NOTES.

ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ. The Republic was regularly known in antiquity under the name of Πολεσία. Whether Plato himself gave it that title cannot be determined, but he must at least have recognized that such a name would befit the dialogue, since in Tim. 17 θε uses the expression τὸν ἔν οἰκεῖος λόγον περὶ πολέσιαν. From Aristotle downwards it is so referred to, and Cicero, when he does not translate by Republic, retains either the Greek Polis or transcribes as Politia. Cf. Epist. ad Att. iv. 16 feci idem quod in Politeia deus illa noster Plato et de Div. ii. 27 Platonis Politianum super aequae me nunc eorum corroporunt. Later the plural Poliesia appears, and the chief use of the Republic (Par. A) bears the inscription Πολεσιανος Πολεσιανος, επερι δικαιος. This illogical plural refers (like the expression 'the Aeneids of Vergil') to the several books. Thus Πολεσιανος τριτη of the Aldine edition stands for Πολεσιανος τριτη πολεσιανος (or βιβλιον).

Diogenes Laertius (iii. 60) has Πολεσιανος, επερι δικαιον' πολεσιανον (as δικαίον or λόγον), quoting the secondary title and classification of Thrasylus (or Thrasyllus), a rhetorician of the age of Augustus and Tibullus, who gave similar designations to all the dialogues, e.g. Παρμενίδης, επερι ιδεων, λογικος και Εὐθύρων, επερι δικαιων, περιστοτεικον (v. Grote Plato Vol. i. 4. iv. pp. 168 sqq.). The same Thrasyllus also divided the dialogues into rather fanciful tetralogies based on the alleged share of each set in a common theme (συνη ἔσχος). In this, however, he had been preceded by an arrangement in trilogies (after the dramatic example) made by Aristophanes of Byzantium.

The term πολεσιανος refers to the place of the dialogue in the following scheme of distribution made (or adopted) by Thrasyllus—
It has been pointed out (Introductory §§ 57 sqq.) that the first book of the Republic is separable as a dialogue 'of search,' and that the expository character belongs to the later portion.

BOOK I.

327 A. κατὰ τὴν χρήσην κ.τ.λ. There is a familiar story that a few of the opening words of the Republic were found written upon Plato's tablets in various arrangements. Dionysius Halicarnassus, De Comp. Verba, v. p. 390 (Reiske) says that there was discovered a tablet containing τοιαύτα μετακατάστησιν τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς Πολειτείας τῆς Κατάβας χθεσιν ἐς Πειραιά μετὰ Γλαύκονος τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους. Quintilian Inst. Or. v. 6. 64 says it was the first four words (inventa sunt quattuor illa verba), and rightly remarks that the various arrangements aimed at making the language rhetorical (nominae). Diog. Laert. iii. 26. 37 does not mention the number of words, but only that it was 'the beginning of the Republic.'

It is impossible to decide whether there is any truth in the story or not. What it points to is the recognition of the fact that Greek writers spared no pains in the elaboration of their style and its rhythm. For the care spent upon the latter see Aristotle Rhet. iii. 10. 8. Bliss and others have done much for the appreciation of the style of Demosthenes by investigating its principles of rhythm and enunciation.

dΣ Πειραιά. Equally allowable is εἰς τῶν Πειραιῶν.

Originally δΣ Πειραιᾶς was adjective, with λαμβάνει expressed or understood. As a town grew and came to be thought of as more than the harbour the article was dropped, although the older expression was too inerterate for the article to be omitted consistently. The same phenomenon of language is familiar in new countries. A river is called 'the Werribee' or 'the Thames'; a town grows beside it and is first called 'the Werribee' or 'Werribee,' 'the Thames' or 'Thames' indiscriminately; later the article gradually disappears.

From the middle of Athens to the middle of the Peireneus was about five miles.

Πειραιά. In Attic Greek of the 5th and early 4th century, in the declension of adjectives and nouns in -αί, contraction always took place, where it was possible, in the last syllable, e.g. Πειραιάς, Πειραιάως, &c. So Δαμαί, Δαμαῖος, Δαμαίος,
as against Φωκίδης, Φωκίδης, Φωκίδης. See Meisterhaus Graum. Att. Insch. § 65 b) 9, who quotes Φωκίδης, Παιανίν, Αρχιλάχης.
Thomas Mag. 287 says Παιανίν Ἀττικόν * Παιανίν κοινόν. The uncontracted forms came in with other innovations (e.g. -εις in nom. and acc.) later in the 4th cent.
Hence inf. 328 a we must write Παιανίν and not -αι with most editors.

Γλάκκανος. For the persons of the dialogue see Introduction § 3 c.
γὰ τὸ θεό. That the goddess was Bendis seems clear from 354 a, ταῦτα δὲ σου, δὸ Σάκκαρετ, ελπίζω εἰ τὼς Βενδίδιος. Bendis was a Thracian goddess, often identified by the Greeks with Artemis.
Hesychius has Βενδίδιος (Βενδίδις is a variant accentuation) δ' Ἀπρέμης. Origin (ἀνώ. Cels. 333 ε), with this passage in mind, writes προωανθέμενοι γὰ τὸ Ἀρπέ μεῖδι. Proclus (Tim. p. 9, Polit. p. 350) makes Bendis the Thracian name for Artemis and Selene, and places the Bendida on the 19th of Thargelion (April—May). In Xen. Hell. π. 4. 11 τὸ Βενδίδιον is near the temple of the Greek Artemis on the promontory of Munychia at Peiraecus. The Peiraecus, being the port, and therefore full of Athenian sailors who had made acquaintance with foreign customs, as well as of foreign sailors and merchants who paid frequent visits or actually resided on business, was a natural place for the first establishment of foreign divinities.

Socrates, here as elsewhere, poses as ready to offer the same pious worship to any other average respectable Athenian.

The γὰ τὸ, as γὰ τὸ, is the proper expression in Attic prose and comedy, except where an express opposition is desired between the masculine and feminine, e.g. in μὰ κείκει, μὰ κείε (Symph. 219 ε). [Cf. the necessity of forming the Latin deus in distinction from dea.]

Inscriptions carry out this rule till after B.C. 300. Θεα τι δέω (Dei Demeter and Persephone), but τως τι δέω καὶ τως τι δέω. See Meisterhaus Gr. Att. Ins. § 47 a) 4.
It is probable, however, that in certain expressions, e.g. αἱ σπουδαί, that the feminine form alone was used, the instinct of analogy calling for a full correspondence when article is combined with adjective, while it might not do so with article alone. (So it is allowable to join δόο with either dual or plural, but δόο regularly demands an accompanying dual because of its own pronounced dual shape.)

τὴν ἐρήμην βουλεύοντος διάσατον τινὰ τρέπον ποιήσουσιν. The order shows that the construction is not διάσατον τινὰ τρέπον ποιήσουσιν τὴν ἐρήμην, but the more idiomatic διάσατον τὴν ἐρήμην,
327 C. οί τις ποιητής—either (1) 'to all appearance, from the procession,' i.e. one might conclude that they were coming from the ceremony: or (2) δαδίκες gives a reason for their being together for this lucky meeting, 'as was natural with people making a move after the procession.' The latter rendering has more point, and is properly given in Stallbaum’s ‘quippe qui pompa in intercessione.’

πρὸς ἀστυν. Above (a) we have πρὸς τό ἄστυ.

As with τείχους, πόλις, ἄγρανδικα, etc., the article may be present or absent, though not indifferently. It is incorrect to say that the article is 'omitted.' Such combinations as in ἄγρανδικα, ἐν τείχοις, ἐν ἄγρανδικα, πρὸς ἄστυ belong to a period before the article came into regular use, and, being familiar expressions of everyday occurrence, they were retained in a shape which was not only permissible but normal. When the article is added there is an appreciable difference in suggestion. Thus ἐν τείχοις [Hodg. init.] is simply an adverb, 'out of walls,' the opposite of ἐνδιάκριτος; ἐν τείχοις is 'in country;' the opposition is of 'in town'; πρὸς ἄστυ is 'outwardly, i.e. 'inwards' as opposed to 'outwards.' The particular τείχοις, ἄγρανδικα, ἄστυ are not contemplated; the expression is generic. Of ἐν τοῖς ἄστις, at home,' to market,' etc. On the other hand ἐν τοῖς τείχοις is 'outside the wall (well-known) or 'its wall,' πρὸς τό ἄστυ is 'towards the city (which lay near):' the wall or city being specific and individual to the consciousness of the speaker. The difference may be realised by comparing the delicate ways in which we use 'go to market' and 'go to the market,' 'go to town' and 'go to the town.'

οὐ γὰρ κακῶς δοθέως: 'yes, your surprise is not amiss': literally ('we are going downwardly,' for your surprise') etc. Cf. Phaedr. 228 οὐ μὴν δοκεῖς οὐδὲ ὑμᾶς μὲ φαινέταις μὴν διοίκησιν ὑπὲρ ἄν αὑτό. Ιδ. πάντων γὰρ σοι ἀληθῆ δοκή. Sometimes γὰρ in assert is combined with other particles, e.g. Theseut. 170 έκ τοῦ δοκουμεν ἐκάλαιτο τοῦ και εἰς τοιου οὐδ' δοκεῖ; ΘΕ. φησὶ γὰρ οὖν. The ellipse is sometimes actually supplied, e.g. inf. 328 έ χαλαρᾶ, ἐπτ., λέγεις: οὐ γὰρ ἀντέγομαι.

For the playful threat of force cf. Philol. 16 άρπ., ἐκ Σωκαρτές, ἐν οὐδ' ἡμῶν τῷ πλῆθει, οὔτε νέοι νίκης ἔκειτο; Phaedr. 220 σάμην θέλον μὲν ἐν ἔρρημα, ἐνεχυρότερον δὲ ἔγκαι καὶ κεφάλης.

οὖν γὰρ...διὰ ἀλλεπαλληλογράφῳ τῷ ἐν παρεγγείλατο ἤμα τ.τ.λ. The evidence of ass is in favour of ἀλλεπαλληλογράφῳ, though the margin of Δ has
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328 a 15 ὥς τῶν στρατιωτῶν μὴ μετατίθηναι γεγονότα, ὥς τῆς γνώμης ἔχετε.

328 A. ἄδικον ὅτε—‘do you not so much as know?’ = ‘are you actually ignorant?’

ἀλλάσσεις gives in negative statements and questions the same tone of surprised emphasis which belongs to καί in the positive. Thus ἢδε ἤτοι—καί ἡμεῖς: διόκημα μὴ ἄδικον ὅτε, Ἐ. ‘I am afraid it is actually wicked.’

λαμπάσσα, i.e. λαμπαδήρρομα ὑπὲρ λαμπάσαρος. Cf. λαμπάδα δραματικώς, κυρίως, ἔτος.

The usual method of procedure was with competing chains of runners, each chain forming a ‘side’ in the game. For every chain there was a torch, which must be carried to the goal amidst each runner handed on the torch to the next man in his line (Eur. ii. 79 ἤτα καὶ θυσία ἐπὶ τῆς λαμπάδας ἠτόμωτε, καὶ ἀναστάτος ὑπὲρ λαμπάδας τοὺς βίον παραδίδοντες ἄλλους χεριάς ἄλλους (Legg. 776 π.), and the winners are thus the whole winning chain and not the individuals. Hence the expression in I. 284 αὐτός σὺς ὁ πρῶτος καὶ συνελπιστέος δραματικώς. The same fact is pointed to by the existence of rival λαμπαδερχαί (like the rival χορογιά), who would hardly be required unless each provided a set of runners and not merely an individual.

There seems also to have been a simpler form of the race, between single competitors (Pausan. i. 80. 2).

διαδέομενοι ἄλλοιον here shows that the chain-match is meant. The diminutive λαμπάδα implies that the torches were small, and proportionately hard to keep alight.


Bendis (= Artemis, the moon-goddess) might be appropriately honoured with a λαμπάσαρος, and, in a mystic Chthonian character (= Hecate-Artemis), with a πανηγύριος.

καίνῳ: a ‘novelty’ or ‘invention,’ differing from νῦν in implying ‘new-fangled.’ Xen. Mem. i. 1. 3 ὀδὴν κατάτημον λαβέτε τῶν ἄλλων.

ἐξανατατρέπεται: ‘will rise and go out.’

μετὰ τὸ δείπνον. The article implies ‘the dinner of which you will, of course, first partake.’

ξυνομεθάλησα τολλία τῶν νῦν—a great temptation to Socrates. Cf. Xen. Mem. i. 2. 33, where the tyrants Critias and Chares forbid him τῶν νῦν διαλέγοντα.
τέρων πράκτορα ἐτών. It was the peculiar intellectual effect of his intercourse upon the youth of Athens that led to the specific charge ἀλλαὶ δὲ καὶ τοῦ προσιτοῦ διαψευδον.  

328 B. μὴ ἄλλας ποιεῖτε—‘don’t refuse.’ Probably, however, apart from its obvious meaning ‘otherwise (than we ask),’ ἄλλας is here, as so frequently, a ἔκφρασμα for a blunter word. There is an implication that to act ἄλλας is to act otherwise than kindly or civilly. So ὑπέρα ἡ δέκα and the Latin aquila. The expression used here is common. Cf. Ar. Av. 138 μηδεμίῳ ἄλλας ποιήσῃ.

CHAPTER II.

328 B. εἰς τοῦ Πολεμάρχου—‘to Polemarchus’s.’ Cf. εἰς ‘Ἄδωνις, εἰς διασκόλου φαστόν, εἰς διασκόλου (Alc. 1. 110 λ), ἤ εἰς Ἀνδρέου ἐκκλησία, ’to St Paul’s,’ ‘go to the schoolmaster’s,’ ad Vitæs ἄπειρος ὁ θεός.

No specific noun should be supplied (e.g. εἰς <τὸν> τοῦ Πολεμάρχου <δοῦνα> any more than in τὰ τῆς περίπλου τρόπους, where it is unintelligent to say that ‘πράκτορα is understood,’ inasmuch as the next plural article is in itself a complete object. When the same comprehensive τὰ is used in phrases like Arist. Vesp. 1440 ἄνευ δὲ καὶ εἰς παράτρις εἰς τὰ περίπλου ἢ τὰ περίπλου ἢ τὸ τὸν Ἐσθλόν ἢ τὸν Ἐσθλόν, it is wrong to search for a particular neutral plural noun to fit the sense of ‘the doctor’s house, place, surgery, &c.’ So, though εἰς τοῦ Πολεμάρχου is, of course, practically ‘Polemarchus’ house,’ the actual noun which εἰς would grammatically govern is any word which would suit the notion. But the Greek speaker was no more conscious of any definite omission than we are when we say ‘run down to the grocer’s.’

In the opposite expression Ar. Ast. 48 ὄνομα εἰς ἀνταλλάχθηκεν εἰς ἀνταλλάχθηκεν. Prok. 336 a ἀνταλλάχθηκεν, εἰς δὲ does not logically govern the following genitive any more than εἰς in the one before us. [For Polemarchus and the persons about to be mentioned see Introduction § 3 c.]

καὶ δὴ καὶ Ὀρσάρχειον. ‘And, in particular, Th.’ This combination of particles often directs attention to a specially important case. The presence of the great Thrasymachus adds much to the interest of the gathering. Cf. inf. 329 a ἄξονα ἐντεῦθεν εἰς αὐτόν ἀνεύτως καὶ ἄλλος καὶ δὴ καὶ Ὀρσαλίδα ποτὲ τῷ ποιητή παρεχωρήθη. Properly the first καὶ connects, δὴ is explicative, and the second καὶ emphasizes the particular word ‘and, we must not forget, also... Thrasymachus.’

τῶν Καλλικράτων. It is impossible to say decisively in what way Plato chose to spell this word. The proper name of the town, as given on its coins, was Καλλικράτων, but Meisterhans (Att. Inscr. § 88. 1) shows that, as early as the middle of the 6th century B.C., such spellings as Ναυκράτων (sic) existed in Attica side by side with Καλλικράτων. This was partly due to the "cockneyism" of Athenian speech, which tended to asperse illegitimately (e.g. ἀντίκαιν, ἀντικαίν δώρον &c.), and partly to the natural association of the word with καλλικράτως. From the latter cause (probably) the pronunciation Καλλικράτων became prevalent in later Greece and is almost the rule in ms., even when the author may not himself be responsible for it. There is moreover in all languages a danger of metathesis of similar vowels or consonants in adjoining syllables, and for this reason Μετάληθα came to be written for Μεταλήθα, like Καλλικράτως for Καλλικράτων. Plato may or may not have fallen in with the popular error.

Παιανία—not Παιανία. See note on Παιανία, 327 init. Piaania is an Attic name, to which the orator Democritus gave renown later.

328 C. διὰ χρόνου γὰρ καὶ ἐφέρακεν αὐτῶν. ‘For it was some time since I had so much as seen him’: lit. ‘for after an interval of time had I even seen him.’ The καὶ implies that it is possible to see a man without holding conversation with him, but that Socrates had not even done the former. γὰρ explains why Cephalus seemed so much older than Socrates had pictured him.


The sense implied, though not expressed, is that the time has been a long one. Frequently the full διὰ χρόνος χρόνου is found, e.g. Ar. Plit. 1040 ὁδὸν διὰ χρόνον χρόνον στερεᾶσθαι. This implication is not confined to the combination with διὰ, for the same notion of prolonged time is often involved in the use of χρόνος, ‘at last,’ χρόνον ἴππου &c. So in colloquial English, ‘it is quite a time since I saw you.’

ἐφέρακε. The proper termination of the plaguitae persons in classical Attic is discussed by Rutherford New Frinskyttus Att. cxxxv. That η-, ης-, σις were the true finals of the singular is shown by metrical evidence, as well as by that of the best ms. and of grammarians (Euath. 1946, 22 &c.). The tendency of copyists to substitute a first person ending -eiv for -η is proved by Davers from the ms of Ar. Av. 511 τοιτι τοιτων οτι ην' ἔρι, where where
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328 c

(except Vat. and Rav.) actually have ἔθεσυ "γροῖς." It may be added that the 3rd person plural in -σεω, not -σευ, is further demonstrated by Attic Inscriptions (V. Meisterhaus's § 61 a) 9. Originally the pluperfects were aorist formations and the endings were -(ε)σης, -(ε)σην, -(ε)σην, which were fully contracted -εις, -εστε, -εσε. That ἕιρακα and ἕιρακα were both in use in the best Attic times is highly probable. Comedy no doubt often requires, and always allows, a scansion equal to ἕιρακα (see the passage quoted in last note from Ar. Plut. 1045). Sometimes the scansion actually proves 6σαν, as in the second foot of Ar. Nub. 768 πάθην ἔβρακα. But in other places it has not been shown (1) that ἕιρακα cannot be scanned ἕιρακα, (2) that, if ἕιρακα is a correct form, it is the only one which is correct. Whenever the method of augmenting was away from the usual pattern there was a tendency to variety (e.g. ἐνοίκοιμης, ἐνοίκοιμαι: ἐνοίκισα, ἐνοίκισα; and see Rutherford N. P. Art. xx). So, in the next sentence, καθῆστο (καθῆτο) or ἐκάθηστο would be equally authenticated forms.

ἔστεφανωμένος. A wreath was regularly worn by the person sacrificing. Cf. Ar. Plut. 819

καὶ τὰ ἔστεφανα μὲν ἑδον χαύνουνεν
καὶ τράχων καὶ κρῶν ἔστεφανωμένον.

Xen. Anab. vii. 1. 40 τὰ μὲν ἅρια εὐτέχεια πολὺ τῶν βομπῶν καὶ Κομπατάθη πρὸς ἔστεφανωμένον ύπὸ βόσκων. Similarly a στέφανος was worn by many magistrates as a mark of office, investing them with respect. Dem. 602. 5 πέτασμα λέγοντος καὶ τοῦ τεσσαυρός περιτρέφοντο. Cf. the judge's wig and gown.

ἐπὶ τοὺς προσκεφαλαίοις τι καὶ δίφθον. The point of τοὺς is a little obscure. Viewed along with the τι καὶ following it may be taken to imply that, for this very aged man, and as a mark of honour, a special kind of cushioned chair had to be provided.

'On a sort of combination of cushion and chair' is a sort of easy chair.' In Prot. 815 ὁ Πρόδοσα ἔπτελεν τι κατὰ τέφανον ἤπεκαλομένον ἐν κρησίδο τιεῖν καὶ στρώμαιναι καὶ μὴν πολλῷ there is a similar suggestion that Proclus had made himself unusually snug.

It may be assumed that the use of cushions in household chairs was not frequent with Athenians of the time, and would be considered effeminate for younger men. Cf. Xen. Hell. vi. 1. 30 μπατά (cushions) ἐφ᾽ ἥν καθήσασθαι τὰ Πέτασμα καθησαίον, a remark which would otherwise have been pointless. That προσκεφαλία were used in beds or in theatres, where the seats were hard and often wet or cold, is no argument for their domestic use.

In keeping with ἔστεφανωμένος is also the implication that (like Latin pulex and pulexian) the seat was a seat of honour. Cf. Cic.

NOTES.

328 c] ad Fam. x. 13 alla tibi evit in ludu: eam pulvisum aceretor; i.e. 'you shall be promoted later.'

τεθείας...ἐν τῇ αἰλίᾳ—i.e. at the altar of Zeus Ερέκτων (who corresponded in a measure to the Latin Penates).

The altar stood in the middle of the open court which occupied the central part of the ἀγορᾶτος. A colonnade ran round it, out of which the men's rooms opened. This was the αἴλια. Another in the γυναικοκοσμία would want special definition, and had nothing to do with the present visitors. Domestic sacrifices were the mark of a religious man. Cf. Xen. Mem. i. 1. 3 τίθεν οὐ τὸ γαρ δεδεδέλαιον ἤ τολμᾶν μὲν ἄλλο πολλὰς ἐν ἀπιτί τῶν κοίμων τῆς τολμήσις βομπῶν.

παρ' αὐτόν. The accusative implies 'we went and sat beside him.' ἔκανεν ἐκατείθυσε, 'had been placed.' So ἐκάνεται, περιτρέφει δο. τιθεῖν γάρ ο νόμον has for its counterpart καθέται ὁ νόμον.

Where τέθεια is found in the best period of Attic Greek it is middle. In later Greek however (after Macedonian times) such expressions as προτέθηκεν ὁ συνεργός, καὶ διατεθήκε χορὸ, were gradually accepted into literary language. See Cic. Var. Lct. p. 981.

αὐτόθι—i.e. there was no need to move to another room. The chairs were ready 'on the spot.' With κάκως of the social sense of circulus.

οὗτος δαμές. The expression is difficult, whether we read οὗτος or οὗ δεί. An exact parallel does not appear to exist. Jowett and Campbell (with οὗ δεί) say that δεί is adverbial to the idea contained in ἀστάρωσι, i.e. 'you are welcome, but you do not come often enough.' For this we have to assume that Cephalus thinks (though he does not utter) words like ἀστήρωσι μὲν σε before οὗ δεί δαμές. This seems somewhat far-fetched, and one instinctively expects the order οὗ δαμές δεί, or else the words ἀλλ' οὗ δαμές. οὗτος, if correct, must be regarded as one of those colloquial idioms which, logical enough in their origin, imperceptibly shift their application till they defy strict analysis. Thus it is possible to meet with the expression 'Socrates, you are not very frequent either in your visits,' and to feel that, while the idiomatic 'either' is explainable, more or less subtly, in some settings, its precise application eludes the grasp in this particular case. Nevertheless both such an English and such a Greek phrase are conceivable.

PL. REP.
Some editors (after Ast) would read ὅσιτα from II. xviii. 385
πιτος, Θεότα, παντόσπελε, Ιάκωτες ἡμέραν δῶ,
αἰδοίον τε φιλή τε; φάρον γε μὲν ὅ τι θαμβίζειτο—
and Od. v. 87
ἐπιτος μοι, Ἑρμεία χρυσόρροαι, ἠδήλουμεν
αιδοίον τε φιλος τε τι φάρομεν γε μὲν ὅ τι θαμβίζειτο—
It is quite possible, and not wholly improbable, that the similarity of circumstances may have led Plato's Cephalus to quote Homer, or at least hint at him in a way which would be readily understood by Socrates without further elaboration. On the other hand there is nothing specially Homeric about the word θαμβίζειτο itself, and we are not, by the mere guess that a quotation is intended, justified in altering a reading which may be quite sound, however curiously idiomatic.

If any alteration were necessary, one might suggest ὅς ἦ; but probably οὔτε was really written by Plato.

θαμβίς—cf. Hipp. Ma. 321 π ο θαμβίς εἰς τοῦδε τοῦτον ἔννοιαν. ἤπὶ μόνον—lit. 'yet it was your duty (to do so) 'as 'yet you ought to have done so.' As 88a follows, and ἤπι shortly after, it may be well to emphasize the doctrine that properly ἤπι is used of moral obligation ('I ought') and ἐκ of physical or logical compulsion ('I must'). So inf. ἐχρίζει...ἐξέσει, where the same distinction exists.

The distinction is something (though not wholly) like that of je désenvis from je dois. No doubt some Greek writers and speakers occasionally confuse the uses of the two words, especially where the meanings are apt to overlap each other. Language cannot be precise and clear-cut without the thought being precise and clear-cut. Nevertheless the distinction was, in the best prose authors, a real one.

'You should (morally, χρήζει) have been coming to see us. For, if I had still been capable of making the journey to the city, there would have been no compulsion (ἐξεῖ) for you to come to us....But, as it is, you should (χρήζει) come here more frequently.'

