ ὁ εἴη, λέγων τε ἰκανόν ὢν πρὸς τὸ πείθειν, δὲν τι μηνύεται τῶν ἀδικημάτων, καὶ βιβάζεσθαι, ὡς ἂν βιας ἐξείη, διὰ τὰ ἀνάδρειαν καὶ ρήματι καὶ διὰ παρασκευὴν φίλων καὶ οὖσιας. τούτων δὲ τοιούτων ὑντες τὸν δίκαιον παρ' αὐτῶν ἱστώμεν τῷ λόγῳ, ἀνδρὰ ἀπλοῦν καὶ γενναῖον, κατ' Ἀισχύλου ὦν δοκεῖν ἀλλ' εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἐκθέλοντα. ἢφαιρετέον δὴ τὸ δοκεῖν. εἰ γὰρ δοξάς δίκαιον εἶναι, ἐξουσία αὐτῷ τιμαί καὶ 350 δορεάλ δοκεῖν τοιοῦτον εἴη. ἐδ' ἀδικοῦντας ἠτέλεσαν τῷ δικαίῳ, καὶ ἀδικουμένῳ τῷ δικαίῳ, καὶ τοῖς ἀντίων διότι· ἐδ' ἀδικοῦν τοῖς ἄνωτέρων ἐνδεικνύω πῶν ἐπικεφαλής, ἣς ἂν ἐβεβαιασμένοις εἰς δικαιοσύνην τῷ μὴ τέγγεσθαι

350. δὲ ἀριστούν v. supra 350.α. εἰτι τοῦτο οἱ δεινοὶ καὶ οὗτον δὲ οὕτως ὑπολείπεται, ὡς ἐπισκεπτεῖται τοῦ ἀναγκαρχούντος τοῦ ἀδικοῦντος τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ ἀδικοῦντός τοῦ ἀδικεῖται. τοῦτο δὲ οᥴτηθήκη Α. (proving that the best may err).
πολιτείας Β.

δείοντα πράγμα άλθείας εγόμενον καὶ οὐ πρὸς δόξαν ξόντα, οὐ δοκεῖν ἄδικον ἄλλῳ εἶναι ἐθέλειν.

Βαθεῖαν ἄλοκα διὰ φρενὸς καρποῦμεν, ἐξ ἡ τὰ κενὰ βλαστάνει βουλήματα, βρύτων μὲν ἄρχειν ἐν τῇ πόλει δοκοῦντες δικαίον εἶναι, ἔπειτα γαμεῖν ὁπόθεν ἄν βουλήται, ἐκδίδοντες εἰς ὑπὸ ἣν βουλήται, ξυμβάλλειν, κοιμοῦν ὑπὸ ἄνθην, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἄφθεχον θαρρᾶντο τῷ μὴ δισχεραίνει τὸ ἀδικεῖν. εἰς ἀγώνιας τοιῶν ἱάντα καὶ ἱδία καὶ δηομαῖα περιγράφεσιν καὶ πλεονεκτεῖν τῶν ἐχθρῶν, πλεονεκτοῦτα δὲ πλούτων καὶ τῶν τε φίλων εὐθεῖοι καὶ τῶν ἐχθρῶν Βλάττειν, καὶ θεοὶ θυσίαι καὶ ἀναθήματα ἱκανὸς καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῆς θύειν τε καὶ ἀνατίθεινει καὶ θεραπεύει τοῦ δικαίου πολὺ ἁμείνον τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τῶν ἄνθρωπον ὑπὸ ἄν βουλήται, ὅστε καὶ θεοφύλακτον αὐτῶν εἶναι μάλλον προσήκουν ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων τῆς δικαιοῦν. οὕτω φαίνεται, ὁ Σάκρατες, παρὰ θεοῖς καὶ παρ’ ἄνθρωπον τῷ ἀδικεῖν παρεκκλησάτω τοῦ βίου ἁμείνων τῆς δικαιοφ. ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

υπὸ κακοδοχίας καὶ τῶν ὧπ’ αὐτῆς ἔγχρωμον ἄλλα δέ τινα ἐπικάτωτος μέχρι θανάτου, δοκεῖν μὲν εἶναι ἄδικον διὰ βίου, ὅν δὲ δίκαιος ἢν ἀμφότεροι εἰς τὸ ἔσχατον ἐξελλυθότες, ὁ μὲν δικαιοσύνης, ὁ δὲ ἄδικος, κρίνονται ὡς τοῖς αὐτῶν ἐυδικαιομένοις.

Π. Βασίλει, ἡ δ’ ἐγὼ, ὁ φίλης Γλαύκου, ὁς ἐρρομένος ἐκάπετον ὁπότεν ἀνδρίαν εἰς τὴν κρίσιν ἐκκαθάρισε τῶν ἀνδρῶν, ὡς μάλιστα, ἔφη, δύναμαι, ὅτι τῶν δὲ τοιῶν, οὐδὲν ἔτι, ὅτι ἐγὼ, ἤλεγχοι ἐπεξελέγη τῇ λόγῳ, οἷος ἐκάπετον βίος ἑπίμενει.

Εἰ λεκτέον νῦν καὶ δὴ κἂν ἀμυδοκέτερος λέγεται, μὴ ἔμε ἀνὸν λέγειν, ὁ Σάκρατες, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐπισκευάζεσθαι πρὸ δικαιοσύνης ἀδικίας. ἔρωτε δὲ τάδε, ὅτι οὕτω διακεμένους ὁ δίκαιος μαστιγώσεται, στρεβλώσεται,

362 δεδηγείται, ἐκκαθάρισε τῷ ἐνθαρρυμένῳ, τελευτάν πάντα κακὰ παθῶν ἀναστηκαὶ εἰς γνώσεις, ὅτι οὐκ εἶναι δίκαιον ἀλλὰ δοκεῖν δεῖ ἐθέλειν τὸ δὲ τοῦ Ἀισχίλου πολὺ ἦν ἄρα ἀρχότερον λέγειν κατὰ τὸ ἀδίκου. τῷ ὡς γὰρ φήσουσι τῷ ἄδικον, ἄτε ἐπιτη-


10 p. 583 and Theodor. (II. A. 420), Theod. xpt. p. 667. τῶν ὑπ’ αὐτῆς γ. HSS. The confusion of the prepositions is common. Cf. inf. 368 a.

λὸν Νευκίρχε, ὁ τῷ A (with η from c) M+. ὁ τῷ Π (which might suggest θῶν). ἑτερον Euseb., Theod., and γ. All the readings derive most naturally from ἑτερον, an early error by itaeism.

361 Ε. ἐκκαθάρισε Α + Π +. ἐκκαθάρισε M (partly, at least, through confusion of pronunciation, when ν had become Eng. f.). ἐκκαθάρισε ρ η Euseb., Theod. (a frequent substitution of η fut. form. See comment.).

362 A. ἀναστηκαὶ Euseb., Clem. Alex., Euseb., ἀλλὰ a few inferior copies. The form is discussed in the notes. ἀνα-

σκολισθήσεται of Κ is a gloss.
ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ Β.

ἡ βασιλῆς ἄμισος, ὡστε θεουσίς
εὐδικιας ἀνέχεσθι, φέρρως δὲ γαία μέλανα
πυροὺς καὶ κριθάς, βρίθως δὲ δεύρεας
καρπῷ,
τίκτη δὲ ἔμπεδα ἡμέλα, θάλασσα δὲ παρέχῃ
γῆθος.

Μουσαίος δὲ τούτων μεναικώτερα τὰ ἀγαθα καὶ ὁ ὦς
αυτῷ παρὰ θεον διδάσασιν τως δικαιοσ.

Σ. υἱεῖ, editors. Schanz (Plat. Vol. xi. Proleg. § 8)
concludes from xas that "τὸς, not οὗς, was the form in the archi-
type.

But Meisterhans (§ 17. 4) shows that οὗς is good for Plato's
date. The remark of Theognostus (Bek. Anecd. 1496 b) υἱοῖς καὶ
γυναῖς ταῦτα δὲ Ἀττικών ἰδίως τοῦ ἀγαθῶν refers to a more modern
Attica.

363 A. 

363 B. 

363 E. 

363 D. 

Ἀποστάνος ὑμᾶς, followed by Adam: but μακρότέρως is
not μείζονα.