ἐν δυνάμει ἦ. The correct form for the first person in the best period of Attic is ἦ, not ἦν. The derivation is from ποστε contracted. [The form ἦ is probably due to the analogy of other past tenses e.g. ἦψαν, ἐσύν, &c.] See Rutherford New Phrynichus, Art. cxxx., where the grammarian Forpbynus is quoted for this very passage, after saying τό ἦν ἐπιλαμβάνει μοι, τῶν ἵνα Ἀττικίν μι καθό βρίσκετον μενεγράμματον ἀναγράφωμεν. Hence it seems best to restore ἦ here, although it cannot be denied that ἦ had began to appear in Euripides and Aristophanes, at least where it was metrically convenient. μέσ are inconsistent, but they not in-

frequently shew an earlier ἦ turned into a later ἦν. Dr Rutherford says 'this is simply an indication of what has happened in every case.' 'Every' is no doubt too strong, but the evidence for Plato is all in favour of ἦ, πορεί &c.

ημέτερα. There is no necessity to take this as plural for singular with Jowett and Campbell, though such a use is frequent enough in some cases, e.g. that of writers speaking of themselves, or of persons professing modesty. The word includes both Cephalus and his family (the ἐνσείων mentioned below). Cephalus is particularly desirous for the young man's sake that Socrates should come. Cf. 386 n.


νεανίας. As a matter of fact Polemarchus, Lysis and Bathy- demus are middle-aged men, but it is quite in character for the aged father to style them 'these young fellows.' Even the reading of some inferior με νεανίασκαι is sufficiently natural, and perhaps carries more point. Cephalus would be speaking humorously: 'these boys.'

καλὸν...χάρια γε. It is well to take the particles as an intimate group, although of course the word coming between them is strongly emphasized. So Aesch. P. V. 984

ΕΠ. ἔπηκοι οὖνεσάν ὅν ἄρα χάρια πατήρ.

ΠΠ. καὶ καλὸν ἐφεύριον τῷ διόν συνεχεῖ τοῦτο χάριν.

The force of καλὸν is ultimately ' (-age) indeed' or 'and, more by token,' while that of γε is to add a tone of emphasis, serious or irony. Here the sense is 'I (recognize the force of what you say) and, indeed, it is my pleasure to....' This may all be expressed in English by 'Nay, Cephalus, it is a positive pleasure to me....'

328 E. χρήζεια...ἐξέσει. γε—v. sup. ον χρήζει μένων. ἕστηκε τινα ὅδοι—τινα qualifies the simile: 'because, as it were, they have preceded us over what one may call a road.' So quidem in Latin.

ὑπο—either (1) 'equally' (ὑπομοιότατον), or, better, (2) 'probably.' There is no certainty that we shall all grow old, and the latter rendering is therefore demanded.

πραξα...ἡ μνήμει—Plato not seldom omits τούτων in the first member of dependent questions, e.g. Theaet. 161 b τῆν δήσαν κυκλώμενος ἦταν ἐπισκέψασθαι ἐξερχόμενος τῆν ἐτέραν, ἄρθρη τῇ ψυχῇ. Legg. 670 b &c.

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There is a slight chiasmus, a figure of which Plato is fond, in the order of the epithets: πρακτικαί rather answers to εὐτροφαί, χαλεπτά to φανήσι. Cf. infra 348 ε καλάν... ἂν αἰχμήν is answered by καλῶν καὶ ἵσμων. 350 σ οἰκεῖο... δὲ μνήμον τῷ σωφρῶ καὶ κάλον, δ ὡς ἀμφοτέρων τῷ καλῶ καὶ ἀκριβῶς. For a doubly chiasmic arrangement cf. Crat. 47 c πεῖρα τῶν διδάσκων καὶ θύμων, καὶ αἰχμῆς καὶ καλῶν, καὶ ἀκριβῶς καὶ οἰκεῖον. The fact that so many instances can be collected shows that Plato was deliberate in avoiding an obtrusively obvious antithesis.

καὶ δὲ καὶ σοῦ κ.τ.λ.—'and particularly from you I should like to hear....' For καὶ δὲ καὶ, ν. sup. d.

τι σύ φανήσι τούτο; δὲ ἄρα γῆρας σοῦδρο φανὴν εἶναι. Grammatically these words might be rendered either (1) 'what you think of that which the poets say lies on old age's threshold,' or (2) 'what you think of that condition which the poets call being upon the threshold of old age.' The latter is the more natural in point of meaning. τὰ τοῦτο; (ὅτι) "ἐναὶ ὡς γῆρας σοῦδρο"; τὸ τοῦτο δ εἰδον εἰ "ἐναὶ γῆρας σοῦδρο εἶναι!" where eidoν practically = καλῶν. Lkst. "what is that with regard to which they use the expression 'to be on the threshold of old'?

The phrase ἐναὶ γῆρας σοῦδρο occurs Π. πα. 66, 66, 487, 53, 9. 1. 219 we have γῆρας σοῦδρον ἱσθάνω. 'The poets' are not merely Homer, but his imitators also, e.g. Hymn. Aphrod. 106 [γηραν, σοῦδόν λεγοντα]. Hes. op. 331, καὶ ἔριδι ἐν ἡμῖν γῆρας σοῦδρον καὶ, as often, Hesiodus borrows the poetical expression (τν. ια.) ἐν τῷ σκοτώ ἐστιν ὅτι ἡ γῆρας σοῦδρον λαμπρόντας ἐστιν. τὴν ἀφθονίαν 'upon the threshold of old age,' in the sense of the 'entrance to old age,' does not suit the passages in the Hes., nor would it suit the present place, if Plato had so interpreted it. Dr Leaf is for taking σοῦδρον as ἐσθάνω 'upon the path of old age' (see his note Hes. xxii. 60). It is, however, quite simple to understand it of the threshold over which the aged man passes out, and on which he stands ready to depart. This is the explanation of the soliloquy on Pl. xxii. 60. Nevertheless I would suggest that ἐσθάνω is a defining genitive and ἐσθάνω the threshold of death: lit. 'upon the threshold (which consists) of old age.' Cf. Verg. Aen. iv. 490 ὡς ἐσθάνω ἐναὶ τὰ τῆς θάλασσας are thus parenthetical.

The view of the Jowett-Campbell edition, however, is that τούτο refers to what has preceded, and that ἀστικά ἄντικα ἔχει τῆς θάλασσας, ἐν τί σησί φανήσι τούτο; should be taken together, e.g. following ἀστικά for its antecedent, just as it might have followed the equivalent ὑπάρχει. This makes τί σησί φανήσι τούτο weak,

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is rather strained in regard to the relative ὑπάρχει, and does not, perhaps, give any particular sense to ὑπάρχει. Moreover it leaves πῶς τρόπος χαλεπτά... ὡς τροχοῦνταν awkwardly attached. With τοῦτο δ... φανήσι... the sense is 'that which, whatever they mean by it, they call.... No difficulty is then offered by πῶς τρόπος χαλεπτά, with which φανήσι πως naturally supplies. 'How that appears to you... which they call... (viz.) whether it (appears to you) disagreeable... or how....'

χαλεπτά τοῦ βλου. It is not easy to understand how Jowett and Campbell write "τοῦ βλου is a partitive genitive depending on χαλεπτά, a harsh part of life." Indeed (pace tantum varium) the expression is a confusion. If the genitive 'depends' on χαλεπτά it cannot be partitive; it would require rather to depend on τοῦτο, or on an indispensable τι in χαλεπτά τοῦ βλου. Rather render 'disagreeable in respect of the sort of life,' the genitive being the 'genitive of relation,' of which one large department is conveniently labelled 'casual.' Cf. Phaedo 89 ε εὐθύς ἐξελεύστη καὶ τῷ πόλει καὶ τῷ λόγῳ: Theseet. 173 a ἄπει σε αὐτόν καταφέρθης τις σιγουρότερος ἢ ἂν ἐμπαισάναι. A gen. familiar with μακρόσω, is no less natural with its opposite χαλεπτά, σχέδιος δα.

For χαλεπτά applied to old age of. Hom. π. viii. 106 χαλεπτά δ σος γῆρας συνῆκα. ἢ ποῦ σε αὐτὸ ἑξελέλησα; Though these words may depend on ποῦ ἄρταν ἢ (indirect question), it is equally in keeping with Plato's style, and is much more vivacious, to treat them as reverting to the direct. 'I should like to know how it strikes you... whether as disagreeable... or how do you report of it?' ἑξελέλησα is properly used of one who is in the secret reporting to one who is not.

CHAPTER III.

οὖν γέ μοι φανήσι—what it does seem like to me.' The γέ with οὖν gives something of the sense 'just what.' The same colloquial effect is obtained in English by 'I'll tell you what it seems like.'

329 A. πολλάκις γὰρ κ.τ.λ. γὰρ regularly introduces a promised account or narrative. 'You must know.'

diαστάσεως τῶν παλαιῶν παραγμάτων—cf. Arist. Rhet. i. 11 § 25 πάντα τὰ εὐγνώματα καὶ ὄνομα ἡδέω ἐστὶ τὸ παράδειγμα ὅπως ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἄνθρωπον ἡμῶν καὶ ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἄνθρωπον. οὗτος καὶ αἱ παραγματεύει πολλὰς ἡμέρας τέρπεται, καὶ ὡς αἰεί τὸν ὄμοιόν, καὶ εἰσιν ὡς θύρ
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εἶρα, καὶ ἄλλος κολοῦς παρὰ κολοῦν, καὶ ὃσα ἄλλα ταύτα (where see Cope's notes).

Such kindred proverbs about 'birds of a feather' were very numerous. The particular byword thought of here is ἀεὶ ἢλια τέρναι, as we may gather from Pheader. 360 ο ἢλια γαρ καὶ ἄπαλοις λόγοις τέρναι τοὺς ἢλια, and the scholiast at that place completes the line in a manner very apposite to the present passage, viz. ἢλια τέρναι τέρναι, γέρων ἐκ τε χεῖρας γέρων. Cf. Gorg. 530 ο φίλοι... ἵπποι τῷ ὄμοιῳ. The whole of the context here is practically quoted by Cicero de Senect. 3 without acknowledgment. See Introd. § 5 a.

ἀναμμηνοκόμοι—reciprocal-reflexive: 'reminding one another,' ὃ τῶν τοιούτων ἔχεται—'which belong to that class.' Cf. 382 a ἐπιτελεσθενα πράγμα αληθείας ἐχθρον, 383 b καὶ ἄλλα ὃ πολλὰ ἄγαθο τούτων ἐξήκεσα. Mem. 92 b, 93 b ὅσα τέχνη ἐχθράτων.

The sense of ἔχθραι is 'to be closely attached to,' and this may mean 'to cling to,' 'pertain to the same class,' 'fellow,' or 'adjoin,' according to the precise nature of the context. In Herodotus the present use of ἔχθραι is particularly frequent, e.g. 1. 120 τα τῶν ἐκεῖνα τοῖς ἐχθροίς, 'everything in the shape of dreams'; Stein there quotes Hippocrates (περὶ παιδῶν ὁ. 185) ὅσα μὲν αἰτίων ᾧ ποικίλον ἔχθραι νῦν. καὶ τότε μὲν εἴ ὄντες, τότε δὲ ὁ μὲν ὄντες—i.e. καὶ (όντο) τότε κ.τ.λ.

The first ὄντες is imperfect in tense: 'As if at that time they used to live well, while now they do not even live.' For the antithesis cf. Arist. Pol. i. 2 πόλις... γεωπόνως μὲν εἴ οὖν τοῦ ἕνεκα, οὖσα δὲ τοῦ εἴ... γένει. 329 b. τοῦ τῶν εἰκόνων προπαλακτάς τοῦ γέρων—α double genitive—subjective and objective. 'The insults to old age on the part of one's own people.' Cf. Thuc. vii. 34 διὰ τῆς τῶν ἄμμων ἀνάγκης τῶν ταυτάς. Phaedr. 286 ο τῇ γε τῶν ἔριδας ὃ καὶ τοῦ μείλους. Εἰδ. ii. 2 ἵστατον ὑπεύθυνος τῶν ἰδίων τῇ ἄκρων ἐγκυρότητος τῶν διώκεται τοῖς διώκεται πολιτικόν.

προπαλακτήμορφος is defined by Aristot. (Top. vi. 6) as ὃς ἐραὶ καὶ χλωρίας, τ. e. 'insult combined with mockery.' καὶ ἐκ τοῦτος ἰδί—'and on this alleged ground.' δὴ contains some irony. 'They give that as a sufficient reason for bewailing old age,' Cassellius ap. Cic. de Senect. 8 Τοιαίων in senecta hoc dēgito ministrum | sentire ex aetate esse se odioso alteri. ὑπεύθυνο —'to harp upon,' the suggestion being that the complaints are unthinking 'can't' (cantare) to the same old tune. Cf. 549 h καὶ ἄλλα δὴ δόσα καὶ ὅσα φιλοσοφοῦντα γνώσει τοῖς ταύτας ἰδιότητι.
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καὶ ἄλλος καὶ δὴ καὶ Σοφοκλῆς...παραπτώματος—ν. sup. 328 n. Sophocles (ob. 406 B.C.) was noted for his amiable character. Plut. Ban. 82 A 8' εὐκολὺς μηδὲ κακοῖς, εὐκολοὶ καὶ εὖ εἶκα. For the following story cf. Athen. xi. 510 and Cicero De Senect. c. 14. It is told also by Valerius Maximus (v. 3, 2), and three times by Pherech.

πᾶς, ἧνα...[καὶ]...ἐγγὺς—ἐγγὺς is of course redundant after ἐρωτευμένῳ ὧν τῶν, but its insertion is very common, even when εἰς or its equivalent has preceded. The effect is to give naturalness to the conversational style (cf. ὁδὴ θεμίστης 328 c). In origin it springs from the almost universal colloquial habit of repeating and insisting upon the verb of saying, 'said I,' 'says he.'

The usage is particularly common in Xenophon, e.g. Anab. vii. 6, 41 Πολυεράτει δὲ εἰς τὸν αναστάτον ἐτερεφθοτόν, ἄρα γε μήν, ἐγγὺς, ὧν ἄνθρωπος κ.τ.λ., and for the same in Plato, v. inf. 397 a.

With πᾶς ἧνα πρὸς τάφοις...[cf. Prot. 362 b πᾶς ἧνα πρὸς ὑπατίαν; Symm. 174 A Ἀριστοτέλει, πᾶς ἧνα πρὸς τὸ ἑλέους ἀνεμέλητος ἐκεῖνος ἐλέους ἑλέους]

329 c. Ἐφήμερα—Hush!; bona verba quaeque, cf. Prot. 330 ε ἐφήμερας ὁ ἄνθρωπος...[ἐγγὺς...ἐγγὺς adds the same touch of reproach. Sophocles treats the suggestion as a thing to shrink from, as from an evil omen. Hence ἐφήμερα, as in Ethyd. 301 ν ὃν παραγενήται σοὶ βοῦς, βοῦς ἡ, καὶ ὃν τὸν ἐγὼ σοι πάρεμειν διανοούσιος εἶ; Βοῦς ἂν τὸ τῆς γε, ἵστ 8' ἑγὼ, Μένο 91 b, Gorg. 469 a. μέντοι—here not adversative but assuavering (ἐν μυ], 'I assure you.' [V. Liddell and Scott, μέν B. i. 4 b.]

In this sense it is used freely in either affirmative or negative sentences. We may compare to some extent the protestation use of English 'hush!' So in answers in the affirmative, as inf. 392 A ἀλλο μέντοι νῦν ἄλα.

329 d. Σεστίλην—Of Xen. Oec. i. § 20 διστῶνα...δόναι, ibid. § 23, Gia. Off. i. 10. 37 τυλιγματες, βλανδίσσιαι δυναμες (As).

παντάπασι γὰρ...γίγνεται..., ἐπιδιόν...χαλάσωσις, παντάπασι...γίγνεται. If this (without γὰρ after ἐπιδίον) is the true reading, we must take the clause παντάπασι τὸ τῶν Σοφοκλῆς γίγνεται as a repetition in another form of the opening words παντάπασι...ἐνεργεία. 'For most certainly there is great peace and freedom from such things in old age, when the desires have ceased from seeking us and have relaxed their strain,—(yes) it most certainly

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becomes as Sophocles said,—it is riddance from a multitude of mad masters.'

It cannot be said that there is anything impossible about the two saynetai παντάπασι...γίγνεται, καὶ δεσποτῶν...ἀπηλλάξθει. They may even have been adopted with some deliberation by Plato for the sake of arresting attention. Nevertheless with the same words it is doubtful whether we should not rather punctuate—παντάπασι γὰρ τῶν καὶ τοιητῶν ἐν τῇ γῇς πολλὴ ἑρμή γίγνεται καὶ ἐπεδεδυομένοις...ἐπεδεδυομένοις...χαλάσωσι, παντάπασι τὸ τῶν Σοφοκλῆς γίγνεται. The saynetai is then in the clause with ἀπῆλθεν, and this appears on the whole less abrupt.

For the rest, the clause δεσποτῶν...ἀπηλλάξθει, apart from its saynetai, contains a rare use of ἐστι and a form of expression which comes in rather awkwardly after γίγνεται. One of the features of Plato's style is its fluent ease, and there appears in all this passage to be a lack of that quality. The omission of ἐστι (proposed by Stalbaum and accepted by some editors) makes a perfectly natural and neat idiomatic sentence, viz. παντάπασι τὸ τῶν Σοφοκλῆς γίγνεται, δεσποτῶν πᾶν πολλοὶ καὶ μεσαμβαιον ἀπηλλάξθει, where the infinitive clause is exceptable of τὸ τῶν Σοφοκλῆς.

wise other than the best (Par. 4) and the first hand in two of less weight add γὰρ after ἐπεδεικτικοῦ. This of course clears away the difficulty of the first saynetai, but looks too much like a piece of early 'editing,' inasmuch as the loss of γὰρ is somewhat improbable.

τῶν...τοιητῶν...ἐφήμη κ.τ.λ. The genitive is that of emptiness—absence of, as with ἐκκαίνη, ἐρωτήσα τοῦ. Cf. inf. 370 μεγάλη τῶν ἄλλων ἄλογον (and with a verb 371 ἐργάζεσθαι τῷ αὐτῷ ἐρμοῦναί).—Hdt. vi. 185 ἔφηβος ἐς τὸν πολυκρινή, Eur. Iph. Ant. 547 γαλακτείας χρυσώκουσκα μαναρκόνων ὀμηρων.

κατατέθεαις. The metaphor, as in χαλάσωσις, is from the rack. Cf. Dem. Olympiod. 1173. 14 αὐτοπρομείον ἦν τῆς βασίν, and for mental torture Soph. O. T. 153 ἐκείνης ἀθανάτοις φιδέρων φέρει δελεάσα πάλαν, Plato Lyg. 204 c παρατάθεται ἰπτὸ ὑπὸ ακόλουθον βαρά λέγοντο.

χαλάσωσι may be equally transitive or intransitive here, as in many other places.

329 D. δεσποτῶν...ἐστι...ἀπηλλάξθει. If ἐστι is correct the rendering is 'it (the state of things) is (means) being rid of.' There is, of course, no relevance here in the usual sense of ἐστι with infin. 'it is possible.'

Jowett and Campbell quote Arist. Ath. Pol. c. 55 ἐστι δὲ ψυχή...ζεσθαι, 'the case is one of voting.' It is probable, however, as
stated above, that ἐπὶ is an interpolation, due to some Greek editor before the date of our text, who failed to catch the excausal construction of ἐπιλάθησα after τῷ τοῦ Σοφιστῆς, for which cf. inf. 332 σ κανονίζεται. ἰδί τοῦτο εἰς δίκαιαν, τῷ προσέκοψαν ἐκείνον ἀπολλάντων, Χορ. Od. 1. 92 εἰ μὲν δὲ τὸν τούτο φάειν μακράστηθε, νοστήσειν ὑπὸ θείων. Stallbaum notes that the position of ἐπὶ varies in the MSS, a fact which makes its claims suspicious, but does not by any means dispose of them, since transpositions of words are not rare in MSS even where all the words are certain.

τούτων πέρι...μᾶς τις αἵτιν τινί—cf. Phaed. 97 c εἰ δὲν τε μαθέων τὴν αἵτινα εἰρήνει περὶ ἑκάστου, and 98 b καὶ αὐ γεριτο τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι μὲν ἑτέρας τιμώτας αἵτις λέγει, &c.

It must not however be supposed that αἵτια περὶ τινός can be simply the equivalent of αἵτινς των. The words do not occur in immediate juxtaposition, and the analysis of the present sentence for example is 'in regard to these things' (περὶ = good attent ad)...there 'is one and only one cause.'

[περὶ and ἔσεσα are the only prepositions which good Attic prose allows to follow their cases.]

ὁ τρόπος—'the disposition;' 'temper.' Cf. Aeschin. in Ctes. 65. 1 μεταλάττετον τὸν τρόπον ἄλλα τῶν τόπων = androton πον ἀπάθεαι mutat.

καὶ τὸ γέρον—'then old age too (for its part).'

καὶ γέρον...καὶ γέρον χαλεπά—'not only age, but youth also is unpleasant,' γέρον thus becomes the more emphatic subject, or practically the subject; hence the singular ἐρμηνευειν and the position and gender of the adjective. V. inf. 332 β ἐπέρι μὴ ἄνδρον καὶ ἔλεγεν μελέτου γέρην.

τῷ τούτῳ—so τῷ μὴ κακῷ καὶ καθόλου.

CHAPTER IV.

ἀγαπᾷς εὖτε αὐτῶν ἑπόντος τοῦτο. Besides the common conceptions corresponding to those of θανατί, τίς ἄγαμα τινὰ τοιοῦτον and ἄγαμα τινὰ τέλλει, the verb ἄγαμασθαι may (probably from the influence of the latter) take a genitive of the person alone, as here. Cf. Xen. Oec. iv. 21 ἄγαμα τινὰ πατρωτῆσας. Ηερ. vi. 76 ἄγαμασθαι μὲν ἐφι οὗ ἓραν τούτῳ ἑρασάντιν οἵ προσέκοπτος τοῖς πολλάσκην. The position of εὖτε would itself shew that the genitive is not 'absolute.'

329 b] NOTES.

For the more familiar construction, cf. Rep. 426 ν τοῦτο ἐκδοθέν τίνα ἐγκεφάλους γιαγεῖσε τῆς ἑπάρκειας: Plato might here have written ἄγαμασθαι αὐτῶν ταῦτα, but ταῦτα here, of course, depends on εὐπόροι.

βολάμους οἴκους εἰς λέγειν διαλέγεσθαι. The expressed αὐτῶν belongs by position to λέγειν, with which it is absolutely required by the sense; but another αὐτῶν remains to be supplied with εὐπόροι. It is usual to express this by saying that αὐτῶν is constructed as κοινοῦ with both words. Stallbaum’s note of αὐτῶν εὐπόροι, 'cum commovebamin,' is misleading. It is not of course Socrates who 'wishes still to speak,' and 'to carry on the conversation' would require διαλέγεσθαι.

ἐλεγον. The imperfect of the attempt. For the use of the word itself, cf. Charmid. 162 ο βολάμους μὲν αὐτῶν ἐπέρι λέγειν λόγον ὑπεκείναι αὐτῶν ἐκεῖνον. Λυγ. 233 ε ἄριστον ἐλλα τῷ προτέρους κοινοῖ, Χερ. Mem. iv. 2 λοῦ βολάμους κοινοῖ τῶν Εὐδημίων. The procedure implied in κοινοῖ is eminently Socratic (see Introduction § 7 c).

329 E, τοῖς γὰρ πλονοίς...φασιν τὸν...ποιμην (οὐκ it) suggests that there was a well-known proverb to this effect. It has for its subject, not of παλλολ of the previous sentence, but 'they' = people at large, mankind.

There is little use in reconstructing with Murettus any hypothetical verum-proverba (γραμμα) out of these words.

λέγον τὸν τινί...οὶ μὲντοι...οἰ διὸν...οὐκαίνων—There is something in what they say, but by no means so much as they think.' λέγον τι is opposed to οἴκου λέγειν (nagari or menti), cf. Crat. 404 η καθευδέες τι λέγειν, with which contrast Symp. 305 δ καθευδέες ἄλογη λέγειν. Ευθύδ. 305 δ δοκιμός τι, δ Σδικράτες, λέγει: Lach. 193 καὶ γὰρ λέγειν γίνεται, ὑπὸ μὲντοι ἄλογες γε. Soph. O. T. 1475 ΟΙ, λέγω τι; KR, λέγει.

[As there is a distinct stress on τι in the present passage, some editors write λέγοντι ποιοί τι. There appears to be no certainty as to a Greek rule on the subject.]

For οἰ μὲντοι in answer to μὲν τ. sup. 327 λ. τ. serves to throw further emphasis, 'but not, be sure....'

τὸ φροσφίμα. The article implies that the story was well known: 'the Seriphian' (who has become historical).

Scribonius is an inconsiderable island in the Cyclades between Aitica and Paros. Like Babina, Cytinos and other out-of-the-way islands (v. Stob. Flor. xi. 8), it became proverbial as a 'Little Pddlington'
or 'Hole-and-Corner,' in which no one would be condemned to live.


... Cum vis in Cycada mithi
Contigit et parce tandem carissime Scribho
(referencing a time when banishment took the shape of which it was experienced by Napoleon I. at St Helena). A similar story appears in Herod. viii. 256 of a certain Timotheus of Aphidnae, to whomThemistocles said ostra zegy vou' oet.' Ev egy, loun Belmaistis, etnophy otho proe Synagognw, oth ev oth, asphoxe, zon 'Athenaiois, where the commentators seem to think the retort is the same as here. Examination however will show that, while the repartee here is sharp and double-barrelled, in Herodotus its force is much weaker, inasmuch as Timotheus was an Athenian and was not a Belmaist (hoi 'Athenaiois = 'though you are an Athenian'). The story had improved with use. It is told again by Plato (Themist. 151 a).