καταστέθη Π., but copyists had a notion that ν ἐπηλευστικὸν
preceded vowels only. Meisterhans (§ 42) shows that it was
Proleg. § 17.
ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ Β. 61

τὴν μὲν κακότητα καὶ ἱλαδῶν ἔστιν ἐλέσθαι
ῥηίδσις· λεία μὲν ὁδός, μᾶλλα δὲ ἐγγύθη ναιεῖν· δὲ
tῆς δὲ ἄρετῆς ἱδρῶτα θεοὶ προσάραξον
ἐθήκαν
καὶ τῶν δόνον μακρόν τε καὶ ἀνάντη· οἱ δὲ τῆς τῶν
θεῶν ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων παραγωγής τὸν Ἄμηρον μαρτύρο-
ροῦται, ὅτι καὶ ἐκείνοι ἐίπεαν

λεστοὶ δὲ [στρεφτοῖ] τε καὶ θεοὶ αὐτοὶ,
καὶ τοὺς μὲν θυσίαίοις καὶ εὐχωλαίς ἁγα-
ναίσιν

λοιβῆ τε κύριῃ τε παρατρωπῶν ἀνθρώποι Ε.
λισσόμενοι, ὅτε κέν τε ὑπερβή καὶ ἀ-

μάρτυς.

βίβλων δὲ ὄμαδον παρέχονται Μουσαῖοι καὶ Ὀρ-
φέως, Σέλινης τε καὶ Μουσῶν ἔγγυον, ὡς φασί,
καθ’ ὁ δὲ θυραμόντω, πειθοῦντες ὡς κόμου ἰδιότα
ἀλλὰ τῶν τέλεω, ὡς ὁ δὲ λύσεως τε καὶ καθαρο-

δικημάτων διὰ θυσιῶν καὶ παιδιῶν ἡδονῶν εἰσὶ μὲν

ἐκατ’ ἔκατ’ ἄρετον ἀπὸ θρόνων ἡμᾶς, μὴ

θύσαται δὲ δεινά περιμένει.

VIII. Ταῦτα πάντα, ἐφη, ὡς φίλη Σώκρατες,
τοιαῦτα καὶ τοσαῦτα λεγόμενα ἁρέτης πέρι καὶ

λεία ἦσαν. Λόγος ἦσαν of Hesiod. Qu. λισῆ as the original in

Hesiod, though not in Plato? See note.

364 D. καὶ τραχέοι μετ. Ας, μ. α. μ. after ἡνατη, a note to

complete the Hesiodic description.

στρεφτοΐ δὲ τῷ Ἐπὶ + Ἐπὶ +, λόγοι στρεφτοι τῷ Ἐπὶ, λόγοι δὲ στρεφτοί
tῷ Ας, λόγοι δὲ στρεφτοι τῷ Ας. See note.

εἰκωνίῳ δυνάμει ημ. restoring the exact Homeric form. Cf. inf. 365 ε.

364 Σ. ἐγγύθης Ast: but see note.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

κακίας, ὃς ἀνθρωποι καὶ θεοὶ περὶ αὐτά ἔχουσιν τιμῆς, τὰ οἴκομεν ἀκούοντας νέων ψυχὰς ποιεῖν, ὅσιοι ἐνυφέσεις καὶ ἱκανοὶ ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα ὁπερ προτόμους συλλογίζονται ἐξ αὐτῶν, ποιὸς

Β τις ἄν ὅν καὶ τῇ παρεχθέν τὸν βίον ὁς ἀρίστα διέλθη; λέγει γὰρ ἂν ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων πρὸς αὐτὸν κατὰ Πόνταρμον ἐκείνο τὸ Πόντερον δίκα τέχνης δύνην ἢ σκολιαίς ἀπάταις ἀναβάς καὶ ἐρωτάτων οὕτω περιφράζας διαβρώ; τὰ μὲν γὰρ λεγόμενα δικαίως μὲν ὑπὲρ μοι, ἐὰν καὶ μὴ δοκᾶ, ὄβρειος οὐδὲν φασίν εἶναι, πόνους δὲ καὶ ξηρὰς φανερὰς, ἀδίκῳ δὲ δύον δικαιοσύνης παρασκευασμένον θεσπέσιος