330 A. εδωκαριαν. That this, and not εδωκαριον, is the classical Attic prose form of optatives of -ω and -η verbs (ωω verbs in φιν) is acknowledged by grammarians. Cf. Meisterhans § 61, 8, and a full discussion in Rutherford New Phen. pp. 449 sqq. The use of Plato naturally exhibits the proper forms in the 1st person singular, while in everything else from εδωκαριον the 2nd person singular is palaeographically considered (e.g. ἵδεθαγομεν Ἀριστ. 17, καλλιτικ. ibid. 40 a, συνδια-

καταινερ Προτ. 361 b, εγκωθήμα Μανον 75 a and c), but in 2nd -εις the corruption was easier and is frequently made.

καὶ τοις δὴ μὴ πλασται—'so, in the case of the said (supposed) class who are not rich and...'; καὶ (as more frequently after a comparison introduced by δὲ et c.) gives the application, δὴ introduces into the sentence a tone very much like that imparted in English by the use of the ironical 'your'—'so with your poor people who...'

τάννηρι—to be connected with the negative, without which it does not occur. Cf. 419 a ἐπει τὰ σε φη δὴ πάνω τι εδωκαριον ποιεῖ τοῦτος τοῦ ἀποθανέται. Dem. in Naxos, 14 ἐν ὑποθανείτι τῶν φαντασμάτων πάνω τι τινὲς. Whereas ὃ τάννηρι may also = not at all (οὐτως non), τι πάνω τι has only the meaning non omnino, 'not altogether,' lit. 'not wholly, so to speak,' τι is frequent with adverbs, e.g. σχεδόν τι, μελλόν τι, et c. 

γέρος μετὰ πενιας. These words should be closely joined (cf. 'peace with honour'). So 372 b διάγοντες εν εἰρήνῃ μετὰ Γεραθυς, 591 τὸ πολίτης ποιεῖ τε καὶ δικαιώσειν μετὰ φροντίσεις κτερμήνης (ὁ

σώμα αὐχώς τε καὶ κάλλος μετὰ υγιείας λαμβάνων.
which is at present left with asyndeton; i.e. ὅτι ἐπεκτεινόμεν, μένους τις ήγεις χρηματισθή, 'in regard to any little I may have acquired, I have stood about midway.' Cephalus would thus not deny having made some acquisition, while he would speak of it modestly in the word ὢνοια (quantumque, quanta quantae). The initial Ο might easily be lost after Ω.

μένους...το τε πάσπον καὶ τοῦ πατρός. μένους with genitive is frequent enough. Cf. Polit. 303 λ ἐνδεικτή Δῆλον μένους, and in Latin, Hor. Od. ii. 19. 27 paece eram meditique belli (though not in the same sense). More deserving of remark, however, is the use of τε...καὶ in such contrasts (= on the one side...on the other). Cf. 360 Υ ἐναντισώμεθα τον το δικαιότατον καὶ τον ἄδικοτατον. Asch. P. F. V. 927 δον το τ' ἀρεν καὶ το δοκεόμεν ἄρχα. There is something of the sort, but otherwise expressed, in Latin in e.g. Hor. Sat. i. 7. 11 inter...Praemedit animosum atque inter Achilles | Ira fuit.

πάσπος τε καὶ ἀγάμος ἵππο. That it was almost the rule for Greek names to alternate thus in a family is well known. Among familiar instances are Nicias—Nicias—Niscatus, Nicomachus—Aristotle—Nicomachus, Sophocles—Iophon—Sophocles, Xanthippos—Paricles—Xanthippos. Cf. Lasch. 179 ζ γένος ὡς ἂν αὐτῶν, δὲ καὶ διὰ τῆς ἄκαμπτι, οὐδέ τις ἄκαμπτι ἂν καὶ αὐτὸς ἄκαμπτι 'Ἀριστοτῆς γὰρ αὐτῶν καλὸν' (i.e. Thucydides—Mellesia—Thucydides, and Aristotle—Lysoimachus—Aristides). The same custom is more than hinted at in Asch. Eum. 8, where it is said of Phoebus, grandmother of Phoebus,

ἄλον...δ' ἄγαμον ἰδέα

Φοίβος 'το φοίβος τ' ἴππον' ἔχει παραμόρφω

There is consequently much in van Pintestaer's suggestion that the name Ἀγαμάτα immediately following ought to be Ἀριστέα. This would give the alternation Cephalus—Λυσία—Cephalus—Λυσία.

ἀλάτο...πλείω—neuter plural. If τὸν ὀνόματι were understood, αὐτῶν would be almost indispensable, and πλείω would rather be ριζών.

οὐ τοι τέκνα ἑρμὴν...ςτα. A frequent idiom. 'Why I asked you (was this, τὸν ὁμῶ...), because.' Cf. 491 π νῦν πάσαν σωματικῶτας ἀλώνας, ὅτι ὑπὲρ ἐκείνον...ἀνάλληλον, Phaedr. 264 π ὡς ἔνδεια τὰ πάθη ἐκ τῆς...καὶ λ. Lach. 154 π, de.

330 C. διπλῆ...ὅς ἀλλο—'in a twofold way as compared with other people,' διπλή being explained later by (1) ταύτῃ τε (ec. as creators love their own creations, summing up ὠπερ...ἀγαμής) (2) καὶ κατὰ τὴν χρήσην (for their practical utility). ὑ follows διπλῇ or διπλάσιον ὅπως as it follows comparatives, πλεῖον, μᾶλλον ὅπως.

For the thought cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. iv. 1. 20 ἀνθρωπομοσχεύοντα δὲ εἴναι δοκεῖν, οὐ μὴ κηρύσσομεν ἀλλὰ παραλαβοῦμεν τὴν ὀπίσθιαν, ἀποκριθεὶς τῷ γὰρ τῇ ἐπίδειξι, καὶ πάντες ἀγάμας μᾶλλον τὰ αὐτῶν ἑραία ὠπερ οὐ γονεῖ καὶ οἱ πνεύματα, καὶ ἦδι τι. 7. ὑ προφανοῦσι γὰρ ὁτι δόλων τὰ ἀλεξία πολλάκια στρέφοντες ὡπερ τέλεα.

CHAPTER V.

330 D. εὖ γὰρ ὑπό. γάρ is introductory. 'You must know...'

ἐνθάδε τοι ἑγγείρετας τελευτήσωμεν—'when a man gets near thinking he is going to die.' Apparently there is some confusion between the thoughts ἑγγέρζει τοι τελευτήσωμεν and ἐριέται ἐγών ἔμειν το τελευτήσωμεν.

δέκα καὶ φροντίς—the two words form one notion: 'fear and anxiety' = 'anxious fear'; hence the sing. ἀνεξίχνια.

περὶ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς περὶ δὲ. Note imperf. Ἀνεξίχνια, 'concerning which it used not to occur to him.'

ἐνθάδε...ἐκεί: The euphemism ἐκεί, 'in the other world,' answered by ἐνθάδε, 'in this world,' is almost too common to require remark. Yet cf. Eur. Med. 1078 ἐκεῖ γενειακῶς, ἀλλ' ἐκεί, Soph. Ant. 76 πλείως χρὴν | ὃν δὲ μ' ἄρχειν τοῖς κατὰ τῶν ἐνθάδε, Aj. 555, Ag. Rhes. 32 (where, the scene being in Hades, the two words are reversed) δ' ἐκείνος μὲν ἐνθάδε, εἰκόνος δ' ἐκεί. Inf. 365 λ ἀ τι τῶν ἐκεί κατὰ ἀπόλους ἡμᾶς.

καταγελάσωμοι τέσσερ' ἐκ τῶν φυλακῶν. Besides possessing the meaning 'for a time' τέσσερ' is demonstrative, 'up to that time,' 'formerly.' Cf. Asch. Cho. 993 τῶν φίλων, δυσὶ ἠγάμω. Lysias in Epic. 16 ὠπερ ἐν τούτων χρήσιν εἰσήκουσιν ἑστή (= adhibue).

τότε δὴ—then, if not before.'

στρεφόμενοι—Make him uneasy.' Cf. verbae, and the use of ὠπερ and the impersonal στρέφει of the colic.

μὴ ἄνθρωπος ὑπέκαθι—'For fear they may prove true.' The words στρεφόμενοι αὐτοῖς τῷ πείρατι ἑπιστήμου ἑστή (= adhibue).
The passage as usually read and punctuated is lax and difficult. If we write καὶ αὐτὸς ἦν...καθορὶς αὐτῷ as an independent sentence ending with a full stop or colon (and with δ’ οὖν following in the sense 'however that may be'), we shall be obliged to render 'He gets a better view of things in Hades either through the weakness of old age or else because he has got, so to speak, nearer to them.' But though the weakness of old age may be conducive to alarm, it can hardly be conducive to clearer sight.

If, on the other hand, we place a comma after αὐτῷ, the passage becomes harshly anacholitic, καθορὶς being an error for καθορὰς of a sort which it would be hard to parallel in Plato. 'And, either through the weakness of old age, or else because it was...at the same time Tim. 28 ά δὴ πάνω οὐρανῶν ἢ κάμος ἢ καὶ ἀλλ’ ἢ τι ποτε δυναμεῖς...ποινεῦσθαι δ’ οὖν περὶ αὐτοῦ πρότατον. That nominative pupils, however, is common enough in Greek, and there arises in regard to the meaning any such ambiguity as is entailed in the present passage. Nevertheless, whether a particular anacoluthon (resulting in or produced by a confusion of thought) is probable or improbable, is one of those matters about which opinions of competent scholars will differ without hope of definite settlement.

The whole passage is rendered both grammatical and logical if we insert ει after ἔστηρ and before ἦν (εἰ after εἰ and before ἦν, with which its pronunciation became almost identical). Thus θύω ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ γάμου αὐτεῖας ἢ καὶ ἔστηρ <ἀ> θυίῳ ἐγγυτέρα ὡς τὸν ἔκλει μᾶλλον τι καθορὰ αὐτά, ἦσθαρ γάρ θι οὖν...either through the weakness of old age, or else as if, being nearer...he catches a better glimpse...no matter how it is, he...’ Indeed it is a question whether for ἦν itself we should not read εἰ ἦν (ἐστήρ εἰ ἦν). The δὴ would qualify the rather quaint notion. But δὴ has a point worth retaining.

For δ’ οὖν resumptive (sed), after the quasi-parenthesis ἦν...ἀνευρέστω, cf. Apol. 69 B ei δὴ τις ὅτι όστις ἔχει, οὐκ ἔδωκεν μὲν γὰρ ἔγνωκεν, εἰ δ’ οὖν..., and frequently. διάφαντος—a word used by Thucydides, but otherwise in Attic mainly confined to poetry. So Plato uses εἰμι, but with other old-fashioned terms and phrases, μετὰ κακῆς ἐλπίδος—ἐλπίς originally signifies 'expectation,' whether good or bad. (Cf. δίκα, ἡμέρα, δόλως with meanings εἰς ἀπεφέσα.) Plato himself writes, Legg. 644 6, πρὸς τὸ δὴ πάντων ἀμφοῖν αὐτὸ δόξας μελετάντων, οὐ κοινοὶ μὲν δομαὶ ἐλπίς, οἷον δὲ δόξας μὲν ἡ πρὸς λύπης ἐλπίς, ἐρροσὶ δὲ ἡ πρὸς τοῦ ἔκτασε. Hence, though ἐδέξασθαι τῶν ἐλπίδων is usually 'to cheat one of his hope,' in Soph. Aj. 1382 καὶ μὲν ἄνωθεν ἐλπίδως πολὺς 'γεγονός ὑεχοὺς (agreeably) disappointed me.' ἔρημος and σερφυον are similarly used in Latin, e.g. Livy ii. 3. 17 (bellum) sse omnia senis fuit. The opposite met à καλὸς ἐλπίς occurs in 406 ε.

331 Α. ἤμεν ἐλπίς αὐτήν καὶ ἀγάθην γυρηπότροφος—'Hope is always with him to gladden him (ἡμέα) and to be a kindly nurse of his old age.' [The order is altogether against construing as if it were ἤμεν καὶ ἀγάθην ἐλπίς αὐτήν γυρηπότροφος.] Ἐλπίς is personified. The γυρηπότροφοι (οἱ γυρηπότροφοι) were usually the sons or daughters.

δικαῖος καὶ ἄλογος. The usual order, at least in the formula τὸ δικαῖο καὶ δίκαιον, is the reverse. The present order occurs in Gorg. 507 ε ἄνω, and in a negative sentence Legg. 86. 1. ὁ δὲ γὰρ ἐν νόμησιν οὐδὲ ὑπὸ καὶ τὸ δικαίον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον (οὐ γὰρ) ἡμῖν. Ἀπολόπαθος (114. 9) has the full expression πρὸς θεῶν δικαίον καὶ πρὸς αὐθαίρετον δίκαιον. Similarly Polyb. xxxiv. 10. 8. See also Cobet Var. Legat. p. 359. Cf. Gorg. 507 ε παρὰ μὲν αὐθαίρετον τὸ προ- ὑκτοῦν πρότατον δίκαιον, παραλληλοποιητῶν θεῶν. Iliad. 523 Ζ, ἡ δίκαιος καὶ ἄλογος is answered by ἀδίκος καὶ ἄδικος.

polostrophon γράμμα κυβερνήτης. The human γράμμα is regarded as a ship, whose head is kept right whenever it would swerve aside, γράμμα means 'thought' or 'mood,' which is variable and erratic (polostrophos) unless there is some steady influence at the helm.

331 B.  τὸ γάρ μηδὲ...πλεύσθην δεδομένη. A nominativas pen-
dens. The sentence begins as if it would run somewhat thus, τὸ γάρ μηδὲ...πλεύσθην, δεδομένη, (τοῦτο) ὡς ἴκνητα ἐκ τῆς τῶν χρησιμῶν κτήσεως συμβαίνει. It actually ends as if it had begun εἰς γάρ τὸ μηδὲ...πλεύσθην. 'For that one should not even unintentionally cheat or deceive anybody, nor yet, through owing either sacrifices to a god or money to a man, therefore (consequently, δεδομένη) depart to Hades in fear—to this end the possession of money greatly contributes.' The force of ἰκνητα is simply 'thereafter,' and this may mean, according to context, (1) 'consequently,' (2) 'nevertheless.' With its value here of. Lach. 192 ἐν πείρᾳ δ' ἐπιεύει, τε οὐδ' εἰσίναι...ἐντεύσαται, ἀνδρέα κλέησιν.

ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐν ἄνθρωπον ὡς ἐλάχιστον...θελγαν ἐν...πλεύσθην χρησιμο-

331 C. τὸ τοῦτο δὲ αὐτὸ, τὴν δικαιοσύνην. See Introd. on this

place.

πάσα φύσις. Cf. 397 ν οἷς ποιημένων;

The tone and implication of the future and those of the deliberative subjunctive are different. τι φιλεῖ = 'what ought we to say?' τι φιλεῖν = 'what are we going to say?' The distinction should be apprehended even in clauses where the two uses occur together and are often spoken of as identical, e.g. Eur. Ion 708 εὐκρινεῖν; η σεβάσματε; η τι διδακομισθή

ἄλλως οὕτως. These words, as in 886 μ, θέμα 75 καρυγχυλοτρὸποι
pέρα ὠφείλεται ἐν ἔγγοις, ὅτι σχιματικά τί ἐστιν, οὐκ ὠφείλεται ἀψίδα ὧν σχίμα, and Prot. 251 α ὡς ἄλλον...ἀπλάθος οὕτως, ὅτι ἐν ἔγγοις, may be translated in two ways, according as the stress is laid on one or on the other.

(1) With the stress rather on οὕτως (i.e. with οὕτως qualified by ἄλλως), 'simply so' i.e. 'so, without qualification,' in which case οὕτως would be explained by τις ἐλάχιστον καὶ τὸ ἀποθέοινον τοῦτο νοτικής πλευρῆς. 'Shall we say that it is truth—speaking just in that way, without qualification—and the restitution of something received?'

The position of the words, however, in the middle of the explanatory terms makes against this interpretation.
(2) With the stress rather on ἀπὸ́ς (i.e. with ὅπως qualifying ἀπὸ́ς) 'just absolutely' (= 'neither more nor less').

Both position and usage are in favour of this rendering of ὅπως.


Compare also inf. 320 ὅλλοι, ὅπως, λέγοντες τὸ μείζον ὅπως.

责任制 τοὺς τοῦτον—καὶ ἀποθέων καὶ ἀποδίδωσιν. The point of ὅπως is 'even these things,' i.e. unlikely as it may appear that truth and restitution could ever be unjust.

εἰ τις λέσα... διὰ μᾶς ἀπαντήσῃ. For a similar (somewhat awkward) combination of clauses with ὅπως cf. Meno 74 b (where there are three), Theset. 147 a. Cicerho borrows the illustration in De Offic. iii. 26.

οὕτω δικάσων εἰς ἐκ... τοῦτον λέγων—i.e. 'you would be the man who did so restore it (ὁ ἀποδιόδων) to him, not yet (would he be so) ὅπως he consented (καταλήγων without article) to tell the man who was in such a state the whole truth and nothing but the truth' (παῦρατα ταλήτης has either or both these meanings).

331 D. ὅρας—a definition. Cf. Aristot. Met. xiii. 1078 b ἐν δόλῳ γὰρ ἔτερον ἀπὸν ἄποδιώσει Σαρκατοὶ δικαίων, τοῦτο γ’ ἐπεκτεινοῦσα λέγοντι καὶ τὸ δριθείσαν καθόλου ('inductive reasoning and the definition of general terms').

Of the cardinal virtues, as the Republic is concerned with justice, so the Laches turns upon the definition of courage, and the Chermades upon that of temperance. See more on the subject in Introduction § 7.

Σμοκάνθη—i.e. the lyric poet Simonides of Ceos (not of Amorgos), who lived c. 556—467.

Other allusions (apparently to the same historic sage occur in 356 c, and 499 a, and the Protagoras 339 ἂν he again supplies a text in the well-known lines ἀνὴρ ἄγαθον μὲν ἀλλὰ κατὰ μείζον γενέθλιον, χαλέπιον, χαλέπιον τε καὶ σῶλον τέρσην, ἄλλον ψύχον τετυγμένον, καὶ μέντοι... καὶ παραθέτωμι ἄνων. The first καὶ implies the thought ('well, you have joined in') and... The second is attached to παραθέτωμι in the sense 'I do (indeed, as a matter of fact) hand over the discussion to you (μεν, the rest of the company), μέντοι as in 329 c. The whole thus—'nay (it is well you speak as if the discussion were in your hands), and I do resign it to you.' For the graceful retirement of Cephalus see Introduction § 8 c.

331 E. ἀλλὰ μέντοι—'nay but (indeed)...' Cf. Xen. Anab. iv. 6, 16.

σοφὸς γὰρ καὶ θεός ἄνθρ. σοφὸς (doctus) was a standing epithet of poets, but the term is used with a special significance in speaking of Simonides. Cf. Cic. Nat. Deor. i. 22 Simonides non item poeta suavis, sed etiam cataractus doctus sapiensque traditum. For the combination of adjectives cf. Protag. 315 ο ἄστις σοφός γὰρ μοι δεοείς ἁπάντως καὶ θεοὺς (of Providence), and very similarly, after mention of the same person, Theset. 151 ἔκλεισο σοφὸς τε καὶ θεατής αὐθαίρετος.

The reading ἄνθρῳ is apparently given by xas of less authority, ἄνθρῳ by those of greater. The common source is almost certainly ἄνθρῳ. Where metre absolutely requires ἄνθρῳ there is often διψατο ἄνθρῳ itself is of course translatable enough: 'for he is a wise and extraordinary man'; but, since palaeographically ἄνθρῳ and ἄνθρῳ are

1. Τῶν γα... κληρονόμους. The words contain a double meaning: (1) 'P. is heir to your share in the discussion,' (2) playfully—'then you give us to understand that P. is to be your heir (at your death). Socrates pretends that in his remark to Polemarchus Cephalus has shown he has made his will, since he has thus formally recognised him. Hence γιλάρας in the next sentence, 'Oh, of course,' said he, with a laugh.' In τῶν γα... τοῦ παραταστεῖ γαρ, the particle supplies the same force as the tone in, 'then we know who your heir is.'

γιλάρας. Though this sort or participle literally = 'having broken into a laugh,' it is best rendered in English by 'with a laugh.'

Certain norists, e.g. ἐπὶ θείως, οπίσθιως, ζωή, ζωήσαν τὸ ρήθην, ἐγκαθίστας, θεόν, are used idiomatically in positions where English requires the present. Cf. Ar. Eq. 686 ἔστθεν ἀπολλαίος, ἔστθεν γιλαράταις. Inf. 333 ἐν... ἔργον ἐλέγετο. 345 ἐθαμαμα. Goodwin M. and T. § 60 says that 'α awakened action, which is just taking place, is spoken of as if it had already happened.' It is, however, difficult to feel satisfied with that account of the matter.

Rather the sense was originally explainable on strict principle. 'I approved (as soon as you spoke),' 'I understood you (before you had finished), I was delighted (when I heard you),' &c. That the feeling or demonstration continues into the present, and that, therefore, ἐστίν, ἀνθρώπος, δέχομαι, γελοῦν, ἥμας, might stand where the norists stand, is no proof that the tense-suggestion did not exist in the sorist.

CHAPTER VI.

331 E. ἀλλὰ μέντοι—'nay but (indeed)...' Cf. Xen. Anab. iv. 6, 16.

σοφὸς γὰρ καὶ θεός ἄνθρ. σοφὸς (doctus) was a standing epithet of poets, but the term is used with a special significance in speaking of Simonides. Cf. Cic. Nat. Deor. i. 22 Simonides non solum poeta suavis, sed etiam cataractus doctus sapiensque traditum. For the combination of adjectives cf. Protag. 315 τος σοφος γὰρ μοι δεοείς ἁπάντως καὶ θεοὺς (of Providence), and very similarly, after mention of the same person, Theset. 151 ἔκλεισο σοφὸς τε καὶ θεατής αὐθαίρετος.

The reading ἄνθρῳ is apparently given by xas of less authority, ἄνθρῳ by those of greater. The common source is almost certainly ἄνθρῳ. Where metre absolutely requires ἄνθρῳ there is often διψατο ἄνθρῳ itself is of course translatable enough: 'for he is a wise and extraordinary man'; but, since palaeographically ἄνθρῳ and ἄνθρῳ are
equally probable, it is usage and environment which must decide when the use differs. Usage is rather in favour of 'the man is wise and admirable.' See however Ar. Rph. 908 Θερηματίσι; σοφός γάρ αυτός καὶ δικαίος ἐν τῇ πάντῃ.

θεῖος = 'extraordinary,' often with an implication of inspiration (ανασκητήριον).

Cf. Meno 81 b Πλάτων καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν τῶν ποιητῶν, ὡσπερ θεοῦ εἶτι. Phaedr. 234 b συμβαθάγχαλα μετὰ σὺ τῆς θείας κεφαλῆς. Meno 108 c ὅποιον...Δίκαιον τούτου θείον καὶ καλεῖ τὸν ἄνδρα, έστιν γὰρ ἡ ἐξουσία πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα κατεργάσον ὁμοίως καὶ λέγοντας; ἀλλ' ᾧ καὶ οἱ Δίκαιοι ὅτι τινὶ ἐγκατασταθοῦν ἐφικίαν ἄνδρα 'θείον (really σίγεντες) ἄνθρωπον, 'ανθρώπον.' Cf. inf. 385 e τῶν σοφῶν τις καὶ μακαρίων ἄνδρας.

γνωστόκες—οὐ γράφως, but 'you can make out,' 'you perceive.' ἐγὼ δὲ ἦγνω. For the Socratic irony see Introduction § 22 a. παρακαταθικόν. In the comparative rarity of large and trustworthy banks, strong-rooms, or opportunities for profitable and safe investments, it was not uncommon with Greeks and Romans (when about to travel &c.) to entrust money or articles of value to the safe keeping of friends or persons of known probity. Such παρακαταθήκαι (fideicommissa) were evidently very much at the mercy of their temporary holder, and a special bona fides was expected of him. For an instance of such depositing in its crudest form see the story in Hdt. vi. 86, and the allusions to it in Juv. xv. 174 sqq.

ἀγαθόν—after παρακαταθήκαι. The word is more emphatic than if it had been (τῶν παρακ. τῆς τινὶ) τινὶ, and = 'where a man has deposited a thing with anyone whatever,' i.e. 'in any case whatever where a man receives a deposit.'

μὴ σωφρόνεις ἀπαιτεῖτε—i.e. εἰ ἀπαιτεῖ αὐτὸ μὴ σωφρόνεις.

The use of the adverb is exceptional in reference to 'the condition of the agent and not to the mode of action' (Jowett and Campbell), μὴ σωφρονεύουσιν ἀπαιτεῖτε would be an intolerable casuistry. We may compare Shakepear Henry V. ii. 1 'If a son do sinfully miscarry upon the sea' (i.e. in his sins).

332 A. ἀποδοτόν δὲ...ἀπότε τι...ἀπορίαν. It is an error to call this the optative of 'indefinite frequency,' inasmuch as in the technical acceptance of the term that optative is only used in past conjunctions. On the other hand it is in no way necessary, but shews a want of appreciation of Greek idiom, to alter with Madvig into the obvious ἀποκεί. Cf. inf. 381 a ἄδρον ὅπως (καὶ ἀποκεί) εἰτε τοῦ δικαίου ἐπί τῶν δικαιῶν ἐξέκαστο τοῦτος εἰτε, Gorg. 482 c ἐγώ γάρ

332 b] \[NOTES.\]

οἷς καὶ τὴν λέξιν μια κριτήριον ἐκείνον ἀμφοτέρων τε καὶ διαφωνεῖν, καὶ χρηστὸν διὰ τὴν ὁμολογίαν, Soph. O. T. 970 ἐκείνος κρίττων (καὶ ὅτι) ἡ ἀμφιβολία ἐν τῇ διαμαρτυρίᾳ (where see Jebb's note), Antig. 666 ἄλλιν ἐπὶ πολὺς στράτες, τοῦτο ἡρῴας οἰκεῖο, El. 1344, O. T. 315, Xen. Cyr. i. 6. 19 τοῦ λέγειν ὅτι σαφῶς εἰσελήφθη ἑδρείς. Thuc. i. 120 σωφρόνων εὐθυς, ἐλ ἐδικαστέω, ἔρυγμα. Goodwin M. and T. § 555. See also Jell § 831.

Such sentences belong to the class of 'mixed conditionals,' which become exceedingly frequent in late Greek writers, e.g. Lucian. It would, for instance, be possible to write here with formal correctness (1) ἀποδοτῶν (ἔστι)...ἀπότατο (καὶ τοὺς) ἀπαύγης, (2) ἀποδοτῶν (ἔστι)...ἀποτάτων (καὶ τοὺς) ἀπαύγης, (3) ἀποδοτῶν ἐκ εἰσ...ἀπότατο (καὶ τοὺς) ἀπαύγης. In the present example, as in the others quoted, it is a matter of indifference whether we speak of the apodosis or the proasis as the 'irregular clause.' Each is formally 'irregular' relatively to the other. It is worth noting, with Goodwin, that this construction occurs almost only when the apodosis states an 'obligation, propriety, possibility &c.'

λέγει ό τὰ ὀφειλόμενα δικαίως εἰσί σποδιδόμαι—"means by his saying (τὸ) that 'it is just to make restitution of what is due.'"

τὸ ἅπαν τὰ that follows, as if the words τὰ...ἀποδιδόμαι were beneath quotation marks. Cf. 385 b τοῦτο εἶπεν θεῖον...δὲ λέγει...τάπτων ἐνιαυκός for the use of λέγει (= I mean by saying...)

ἀλλ' μᾶς...—nay, something else certainly'; v. sup. 329 a. μᾶς. The combination μᾶς τινὲς ἃ Δίας ὁμιλεῖ 469 a. Cf. Phædo 65 b, 68 b, 73 b &c.

μαθήσω...ὑμνὶ δ' ἐγώ...ἐτι... It is best to make ἐτι independent of μαθήσω and = διότι, 'because.'

332 B. βλαβερὰ μήκη. The singular not so much because ἀναθέως καὶ ἡ λήψις form one notion (each action necessarily implying the other), as because the real subject is felt to be ἡ λήψις. Cf. sup. 329 a καὶ γήρας καὶ νέοντα χειρὶς βασιλεῖαν.

ὅπερ καὶ προσήκεια—as an impersonal verb προσήκεια differs from ὅπερ and χρήσει in expressing that which befits, or is called for by, a particular set of relations. Here, of course, it is not impersonal, but the connotation remains the same. 'What, you know, suits their relationship.' It is this expression which prompts the correction made below (c) by Socrates (προσήκεια).

The γε after παρά and the explanatory καὶ indicate a certain amount of scruple in pleading for the doing of injury to anyone. For the scruple and the half-exculping tone contained in γε cf.
332 ν. Διδύς is a common expletive in appeals of remanence. Cf. Apol. 25 ν ἔρωτι ὅπως εἶναι, δ' πρὸς Διδύς Μέλαντη, κ.τ.λ. Μένος Τι ἂν δὲ ἄντος, δ' πρὸς Διδύς, Μέλαντη, τι φαν ἢ ἄρτων εἶναι. That δ' does not belong to the vocative, but forms an integral part of the expletive, is clear from e.g. Soph. Aq. 371 ν ὅπως ἦπεί καὶ φρῷσιν εἶναι. Inf. 459 ν ἂν ἦπε, δ' πρὸς Διδύς, προσνεκηκαί τι τοις τοῖς γάμοις; θα. In Protag. 305 ν ὅ, τι λέγεις; simply. [The circumflex, δ' or δ, is doubtful.]

CHAPTER VII.

ψυθατο...σκευασμα—'spoke darkly (in riddles) as poets do.' Cf. Theaet. 152 α τοῦτο ἦν μέν ψυθατο τὸ πολλὸν εὐφαντο, τοῖς δὲ μαθηταῖς ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τὴν ἀληθείαν δείγνωσιν.

The construction is ψυθατο τὸ δικαίως, δ' εἴη. See on 327 α τῷ ἐργεῖν βουλόμενον καθαρικὰ κ.τ.λ. διενεργοί—'meant, not 'thought.'

332 C. τοῦτο...ἀπολογίσατο. The infinitive is exegetical of τοῦτο. (The article τὸ of course belongs to προσήκον.) See on 329 ν (inf.) and cf. Gorg. 491 ν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτο ἀντὶ τῶν ἄλλων, τοῦτο δὲ οὐκέμενον ὁφελόμενον—not τὸ ὁφελόμενον, but τὸ and for this he used the word ὁφελόμενον.

ἀλλὰ τι ὅτι; εἴη—'Well, and what have you to say of it?' said Polemarchus.

It is hard to understand what is difficult is that editors have found in these words, and which has caused some (after Mavryg) to treat ἀλλὰ τι ὅτι as part of Socrates' speech, and then to continue with ἔρωτι (= ἔρωσὶς sc. Polemarchus), while others have boldly omitted ἔρωτι and run on ἀλλὰ τι ὅτι, δ' πρὸς Διδύς, ἦν δ' ἐρώτα, thus creating a sentence in which ἦν δ' ἐρώτα is both superfluous and badly placed.

It is usual to say with Stallbaum that ἀλλὰ τι ὅτι; = ἀλλὰ τι (ἀλλὸ) ὅτι; and to compare e.g. Gorg. 430 ν τι γὰρ δέ φάσεις; (= τί γὰρ δὲ ἀλλο φάσεις). But in a matter of fact the words convey no implication that Polemarchus confirms Socrates' statement of the case. He simply asks, 'Well, what then is your opinion?'

δ' πρὸς Διδύς. These words belong to the question which continues with δ' Σωκράτης. They are supposed to be uttered by the person (της) who interrogates, not by Socrates. "I replied, 'If any one had asked him. "In the name of Zeus, Simonides..."'"
were, or in what precise manner any one of them was played. The feature apparently common to all games of πεττοί was a board marked with lines and occupied by pieces to be moved, as in chess or draughts, or else as in backgammon.

From Aristot. Pol. l. 2. 10 ὡς παρὰ δίσολον ἡ σκαλίσσα ἐν πεττοῖς, and an epigram by Agathias (Anth. Pal. ix. 489) it appears that one well-known form of πεττοὶ was almost the same as the Roman ludus duodecim scriptorum, and very much like backgammon. To this game may very well refer the words ins. 457 ν ἱστερον ἐν τῶν πεττεύον δείκτων οἱ μὲ τελευτάτων ἀποκλείονται καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὑπ’ ἐν ἁρμονίαν (cf. Polyb. 7. 84), though these are usually taken as applying to another familiar form of πεττεύειν closely resembling draughts. The latter is described by Pollux (ix. 37) as a game in which πάντες (οἱ παιδεῖς) κατὰ τοὺς παιδίων ἐκ τῶν παιζόντων ἐπὶ πάντες γραμμαί, but as to exactly how it was played, we have no information.

For the present passage it would be obviously quite irrelevant to inquire farther into details. In πεττοῖς Plato is thinking of any and every kind of chess, draughts or backgammon playing.

Theos is the technical name for a move (θέσθα τῆς ψέφου). Thus in the epigram of Agathias (Ζηραία) τῶν παλαιότερον θέον θέα. That the παρακαταδείκνυσι might have almost a professional character appears from ins. 574 ὁ πεττευόν δὴ ἐκ πεπεραστοῦ ἑαυτὸν ὅπως ἦν εἰς τόσον μὲν αὐτὸ τοῦ ἐκ παιδοῦ ἐπιτεθεῖτο ἄλλως παρεήγη τρίαν. Εἰς κρατητοῦ—50. καταλαμβάνω.

333 C. ἦτο παρακαταδείκνυσι καὶ σῶν ἐίνα. The implied subject of ἦτο (viz. αὐτός) is the object of παρακαταδείκνυσι. The next sentence contains a similar change of subject, viz. ἦτο μᾶλλον δή (ἡμῖς) αὐτῷ χρήσαι ἄλλα (δὴ αὐτῷ) καθήκα. Cf. 349 καὶ 360 λ (φανοῖ) ἄφεινα αὐτῶσον γενέσθαι τὸς παρακαταδείκνυσι καὶ διαλέγεσθαι (οὐκ αὐτῶ) ὡς περὶ οἷον. 

Σῶν is a word frequently used of money, e.g. Ar. Lys. 488 τάργανον σῶν παρέχετο. Cf. Plaut. Pers. ii. 5. 23 argentum hoc actuatione insidere. Καθήκα—be idē;’ Cf. Hom. H. ii. 658 καίτο γὰρ ἐν νῆσει (sc. Achilēs).

ἐν’ αὐτῷ—‘in dealing with it,’ or ‘in charge of it.’

333 D. καὶ κοινῆ καὶ ιδικ.—i.e. whether it be kept jointly (as belonging to partners), or where an individual only is concerned. 

Jowett’s ‘to the individual and to the state’ makes κοινῆ = δημοσία. But what has the state to do with a pruning-hook?
CHAPTER VIII.

333 E. ei pro's tê dêxhrona khrêsmonon òn tênykhâna. The participle is assimilated to the gender of khrêsmoN.

The neuter adjective with masculine or feminine noun is common as a predicate, and a feminine participle following immediately would naturally sound awkward. Cf. 420 c o géo térâdmoi, kallistôn òn, k.t.l. In 336 ò fêpiai òn ou thûno orphovan òi khiphsoN òn the attraction is less called for, and is due to a confusion of subject with predicate. So 331 ò eukkhôN òi tênykheN òn diakvutên. The reverse assimilation, from neuter to feminine, appears in 334 ò oustatô kai diakwuo ou oûN ou stoû, xochê estûnai, eVê orenê tê tênykhêN ou stû. For attraction of participles generally see Jelf (§ 388), who quotes, among other passages, Lese 785 ò proûvêN dêxhronaN anàstôn òn oustatô, megistôn òi ou stûn kaiN âphsou fêlêwv k.t.l.

The sense 'only' is obtained by emphasis on dêxhrona. See note on òdêkê hêmûkhrôN 332 c.

That ònûnon can be dispensed with is clear also from o.g. 357 ò ò ò fêpiai, ou thûno, kaiN exhômaN (so, ònûnon). Cf. Herod. ii 128 ò tênikheN òi kiphsan ou chôN (so, mân) hêmûkhrô. Moreover the emphatic juxtaposition of dêxhrona khrêsmon is sufficient for the point; 'if it comes to being useful for the useless.'

êve tûv kal allâ. The proper Attic order (not êve kal tân allâ). Lit. 'and (it holds good) in one of another kind as well.'

Êpê ouN ouNou oustatô deîfês fêlêzôNai kai laðhêN oustôn deîfês âphsouNai. The best mas give this unsatisfactory reading; two inferior copies substitute kal mi laðhêN fô kal laðhêN; some have kal befoe âphsouNai.

(1) Taking the reading which is best authenticated, we have first to consider the punctuation, determining to which clause kal laðhêN belongs. (a) Òpê ouN ouNou oustatô deîfês fêlêzôNai kai laðhêN, oustôn deîfêsouNai âphsouNai; is favoured by some editors. Yet kal laðhêN is surely meaningless, nor can laðhêN be joined with an accusative of the thing. If, on the other hand, we were to personify nûson (with Jowett), it would be necessary to keep up the personification in the following clause, and that device is impossible with âphsouNai. If, therefore, fêlêzôNai-kal laðhêN be taken as fêlêzôNai

334 A. òstera...xalâNai—so, âgadêv évou. Cf. ònêk. Mêm. i. 6 τòv sýstratôn éva nêr...âpîroûNai kai fêlêzôNai têk kai klêptôn kai prokeptôn kai ârasthâN. Hêrâphr. v. 2 xêr dê maçkêstêNai évaN tê kai têN fêlêNaiN éouN klêptôn èpitouNai. The notion here is of 'getting secret possession' combined with that of 'forestalling.'

klêptônêuN is often difficult to render in English, but may be resolved into a verb supplemented by the adverb 'by stealth.' ònêk. Mêm. v. 6. 9 klêptôn tê nêr 'occupy by stealth' (kal lêrha keraKâmaN); klêptôn fêgêv 'toe by stealth' (lêrha fêgêv). Frequently, however (as seen in the examples given), the notion of forestalling is also present, the sense being that of matching
what another was on the point of obtaining. Cf. 'to steal a march.'

334 B. Αὐτολόκον. Ημ. Ὀδ. ix. 396

The title ἐσθὼν justifies the word ἄγατος used by Socrates, but it does not justify him in quoting Autolycus as a type of the dis- casos, even in what Mr Merry calls 'the society of low morality' represented in the Odyssey. The ἕρης was a cunning use of oaths to cover his thefts while selling short of absolute perjury, or an equally cunning evasion of oaths when made. The character of Autolycus is given in Οἰδ. Μετ. 1132.

334 C. καλὶ ἐργασίας ἄριστος:—i.e. καλὶ ἐργασίας (λέγεσις ἐκείνης) ἄριστος, “and do you term men ‘enemies’ on the same principle?” εἰς τὸ πρὸς τὴν εἰρήνην, μὲν, τὸν κ.τ.λ.—πάντως does not, of course, answer to S' in αὐτὸς ἐν τέχνῃ. For this the order αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ κ.τ.λ. would be required. The answering ἐκ really belongs to a suppressed clause, e.g. ‘it is natural (but I will not speak positively).’

334 D. οἷς μὲν ἄδεικτος:—i.e. of a character to do no wrong, i.e. τοιοῦτοι οἷς... (a full expression regularly found at the beginning of a ‘character of Theophrastus.’) Cf. 385 ἐν λέγοντι ὑπὲρ τῶν τινῶν τῶν δικαστῶν τοὺς πράγμασις, Χειρ. άνα, 11. 3. 13 ὅ γαρ ἦν ἄριτο τὸ τεῖχος ἔρεων.

κατὰ δὲ τῶν σων λογον—δὲ brings us again to the vital point, here a conclusion. μεθαμόφυτος:—deprecatory; σο. γένεσιν, or τοῦτο λέγει (λέγομεν). This usage is common. Cf. Gorg. 497 ν, where, in answer to οἷς ὁ τῷ λέγει, Socrates answers μεθαμόφυτος, ὡς Ἀδριάνος, ἀλλὰ ἀπεριφέρετο. ενοπλευρία (i.e. as a logical consequence. So ἐπιβαίνειν inf. εἰ. (where the sense ‘happen’ would have required the future).

Soph. Ant. 904 καὶ τοις σφυρηλατησαι τοις φρονεωσαι εἰς. Ο. C. 1666 Ὀκ., but quite away from the sense required here. The position is no longer that it is just to injure those who seem to wrong, but those who are so. A man may make a mistake and accept as his friends persons who are δόλοι (= σφυρηλατησαί). Yet, though his friends, he is bound to injure them, σφυρηλατησαι γὰρ εἶναι, not indeed in his opinion, but in reality.

οὐκ ἔφησε—-the two words must be closely joined. οὐκ negatives the one word = ('improperly'), not the sentence; otherwise μὴ would be needed.

τῶν φλογῶν καὶ κηρύτων. For the one article see 332 b and e; 'our friend and enemy (as the case may be).'

τὸν δοκοῦντα εἰς...καὶ τὸν ἐκτε συνθέτου φλόγον—-σο. ἐστι μεταβαθεῖα. 'The man who both seems and is good let us put down as our friend.'

The position of τε, combined with the fact that the participles refer to the same person, would make it natural to expect no article with δοκοῦντα. Its repetition is difficult to explain. Possibly, as the words form part of a definition, we may misunderstand inverted commas, so to speak, i.e. let us change the words, and not be satisfied with ἐν δοκοῦντα, but rather demand τὸν δοκοῦντα, "not merely him 'who seems' but him 'who is.'"

335 A. καὶ πρὸς τοῦ κήρυτον δὴ—-δὴ is connective of the sentences, while καὶ εἰσίν and belongs to πρὸς τοῦ κήρυτος, 'And concerning the enemy also...'

In καὶ...δὲ the particles are separated by such words as καὶ in intended to mean: usually there is but one; here πρὸς τοῦ κήρυτος is of course incapable of division.

προσθέται τῷ δοκῶντα ἢ ἐ στι κ.τ.λ. 'To qualify our previous statement as to what is 'just.' Literally 'to add to our (explanation of) δοκοῦντα (and make it otherwise, ampler), than the way in which we gave it at first.' The ἢ follows the sense δοκοῦντα μεταθέτων (or ἰδίον) ἐστι implied in προσθέται. Cf. ἑαυστίαν and εἰς ἑαυστίαν ἢ...διάφρον ἢ...καὶ Γοργ. 481 c ἰδίον τι ἢ ἑαυστίαν πάντως ἢ ἐ στι ἰδίον.

For προσθέται used absolutely cf. Aristot. Eth. ii. 6. 9 τοῖς εἰς ἑαυστίαν ἑργάζεσθαι ἢ ἑαυστίαν ἔχοντες προσθέται and inf. 339 b σοὶ δη προσΘΕΣΤΑΙ.

νῦν πρὸς τὸν ἔτει λέγειν—-καὶ κηρυκτεῖν, 'to this, I say, do you bid us now add...?' λέγειν κ.τ.λ. is resumptive, and exegetes of προσθέταις κ.τ.λ.
THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO, I. [335 c—

ὅσκοτροφος—a ‘less just.’ It is frequently necessary to render Greek comparatives in this negative manner.

ἄλλα τῆς δικαιοσύνης δὴ—δὴ intimates that the speaker has now come to the point or application. ‘Well then, to come to the case of justice.’ So οὐδὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ [infra. n].

335 D. ἐρμήκτητος...ἔργον. For the meaning of ἔργον cf. 352 a δὴ οὕτω ὁ θεός καὶ τέκνα καὶ ἄθλος ὑπομονή ἔργον, ἀλλὰ καὶ μόρφος ἐκεῖνος τοῦ τῆς ἀριστοτεῖα.

335 E. τοῦτο δὲ δὴ νοεῖ αὐτῷ—either (1) τοῦτο is subject to νοεῖ and αὐτῷ is ‘ethic’: ‘and this means, to his mind...’=‘and by this he means’:

Cf. Euthyd. 227 E τι σὺν ἄρτῳ ἔργον, δὴ μοι νοεῖς τὸ ἥρμα; Cratyl. 407 b ποιομένα τῶν ἔρμων σχέδεσθαι τί καὶ νοεῖ τό ὄνομα. Αἰχ. Plat. 55 κυμῆσθαι τῶν χρησίμων ἡμῶν δὲ τι νοεῖ. Similarly Lucian Neocon. 1 τί σὺν αὐτῷ βούλεται τὸ ἐλλάδατον τοῦ σχήματος;

οὐ (2) τοῦτο is object to νοεῖ ‘and he means this by it.’

The letter might seem at first sight too much like the English idiom to be unquestionable Greek, but the instrumental dativus may stand very well in the sense ‘and he intends to convey by it (viz. τω φάναι αὐτῷ) this, viz...’ There is nothing to show that Greek could not say τί νοεῖς τῷ δοῦλοι; as readily as τι σοι νοεῖ τό ὄνομα;

δὴ perhaps gets a better force with this rendering, ‘and if what he means by it is this.’ With the other view δὴ belongs to the whole clause, ‘and if this, as we are to think, means δὖ.’

οὐκ ἐν σοφῶν ἐν πατρὶ ἐποῦ—i.e. The man who so spoke (and still speaks in our current proverbial philosophy, φήστων) was no true sage. The saying lives, though its author is long dead. Hence the imperfect ἐν, despite φήστῳ preceding.

Otherwise, though much less naturally, it is possible to regard ἐν as the idiomatic imperfect (habitually combined, however, with ἔρυτο) of ‘a fact which is just recognised...having previously been denied, overlooked, or not understood’ (Goodwin M. and T. § 59). The usual ἐρυτο may then be in a measure understood from el ἔρυτο at the opening of the sentence.

ἐν τι...ἐν...Σωκράτῳ. It is not likely that Socrates doubted the authenticity of the proverb. Ironically charming the reputation of Simonides, he covertly hints at the imperfections of the sages and the shallowness of gnomic ethics. Homer,
courage a certain school of critics in declaring ἐνομικὸς to be an
adscript.

Περδικής. The tyrant of Corinth (circ. 625 B.C.).

He is mentioned first as being himself commonly included in the
list of Seven Sages, and as the author of gnomic verse (ἐνομικοὶ).
Despite these claims to sagehood, however, he is regarded as the
very type of a τύραννος, practising the Machiavellian cunning and
coarsely associated with Greek despotism.

Περδικής—i.e. (presumably) Perdiccas II., King of Macedonia,
who was frequently at war with Athens, particularly in C. 432—431,
and who died B.C. 418.

Beyond the fact that he was a τύραννος and assured himself of any
form of diplomacy to increase his power, there seems to be no
special apposition in quoting him. Perdiccas is mentioned again
in Gorg. 470 ὡς as the father of Archelaus, and there, after asking if
Archelaus is to be considered ἐπικρατοῦς, Polus proceeds to ask if the
'Great King' (cf. Xen. here) is to be so considered.

'Ἰσμενίδος. A Theban who (in 335 B.C.) accepted bribes in the
interests of Persia against the Lacedaemonians. Paus. ii. 9, 4,
'Xen. Hell. i. 5. 1.

He was put to death by the Spartans B.C. 382 (ibid. v. 2, 38). Plato
mentions Ismenias as a πολίτης again in Meno 90 ὃ δέδεσθε ὃ ἐν
νομικῷ εὐθυμοῦ τὸ Πολικράτους χρηματα Ἰσμενίδης ὁ Ἐθικής.

πολιτής—implying, as often, not merely 'rich' but 'prosperous,'
strong in both wealth and position. Cf. Soph. O. T. 1070 πολύ
χάριν γένει (= 'of wealth and power'). Hor. Od. iv. 7. 15
πολυναυτός. The word is ἔντειος ἐν τετράγ. 8. 121, ἄνω
τότε—'not this either;' any more than the previous defi-
nition.

ἐφόν ἦ δικαιοσύνη ὑπ'. For the attraction of the participle to
gender of τότε ν. sup. 333 μ, ἦ δικαιοσύνη is the abstract
quality, the virtue in theory: τὸ δίκαιον is the concrete embo-
ment in practice.

CHAPTER X.

336 B. Ἐρασίμαχος—upon his standing and personality see
Introd. § 3 e and § 21 d.

καὶ διάλεγομένων ἓρμων μεταύξει ἄρμα κ.τ.λ. Though μεταύξει (pre-
ceeding) is frequently joined with participles, the position here
336 Ε. μη γάρ δι οὑν κ.τ.λ. Τὸ δὲν ἐν ὑποκατακλίνοναι is not to be repeated with ὑπάκουει. Ὡς, 'Pray do not think that whereas, if we had been searching for a piece of money, we should not, at least knowingly, have been shewing complaisance to each other in the search and thereby spoiling the discovery of it, yet, now that we are searching for justice...we are yielding in that senseless way...'; i.e. briefly 'that whereas we should not show such foolishness in searching for money, we are showing it in the search for justice.'

διαφθάνειν—combines the notion of corrupting the method of search (i.e. carrying it on disingenuously) with that of spoiling the result of it (i.e. ruining the chances of discovering the truth). 'Spoil by improper practices.'

ἐπιθυμησις—'Nevertheless' (i.e. despite its superior value). See 331 η. Cf. Prot. 319 δ ὀδηγημένοις μαθίν αὐτὸν ὁδῶν διδάσκαλον ὅθεν αὐτῷ ἐπιτελεῖν ἑπιτελεσίματα. Phaedo 70 b, Deor. Eum. 663 sqq. ιτις—see as you accuse us of doing.

ἀτόδη—referring to διακαίασθην. Cf. 368 ε καὶ πρῶτον μὴ ἔρωτα δικαίασθην οὐκ εἶναι φασὶ καὶ ἕκεν γεγομένη: ὁπάντως ὃ ἔφη πάντως αὐτῷ οἱ ἐπιθυμητοὶ ἐπιτελεῖσθαι. Μένος 86 b ἢ ὡς ἐπιθυμηταί εἰς ἑπιτελεῖν οὐκ ὅπως ἐπιτελεῖν ἐπιτελεῖσθαι. Phaedo 88 a (ἀτόδη in reference to ὑπάκουει).

οὐον γε σο—Bekker's reading for οὐον τε σο ὑσις. It cannot however be called quite satisfactory. With it we must supply σταυδάκιν ἡμᾶς δε τι μάλιστα φαινομεν αὐτῷ from the preceding negative, which he is not to think. 'Do think so, my friend.'

Jowett and Campbell quote Phaedo 68 ο ὡς ὁμοιος εἰςών αὐτόν; οἰσεθαί γε χρη; καὶ Κρίτη 52 ο ὡς ὁμοιοις φαινεῖται το τοῦ ὑποκάτα του πράγμα; οἰσεθαί γε χρη. Cf. Crîtô 54 a, Prot. 325 ο. These passages, however, are manifestly easier, being questions to which the answer 'yes' is expected. In other words, the negative there is not a real negative, but the sign of an interrogation (=ομοίως, not οὐκ). So here a question ως σταυδάκιν συνάντησαν αὐτῷ might have been followed naturally enough by ως οὐ σο. ως δυνάμεθα—i.e., 'we are incapable,' 'we lack the power.' There is no need to supply e.g. ἐφευρεν αὐτῷ.
THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO, I. [337 Α]

337 Α. ὑποὶ ὑπόκου ὁ τῶν δεινῶν. Thrasymachus is a recognised sophist, one of the professors of instruction, and both δεινὸς and σοφός are specially used of sophists, in Plato, of course, ironically. Cf. Theaet. 173 π δεινὰ τὰ καὶ σοφοὶ γεγονοῦσι, ὡ τὸν ὁμιλεῖ. Protag. 341 Ἀνα ἅπαν περὶ τῶν δεινῶν Πράξιος με ἀνθρώπου θνητῶν ἐκάνετο, όταν ἐνεμοὺς ἐγὼ ἢ ἐστὶ καὶ ἀνθρωπός καὶ ἀθέτει ἡ πρ[text continues]...
337 c] NOTES.

force Hes. in δ' ὣς. cf. Xen. Hell. v. 4. 6 οὐσία γε τὸ ἐν τούτῳ ἐν δὴ ('the pretended'). Eur. Bacch. 224 πράσσεις μὲν ὥς ὡς Ἐμεθυρίον ἀθανάτων.