C βίος λέγεται. οὐκόν, ἐπειδή τὸ δοκεῖν, ὡς δηλοῦσι μοι οἱ σοφοὶ, καὶ τὰν ἀλάθειαν βιάται καὶ κύριον εὐδαιμονίαν, ἔπι τοῦτο δὲ τρεπτῶν διός· πρὸ ὅλην μὲν καὶ σχῆμα κόκλωρ περὶ ἐρωτῶν σκειραφαλὸν ἀρετῆς περιγραπτέον, πήν τε τοῦ σοφωτάτου Ἀρχιλόχου ἀλώτεκα ἐλκτῶν ἢξοπίθηθον κερδολάχος καὶ ποικίλος. ἀλλὰ γὰρ, φησὶ τις, οὐδὲν δὲν λαθάνειν κἀκεῖνο ὑπάρχει. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλο οὐδὲν εὐπετές.

Φήσομεν, τῶν μεγάλων ἄλλον όμοιοι, εἴ μὲλλομεν εὐδαιμονίζεσθαι, ταύτη  ἰτέον, ὡς τὰ ἔχειν τῶν λόγων

365 A. ἐφιπτόμενοι a recent corrector in A. Schans Plat. Vol. II. Proleg. § 17 agrees with Cobet as to the prose forms. See note. ΕΙΣΘΥΕΜΟΝΑΣ DEK, a misreading.

365 B. τοῖς χθείον for πῆ. δικαὶ (for δίκη) most ms. Δικαῖος would have been written δίκη at once, but δικαὶ suggests the plural. Δικαῖος ἰτέον. The δικαῖον of ἰτέον is simply a misreading δικαίο (where ἰτεῖ represents ω). καὶ before ἐρωτῶν om. DEK. It can be spared, and there was a tendency to insert καὶ between participles, one dependent on the other.

ἐάν καὶ μὴ δοκῆται ἰτέον. ἐάν μὴ καὶ δοκῆται ἰτέον, a mistaken conjecture. See comment.

365 D. καὶ ἦμας μερετρίων Α.ΠΙ.Μ + τί καὶ ἦμας μ. κ. +. οὐδ᾿ ἦμας μ. χθεῖον. καὶ ἦμας ὧλος μ. DEK. καὶ ἦμας ἀρέστοις Baiter. For the suggestion in the text see note.

365 E. ἀνακοίμησις κ. +. Cf. sup. 364 D.

366 A. ἀξιόματι μὲν Muretus. ἀξιόματι ΠΙ.Μ +. ἀξιόματι A+. Probably ἦμα was mistaken for ἠμα, or μ. so misread.

ἀδρέγα δύναται om. Α.ΠΙ.Μ through homoeoteleuton. Cf. sup. 364 A. Hermann’s ἄλλο διπλάσσουσίν ἔγραφεν is reckless.

ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ Β. 63

φέρειν. ἐπὶ γὰρ τὸ λαχείου καὶ ἐπάθειας συνάξομεν, εἰλαῖ τε πειθοῦς διδάκτης ἰστιοφορίκην τε καὶ δικαίως διδόντες, ἐξ ὅν τὰ μὲν πελάσομεν, τὰ δὲ βιασύνησθα, ὥσ πλεονεκτώντες δίκην μὴ διδόναι, ἀλλὰ δὴ θεοὺς ὑπὲρ λαχανίων οὐτοί βιάσασθαι δυνατοί. οὐκόν, εἰ μὲν μὴ εἴσον ἡ μηδὲν αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀνθρωπῶν μέλει, <ὁδὲν> καὶ ἦμας μερετρίων τὸ λαχθανεῖν εἰ δὲ εἰσὶ τε καὶ ἦμας μερετρίων παραμετριοῦν τοῦτον· ἦμας μερετρίων τὸ λαχθανεῖν εἰ δὲ εἰσὶ τε καὶ ἦμας μερετρίων παραμετριοῦν τοῦτον· ἦμας μερετρίων τὸ λαχθανεῖν εἰ δὲ εἰσὶ τε καὶ ἦμας μερετρίων παραμετριοῦν τοῦτον· ἦμας μερετρίων τὸ λαχθανεῖν εἰ δὲ εἰσὶ τε καὶ ἦμας μερετρίων παραμετριοῦν τοῦτον· ἦμας μερετρίων τὸ λαχθανεῖν εἰ δὲ εἰσὶ τε καὶ ἦμας μερετρίων παραμετριοῦν τοῦτον·
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