οὖν γε καλέσει. Jowett and Campbell render 'there is nothing to prevent it,' and compare the remark (inf.) ὅσα ἐκ τοιούτου γινόμενα κ.τ.λ. But that answer here is more peremptory and lacks the suavity of Socrates. The passage cited from Charm. 164 ἄκατον ὃς οὖν καλέσει ἄλληρ λέγειν is evidently quite different, being concessive. Rather οὖν γε καλέσει is a formula of polite concession, or waiving the point: 'be it so, if you like.' Cf. Euthyd. 272 ἄλλο οὖν καλέσει, ἡ Σάκκρατες, ἔον γε τοι δέχεται. Αἴτ. Eq. 972 ὥς. Σοῦ τὸ γε ἐμοὶ οὖν καλέσει (par με λοίτο), Gorg. 458 d, Lach. 188 c, and τὸ γε καλέσει; Euthyd. 9 b, ὥς. It is doubtful whether οὖν is the subject of καλέσει or adverb with the verb impersonal.

ἐπικρατοῦσα——the fut. opt. as above (§ 4), οὖν ἐκείνην. It follows, not the literal ἔδοξεν ὅτι, but its sense, as ἔγνωσα, the verb sententi.

ἐφὶ ἐπὶ ἐκείνην—not ἐπὶ. 'If (in the supposed case which did not occur) he had said...' μὴ ἀποκρίνεται. For μὴ v. sup. 335 c μὴ αὕτη φάσαι; μὴ τὸ τοῦτο τὸν γιγαντίαν ὅτι (1) with τοῦτον τι in predicate, 'not even if it (so, the thing in question) happens to be one of these,' or (2) with τι as subject, 'not even if one of these things happens to be the fact.' The latter plainly makes too great a demand upon the participle ἔδοξεν.

337 C. ὡς δὲ ἐμοί ποιήσῃ καλῶς——ironically. Lit. 'because, of course, this is like that!' i.e. 'as if the two cases were alike!'

Grammatically ὡς ἐπὶ ἐκείνην and a previous clause is understood, e.g. 'your illustration is excellent,' seeing that the cases are so very similar!' This appears also from Charmid. 170 λ ὥς ὡς, ὡς Σάκκρατες, τοῦτον ὅτι τοῦτο καλῶς. Cf. Gorg. 468 ὥς ὡς ὡς, ὡς, ὡς Ἐμεθυρίον, οὐκ ἂν δέχομαι ὅτι τοι ἐκεῖνον σου. Lach. Ag. 1633 ὡς ἂν μὴ μοι ἄραμον Ἀργείου ἔδοξε. Eur. Andr. 338 (without verb, as here) ὡς ὡς ὡς σωφρόνω, ταῦτα δὲ ὡς καλῶς. The ironical

ἡμῶς——ironically inculpating himself with Thrasymachus. Cf. inf. 350 ὡς ἔδοξεν.
From positions in which the ἄλλα τι possessed a strict grammatical regimen in the sentence (e.g. ἄλλα τι λέγειν ὅτι... or τι λέγειν; ἄλλο τι ἢ οὐτ...); or finally the simple ἄλλο τι λέγειν; = 'surely it is so') the combinations ἄλλο τι ἢ and ἄλλο τι each came, by an irrational brachylogy, to be regarded as introducing a question, while intimating an assurance that the thing is so.

οὐκ ἄν συμμάχωμε... ἢ μοι... δέξεις—either (1) 'I should not be surprised if I were to see fit to do so,' or (2) 'I should not be surprised (to give such an answer), if on consideration I thought it so.'

The latter appears to be chosen by Jowett, and by Davies and Vaughan, and grammatically might be supported by Euthyph. 6 c ΒΥ. διεγράφωμαι ἢ σὺ διεκόψω ἢ σῶμι ὡσι τῆς ἐκπλογής. Συ. οὐκ ἄν συμμάχωμε, ἄλλα, κ.τ.λ., but is much less natural. Its adoption seems to be due in the first instance to a misapprehension of the sense of εἰ μοι οὖν δέξεις, which does not mean 'If it seemed to me to be so,' but 'If I thought well to do so.'

337 D. τι ἀρετὴς παθεῖν—'what do you think you deserve to have done to you?' This is the first part of a judicial formula, the completion of which is hinted at in ἀποτέλεσον immediately below.

In full it is found in Apol. 36 b τιμᾶτε δ' ἐν οἷον μοι ἄν ἁπειρότητα ἑπονείν. ἔγορα δ' ἐν τοῖς ἐννομισμασις ἠμαφροτοστίως καὶ ἅξιον τῷ πάθει ἐν οἷον δεῖ ἄναλημα παθεῖν ἤ ἀποτέλεσον. Cf. Polit. 299 a τιμάσθαι δ' τι χρὴ παθεῖν ἢ νοητά τινα ἢ ἀποτέλεσθαι. Xen. Mem. τ. 9. 5. ἕκτη. 339 b ἀποτέλεσθαι.

The two words embraced punishment of the person (death, imprisonment, ἀγρία &c.), and pecuniary penalty.

τιμᾶτε δ' ἐν...—'yes! you are a sweet innocent!' Cf. inf. 527 ν, Gorg. 491 ν ἐν ἄγρίῳ, inf. 548 c ἐν ἄγριῳ. Similarly Hipp. Mai. 298 b ἐν ἄγριῳ εἰ. Or 'you are pleased to be facetious.'

For ἀγρίῳ—on 338 b βέβαλον τοῦ ἀγρίῳ.

ἀποτέλεσθαι.

That this was the correct spelling in the 5th and 4th centuries B.C. is certain from Meisterhans, §§ 15, 26 and 64. 6. The present is τιμασθεῖν, but the forms τιμᾶσθαι, ἔτεσθαι, ἔτεσθαι alone are warranted. Socrates and Plato cherished a genuine and vehement repugnance to receiving pay for teaching. Cf. Apol. 19 b, 31 c, Xen. Mem. 1. 2. 60, 6. 11, 6. 13 (τινί σοφίας...τόσο μὴν ἄρρητον τῷ βουλομένῳ ποιῶν τὸν τινά ἄνευς ἀνκαλακάς). Jowett and Campbell fully illustrate from Plato Socrates' habit of bantering the sophists on their money-making. See also Introduction § 33.

NOTES.

οὐκόνων ἐπιτίθεται μοι γνήσια. οὐκόνων = 'yes,' is conversational.
Cf. Ap. Pax 364 ΒΠ. ἄφθολος, καθαίρομαι. ΤΡ. ἐφικτός, δι' ἄρχος, and somewhat similarly Polit. 299 b ΒΕ. τι δ' ἐσπεργάτα... ΝΕ. 30. ὀνόματι χρῆ. Perhaps originally 'will it not, then, be when...?'

For the poverty of Socrates cf. Apol. 35 b ἐν πτωχείᾳ μαρτύρω εἰς, 37 c, 32 b ἔστω δ' ἐν δυνάμει ὠφελεῖται ὁμοιός μεν ἀρνητικόν. In Xen. Oec. τ. 2 he assesses his total property at 5 minae.

ἄλλα ἐστὶ...ἄλλα ἕνεκα ἀρχηγοῦ κ.τ.λ.—for reiterated ἄλλα cf. 337 b. Here, however, each = 'nay,' and one repeats the other.

ἀποτέλεσθαι—we will club together.' The word is especially common as applied to ἔρως (friendly loans by contribution). Cf. Symposium 177 c ἀποτέλεσθαι τοῦ ἔρως ἱερανεῖτεν.

The locus for ἔρως is Dem. Meid. 547 (101) where both ἐσφεροῦν and φέρεσαι are used. The latter occurs again ibid. 573 (184), followed by εἰσερχόμεθα.

337 E. λαμβάνων λόγον—σὺν λόγῳ, but a current phrase 'begin to argue' ('against' being implied). Cf. Meno 75 ν εἰ μή ἄρα λόγον, σὺν λόγῳ λαμβάνειν λόγον καὶ ἔλεγχειν. Compare 'to take objection."

τι μὲν ἐν...ἀποτέλεσθαι εἰ. The sense itself is clear: 'how could a man answer if, in the first place, he had no knowledge and did not pretend to any, and (if), in the second, it had been forbidden him to say anything he thought?' The first 'if,' however, according to the ψευδ.; is only expressed in the participle, while the second (with the reading ἀποτέλεσθαι εἰ.) is not expressed at all.

The sentence being thus ungrammatical, it is possible to take divergent views of its evolution.

(A) If the reading of ἐστιν as Plato left it, he may have written ἀποτέλεσθαι εἰ either (1) under the impression that he had said εἰ πρῶτον μὴν μὴν ἐπιθέν μὲν ἄρχος, the sense 'if' being present to his mind, though not the actual manner in which he had expressed it. We may compare Prot. 337 b εἰ δέων αὐτόν κρίνομαι σὺν ἄρρητον, οἷον ἐπιθέν τοῖς τιμῶν τῇ δικαστηρίῳ...ἄλλας ἐστιν ἀρχαιοὶ τινες. Or (2) in consequence of a confusion, the use of εἰ in the subordinate clause εἰ τι καὶ ἐστιν leaving the impression that the 'if' of the main clause had actually been expressed (in other words, εἰ is made to do double duty).

(B) If the reading is incorrect we may emend (1) by omitting εἰ with Stahlbaum. ἀποτέλεσθαι εἰ then stands absolutely (like ἔρως, πορείας, λόγως, προστάξεως, αἰσχροῦν &c.; Goodwin M. and T. 361)
and = ei ἀπείρωντα, the participle containing the same hypothetical force as eiδω and φιλοκεῖναι just above. We should then have to assume that an early copyist or editor missed the construction and inserted eiδω, though this would involve the further assumption that a person so solicitous about making Plato grammatical himself failed to see that his own eiδω had no regime. A reader who missed the grammar of the ‘absolute’ participle would perhaps be quite capable of the other blunder; (2) as in the present text, ἔστεων (§ 8) τι καὶ ἐστὶν περὶ τόσον, ἀπερείπεμενος αὐτήν eiδω, κ.τ.λ.: ‘and in the second place if, in regard to whatever he thinks about them, it were forbidden....’

φιλοκεῖναι—with the frequent implication of pretence. Cf. infra 588 αο τούτων οτι τῶν φασκόντων γονέων.

§ 8 τι καὶ ἐστὶν. καὶ emphasizes the contrast of thinking with knowing (δεδεμένης with ἔστω). ‘If he goes so far as to think...’

ὅπως μικρόν ἡπείρα. Properly ὅπως and ὅπως μικρόν μεθ ὑπονοο. are used only after verbs of planning or considering (φορτιζόμενοι, ἐπιμελοῦμαι, σκοπεύων, βούλεύομαι &c). Thence by brachylogy came an imperative sense (εἰσόντα) ὅπως μικρόν ἡπείρας &c. This was taken as a normal way of expressing a direct command without the association of any verb of precaution. Thence, as a command in indirect discourse, it becomes naturally attached to verbs like παραγγέλλων, ἐπιμελεῖται &c. Cf. infra 415 α παραγγέλλοντας ὅπως μικρόν ἡπείρας, 589 α διακελεύονται ὅπως παρενεργεῖται τάντα τῶν τοιούτων.

338 A. ἀρχίζων—not merely ‘do me the favour’, but—‘be liberal.’ Cf. the Homeric ἀρχίζωσιν παρέσχεν δικ. Reference has already been made to the commercial spirit of the sophists. Note also μή φοβοῦσθαι following, and cf. Protag. 397 αει καὶ Ἰδίων καὶ διμοσίων τὰ πάντα ταῦτα καὶ ἑθικῶς καὶ ἐπίθεται τὸν μὴ καλῶς αὐθεύτως, καὶ μὴ εἴθος τοῦτον κ.τ.λ.

Γλαύκωνα τόνδε—though ὅπως, and not ὅπως, is necessary with proper names when the article is absent, δει (deosia) is used freely without article. Cf. Prot. 316 κ, 318 ο, 329 κ, 340 κ, 341 κ, Lach. 178 κ, 180 κ, 187 κ (bis), Ap. 35 κ, 38 κ, Meno 8 κ &c.

CHAPTER XII.

παγάλην. Of three terminations in Plato (Phaedr. 276 ν, Legg. 722 κ), but in Ar. Plut. 1018 (χείρας παγάλην) of two. Cf. Ar. Lys. 969 sq. ἡ παραβίασε καὶ παραμυθεῖα...καὶ παγάλεια. So παγάληθα, παγήμερα, παγνυσία were in use.

338 B. αὐτὴ δι... ὁ Σωκράτης σοφία: ‘here is the wisdom of Socrates, with a vengeance’: i.e. it consists in being shrewd enough to get what he can for nothing.

παρά τοῦ τῶν ἄλλων κ.τ.λ. The whole tone of the passage shows that Thrasymachus, regarding Socrates as a sophist, though a peculiar one, means Socrates, for all his reputed wisdom, is one who won’t himself teach, but goes the round (sc. of the schools of the sophists, the στοι &c.) and learns from the rest (sc. τῶν ἄλλων διδασκόντων &c) without even so much as paying them a thank-you, much less a fee.’

NOTES.
This is more pointed than to take τῶν ἄλλων as simply = ‘other people’ and περιμένα as simply = ‘going about.’ In the latter case there would be no occasion for money-payment, nor (in most cases) even for ἔκανον. These things belong rather to the formal instructors, e.g. Proclus.

The expression χάραν ἀποδήλων also should be noted. The ordinary terms are χάραν ἔχειν, εἰδέλα, and ἀποδήλων is only combined with χάρα in order to allude pointedly to the propriety of a ‘payment.’

ἦτεν... ἦτεν. Thrasymachus had said ἀποδήλων. Socrates uses another and stronger word: ‘I do pay a full return, of as great a sort as I can.’

ψεύδο—‘you are in error.’

ο🛏κρα γὰρ σι ἔρπον. Editors regularly print γὰρ σι. Yet the emphatic pronoun seems demanded. The sense is ‘I praise zealously when I think a man speaks well. You will find that out at once when you answer. For I think you will speak well.’ The compliment is in the style of Socrates.

333 C. τῷ τῶν κρείττων ὑμήπνου. See Introd., at this place. τῷ εἰκότε ἔκανον—ὅμοι λάδας—‘come now, praise me!’ The expression is quasi-imperative, and hence there is no difficulty in the following future. ‘Praise me! Nay, (I know) you will not.’ Cf. Protag. 380 εἶ ἄλλα τί σῇ βασίλευεν πάντι ἀπόν ; καὶ τοῦτο... τοῦτο λέγε;—καὶ looks forward to τί, with the same implication of surprise, or slowness to understand, as in a closely combined καὶ τί.

Πολυδήμου. Of Seostonas (Seotoessa) in Thessaly, victor in the pancration at the Olympic games B.C. 409.

Pausanias vii. 27. 6 speaks of his statue standing at Olympia in his own day (circ. 180 B.C.). He remains the traditional type of invincible athlete as late as the literature of Lucian (Quom. Hist. Con. 36). The scholiast on the present passage tells of his great stature and of his killing lions etc. while on a visit to Darius Ochus. The name is variously quoted as Πολυδήμου or Πολυδήμας. The latter is plainly only the attested pronunciation of the former, which is genuine Thessalian.

ὁ πυγκρατιστής. The pugkráton was a combination of wrestling and boxing. Plut. Symp. ii. 4 ὅτι γὰρ μέριμνα τὸ πυγκράτος ἔκ τε πυγμαῖ καὶ πάλια ἔραξαν. Aristot. Rhet. i. 5. 16 ὅ ὁ δὲ ὁβιζήν (διαβό-μενος) καὶ κατέχαν πολιορκεῖς, ὃ δὲ ὅσι τῇ πληγῇ παντίκες, ὃ δὲ ἀμφότεροι τὸ πυγκράτιστος.

338 D. ἑμιφρόν αἵμα καὶ δίκαιον. This is misrepresenting Thrasymachus. See Introduction.

βασίλευς γὰρ εἰ. ‘That’s just like your gross behaviour.’ Lit. ‘(Of course you must garble things) because you are shameless.’ Cf. 340 εὐκομάρχειας γάρ εἰ. Sup. 387 ἦδε γὰρ εἰ.

Theophrastus has a character (No. 11) of the βασίλευς, in which the prevailing feature is παιδί ἐνισχύς καὶ ἐνωπίς (obtrusive and objectionable pleasantry’ Jebb). This is the charge intended here. Appendix also is At. Ach. 289 τούτο ἐρωτήεις; ἅνα-κατολοχεῖ τε καὶ βασίλευς.

ταύτη ὑπολογίσεις:—either (1) ‘you understand (take) things in such a way,’ or (2) ‘you catch one up in such a way.’ See lexicons for both meanings. The former appears the better: ‘you put such a construction on (things).’ It is possible, but not necessary, to understand τῶν λόγων also with ὑπολογίσεις (i.e. ἀπὸ κακοῦ).

ἀν κακογράφησαι.

[Above (a) we have the form εἰδοκυμάσεως. The metrical evidence of Aristophanes and the other comedians is all in favour of making εἰκος, εἰς the proper terminations of the first aor. opt. 2nd and 3rd persons in Attic conversation. They use εἰκο, εἰς only in poetic quotation or par tragically. These forms were therefore literary. As, however, they existed, and as was shew no variation here, it appears safest to retain κακογράφησαι in the text, with a hint that Plato probably wrote κακογράφησαι. For a full discussion see Rutherford New Phryn. pp. 433 seq.; where it appears that the 2nd person in -ας must have been more familiar to the Athenians than the 3rd person in -ας, but that it was hardly conversational.]

For κακογράφην in reference to argument cf. Gorg. 483 ἐ ὃ ὁ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ σφόδρον καταπανεῖσθαι κακογράφηεν ἐν τῶν λόγων ἐκείνων τὰ κατὰ νόμον λέγει, κατὰ φύσιν ἐπερατοῦ, ἐκείνων τὰ τῆς φύσεως τὰ τοῦ νόμου. Aristot. Rhet. ii. 2. 7 τῶν δ’ ἀριθμῶν τὸ μὲν ἄφροτα ἀριθμοῦ-μα χρῆσεις (πολλὰ ταύτα γὰρ κακογράφην). Cope on Aristot. Rhet. i. 1. 10 (ῬΕΣ κακογράφος ἡ δημογραφία) explains that the word is used ‘of the knavish tricks and fallacies which may be employed in rhetorical and dialectic reasoning.’ So Dem. Lepid. 491 ἐπειδ’ ὅτι κακογράφην ἦτ’ ἐπιρέσκειται πρᾶγμα τῶν λόγων μεταφέρ. ἀντ’—expressing impatience, as often. Eur. Andr. 666 ὅ- τοι κρατε... τῷ ἅρσεν. κρατε here, as in 339 ἂ, is correctly treated as the verb corresponding to the adjective κρατινος in the

PL. REP.
definition of 'Justice.' Thrasymachus is pointing out what the κράτος in each case is. "This then is the 'stronger' in each state."

τοῦτο is not = τότε, nor used in anticipation of τὸ ἄρχων. Grammatically τὸ ἄρχων is an afterthought, exegetic of τοῦτο, which itself refers to something implied in a previous expression. The speaker is not satisfied, after saying τοῦτο, that the hearer will grasp exactly what it imports, and therefore adds an explanation. Thus "some states are under despotisms, some democracies, some under aristocracies... Well then, that is the 'stronger' in each state—I mean the governing power." In the same way infr. 398 ὁ τοῦτο γάρ, ἐφι, τὸν ἵπτον ἰδιότητα γίνεται, ἰδιότητα (the previous sentence having said τὴν ἰδιότητα τὸν τοῦτον ἐγκυκλάομενον ὅσ ἔσται, o τῷ χαὶρεσ). Cf. Gorg. 478 c.

For different forms of government and the ἄρχων (or κράτος) in each case, cf. Aristot. Pol. ττ. 6, 7, 8. In the latter place he remarks ὡς χαὶ πολιτεία μὲν καὶ τὸ πολιτεία σημαίνεται τοῦτο, κοινότητα δὲ ἴσον τὸ κράτος τῶν πολισιῶν, ἰδιότητα δὲ ἴσον κράτους. ἦν δὲ ἴδιως τά τοι πολλάκια ὅτι μὲν ἐν τῇ ἰδιοτείνῃ ἤ τοῖς τοιούτοις πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν συμβοῦν ἄρχουσι, μεντάν μὲν ἀρκετοὶ ἀναγκαίοι εἰναι τὰ πολιτείαι, τὰ γὰρ πρὸς τὰ ἱδία ἢ τῶν ἱδίων ἢ τῶν συνόπτων παρεστάσεως.

κράτος. A distinction frequently imagined between δέον κράτος (of an autocrat) and θέωσι κράτος (of a republican legislator) is not sound. A republican legislator may τοῦτον κράτος when regarded simply as former of laws for a community which has appointed him to the task. On the other hand as autocrat may τοῦτον κράτος when the notion of self-interest is emphasised. The middle here and in 398 c differs from the active (398 c) only in the greater prominence of that notion.

It would be better to say that (1) δέον κράτος has reference to the mere act of legislating for a state (whether, as with a republican like Draco, the legislator must obey the laws himself, or, as with a despot, he need not), (2) θέωσι κράτος has reference to the effect upon oneself of the legislation (whether, as with republican states, it be for their own obedience as well as interest, or, as with a despot, for his own interest only). The natural result is of course that δέον κράτος is the usual expression of a people legislating for itself. In other words, the middle does not imply the binding of the legislator but the serving of his interests.

398 E. ἰδιότητα—
Par. A has ἰδιότητα, of which Jowett and Campbell remark that it is 'a manifest error.' But it is hard to see why a δέον σημαίνοντα κράτος (κράτος) could not be right, if the middle τοῦτον be explained as in the last note. On general principles it is more likely that ἰδιότητα should be altered to κράτος than vice versa. In point of sense, however, ἰδιότητα is more natural, and the dative may be due to the dative in the previous line.

κράτος—very frequently = δέον κράτος in Plato. Cf. Prot. 319 c.

ἀνάκτησιν...ἐκ...—declare it to be, ' make it into.' The aorist is gnomic. Goodwin M. and T. § 155. Joined with present in Symp. 188 ἐντάσσεται ἐκ τῆς ἐγκυκλάομενης ἰδίαν, διαφθείρει τι πολλά καὶ ἱδίαν τε, and with perfect Prot. 328 b, c.

τοῦτον ἰδέαν. One is only has τοῦτο. Both cases are allowable, according to the shade of meaning attaching to the verb.

In ἐκβάλον τοῦτον the thought is literally 'depart from,' cf. Prot. 326 ὁ δὲ ἐκ τῆς βαίνει τοῦτον κολχηκεί. While in ἐκβάλειν τὸν verb has come to be treated as if it were like e.g. παραβαινεῖ / παραβαίνει ('transgress'). Contrast 390 ὁ τῶν καυτήν ἰδέαν ἐκβάλειν, καὶ ἐκβάλειν τὰς τεσσάρες διανείκειν τὰς τοῖς ἐκβάλεται τῆς τεσσάρεως διανείκειν. Cf. 328 c, ἐκβάλειν τὸν ἐκβάλειν, and also compare the uses of ἐκβολήματα τὰ = ἐκφορά, 'shirk' (ἐκβολή, Dem. Legit. 256), and ἐκβολήματα τοὺς 'depart from,' infr. 396 d (ἐξεστάσεις τῆς ἱδίας).

Often of course it is equally possible to use either, as in the present instance.

tοῦτ' εἰν τῶν...λέγονταν...παύσαν...ἐκφολίον. "It is in this sense, then, that I use the expression that 'the same thing is just.'" = "This, then, is what I mean by the same thing being just." Cf. 389 A. Davies and Vaughan mistranslate 'therefore my meaning is that in all cities too,'

389 A. κρατήτως = κράτείτως ἐστι, v. sup. 398 δ (ad fin.).

θέωσι—i.e. logically. Cf. sup. 394 δ. v. supra...

ὑπο...ἐκάκον. The aorist for English present, as in ἡκόνων, ἐκάκον, ἑκάκον τὸ ἁκόντως ἐκάκον ἐκάκον. V. note on γελασάσας sup. 391 δ.

τὸ ἐγκυκλάομεν αὐτερκότως ἐκάκον—which, plainly, is not the same as saying that τὸ δίκαιον τὸ ἐγκυκλάομεν. See Introduction. A strictly logical antagonist would have reversed the subject and predicate of ὑπο...ἐκάκον and said e.g. ἐγκυκλάομεν μὲν τι καὶ σὲ ἐγκυκλάομεν τὸ δίκαιον ἐκάκον. θέωσιν ὅ ἐφικτέτη τοῦ K.T.L. Plato, however, is far from logical (see Introduction §§ 9 a, 14, 15 b and c).

ἀποκρυφόμενον—future. V. sup. 387 δ.

προσέτατι ὅ δ' ἐκάκον K.T.L. "It is true that in this case (i.e. in
CHAPTER XIII.

339 c. ἐν τοῖς πόλεωις ἐκάσται—'In the several (or respective) states.' ἐκάσται is less emphatic in this position than in ἐν ἐκάσται τοῖς πόλεωισ—'in each and all the states.' So

339 π] NOTES.

Plaeadr. 244 b εἰς μὲν γὰρ τὸ συνάντησις ἄνωθεν ἐκεῖς ἡ ψυχὴ ἐκάστῃ ("the several souls") ὁδὲ ἀναφέρεται ἐκείνοις μόνον.

οὐς τι καὶ ἀμαρτείνει—For ὁς with inf. v. sup. 334 d. καὶ throws a stress upon ἀμαρτείνει: 'they are capable of a mistake occasionally.'

τοῖς ἐν τινασ—the addition of τινασ is not without point. 'Some rightly, and some (i.e. perhaps only few, but still some) wrongly.' The force of τι in οὐδὲ τι καὶ ἀμαρτείνει is similar.

[There are, of course, other uses of οὐδὲ τινασ, where τινασ has no such implication as here.]

τὸ δὲ ὀρθῶς—so. τίθεναι. That this is the grammar, and not τὸ "ὀρθῶς" ("the term 'rightly'"), is shown by the following μή ὀρθῶς. "The term 'wrongly'" would have required τὸ ὀκτώ ὀρθῆς. V. sup. 334 e.

ἐναρτόν—with ἐμφύρωμα. The self-regarding middle τίθεναι could not properly be used with a reflexive pronoun.

339 D. τί λέγεις σὺ;—σὺ, though in the best, is not in all, ms., but it (1) is more characteristic of Thrasymachus, as it adds a tone of impatience or asperity, (2) leads additional point to the ὁς in Socrates' answer. For the tone 'scritter conradecent' of τί λέγεις σὺ; see Blaydes in Ar. Nub. 1173 sqq.

οἷς μὲν τίνι ἤ δὲν ἐε ἐπὶ τούτων ἐξαρτητοί τόν πολιτικόν, κάκηγος ἔργων ἐπιχείρησε, τὸ τί λέγεις σὺ;

οἷς ἐγγεί, ἐβη. Οἶκον τούτων...καλ.: 'I believe so... Then believe also...'. Jowett and Campbell compare 430 c, where ἀπὸ ἀνθρώπων is followed by the reply καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ ἀνθρώπων κ.τ.λ. Thrasymachus' answer is a grudging one, and Socrates, ironically taking up his word οἷς, instead of replying with e.g. 'then it must be clear to you,' says 'if you believe so (go a step further with your believing and) believe...'.

Plato enters into the feelings of his refuted sophists, and graduates their terms of assent from the ready and cheerful to the impatient and sullen. Cf. Prot. 360 c sqq. τῶν γε...συνεβρη...ἐπίκεισθη...πάνω μέγας ἐκεῖνοι ἐπικείεσθαι...οἷς, ἐβη, τίραμον.

339 E. τοῖς δὲ δικαιοῦν εἶναι φήσι—a condensation for τοῖς δὲ δικαιοῦν ὢς, ὦν σὺ φήσι: 'and when (nevertheless) it is, according to your account, just...'

ὁς ἀναγκαῖος συμβάλλειν αὐτῷ ὀνόμα δικαιοῦν εἶναι τοίον τούτων ἢ δὲ σὺ λέγεις;—(1) 'must it not of necessity follow that, in
such case, it is just to do exactly the opposite of what you contend for?

This punctuation was first given by Madvig, the earlier editors being misled by the unusually wide separation of αὐτῷ from τοῦτον. The position of αὐτῷ is due to strong emphasis. The sense of συμβάλλειν is as in 388 a.

Otherwise (2) it is possible to place a comma after οὖνευς, and to render 'must it (αὐτῷ) not turn out thus, (viz.) that it is just to do the opposite of what you contend for?' αὐτῷ then = 'the case' (with which we are dealing).

340 A. Κλειστοφόρον—v. 326 a and Introd. § 3 c. He supports his master Thrasyamus, and his observation is not particularly polite.

δεῦτα—so. Συμπάττειν, to be supplied from αὐτῷ preceding.

The rendering 'what need is there of a witness?' answers rather to τί δεύτα...; but not out of the question. Cf. Meno 70 c δεύταον: σοι τάλαν εξ αρχῆς τῆς αὐτῆς ἐρωτήσεως...ό δε δεύτα αὐτῷ ἐρωτήσεως; Soph. O. C. 570 δότο βραχόες ὡμιὶ δίδακα προφανές.

'There is need = deúta. 'It (the thing in question) needs' = δεῦτα. But the latter is very rare and not entirely above suspicion.

τὸ...τὸ καλωδομά των κ.τ.λ.—Thrasyamus admitted this 389 a (fin.).

τὸ γαρ...καὶ γαρ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος κ.τ.λ.—Both instances of γαρ, belonging as they do to the vivacity of conversational retort, are somewhat elusive of precise interpretation. The ellipsis however can be rightly supplied as follows. 'Yes,' says Cleitophon, '(but there is no overthrow of Thrasyamus in that) for what he laid down as just was the doing what was hidden by the rulers,' 'Nay,' replies Polemarcatus, '(that is not all) for he also laid it down δέ옹. In English we say 'yes, but,' followed by 'nay, but he also...'

The unusual separation of καλωδομά from ὑπὸ τῶν ἄρχοντων—a hyperbaton certain to be felt by a Greek reader—throws an emphasis upon καλωδομά. Cleitophon wishes to shift the definition from a doing of τὸ ἐμφάνει τῶν ἀρχοντῶν to a doing of his commands.

340 B. ὃ ηγεῖτο—some have ἦγεῖτο. The imperfect indicative is out of place, and what is required is the oblique of either ὃ ηγεῖται or ὃ ἦγεῖται after the past tense. ὃ ηγεῖτο would represent either, or the present ὃ ηγεῖται must remain for the former. Goodwin M. and T. § 609. 2.

τοῦτο ποιήσας εἶπε—σ. εἰπεν (from the previous sentence).

CHAPTER XIV.


ἀντίκα—'for instance' (i.e. not to linger over the matter, but take the first example to hand). The use is very frequent, e.g. Protag. 399 b, Phaedr. 235 b. In Gorg. 472 c more fully ἀνακάρα πρῶτον. Similarly εἴθων in Aristotle, Pol. iii. 4 § 6 ἀπερὶ ζῷων εἴθων.

καλῶς σὺ—the σὺ of impatience, which we rather express in the verb, 'now, do you call...?' Cf. 389 b τι λέγεις σὺ; 'what are you saying?'

λογιστικὸν—'accountant' or 'arithmetician' (not 'reasoner,' since Plato is speaking of professional occupations). Cf. λογιστὴς (inf.) = 'auditor' and 'teacher of arithmetic.' Gorg. 451 c τὰ μὲν ἄλλα, καθὼς ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ, ἡ λογιστικὴ ἔχει (and context).

λόγοιν τῷ βίματι οὖσας—For two manners of rendering οὖσας v. 381 b (ἀπὸ τῶν οὖσων). The better here, as there, is 'just,' 'offhand,' i.e. 'we do say loosely in so many words.' Cf. Gorg. 460 b ὅ τι τῷ βίματι οὖσας ἐχει, ὅτι...not but what you did, so far as that goes, make use of the form of words, that,...' There is an emphasis on τῷ βίματι, 'so far as the form of words goes.' Cf. Thesm. 166 β ὅ τι δὲ λόγον μὴ τῷ βίματι μοι διοικεῖ.

ὁ γραμματιστὴς—'the writing-master' (Prot. 392 b) or 'teacher of reading and writing.'

He is to be distinguished from the γραμματιστής, who was a critic and man of letters. Cf. litterator (= litteratus).

τὸ δὲ ὅτι ὅταν τῷ ἑτερῷ ἐτοιμοὶ ήσαν λόγου ἀπηλλέξασθαι τὸ δὲ ὅτι ὅταν, ὅταν δὲ, προσκυνῆσαι, 443 c, Prot. 344 b, ὅτι ἂν δὲ, ὁ Πιπέρης, χαλεπόν ἄτοιμος ἐμεῖς: τὸ δὲ ἐστὶ γενέθλιον μὲν χαλεπὸν, ἀναδιομένω δὲ ἔστι, ἐμένω δὲ ἀδυνήτω. Apol. 28 a τὸ δὲ καυδοῦσιν τῷ ἑτερῷ ὁ θεὸς σφόδρα εἶναι, δ. So later, in e.g. Lucian Alex. 17 τὸ δὲ σφόδρας ὅτι ητί.

The use originated in an antithesis of τὸ μὲν...τὸ δὲ (like τοῦτο μὲν...τοῦτο δὲ Ed. 1. 161 &c.)= 'on the one hand...on the other...'
The τὸ μὲν of the first member is then omitted, or rather τὸ δὲ comes to have the meaning ‘on the other hand’ without the assistance of a preceding τὸ μὲν. Grammatically τὸ δὲ is in apposition to its sentence.

340 E. δημιουργῶν. The width of application of the word δημιουργῶν is perhaps best illustrated by Hom. Od. xix. 358

τὰ γὰρ δὴ δείκει καλοὶ ἄλλοι καὶ αὐτῶν ἐπέλθοι
Ἀλσον ἔργα, ἐκ μὴ τῶν δὲ δημιουργῶν ἔργων,
μάρτιο πολλοὶ κακῶν ἡ τεκτόνα δοῦμαν
καὶ ἡθικοὶ δοῦμαν, δὲ κεῖ τέρματια ἀλλὰν;

It includes all those who practise a skilled calling which brings them into service to the public, e.g. sculptors (infra 529 b), physicians (Sympos. 186 e), confectioners (Hdt. vii. 31); and therefore embraces both trades and professions. Its use as = χειρότερον alone is unusual.

For the λαστὸν as δημιουργῶν cf. Aristot. Pol. iii. 31 § 11 λαστὸν δὲ τὸ δημιουργῶν καὶ τῷ ἄρχοντος καὶ τῶν πεπαιδευόμενων παρὰ τῷ τέμνων.

ἡ σοφία—In the mouth of Thrasymachus, and in the context, σοφία, used as a noun, implies that there is such a thing as a professional σοφία with a recognised standing as an expert in wisdom. The σοφία (among whom, as a sophist, Thrasymachus would include himself) would be authoritative guides to right views in general. Cf. Xen. Mem. ii. 20 Πρόδικος ὁ σοφός, Ιωάθρυθ. δὲ κακοκενόντως ψόφος τις εἶναι, Μενο 75 c, κ.κ.

οὖν ἄρχων ή—put loosely for ὁ δὴ δημιουργὸς ἡ σοφία ἡ ἄρχων ή.

τὸν ὁδὸν ὁδὸν τοῦτον ὁδὸν ἄαρκτον ἄαρκτον—well then, take it that I also just now answered you to the same purpose, or in other words, ‘take it that the answer which I just now gave was meant in the same way.’

νῦν δὲ (with a past tense) in Plato and the dramatists regularly = ‘just now,’ while in most writers it = πως οὖν μαρτίοις (‘at this very moment’). Its force is sometimes brought out strongly by an antithesis to νῦν, e.g. Legg. 668 δὲ νῦν δὲ μὴν ἄλλοις ἐμπρόσθεν τοις πεπραγμένοις τοῖς λόγοις οὕτω ταὐτὶ ἐπειδήν, νῦν δὲ ἐπειδήμεροι, καίρας καὶ τοιούτοις, καίρας καὶ τοιούτοις.

ἀποκρίσιμα is imperfect, corresponding to the direct τοῦτον νῦν δὲ ἀπεκρίσιμα. Cf. infra 341 οὗ νῦν δὲ ἀπεκρίσιμα.

τὸ δὲ ἀκριβέστατον ἐκείνῳ τιγχάνει ἢν—‘but the strictly accurate

341 A] NOTES.

(way of speaking) is this’ (ἐκείνῳ = ἐλθὼν, of what follows). The infinitive clause following is expository of ἐκείνῳ (v. 329 d).

CHAPTER XV.

341 A. ἐν τοῖς λόγοις κακουργοῦντα—Cf. Gorg. 483 λ, and v. sup. 338 d. so belongs to ἔρασθαι. ‘Nay, do you think it was maliciously and with knavery that I put you the question in the way I did?’

341 B. οὐκείν μὴ λαθὼν μισάσθαι τῷ λόγῳ δόμαι—Lit. ‘nor could you, when you failed to remain undetected, force me by sheer argument.’

The tense of λαθὼν is important; it differs from λαθόν by assuming that the attempt has first been made. ‘I should detect you if you tried trickery; also, when you were detected (and had to come into the open), you could not overpower me by strict argument.’

For the form of sentence cf. Apol. 39 λ ἐδεὶ τὸν ἑπεκτιμάσσω παρὰ τὸ λόγῳ δίκαιον δίκαιον τὸ δίκαιον. ἓν, ὡς κείσκε, δὲ ἡμέρα καὶ ἡμέρα ἐποτιζοντο.

The word μισάσθαι is in keeping with the cristic attitude of the sophist. Socrates would rather say πέταλον. At the same time, the antithesis of λαθοῦσαν and μισᾶσθαν was not rare (cf. Xen. Mem. iv. 4. 21).

τοῦτον—‘such a misunderstanding.’

τὸν ὅτα ὁτα ὅταν κ.τ.λ.—‘The ruler in the loose sense, or the ruler in the strict signification, of whom you just now spoke.’

The phrase ὅτα ὅτα ὅταν is restrictive or qualifying, and is so used in two connections (1) when the speaker claims that he is not aiming at strict exactness in the particular language he chooses, but qualifies it with ‘to speak approximately’ or ‘not to be too particular.’ This is the sense here (cf. 340 γ τὸ ἐπιστήμων ὅταν, Legg. 659 b, κ.κ.: (2) when he qualifies a word, which may be too strong or comprehensive, by adding ‘I might almost say’ (μπρος διήθειν). Cf. Apol. 17 α καλοὶ ἔλθοι τε, ὡς ἔτοι εἰσελθεῖν, ὁδὲ ἐπιστήμων (where ὅταν is too strong). ὁ παραγόν, ὡς ἔτοι εἰσελθεῖν Gorg. 480 b, Ἀσκλ. Par. 714 διεπιστήμων τοῦ Ἡρώδου πράγματι, ὡς ἔτοι ἔτοι. Phaedr. 258 π καθόταν ἔκανε καὶ τοῖς, ὡς εἰσελθεῖν, ὡς ἔτοι. These two uses of ‘to speak’ are closely related, and in e.g. Legg. 659 π ὅταν ὡς ἔτοι εἰσελθεῖν μωριστῶν, ἑλλ’ ἀκριβῶς they practically coincide.

[A sense given in some lexicons, but which the phrase never has, is that of ‘as the saying goes.’]
δ ὃν δὴ Ἡλέκριν—If we read ὃν it of course refers to τὸν ἔρχοντα (viz. 340 e), not to λόγος. Cf. inf. 348 E λόγος γὰρ ἐπερ ὃν δὴ Ἡλέκριν, τὸν μεγάλα δυνάμεων πλεονεκτῆσαι. But the reading ὃν is quite satisfactory 'as you were just now saying'; lit. 'to take the expression' which you just now used.' Thrasymachus had said κατὰ τὸν ἐπερ ὃν δή (340 e).

οὐδὲν ςοι παρέμει—'I ask no quarter (or concession) from you.'

The gerundive may be explained (1) ad sensum, as if παρέμει = αἰτεῖ

τα ὑπό του σου σταθμοῦ and its like, i.e. 'I try to win over (in you) on your part.'

The latter is on all accounts the better. Cf. Apol. 17 a τὸ ταῦτα ἐμῶν δεῦτα καὶ παρέμει. This, which is the only one quoted, is no instance of παρέμει, but merely a direct dependence upon it. We cannot therefore render 'in no way (adv.) do I beg off your opposition.' In that sense the verb would take an accus. of the person (as with παρασκευαζειν). Cf. Legg. 745 η παρέμει καὶ ἐρέχοντον ἐπομενότατο. The same accus. is understood in Soph. O.C. 1660 ὃς το παρέμει (οτ. τουτέος) ὃς μὴ δείκται προσεχεῖ.


ἐρείπω...Ἀντιοκχόν—a proverb more quoted in late Greek than in the classical. Cf. Lucian Gynic. 14 οὐκ ἐν ὑπέμεινοι οἴδε ἡ εἰ ἠτέων οἴδες μάλλον ἣ τῶν λέοντων τις ἐφερόμενος. νῦν—οὐτοῦ μὴ ὃν ὁ διὸ, but 'in the present case' (cf. nunc vero and νῦν δὲ with past tenses).

οὐδὲν δὲ καὶ ταῦτα—The translation of these words depends upon the tone and inflection with which they are spoken: (1) with καὶ ταῦτα run practically into one word (i.e. with καὶ lightly and rapidly pronounced) the sense is 'moreover' or 'too,' i.e. 'and proved a failure, too'; (2) with more stress on both καὶ and ταῦτα it = 'being a failure at that also (as well as at other attempts).'

The sense could in any case hardly be the same as with the order καὶ ταῦτα οὐδὲν δὲ, since there is no point in saying 'that too though you are a man of no account,' even if we allow that Thrasymachus is capable of such extreme rudeness. καὶ ταῦτα, when it = παρασκεύασαν σου, regularly precedes its participle, though it is possible to quote from Diodorus Comicus τὴν ἐσυμβέβη καὶ ταῦτα μέσον τοῦ βιοῦ (and still better Aristid. pro Quat. p. 501 Perip.).

Editors who are alive to this fact (Stallbaum, Jouves and Campbell, etc.) give the explanation (2) above, i.e. rendering καὶ as-quoque and ταῦτα as an accus. respect, 'being a nobody in regard to this also.' They do not appear to have thought of the other, (1), which is here

341 D. οὗ καὶ ἐκέντρον τοῦτον ἔστιν τι ξυμφέρον;—'I suppose in the case of each of these there is something which is his interest?'

οὐ καὶ ἐκέντρον τοῦτον ἔστιν—'and is it not also the case that the art (in each instance) is essentially directed to this, viz. the discovery and provision of what is for the (said) interest of each?'

These questions are sufficiently obscure to deserve more comment than they usually receive. What is meant by ἐκέντρον? It is difficult to believe that it can refer to the practitioner of the art, since Socrates is bent on showing that an art is not directed to the interest of the practitioner, but to that of the 'subjects' on whom it is exercised. On the other hand, to take ἐκέντρον τοῦτον and ἐκέντρον as referring to the 'subjects' upon whom the art is prac-

tised, seems to put a rather unnatural strain upon the language. Yet this is apparently the only rendering which is in keeping with (a inf.) τοῦτον oὐκ ἄτοι ἐκείνων ζωγραφεία κ. τ. λ., and (342 a) oὐδὲ προσέχα ἡ τέχνη ἢ εἰς καὶ ἡ τέχνη ἐστιν. We shall then be obliged to consider ἐκέντρον τοῦτον is made to refer to the 'subjects' the more easily because τῶν τῶν πάντων ἐκχώρει has just preceded and so drawn attention to the 'subjects' as opposed to the practitioners. Either, therefore, Plato has expressed himself awkwardly, or something which imparted more precision has been lost from the καὶ.

We may suggest ἀνθρωπος <εἰς> ἐκέντρον τοῦτον—'in each depart-

ment of the operations named is a certain interest somewhere, (which is to be provided for).' For εἰς cf. inf. 389 οὐκ ἐν φαινόμενοι εἴδει ('in the department of medicine'), εἰς εἴδος subsequently became common. Cf. πετοίματα τι ἐν τοῖς μερεῖς (in the department of medicine'), εἰς εἴδος τοῦτος καθολῶς τὸ εἴσοδον, τὰ τρόπον δὲ ἐστιν, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα τοῦτο τότεν.' ἀλλὰ γὰρ εἰς εἴδος ἐκέντρον τοῦτον ἔστιν ('belong to different departments'), ἐκέντρον τοῦτον 'tis of course equally possible, 'each of the sets of circumstances specified introduces a certain ξυμφέρον.' With ἐκέντρον of the following sentence εἴδει is then again understood.

ἄρ' οὖν καὶ ἐκέντρον κ. τ. λ.—There being some form of ξυμφέρον
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involved in each set of relations (viz., of physician to the sick, navigator to sailors), Socrates proceeds to show that there is no ἀξιόμαχος of the art itself and its practitioner to be sought, but only a ἀξιόμαχος of the ‘subject’ of its exercise. The κάθε either (1) emphasizes έως ὑπ’ οὗ τεχνῶν, ‘Well, but then, as regards each art (itself), has it any other interest (i.e. gain that art and nothing else) than that it should be as perfect as possible?’; or (2), belonging to the whole question, —‘going a step further.’

341 E. vīv—‘in actual experience.’

τονῦρον—τουρίς, like μουρῆς, is used of both the physically and the morally unsound and defective. Cf. Tim. 86 δ τονῆρα καὶ ἀφάνεια. Thus, VIII. 97 των πραγμάτων γενέσεως.

The old grammarians laid it down that in Attic the accent was oxytone only in the moral sense. It seems safest to follow their rule. Cf. (though with reservations) English ‘huma’ and ‘human.’

τοιοῦτο εἶναι—‘to remain in that state.’

342 A. Ἡ ἄλλη τις τέχνη ἔστιν δὲ τι προσδοκεῖται πνεῦμα ἀρετῆς—‘or does any other art in any way stand in need of some further excellence?’ ἔστιν δὲ τι προσδοκεῖται, except that it is brought into greater prominence. Cf. infra 346 b. ἐν τούτῳ τῷ ἔστιν ἐπὶ τούτῳ, ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ.

Of Protag. 381 b πᾶς γάρ λεκνὸς τοῦ μέλαν ἐστὶν ὁπότις πρόσθεσε. ἀρετῆς = excellence enabling it to perform its special function (ἀρέτας), v. on 335 b.

ἐστὶν ὁρθός κ.τ.λ.—‘For example eyes stand in need of (the ἀρετής) of seeing, and ears (of the ἀρετής) of hearing, and therefore there is need in connexion with them (ι’’ ἄρετας == in charge of them,) or, ‘engaged upon them!’ of some art to consider and provide what is ἀρετής to these ends (viz. seeing and hearing) [such a ‘providing’ art is that of the oculist or aurist]. Is it also the case that in art itself there is a certain defectiveness, and that —[inasmuch as it therefore stands in need of a completing ἀρετής to enable it to perform its function)—each art requires the help of another art to provide it with what is ἀρετής; (to that end, viz., the obtaining of the ἀρετής in question), and so ad infinitum?”

Socrates does not conceive of the interdependence of arts and sciences. ‘The art of healing’ is complete in itself; it implies the fullest and most ideal command of healing, and what further can it require to enable it to perform its function? So far as it is the art of healing it can proceed at once to heal. Cf. Inf. b ὅπως γάρ ἡν τ.users αὕτη ἡμείς ὑδατική τέχνη τάρτατον κ.τ.λ.

NOTES.

οἰκοτιμόμενος τι καὶ ἀκραχήτως. ἀκροτιμόμενος (a form liable to corruption) is given in two ‘edited’ MSS., but is perhaps unnecessary. In 604 a μάχεσθαι τι καὶ ἀντιπέλων should, however, almost certainly be corrected ἀντιπέλων.

σκόπηται... σκοπούμενον—v. supra 380 b.

342 B. οὖτω τὴν αὐτήν τινος—‘to remedy its own defectiveness.’


ἀυτή δὲ ἀξιομαχία καὶ ἀκραχία κ.τ.λ.: ‘but in itself it is without flaw or blemish while it possesses its true nature—that is to say, so long as each art, bearing its strict meaning, is nothing but the art it is.’ ἐστιν εἰς γ. κ.τ.λ. is explanatory of ὁρθός ὁσα. It is to be noted (1) that the Greek is not ἀξιομαχία καὶ ὁσα, (2) that we have ἐστίν and not ἔστιν.

It is therefore no literal rendering to translate, ‘while in all strictness and entirety it is what it is.’ Grammatically ἀξιομαχία = ἀκραχία ὁσα, and its meaning is that which attaches to τόν ἀκραχία λόγον supra 341 a. So Inf. c ὃ ἀκραχία λόγος ἐστιν ἀκραχία λόγος λέγειν. By ὁσα, which belongs to the predicate with ὅ (i.e. εἰς τὸν ἀκραχή ς ὁσα (ὁσα) ἐστιν ἀκραχία) is meant ‘nothing but’ the art which it calls itself (i.e. ἀκραχής, for instance, without involving χρησιμοτητική &c.). This use of ὅσα or πάντα is frequent enough, e.g. ἄλογον ἀκραχίαν (‘nothing but a mistake’), πλάνα ἄλογα (‘a cheat and nothing else’).

The balance of the whole passage is thus ὅσα γάρ τινος... τάρτατον corresponding to αὕτη δὲ ἀξιομαχία ὁσα καὶ ἀκραχίας, and ἐστιν προσδοκεῖ ἄλλῳ τῷ ἀκραχήν κ.τ.λ. corresponding to ἐστιν εἰς γ. ἡ ἀκραχία ὁσα ἐστὶν—‘and the meaning in brief is, ‘art has no defects and no flaw; and, in so far as it is simply what it professes to be, it only seeks the advantage of its subject. [It is only when it becomes confused with money-making &c. that it either (a) requires a supplementary art, or (b) aims at some other interest than that of the subject.]’

342 C. ἄρχουμεν γαὶ τέχνηι καὶ κρατούμενοι κ.τ.λ. In these words Socrates brings the remarks upon τέχνην round to their application. For the reasoning and its fallacy see Intro. § 31 a.

342 E. τῷ ἄρχουμεν—neuter; hence ékein below.

ἔμμοιρα... v. supra 340 b.
CHAPTER XVI.

343 A. ὁ τοῦ δικαίου λόγος—'the account (to be given) of justice.' Of Phaedr. 340 π ψυχῆς φύλαξ τα καὶ λόγων. The sense is often indistinguishable from that of ἐνν 'definition.' See Legg. 895 ε.

[τί δὲ;—Stallbaum's τί δεῖ; is not in the ms.