IX. Κατὰ τίνα οὖν ἐτὶ λόγον δικαιοσύνην ἄν πρὸς μεγίστης ἀδικίας αἱρομέθη ἀν; ἡν έὼν μετ’ εὐσχημοσύνης κυβιδῆλον κησοσύμβα, καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς καὶ παρ’ ἀνδρῶν πράξει θεῖα θεῶν ζωτεῖ τε καὶ τελευτησάγετε, οὐ δ’ τῶν πολλῶν τε καὶ ἀκρῶν λεγόμενον λόγος. ἐκ δὲ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων τις ἡμιχαίρις, ὡς Σάκρατες, δικαιοσύνην τιμᾶν ἐθέλετο, οὐ τις δύναμις ὑπάρχει ψυχῆς ἢ χρημάτων ή σώματος ἢ γένους, ἀλλὰ μὴ γελάν οπασκυμένης ἀκούσαντα; ὥσι δὴ τοῦ ε’ τις έχει ψευδὴ μὲν ἀποφήμαι ἐρήμηκας, ἰκανός δὲ έγνωκεν ὃτι ἀριστον δικαιοσύνην, πολλῆς ποὺ συγγραμμένη εἶχεν καὶ οὐκ ἀρξεῖται τοῖς ἀδικοῖς, ἀλλ’ οἶδαν ὅτι, πλὴν ε’ τις θεῖα φύσει δυσχεραῖν τὸ αἱμεῖν ἢ ἐπιστήμην λαβόν πράγμεαι.

D αὐτοῦ, τῶν γε ἅλλων οὔτει ἑκὼν δίκαιος, ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ ἀναδρόμιας ἢ γῆρος ἢ τινος ἄλλης ἀνθρεπίας ψέψει τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ἀἀθωμα τοὺς ἀδίκων ἡράκλεις. ὥσι δὲ, δὴλητον. ὡ γὰρ πρῶτος τῶν ποιουμένων ἐις δύναμιν ἀλλοῦ πρώτος ἀδικεῖ, καθ’ ὅσον αὖ οἶδ’ τ’ ἂ. καὶ τοῖν ἄπαντων οὐδὲν ἅλλο αἰτίων ἃ ἐκεῖνο, ἀθέουσι αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος οὔτως ἀρίστησεν καὶ τάδε καὶ ἐμοί πρὸς σέ, ὡς Σάκρατες, εἰσεύ, ὃτι ᾖ Παναμέσις, πάντων ὑμῶν, ὅσιον ἐπαινεῖται φατε δικαιοσύνης εἶναι, ὅπως τῶν ε’ ἁρχῆς

366 C. ψυχῆς Α + Π1+. τίχου Α mg. ΠΠ+1. The confusion of ψ and τ is common.

366 D. ὡς δὲ, δὴλητο πο Μ + Α1. ὡς (οὐ δὲ Α). ὡς δὲ ΚΤ+. εἰσεύ Α (corrected to εἰσεύ), through the frequency of ἐμοί or ἐμεῖς after a quotation has begun.

366 D–Ε. ὡς δὲ εἰσεύεται φατε δικαιοσύνης Α + Μ (omitting εἰσεύ). εἰσι add. vulg. ἡμῶν διὸν ἐμ. φέρει τὸ (ἰκι) δ. εἰσεύ Π. The omission of εἰσεύ is remarkable, as is also the error in Π. φατε might be adscript, but is an unlikely one. Qu. a.g. ὡς δἐ εἰσεύεται πέφαρθε δικαιοσύνης (though πέφαρθε is not actually found).

367 A. ἀριστος is interpolated by some copies before or after ἐκατός.

367 Ε. ὡς δὲ εἰσεύ Α + Α1. εἰσεύ Π +. See note.

367 C. ὁλὰ ὅ δ’ ἐκατόν ἀριστος ἔμειν ΠΧ. ὡς γ’ ἐμεῖν Α + Α1.
πολιτείας Β.

ελεγείον ἐπαθήσειν ο Πλάτωνος ἑρασθῆς, εὐδοκιμήσαστας περὶ τὴν Μεγαρῶν μάχην, εἰπὼν παῖδες Ἀριστοτέλους, κλεινῷθε θείον γένος ἄνδρος.