Both expressions were in use in conversation, and, in the later entire confusion of pronunciation of ε and αι, one was often substituted for the other in the copies. Sometimes the corruption can be detected from the metre, as in the ms of Aristophanes (e.g. Acharn. 912, where however it is δεῖ which has replaced δεῖ). τί δὲ; was more widely recognised in literature than τί δεῖ; and there can be no reason whatever for altering it here.]

κορέζώντα—'drivelling.' Literally κόρηζωντα, 'a running at the nose.' Hence it is used of idiocy or childish helplessness. Cf. Lucian Alex. 30 κορέζων περισσοί τὸν βία, and κορέζων (Menander). Hor. Sat. 1. 4. 8, speaking of Lucilius, employs the contrary expression ευμαχαῖς ναρίς.

αὐθὲν—'ethical' dative: 'to her shame'; lit. 'so far as she is concerned.' Of. Lyra. 205 ε ἁπάντη αὐθένας εἰς εἰς ποιον ἤ τι ἢ ἢ δοκήσῃ αὐθέναν ἵνα. Soph. Aj. 1188 θέου γὰρ ἀκούσανε με, τόδε δ' ὁσίους.

οὔτ' πρόβατον, οὔτ' ποιμήν γραμμὸς—not=οὔτε...οὔτε; but the first οὔτε=ne...quidem (with the verb or general sense), while the second=neque; cf. Apol. 26 ν οὔτε ἡλικίαν οὔτε σέκλησα τοῦρα κοραθίων τους εἰσί. Lit. 'Inasmuch as you cannot so much as tell sheep or shepherd.' English prefers the form of expression 'sheep and shepherd,' or 'sheep from shepherd,' but with the present 'dis-junctive' form Jowett and Campbell compare 605 ν οὔτε τὰ μέλιτ' οὔτε τὰ ὑδάτων διαγγέλλειτε.

οὔτ' δὲ τι μάλιστα; Lit. 'because why, exactly?'

Both the English and Greek belong to the ungrammatical vivacities of conversation; but while the English is colloquial, the Greek is countenanced in literary use. The sentence begins οὔτ' δὲ 'because, of course... and then the speaker, finding himself unable to assign the reason readily, asks for it instead: 'because, of course...why, exactly?' The idiom ἠκούσα τι; is somewhat similar: 'in order that—what?'

With the present passage cf. 448 ε δέ, ἐγὼ στὰρν, ι καὶ μάλιστα;

For μάλιστα cf. Ofrit (ad init.) πρῶτο μάλιστα; 'what o'clock, exactly?'

NOTES.

343 B. τοῦ τῶν δικαιῶν...καὶ τοῦ αὐτῶν—The shepherds &c. are in the first instance naturally thought of as slaves, since they were commonly such. καὶ τοῦ αὐτῶν might either refer to the advantage which even slaves may get from success with their masters' flocks and herds, or (=τοῦ αὐτῶν) to freemen who act as their own shepherds and herdsmen.

καὶ οὖν ταὐτ—'and so, of course, also....'

ὦ ἄνθρωπε ἄρχοντες—i. e. are really and truly lords and masters (and do not qualify that attitude by seeking any other object, e. g. social good or beneficial organisation &c.).

διακοινοῦσα πρὸς τοὺς ἄρχοντες. It is natural (especially with διάλεγεν following) to suggest διακοινοῦσιν, with Feuss, Cobet, and others. Yet cf. inf. 414 ο ὡτείς τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν οὐ αὖθεν ὄντως καὶ γραφη χαράεται (‘be minded’), and with πρὸς Legg. 638 ν ωσίως πρὸς τόλμης εὐθυμοῦν παραιτεῖσθαι, &c. 'To be minded' being thus an established sense of διακοινοῦσα, there is nothing gained by altering to its synonym διακοινοῦσιν 'to be disposed.'

ἀφροτώτατα. For the middle form with passive sense, cf. inf. 361 ἐ μαστύζωτα, στερβλύτα, 426 κ τύμηται. In 376 ε ὧρατον is middle 'will grow up.'

Χερσόμας, ἄθεραμας, ἄθροιμα, λέχωμα, ἀπατοῦμα, φαλάξωμα, εὐγογραμμα, μισώμα, ἀλησμα, ἀθέωμα, ἀθέμα, καθησιμα, and others are similarly used.

343 C. οὔτε πόρρως ἐκ—'you are so far (out),' sc. τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, οὐ κατὰ ὅρθος γνωσιν.

The expression πόρρω εἴτε περί, 'to be far off in the matter of,' is here treated as sufficiently explicit to dispose with the usual genitive, for which cf. Thesel. 151 c πόρρω ὄντως τοῦ εὐθυμοῦ, ὅτι...περί τε τοῦ δικαίου καὶ δικαιόσυνής κ.τ.λ. For the distinction of τοῦ δικαίου and δικαιόσυνης v. supra. 388 a. The 'hyperbatic' position of τε immediately after the preposition is the regular Greek. Cf. Prot. 316 τοῦ ἄρθρα τοῦ Ὀρθία καὶ Μοῦσηι. Thus, vesp. 78 ὁ στῆ τε 'Ἀστράχον καὶ Τυρασφέρουν (ποὺ ὀκτὶ Ἀστράχον τε καὶ Τ.)' and inf. 345 ε στ το ἀλήθείς καὶ διακριτή ἀρχή.

A omits τε ὑπόθεσιν, not is requisite. The sense is περί τοῦ δικαίου—καὶ...καταφυσάτε, καὶ δικαίω—ὁμίλα, concerning on the one hand justice and on the other injustice.' If, however, τε is right, we must suppose it to have been deliberately inserted in order to shew more definitely that the words ἀδίκως τε καὶ δικαίως form a single notion opposed to the other single notion τοῦ δικαίου καὶ
much property (διὰ τῶν ἱστῶν) as the δίκαιος, might deceive the
sympathies or collectors.

οὕτων τε λόγῳ. These would include (a) the ordinary payments
e.g. the μισθοὶ δικαστῶν, βουλευτῶν, ἀκρογοικῶν, magistrates' fees,
officers' fees (e.g. of πρὸσμα and ἱστῶν) and payments for
government jobs and contracts (e.g. in buildings, religious pro-
cessions &c.); (b) state doles e.g. the θεουργοί, στρατιώται, gratuities
to orphans &c.; (c) the handling of public money by paymasters,
στρατηγοί, &c. The δίκαιος would thus receive more than he had
earned or secure more than his share of largesses, or let public
money stick to his fingers in passing.

343 E. ὑπάρχει—not simply—ἐστι, but implies a first condi-
tion to be reckoned with ('to start with'). That condition may
be either an advantage or a disadvantage. Of Xen. Ages. 8. 1
ὑπερηχούσης μὲν τιμῆς, παροῦση δὲ δυνάμεως, inf. 360 6 ὑπὲρ δύναμιν
ὑπάρχειν ἑαυτῆς κ.τ.λ. τά γα οἴκητα. It is obviously more natural to take these words as
the subject of ὑπάρχει (and not as accus. respect). The fact that
the subject of ὑπάρχει changes to 'the just man' counts for nothing
in the Greek. Of. sup. 338 6, where the instances are much more
abrupt.

اتفاقσια or اتفاقσια?—The latter appears to be the correct
form for Plato.

The prepa-roynite accent of ἤσιος,—an accent which can only date
from times when a later verb ἤσεθαι was actually in current
use—manifestly proves nothing. The older verb was ἠσθάνθαι,
of which various parts occur in the classical period. If ἠσθάνθαι
had existed as well, we should have looked for corresponding parts
from that present, and it is at least highly suspicious that the only
part which claims to represent it is identical in form with the aorist
of ἠσθάνθαι, viz. ἠσθένθησαν. The first appearance of ἠσθά-
θησα is in Theocritus (7. 45), but that writer can hardly be quoted
to validate a form in Attic Greek (cf. his ἄδησα). Later, however,
افظσια came into general use, and it is to that fact that the
error in ἠσθένθησα is due. ([افظσια, the old reading in Eur.
Hipp. 1960, has been long corrected (from ἤσιος) to فياءσια.]

νῦν τὸν δὲ Ἀλκην—sc. in the general sense of 343 π οίς ὕπαρξεν
ἀρχιτέκτον. For the expression cf. 341 6. Here also some inferior
was have ἦσθε.

μεγάλα—with πλεονεκτῶν (otherwise μέγα would be required) 'the
man who has the power to grasp on a large scale.'
344 A. ἢ μείλον ἐξερήτωρ ἢ ἀντί ᾧ ἀδικον εἶναι ἢ τοῦ δίκαιου—ἀντί, from its position with ἢ δικαιον, is rather ἢπιο than ἢ. 'To his own personal advantage.'

344 B. ἢ πο δικαιον μήρα—'Now in the case of each separate instance of these [aforesaid] crimes,' i.e. 'when each of these is taken in detail and alone.'

The former rendering is probably correct, though editors appear to have overlooked it.

344 B. ἢ πο δικαιον μήρα—'Now in the case of each separate instance of these [aforesaid] crimes,' i.e. 'when each of these is taken in detail and alone.'

344 B. ἢ πο ἐκ τοῦ ἴσον δικαιον μήρα—'Now in the case of each separate instance of these [aforesaid] crimes,' i.e. 'when each of these is taken in detail and alone.'

344 B. ἢ πο δικαιον μήρα—'Now in the case of each separate instance of these [aforesaid] crimes,' i.e. 'when each of these is taken in detail and alone.'
344 C. φοβοῦμεν—belongs to the first member of the clause only by a slight zeugma: ‘not because they dislike (e.g. ἄκοσμος) doing injustice, but because they fear to suffer it.’

The antithesis of τὸ ποιεῖν and τὸ πάσχειν is, however, better brought out by putting both under the government of one word, which, after all, is but slightly strained.

κακῶς γινομένη—i.e. εἰ κακῶς γίγνεσθαι, if it comes off adequately.' Cf. οἴη, καλῶς, κακῶς γίγνεσθαι τῷ γίγνεσθαι often has the sense of ‘amounting,’ ‘occurring.’ Cf. inf. 346 c. That sense may be present here, i.e. ‘if there is a sufficient amount of it.’

τὸ δ’ ἄδικον λαύτω λαυτελεύον—‘whereas to oneself injustice is profitable.’ The common rendering, ‘injustice is which is of advantage to oneself,’ is neither so apt, nor is it grammatical, in view of the absence of τὸ before λαύτω.

CHAPTER XVII.

344 D. ήμῶν καταντλήσας—the genitive ήμῶν depends directly upon the participle, while κατ’ τῶν ἄνω is added for further definition. Cf. 538 ε γραφεῖα ἐς πλείω γέλοια καταντλήσαι.

For καταντλεῖαι of a deluge of words, cf. Lys. 204 v, Ar. Vesp. 488 ἄλλ’ εἴ τινι κοινίσας [τοῖς τοῦτον κατατάλεῖσαι καταντλήσαι]. Alth. v. 221 λ δικαίως μη σᾶρξη αἰσθητήρια συμπλθηθεῖσαι λόγος.

Similarly καταντλεῖαι (Legg. 900 e) and κατατάλειαι (Eur. Frag. 891). The whole passage is imitated by Lucian Dem. Enc. 16.

ἀδέρφων καὶ πολίων τῶν λόγων—‘emptied his speech plump over us in a torrent.’ The adjectives keep up the metaphor of καταντλεῖαι. Cf. the familiar πολίτες μὲν, Dem. de Cor. 272 θρασυφρόνω καὶ πολίων μέντω (of language), Hor. Sat. 1. 7. 29 salto multoque fluent. Their ‘predicative’ position is part of the idiom, i.e. as ὁ λόγος πολίς μὲν ὁ λόγος πολίς καταντλεῖται.

NOTES.

344 Ε. ἄλλ’ οὖ εἰς διαγγέλῃ, ἂν ἐν διαγγέλεσιν...ζητή—‘and not the leading of a life—(I mean) by what manner of conduct one would live the most profitable existence.’ It is better to treat ζητή not as a διαγγέλῃ, but as the advorb (= qua ratione).

ἄλλ’ οὖ is regular for English ‘and not’ in such emphatic oppositions. Cf. 379 d, 492 a, 532 c (ὅστε κρήνηκατοι), ἄλλ’ οὖ ποιεῖτε), Lach. 185 & c. καλ οὖ is, however, no less permissible. Cf. 850 οὐ δέκλει πλείαν ἐς ἔθελεν αἰρεθήσασαι...καὶ οὐ ποιεῖ.

διαγγέλεσιν—much rarer than the active διαγγέλω. With διαγγέλω it is possible to understand (1) χρόνον or βίον, (2) ισχύ, ‘to keep oneself (occupied).’ But διαγγέλω διάδοται may be expressed by διαγγέλεισαι, while the meaning is practically identical with διαγγέλω (βίον).

ζητή—properly differs from βίον as the physical existence differs from the course of life and its activities. Here also a rational way of leading a life (βίον διαγγέλῃς) is answered by ‘getting the most profit out of existence’ (ὡς λαυτελευτήτης).

γω γὰρ ὁμως κ.τ.λ.—‘pray, do I think otherwise?’ or ‘do you mean to say that I think otherwise?’ To which Socrates replies ‘You seem to, or else to care nothing about us.’

This rendering is so simple that it is hard to understand why ὁμος has been suggested for ὅμως, and why the mark of interrogation has not been universally accepted after ἃτεύ.
345 A. οὗτοι κακῶς σοι κέισται...ἐφεργήσθης—any benefit you may confer upon so great a number of us will be no bad investment for you. The sense of κέισαι, as applied to money or other treasure stored or invested, may be gathered from e.g. Soph. Ο. τ. 1513 ἐγὼ δὲ δὲν έκέλευς, τέκνοι Ἀγώνη, ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ ἔτη λίπαν τόδε κέισται πόλει, Ἡδ. τ. 86 οὐ ἐπεκατομένω ὡς μοι κέωνα έσται παρὰ σοι σφία.

In connexion with ἐφεργήσθης there is an allusion to the custom of the Persian kings, who recorded the names of their ἐφεργητοί for future recompense. Cf. Gorg. 506 c καὶ με τὸν έξαλέγετο...μέγιστοις ἐφεργητοῖς παρ’ έμι αναγράφοις, Thuc. τ. 139 κέισται σοι ἐφεργητεία ἐν τῷ ἁμέρῳ όποιον εἰςαἰεὶ ἐμπροςπερατος.

τὸ γ’ ἢμι—either (1) ‘I tell you my own feeling (or case), viz., that...’, cf. Soph. 237 ἐν τῷ μὲν ἔστι δύοι βοῶνες τίθετο, δεκα τό δὲ λέγου, κ.τ.λ., or (2) τὸ γ’ ἦμι is purely adverbial: ‘so far as I am concerned.’ Cf. Prot. 338 ο ἐπι το γ’ ἔστι δύοι δόθη κοινοφρεμὲς, Ἡδ. τ. 108 ἀλλ’ έτοι φίλοι τόδε οὔτε γένεσθαι, χρὴ δ’ ἂν γε ἔστω ὑπερηφάνεσθαι ἐπιτίθην (though this also is capable of being rendered as if τό ἦμι were the subject to ὑπερηφανείαν). έστω μὲν ἄθεοι κ.τ.λ.—‘let there be an unjust man, and let him...

οὔ πείθει—so, ‘he’ (the aforesaid successful ἀθέος), ‘such a man.’ This is more natural than to supply ‘it,’ ‘such a case.’

ταῦτ’...πέπονθεν—[or ταύτ’? ]—‘is in this state of mind’; v. note on 329 A.

345 B. πείσω...ποιήσω—since ἐπὶ follows, these verbs are probably subjunctive.

ἐπὶ—apparently a metaphor from putting food into another’s mouth. Cf. Ar. Eq. 716 seq. κ"δ’ ὡσπερ αἱ τεῦθεν γε αὐτίκα κακά: | μαρτύρουμεν γὰρ τῷ μὲν ἀληθείᾳ ἐντιθησί | ὥστε δ’ ἐκεῖνοι τρικλίαις κατάστασιν. So ἐπίθετος=‘mouthful.’

This form of ‘teaching’ is the last of which Socrates would approve.

πρῶτον μὲν—it is not necessary to look for a δὲ-clause to balance

the stereotyped πρῶτον μὲν, which here simply = ‘above all things.’ For the absence of the δὲ-clause cf. Aesch. Ag. 810, Supp. 410.

[Otherwise it would perhaps be permissible to take πρῶτον μὲν δὲ ἀληθείᾳ μὲν (‘if possible’), and to suppose that the regular δὲ μὸν is here replaced by a clause with ἦτα, i.e., ‘if possible, abide by your assertions, or else...change your ground openly.’]

345 C. ὁρίζωνος κ.τ.λ. Jowett and Campbell say ‘having at first defined the physician as the true physician you did not think fit afterwards &c.’ But ὁρίζωνος is not ὁρίζωνος, and must be synchronous with ἦμι. Rather render ‘that, while providing at the outset for the genuine physician, you did not, consistently therewith (οὐκέτα), realise that you were bound subsequently to keep to the genuine shepherd’; i.e. ‘while making the proviso in the one case, you did not see that you would have to make it in the other.’

οὐκέτα does not mean later in time, but following in logic: ‘you did not carry on the principle.’ Cf. Prot. 321 ὁ τὸ δὲ Πρωμέθεις εἶναι τὸν ἀρέστον...οὐκέτα ενέχει ροῦσιν ἐκεῖθεν (i.e. he could not carry his boldness further and enter &c.).

παινεῖν.

So λ. A few inferior mas have the gloss πακούνειν, while the common reading is παμαίνειν. παινεῖν, being a rare word in prose, was likely to be glossed, and no less likely to be corrupted (in this particular context) to the similar looking πομαινεῖν. On the other hand it is not so easy to believe that a genuine πομαινεῖν could first be corrupted to the rarer παινεῖν and then further glossed into πακούνειν.

Here, as in 348 λ, the main business or ‘art’ of the herdsmen is ‘to fatten’ their herds. The art of the πομαίνειν, which might be expressed by πομαινεῖν, is at least equally expressed by παινεῖν τα πρόβατα. In keeping with παινεῖν also we have immediately μέλλοντα εἰς ταῖς ἑαυτοῖς κ.τ.λ.

ἐπιστασθήσατα. Davies and Vaughan inadvertently say ‘to give an entertainment.’ This, of course, requires the active.

πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτὴν—so, ἐπιστασθητα.

345 D. τὸ δὲ πομαίνειν...ἐκτεθη—see 342 b. ἐκπετρίσθαι—middle, otherwise the nominative ἐκπέτρισθαι could not stand.

ὡς γ’ ἂν μὴν ἔδει τὸ πομαίνειν ἐναι—‘that is to say, so long as it lacks nothing of being (what it calls itself, viz.) πομαίνειν.’

οὕτω δὲ ἐμνή νῦν δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἐναι κ.τ.λ.—ἐναι is imperfect.
CHAPTEB XVIII.

τὰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς—i.e. τὰς ἰδιωτικὰς (πρ. π.), as opposed to τὰς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν immediately above. Socrates means such forms of control as τραπεζή (= ἀρχή συμμάτων), κυβερνητική (= ἀρχή κυβερνῶν) &c. Cf. 342 ε ἄρχουσι ταῖς τέχναις.

[The translation of Jowett and of D. and V., 'the common state offices,' cannot be got from the words.]

οὖν οὐδὲ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἵνα. ἵνα involves no tautology with ἵνα, which simply expresses consent, not desire. A man may 'consent' to hold office ἵνα (against his wishes).

ὡς οὐχὶ αὐτὸν ὡς ἴσον ἴσον— the accus. abs. as in 426 ε, Phaedo 109 β, Soph. Ο. Τ. 101 &c. It is combined with gen. abs. in 604 α ὡς δὲ θαλαζέον ἡμων τον ἄγαθον...οὐτε οὐδὲν προβαίνοντι κ.τ.λ., and similarly in Xen. Mem. ii. 3. 13, Thuc. vii. 26 (fin.). Attempts to draw any real distinction between the two cases in a clause with ὡς are futile.

αὐτὸς τὸν. The 'longer' form, which in Attic literature mostly belongs to verse, is apparently chosen for emphasis (ἔστιν), though euphony may have had something to do with the matter.

The same explanation can be given of the other instances in the Republic collected by Jowett and Campbell, viz. ἦν αὐτῶν τοῦ κυρίου (584 c), συμβολαὶ παθήματα (355 a) and θεῖοι μὲν (359 a). In μεγάλοις τάξεις (350 a) rhythm seems to be the chief consideration. In the treatise on the Laws they are frequent. In such forms was conversational is shown by their free use in Aristophanes. In inscriptions they are rare after 444 n. c., though before that date they occur almost as frequently as the shorter forms. Meisterhan. § 47. 7.

346 B. οὐχὶ...μέντοι—v. on 389 n.

ἐτέρας—'different (from others)' = 'distinct.'

τὴν δύναμιν—'its faculty'; i.e. its special power towards a certain end. Cf. 532 a ἡ τῆς δύνας δύναμις.

From this fact of each τέχνη possessing a special δύναμις comes the later meaning of δύναμις as itself 'art' or 'faculty' (of Medione, Logic, &c.). Cf. Gorg. 447 ε τὰς τὴν τέχνην τοῦ ἄσεως μὲν παρὰ δίδαξαι ἀποκριθῆναι. Socrates being anxious to arrive at some 'actual result' (τὰ καὶ παρασφάλεια) asks Thrasymachus not to give 'some peculiar (unexpected or paradoxical) reply.' The question has obviously only one answer, which should be so readily admitted that he virtually says 'and pray do not bank us by answering in some unnatural way.'

The rendering 'contrary to your opinion' corresponds rather to παρὰ τὴν γνώμην τὴν σως, or would require παρὰ τὴν σωφροσύνην δόξαν as in 360 ε. Lach. 178 τὰ μέγατα παρὰ τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν. Nor has Socrates any reason to suppose that the sophist will be comoncil. In Protag. 337 β πολλάκις παρὰ δόξαν μεσομείρου there is no ambiguity.

περάσομεν—a word of logic (v. lex.). Cf. συμφρασμα, 'a conclusion.' Protag. 360 α αὐτό, ἤδη, πάνων. ἄλλα τοῦτο...ἐκ. For ἄλλα = 'nay' or 'well' v. 327 n.

μημονωτικα—a word invented ad hoc: 'an art of securing pay.' See Introduction.

346 B. ἣ τὴν λατρευτὴν στὰ...ὁ ἱερόν τ. κ.τ.λ.—or do you (ὑπ.), cf. 339 n) call the art of healing and the art of navigating the same? (Can it possibly be so?) or (is it not rather the case that), if you desire to draw strict distinctions according to the principle you laid down (viz. 340 n), the fact of a navigator becoming well through the benefit of a sea-voyage will none the more make you call it (viz. the art of the navigator) an art of healing 'οὔτως το ξυμφόρον αὐτῷ πλεῖν—the best men give διὰ το ξυμφόρον αὐτῷ πλεῖν, of which it is possible to take several views: viz. (1) (most probable) that the frequent recurrence of the phrase το ξυμφόρον in the previous argument caused it to be inadvertently substituted here, (2) that ξυμφόρον αὐτῷ forms an adjectival qualification to the noun πλεῖν (ἔδικα το πλεῖν το ξυμφόρον αὐτῷ), 'through the beneficial voyaging,' (3) that ξυμφόρον αὐτῷ is a phrase of the accus. absolute participle, i.e. the whole = ἔδικα το πλεῖν ξυμφόρον αὐτῷ, 'through his voyaging, it being beneficial to him,' (4) that διὰ το ξυμφόρον αὐτῷ = 'through the fact of it benefiting him,' the participle being used as equivalent to the infinitive itself.

Of these (2) and (3) are exceedingly harsh, and will hardly be considered tenable in the absence of parallels. The last explanation
might perhaps be maintained by those who are satisfied to quote e.g. Thuc. v. 9 το επετείκι πλοίων κ το μέλημα της φιλοσοφίας, vi. 24 το μεν επετείκι τού πλοίων ουκ ἐξερεύνησαν (where, however, it is easy to render ‘the part of them (the feeling in them) which desired the expedition’). Soph. O. C. 1250 ἦσαν τιν το πλοίων πόρον το Ἡλέκοντος, Iph. 196 της γεροντος ἡκέπου ἐκπερισσέα. The Thucydidean usage, however, is by no means to be regarded as a substitution of participle for infinitive. Ηι ἤ διεύθυνε, το νησιόυ, το βουλητην, το επετείκι are never the same thing as το δεδεινα &c. Usually they are accompanied by a genitive (e.g. αὐτῶν, τις γενόμενοι) and are literally ‘the fearing part (of him, his mind),’ ‘the desiring part (of him, his mind)’ &c. In the strongest case i. 123 εν τοι μελεταντι οὐκονετήτωρ λεγοντα it is an error to say that εν τοι μελεταντι could be substituted in exactly the same sense. Literally the words mean ‘in the non-practising quality (part) of them.’ The passages quoted from Sophocles are very dubious (v. Jebb’s notes on each). A careful examination of each instance will show that there is none analogous to the supposed use of το ξυγούρων here.

The second καλές is probably future, which would be the regular tense in apodosis to εἰς ἤγαγε γιγνήσθη. 

346 C. οἶκοσ της γειοβλαν κ.τ.λ.—we accordingly granted (viz. sup. a) this much, that the benefit of each art is peculiar to itself. 

κανὴ τω το οἰιντο κ.τ.λ.—through their common use of some one and the same thing in addition (to their own art) they derive benefit from the said thing. ἄν εἰκόνος, εἰ τοι αὐτῶ τωυτ (which is μαθητικός).

CHAPTER XIX.