τούτῳ μοι, ὃ φίλοι, εὖ δοκεῖ εἶχεν; τῶν γὰρ θείων πεπόθατε, εἰ μὴ πέπεισθε ἀδέκιαν δικαιοσύνην ἄμεινον εἶναι, οὕτω δυνάμειον εἰσεῖν ὑπὸ αὐτοῦ. δοκεῖτε δὴ μοι ὃς ἀληθῶς οὐ πεπείσθαι τεκμαίρομαι. δὲ ἐκ τοῦ άλλου τοῦ ὑμετέρου τρόπου, ἑπεὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸν τῶν λόγων ἡπίαστον ἂν ὄμως ἄσφυ ὅ ἐκ μᾶλλον πιστεύω, τοσοῦτο μάλλον ἀπορῶ ὅ τι χρήσομαι· οὔτε γὰρ ὅταν βοηθῶ ἐχώ· δοκῶ γὰρ μοι ἀδύνατον εἶναι· σημεῖων δὲ μοι, ὅτι ἐπὶ τῶν Ὀμασκομαχῶν λέγον ὄμως ἂν τοῖς καθημερινοῖς, ὃς ἄμεινον δικαιοσύνην ἀδελφὰς, οὐκ ἀπεδείξασθε μοι· οὔτως ὅταν καὶ κρήνη ἄρτος, μὴ διὰ τοῦ ἄρτου ἤ παραγήγαγεν ἄρολον δικαιοσύνην κακῷγαρομενήν ἀπαγο-ρείναι καὶ μὴ βοηθεῖν ἐπὶ ἐμποίεικα καὶ δυνάμειον ἐφείσεσθαι. κράτιστον οὖν ὅτας ὅτας δυναμεῖ ἐπικοινεῖσθαι αὐτῇ· ἐν τῷ οὗν Πλατόνι καὶ ὅ άλλον ἔδωκεν παντὶ τρόπῳ βοηθήσατε καὶ μὴ ἀνείπου τοῦ λόγου, ἀλλὰ διερευνήσασθαι τί τέ ἐστιν ἐκατερών καὶ περὶ τῆς ὁδελίας αὐτῶν τάληθε στοτέρως ἐχεῖν· εἰπὼν οὖν ὅτε ἔμει ἔδοξεν, ὅτι Τὸ ἐξῆται οἱ ἐπισκοποῦσιν ὅ ἀφοῦ λέγον ἀλλ' ἢ χρόνους, ὅς ἔμει φαίνεται· ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἂμει οὐ δεινολ, δοκεῖ μοι, ἂν δ' ἔ

367 Β. τῷ ἐν Μεγαρῷ ε.+. See note. The same copies have εἰκών for εἰκονῆς, partly from the preceding κείμενον and partly from misreading.

368 Α. τῷ ἐν Μεγαρῷ ε.+. See note. The same copies have λείτουργον for λείτουργον, partly from the preceding λείτουργον and partly from misreading.

368 Β. τῷ χρῆσθαι ΑΠ, τῷ χρῆσθαι ΑΣ. Both are possible. See comment.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ Β.

ηῶς, τοιαύτην ποιήσασθαι ξύτηςιν αυτοῦ, οἶκαντερ δὲν εἰ προσέταξε τις ηράμματα σιμικρὰ πόρροθεν ἀναγνώριζη σα μᾶλλον ἐὰν δὲν βλέπουσιν, ἐπειτα τις ἐνενήσει, ὅτι τὰ αὐτὰ γράμματα ἐστὶν που καὶ ἄλλοθι μεῖξον τε καὶ ἐν μεῖξον: ἔφειρον ἄν εἴραν, οἷς ἐκεῖνα πρῶτον ἀναγνώριζαν οὕτως ἐπισκοπεῖν τὰ ἑλάττωσι, εἰ τὰ αὐτὰ ὑπάρχουν. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἐφειδος ὁ
Ε' Ἀδείμαντος: ἀλλὰ τί τιοῦτον, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐν τῇ
περὶ τὸ δίκαιον ξυπηρετεύον καθορίζειν; Ἐγὼ σοι, ἐφειδος, ἐρῶ.
Δικαιοσύνην, φαμέν, ἔστι μὲν ἄνδρὸς ἑνός, ἔστιν
δὲ ποιεῖ καὶ ὅλης πόλεως; Πάνυ γε, ἡ δ' ὃς. Οὐκοῦν
μεῖξον πόλεως ἑνός ἄνδρος; Μεῖξον, ἐφειδος. Ἅτων τοιῶν
πλείον ἡ Δικαιοσύνη ἐν τῇ μεῖξον ἐνεβαλεν καὶ ὅσον
καταμαθὲς. εἰ ὁφ' ἐν θυσίαν, πρῶτον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν
ξυπηρετεύοντος τινὰς τῇ ἐκτιν: ἐπειτα οὕτως ἐπισκοπεῖα-
μέθα καὶ ἐν ἐν ἐκάστῳ τῷ τῷ μεῖξονος ὑμείσης ἐν τῇ τοῖς ἑλάττωσιν ὑιόδες ἐπισκοποῦντες. Ἀλλὰ μοι
δοκεί, ἐφειδος, καλὸς λέγειν. Ἀρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἔγο, εἰ
γεγομένης πόλιν θεασαίμεθα λόγος, καὶ τὴν Δικαιο-
σύνην αὐτῆς ἱδομεν ἀν γεγομένης καὶ τὴν ἀδικίαν;
Τὰς ἄν, ἡ δ' ὃς. Οὐκοῦν γεγομένον αὐτοῦ ἐρωτή-
θ' εὐπτετέστερον ἵνα δ' ἄντιμον: Πολὺ γε. Δοκεῖ οὖν
χρῆναι ἐπεχειρήσεις περαινεῖν; οἵματι μὲν γὰρ οὐκ
ἵλιον ἔργον αὐτὸ ἐναι; σκοπεῖτε οὖν. Ἐσπεκταῖ,
ἐφέιδος ὁ Ἀδείμαντος: ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖ.

NOTES.

ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ. The Republic was regularly known in antiquity under the name of Holsteinia. Whether Plato himself gave it that title cannot be determined, but he must at least have recognised that such a name would befit the Dialogue, since in Tim. 17 b he uses the expression τῶν ἤ' ἐνομικῶν λόγων περὶ
πολιτείας. From Aristotle downwards it is so referred to, and Cicero, when he does not translate by Respulstica, retains either the Greek Holsteinia or transcribes as Politia. Cf. Epist. ad Att. iv. 16 faci idem quod in Politia deus ille noster Plato at de Div. ii. 27 Platonis Politiae super apud me non nescit verum corrererunt.

Later the plural Politeias appears, and the chief of the Republic (Par. A) bears the inscription Πλάτωνος Πολιτείας, περὶ ἑδαυτοῦ. This illegal plural refers (like the expression `the Aeneid of Vergil') to the several books. Thus Πολιτείας πρόφασι of the Aldine edition stands for Πολιτείαν πρόμον πολιτεία (or βιβλίον).

Diogenes Laërtius (xi. 60) has Πολιτεία, περὶ ἑδαυτοῦ πολιτείαν (or δίδακσις or λόγον), quoting the secondary title and classification of Thrasylus (or Thaselius), a rhetorician of the age of Augustus and Tiberius, who gave similar designations to all the dialogues, e.g. Παραμετέχης, περὶ ἑδαυτοῦ, λογικός or Εὐθέρμων, περὶ ἑδαυτοῦ, περιπατητικός (v. Grote Plato Vol. i. c. iv. pp. 168 sqq.). The same Thrasylus also divided the dialogues into rather fanciful tetralogies based on the alleged share of each set in a common theme (ποιήθηκεν διὰ τῆς τριώτητος). In this, however, he had been preceded by an arrangement in triologies (after the dramatic example) made by Aristophanes of Byzantium.

The term πολιτείας refers to the place of the dialogue in the following scheme of distribution made (or adopted) by Thrasylus—

369 D. A comma only is usually read after μείξον.
368 Ρ. μείξον Σ. 3. But μείξον is manifestly better here.
369 A. ξυπηρετεύον some Florentine copies.