The question whether this or ξυστές should be read is one never likely to be settled. (ξυστές would be imperfect, and is out of the question.) The best texts here give ξυστές, as in Soph. 238 Ξ, 243 Β. Similarly in Ar. Lys. 895 and Eq. 717 the best texts (Rev.) has διστάσεις and ἄτασεις respectively. For other arguments establishing the 'thematic' form ('Thes') in the present see Rutherford New Phrynichus Art. cox, where it is remarked that 'the contracted second person singular, being unknown to late Greeks, was altered when possible into the participle, otherwise was converted into the imperfect or late ἐσθ.' In the imperfect there is little doubt of the superiority of ἐστι, ἐστι. The imperative is ἐσθε only. [These quotations lend little help.]

tὸ φιλοτιμοῦν τε καὶ φιλάρεγρον εἶναι—τε καὶ does not imply that the two qualities go together; rather—as the case may be—

347 B. ξυστές.

The question whether this or ξυστές should be read is one never likely to be settled. (ξυστές would be imperfect, and is out of the question.) The best texts here give ξυστές, as in Soph. 238 Ξ, 243 Β. Similarly in Ar. Lys. 895 and Eq. 717 the best texts (Rev.) has διστάσεις and ἄτασεις respectively. For other arguments establishing the 'thematic' form ('Thes') in the present see Rutherford New Phrynichus Art. cox, where it is remarked that 'the contracted second person singular, being unknown to late Greeks, was altered when possible into the participle, otherwise was converted into the imperfect or late ἐσθ.' In the imperfect there is little doubt of the superiority of ἐστι, ἐστι. The imperative is ἐσθε only. [These quotations lend little help.]

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347 C.  οὐκέναι νομοί ἀτικάνονται—either (1) 'compulsion must be brought to bear upon them and a (threat of) penalty, if they are to be willing to rule,' like τῶν μέλλων ἀδέλφων ἀδέλφων. (2) 'compulsion must be laid upon them and punishment, if they are slow in consenting (hesitate to consent) to rule.' In the former sense μέλλω may be joined with present, future, or (less commonly, but certainly) with aorist; in the latter sense the future is inadmissible.

The change to ἄτικανον for ἀτικάνον of sup.  a might therefore have a purpose, and the words ἄτικανον, εἰ μέλλον κ.τ.λ. correspond to ἄτικανον ἀδέλφων μεν ἀδέλφων followed by εἰ μέλλον κ.τ.λ. in precisely the same sense. Cf. Alc. 114 Ε βιωσάσθαι...πλεῖν. ὅσον κυβɛρνηθεὶς...αἰτηρῶν νομοῖο...The sentence is a remark by the way, parenthetical to the argument. 'And that is probably the reason why the voluntary undertaking of office, instead of waiting for compulsion, has come to be regarded as unseemly.' αἰτηρῶν must not be translated by too strong a term. It is τυρπα ('ugly'), as the opposite of καλόν.
transposition: πότερον...πότερον seems hardly sound-principled criticism. Of the reading of the best MSS in the second position we may note at least three views: (1) that πότερον is the correct reading, while πότερον ὑπὸ is due to an emendation (ποτέραν), made in the belief that ποτέρας should naturally stand in both clauses; (2) that ποτέρας is the correct reading, but that the accent was misread and the copyist took the word as ποτέρα ὑπὸ i.e. ποτέραν ὑπὸ (v. Cobet, Var. Lect. p. xxvii.): (3) that ποτέρας ὑπὸ is the original, ὑπὸ belonging to ἀληθευόμενος. As, however, ὑπὸ, though frequent with positive (ὅπως ὁμολογεῖ) and superlative (ὅπως ἀληθευόμενος), is not found with comparative, the last view is less probable.

πότερον and ποτέρας being equally possible, we may decide for the former on the ground of euphony.

έγνω—see. αἰρόμαι.

348 A. βοῦλε ὅν κ.τ.λ.—οὐς follows πιθομένοι, not ἔχουσι (an order which would suggest deliberate contentionsness). 'Shall we persuade him—if we can discover some satisfactory way—that he is wrong?'

έχουσι, like Latin inventi, obtains later a technical meaning of discovering arguments. Here we should grammatically supply ὄν πείσεως.

ἀντικατατέθηκαν—cf. inf. 358 δ ὅσῳ κατατέθηκα ἐρώ τὸν ἄδικον βίον ὑπάρχων, 367 σ ὅσῳ μάλιστα κατατέθηκα λέγω, Arist. H. A. ix. 44. ἦ λέγω κατατεθέν τρίτη.

In each case it should be noticed that the tense is aorist, the notion being that of a position taken up from the start; here, literally, 'having drawn the rope tight' (as in a tug-of-war). The literal sense is soon lost sight of (as in contedere), so that κατατέθηκα is practically equivalent to an adverb 'with all one's might.'

For other parts of the verb, as applied to vehement speech, cf. Eur. Hec. 330 στομαχεῖ ὅσῳ λέγων κατατεθομένον, Xen. An. ii. 5. 39 ὅσῳ...

...λέγομεν λόγον παρά λόγον—cf. Hipp. Min. 369 c et βοῦλε, εὖ ἄν τοποφόρεσθαι λόγον παρά λόγον.

δέκα δέ γαρ κ.τ.λ. αὖ ὅσῳ ἀντίκατέθηκαν, εἰδίκειτο 'on the contrary,' i.e. as opposed to δέκα, ἀντίκατέθηκα τῷ τῶν ἄδικων (ἥπειρ) just above.

καὶ αὖθις ὁτὸς—οὐ. λόγον λέγων.

ἐν δικαίῳ λέγομεν—'in each of the two cases' (or 'conditions'), ὅσῳ ὁτὲ δικαίῳ ἐνὶ ἐν τῷ ἄδικῳ.

348 B. δικαστὴν τινὸς—'a kind of jury.'

αὐτὸς τε δικαστὴν κ.τ.λ. The τε is trajected, as more often after prepositions or the article.
κακοθείαν—Socrates pretends to take εὐθεία literally, although he is well aware of Thrasydamus’ meaning. The temptation to score a point in passing is too great. “Then if justice is ‘good nature,’ injustice is ‘ill-nature’?”

At the same time the point is a real one. That εὐθεία could ever be treated contemptuously implies a tendency to treat κακοθεία with respect. Thrasydamus may give the κακοθεία another name, but Socrates interposes a caustic reminder of the unvarnished truth.

φρόνιμοι...ευλογοί. ‘Do the unjust seem to you to be men of wisdom and excellence?’ See Introduction.

υφ’ ἐνεκους ποιεῖσθαι. So Thuc. iv. 60 τάδε πάντα ὑπὸ σφάς ποιεῖσθαι. The dative, however, is more common, e.g. Philon. 58 αίσθησιν ἐπεξετάζετο...ποιοτό. Sometimes we also differ, as in Hist. i. 201. With the accusative the sense of bringing under is uppermost, with the dative the sense of the subject itself, ὑπὲρ τινων having become a fixed phrase accompanying any verb.

ἀποτίμωντας—cf. inf. 575 ὥς μεταποτίζω. The ἀποτίμων (μεταποτίζω) was a leather pouch hanging from the girdle. Thieves cut this pouch away (ἀποτίμωντας). Sometimes, however, the money was carried in the girdle itself; hence σωματίζω. Mayor on Juv. xiv. 297. In that case the girdle itself would be cut. Plaut. Trin. iv. 2. 20 securus servius. Cf. Gorg. 506 B.

348 E. τοῦτο μάται κ.τ.λ.—I quite understand that,’ viz. that you are referring to the δίκαιον in the grand style and not to the petty practitioners.

εἰθαμαν. For aorist τινα εἰθαμαν 339 A and note. Lach. 186 ὅτι διὰ διαφέρουν ἀλλάξων εἰθαμαν. αίτω is not interrogative, but, as often after θαμάζων, αἰθαμανεῖν &c., approaches the meaning ἄριστον, ἅμα ἡ διαφορά ἀλλάξων διὰ τοῦτο εἰθαμαν ἐστὶν.

στρατηγὸν—λ’ a more stubborn position (to take up). Otherwise ‘this is a stronger position (to attack).’ Either sense is involved in the notion of ‘farmer consistency.’

348 c τις κριτικ. The deliberative subjunctive direct τοῦτο the third person is comparatively rare, and mostly occurs in cases with τις, where τις is only another way of saying υμεῖς, as in Phileb. 15 νοτος τις τις τῆς ἐργάσεως τής μάχης; v. Goodwin M. and T. § 289. The deliberative indirect is less restricted. Goodwin M. and T. § 677. Cf. Protag. 348 κερανθός ὑπὲρ κερανθός ὑπὲρ. Phaedo 115 1 κερανθός διὸ τοῦ με δίκαιον.

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κακαίαν...ἡ αἰσχρόν—answered immediately with chiasmus by καλῶν καὶ λεγήματος, in such a way as to show that κακαία particularly implies weakness. For the chiasmus cf. 328 ν and inf. 330 c.

349 A. ἐ ἡμεῖς τῷ δικαίῳ προσετίθεμεν—which we were attributing to justice, viz. in the general sense of 345 λ, 347 ι, 348 α. There is no express catalogue of praises ascribed in those passages.

τῷ λόγῳ ἐπηκλήθη—a military metaphor, 'to come out to attack the position.' That this is the sense (τῷ λόγῳ not being instrumental) is seen from e.g. Prot. 345 δ ἐστι σόφος καὶ διὰ δῶι τῷ ἄματος ἐπηκλήθη οὐ τῷ Πιντακοῦ ῥήματι. Cf. 381 α. Also immediately below the same sense is expressed by τῷ λόγῳ ἔλθην.

349 B. Βοικετᾷ σοι ἐν ἐθέλει πλέον ἔχειν, κ.τ.λ.—'Do you think the just man would be ready (ἐθέλει, not so strong as βοικετάναι) to have an advantage over the just man?' 'By no means, for (in that case) he would not have been the charming and simple person he is.' 'Well, (would he be ready to have an advantage over) the just action?' 'No, not even over the just one.' For the argument and the sense of πλέον ἔχειν see Introduction.

άστονείς = lepides. Cf. Phaedr. 242 δ ἔτι τῇ ἐθέλει αὐτοῦ πάντων ἀστείᾳ. Lys. 204 ε ἄστοθι γε, ἐγὼ δὲ δέ, ἐνεργήματι. Αρ. Nub. 1064 ἄστοθι γε κόρος ('a pretty piece of luck'). The meaning goes through the stages (1) 'town-bred,' (2) 'polite and charming,' (3) 'charming' (ironically).

ἄξονη—note on εὐκφράοσι 330 α. In meaning the word corresponds to ἐθέλει (supr.), and is accordingly opposed to βοικετάναι (inf. c init.)

πλεονεκτεῖν—differs from πλέον ἔχειν as the habit or disposition of striving differs from the result. Whereas the δικαιος does not think it right to have an advantage (πλέον ἔχειν) over the just man, he does think it right to claim (or seek) advantage (πλεονεκτεῖν) over the unjust man. The unjust man seeks advantage (πλεονεκτεῖν) in all cases.

ἄξονη—it is conceivable that the ss reading ἄξονη might here be indicative (as inf. c init.), but, in the light of the preceding sentence and ἡγοῦσθαι in this, it is almost certainly optative.

NOTES.

349 C. ἐ τούτω μὲν δικαίω μὴ ἄξονη πλέον ἔχειν...τοι δὲ ἄξονοι—sc. ἄξονη. The expression is a brachylougi. Stallbaum compares Gorg. 500 ο ἐτε τῷ δικαίῳ ἄξονῃ...ἡ δ᾽ ἀρσενική (sc. δικαίῳ). Thesath. 136 ν ἐν μὲν ἄξοι τοις καθήμενοι οὐκ ἐπηκλήθην ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ ἐκείνου συλλογικῷ (sc. ἄξονη). Cf. inf. ν. and 350 α. μὴ ἄξονη...μὴ δὲ βοικετάναι—'neither thinks it right (= ἐθέλει supr. κ.) nor wishes it.'

CHAPTER XXI.

λόγον—so best ms. It may be either interrogative, 'shall we put it thus?' or Hortative, 'let us put it thus.'

Inferior ms have λόγων, which, again, may be either a question or a statement of the position.

349 D. ἀρα—sc. εὐκφράοσι.

πῶς γὰρ ὁ μὲν...ὁ τοιοῦτος κ.τ.λ.—either (1) 'of course a man who is of that character (viz. φρόνιμος καὶ ἄρσεν) must also be like people of that character, whereas the other must be unlike them'; or (2) 'of course a man of such and such a character must also be like people of the said character &c.' Editors generally choose the latter, but the addition of ἄξονα makes in favour of the former.

ὁ δὲ μὴ ἔκφραζεν. ὁ δὲ, 'the other man,' is frequently thus written as if ὁ μὲν had preceded. For a peculiar instance see Thesath. 181 δ ὁδὸς ἐν ἀρχῇ τῶν εἰς εὐφράοσιν ἀλλοσομαν, τοῦ δὲ περὶ φράοσιν.

This (the reading of the best ms) is both more idiomatic and more euphonous than the explicit ὁ δὲ μὴ μὴ τοιοῦτος ἄξονα τότε καθήμενοι, which probably arose from an interpretation.

τοιοῦτος ἄρα ἔστων ἐκτέρως κ.τ.λ. ἂρα does not introduce a logical deduction (which would be egregiously inaccurate), but Socrates catches at Thrasymachus' word τοιοῦτος. 'Then (we are to understand that) each of the two is of the same description as those whom he resembles' [i.e. τοιοῦτος...[ὁμοι οὐκετώμεν καθημένος]. Cf. Phaedo 92 ν ὁ γὰρ δὴ ἄρκεσιν γε σοι τοιοῦτον ἄξονα ἔτεινεκάσεις].

This formal admission, in which lies a fallacy, is required as a premise to the following argument (inf. 350 c). See Intro. § 40 a, g (iii).

ἔλλη τι μῆλα.—'Nay (why), what must be the case?' Cf. 332 c

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ἀλλὰ τὶ οὖν; 348 α ἄλλα τὶ μὴ; In such places τὶ becomes practically equivalent to τὸ ἀλλὰ, but it would be a mistake to suppose that ἀλλὰ is omitted. The thought is 'Now, but what is it (if it is not this)?' In full Χειν. Οἰκ. 9 τὶ δὲ, εἰ μὴ... (quid nisi...).

349 Ε. φρόνιμων—i.e. relatively to μουσική. τὶ δὲ ἀτριχότος; see λέγεις.
ἐν τῇ ἐπιστάσει κ.τ.λ.—which is a μουσική φράσει; v. note on 349 b sup. The one article, inasmuch as καθ' ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ =—οὐ' ('as the case may be'). Cf. 392 b. 'The act which consists in tightening or relaxing.'

350 Α. ἐν τῇ ἑκατογέννῃ ἡ πόρει—see which he prescribes. This sense is determined by the article, 'in the food or drink (belonging to the special case).'

ὁρτογενфесс—comes as a sort of emphasizing afterthought, τα having already been expressed. 'If any expect—no matter who...'

πλεῖον ἐν ἑκατόν αἰρέσθαι κ.τ.λ.—'would be ready to adopt the course of either doing or saying more than another scientific man would do or say, instead of the same as his like.'

αἰρέθαι has something of the sense common with προαρέσθαι and ἀρέσθαι, viz. of adopting a policy or taking a line.

ἴσως, ἐφι, ἀνάγκη—the assent becomes grudging as the consequences begin to appear.

ὁμώς μὲν...ὁμώς δὲ... Cf. Protag. 319 δ ὁμώς μὲν τέκτων, ὁμώς δὲ χαλκίου, Soph. Ο. ἢ πόλις δ' ὄρος μὲν δυσμα-μάτων γέμις | ὁμοῦ δὲ πολύν τε καὶ στεπαγμάτων. Latin similarly doubles puriter.

350 B. σοφὸς—i.e. in respect of his particular ἐπιστήμη. ὁ δὲ σοφὸς ἄγαθός; The usual Socratic position in any case, since ἄγαθος comes of knowledge. Here, however, we have simply a laxity for the full expression of sup. 349 ε ὁσίου καὶ ἄμερος φρόνιμων, ἄγαθος;

350 C. τῷ σοφῷ καὶ ἄγαθῷ—a good instance of the Platonic chiasmus is afforded by the reversed order τῷ κακῷ καὶ ἁμαθεῖ: cf. 228 c.

ἀναπλήθεται. Cf. sup. 334 λ. The word is used of that which turns up unexpectedly at the end of an argument. Cf. 497 a ἔτη τελευτής τὸν λόγον μέγα τὸ σφάλμα καὶ ἑαυτίου τοῖς πρώτοις ἀνα-φαίρεσθαι.
is much inferior. With ἡσύος there is plainly an anacolouthon of a kind very unlikely in so short a sentence, and it is possible that ἡσύος is an emendation to remedy the grammar. On the other hand it is equally possible to argue that both ἡσύος and ἡσύος are adscripta, and that ei μὲν, ὡς οἱ ἄρτοι ἠγέμνον, ἡ δικαιοσύνη σοφία (τοι ἡσύος) is sufficient in itself. With the next words ei δὲ ὁ ἠγέμνων we should then understand "but if (things are) as...

[᾿εξεῖ cannot well have arisen from ἡσύος, and the latter reading may therefore be put aside, unless we are willing to suppose that Plato wrote ἡσύος, ἡσύος]...]

If ἡσύος is not a gloss we may make grammar by inserting <ei> after it, with Bater δὲ (a reading which is cacophonous enough), or by inserting <εἰ>, or by omitting either σοφία or the whole phrase ἡ δικαιοσύνη σοφία as a note which has crept into the text.

CHAPTER XXIII.

351 c  ἐὰν γὰρ σὺ ποιῶ—'Thank you': 'it is very good of you!' Cf. Symp. 174 δ καλὸς γέ, ἐφή, ποιῶ σὺ. The finite verb is to be understood from the preceding context; here ἐὰν γὰρ σὺ ποιῶ (χαρᾷ: μοι). Cf. Αρ. Puc 286 (after ἀπολογεῖσαι σῶτος) ἐὰν γὰρ ἐγὼ ποιῶσαι.

In δ ἐὰν ἀλλ' ἐὰν γὰρ σὺ ποιῶ the words to be supplied are to be extracted from the general sense of ἡσύος...οἱ μὲν διὰ-φερόμενοι. Strictly speaking the phrase there has no grammar, but the sense is clear. Cf. ἐπὶ τὰς ἀλλ. a, αλλοχώρι ἐπὶ καὶ ἐρατομένα μή ὧν πᾶντα κράτησι φανέρων τῶν ἀνθρώπων προγόμενον. Καλὸς γε, ἐφή, ἵνα σὺ λέγω. The full expression occurs in e.g. Dem. Phil. iv. 141 ὀ τότις καλῶς ποιῶσαι (thanks to Fortune who) πολλὰ πεποίηκε τα κοινά, and Αρ. Puc 251 ἐὰν γ' ἐὰν γ' νυνίαν διδότων Ἀθηναίοι, ποινών | ἐν διαλογικοὺς καὶ ἑνοῦρτε τῇ πόλει.

In Plato γέ is an essential part of the expression when it is used in replies (Schanz Plat. Vol. v. Proleg. § 7).

ἡσύος—class' (cf. γένος). If the word is depreciatory it is only so from the context. Cf. 420 a διὸ γὰρ τὰ τῶν ένιοτεστάτων ἑπετέρι ἔργον (i.e. of the various classes of a πόλις), Gorg. 455 ἂν περί ιρώτων... ὧν περί παρασχεῖ τῷ περί ἐκλέκτου τούτῳ διημερισμένον ἔθνος, Tim. 19 ὃ τϊ μετακινεῖ ἔθνος. In Latin natio is depreciatory, as in Phaedr. ii. 5 est averditum quidem Romanus natio. Cf. Cic. pro Mur. § 69 natio candidatorum.
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351 D. ἐργον ἄδικας. Not in the meaning of its ‘special function’ (as in 355 d), a sense of ἐργον explained inf. 352 e (init.). Here it is merely a function, or a result.

That injustice necessarily results in implanting hatred (ἰματισμός is used of a disease sup. 353 ε¢ δεκατ.) is simply an observation from experience, assumed as an axiom. It is, of course, assuming too much.

οὐ καὶ ἐν ἕλεθροις τε καὶ δοσόλοις κ.τ.λ. The first καὶ belongs to the sentence: ‘will it not also be the case that...?’ For the rest, there is no point in the usual rendering ‘whether among freemen or slaves.’ This, moreover, would normally be ἐν τε ἕλεθροις καὶ δοσόλοις (cf. 348 c, 349 α δικαί.). Rather we should render ‘in the case of (the relation between) freemen and slaves,’ ‘in a society where there are both freemen and slaves.’ Cf. 364 α πρὶς δεβοῦν τε λόγοι καὶ ἄρσεν, ‘of the relation of the gods with virtue.’ The allusion is to 351 η, where the unjust state enslaves others. In a society composed of these two elements, where ἄδικα is present, μισοὶ and στίγμαι will occur between the parties.

We thus obtain the three steps (1) ἐν ἕλεθροις τε καὶ δοσόλοις, i.e. between two parts of a society; (2) ἐν δοσόλοις, i.e. between two persons; (3) ἐν ἄρσε, i.e. between two parts of a man.

351 E. ἀλλάζουσε τε καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις—not only to the just (to whom they are assumed to be necessarily hostile), but also to one another.’

ἄλλη...ἐν ἄλλῃ ἐγγύτηται. The notion of the individual at feud with himself is further dealt with inf. 444 a, where στίγμα and ἐπιστάσεως μέρους ποιεῖ τῷ διὰ τῆς ψυχῆς are expressions employed. There, however, the position has been led up to, whereas here the strange expression ‘if injustice occurs in an individual’ is sprung abruptly upon Thrasymachus. Thrasymachus assumes however that it has some satisfactory meaning, and therefore asserts to the question, whereasupon Socrates proceeds to explain what the meaning is and what conclusion results from it.

μὲν μα ἐπόλει κ.τ.λ. ‘It will not lose its proper faculty, will it?’ The origin of μὲν (μα εὐρ) was forgotten, and since μα introduces questions expecting a negative answer, and μα also is employed in such questions, it comes about that μαν and μα are sometimes combined. Cf. 505 c, Phaedo 84 c ὅπως τά λεγέντα μαν μα δοκεῖ ἐπειδὴ λαλήθησα;

[It is an error to suppose that in the combination μαν ὅων the expectation of a negative answer no longer attaches to μαν. Thus

352 A. ἐστι καὶ τῷ ἐνατίτι χαντί καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ—to itself (i.e. inwardly), and to every thing that opposes it, and (consequently, or necessarily) to the just.’ Emphasis is laid upon the hostility to ‘the just’ both here and supra, 351 ε (ἀλλάζουσε τε καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις) because of the point which Socrates proposes to make immediately, viz. that hostility to the just means hostility to the gods.

καὶ ἐν ἄρσε δὲ—i.e. to come to the application of the preceding statement. If the ‘faculty’ of ἄδικα is what has been stated, then ‘in the case of the individual also of course...’

ὑπὸν (ὑποτεχνεῖν)—an answer made sullenly in view of the consequence.

The proper Attic form of the 3rd plur. imperative is ὑποτεχεῖσθαι, and Plato probably so wrote it. Later such forms were regularly
adapted to the shape then current, and it is often simply an accidental confusion with the genitive of the participle which has preserved an imperative -δέντος in mss where -θέτων would otherwise have been substituted. Metrical evidence is against the longer forms, except in Eur. Iph. Taur. 1480 (θέτων), and Ion 1181 (θέτων), where, however, the editors have something to say. Inscriptions do not show -ώσας in either active or passive until 300 B.C. (v. Meisterhans Gram. Att. Ins. § 61. 9), though the imperative in -ωσας is previously met with in 111 times, among which δέντος itself occurs in n.c. 448 and 424, while an instance of ἑρεμος is not met with till the 2nd century B.C. The Grammarians (Mocria, p. 13, Epyll. Mag. 8. 50) lay down the rule ἑρεμος 'ὁρεμος ἑρεμος 'Ελληνως. In Eustath. α ν ἐσσείᾳ πάντες αὐτοὶ ἐρεμοῦσαι θεοὶ ἄλκου καὶ πάντες μεσώντως, but the second hand in B alters to ἡγείσθω. In mss all agree. See some apt remarks by Cobet Not. Lect. p. 327 sq.)

352 B. θεῖς... ἐχθρός. Apart from the force of the two words regarded separately, there is a reference to their familiar sense, when θεῖς—ἐχθρός is treated as a compound (whence the noun θεοεχθρία). θεῖς ἐχθρός in that use involves a contempt which is the very opposite of the admiration which Thrasy machus claims for the ἄλκου. The same notion is brought home here. ἐχθροῦ τοῦ λόγου: the partisan genitive (as with ἱσθεῖς, πεινών τού, no doubt assisted by the sense of 'taking one's fill' (μισθισματικά ἐτεκ.)

For the comparison of discourse to a feast, cf. Lynx. 311 c τι ἤμεταν αὐτῷ μένων κύριαν θύμων ἡμίν δὲ ὑπακούσαν θεοκράτων, Soph. 251 β τοῖς ἐπίθεσις...θέματος θρησκευόμενος, Gorg. 520 a, inf. 571 b, and frequently in Plato. Inf. 354 α τάστα δὴ σαί...εὐτυχία καὶ τοῦ Πειθόλου. With the gen. as here Phaedr. 231 β ὅ δέλλων ὑμῖν τῶν λόγων ἔμειν ἀλλὰς εἰσίται;

Τὰ μὲν τοιοῦτο ἄρχειμα. Thrasy machus suitly pretends to believe that the audience is prejudiced.

ἀστυπλήρωσον—combining the meaning of 'satisfying the inquirer' with that of 'making the banquet complete.' The object, being τοῦ λογία κ.τ.λ., shows that grammatically the latter sense predominates; but for the former cf. Charm. 169 α καὶ τός ἐν ἀστυπλήρωσιν ἔνδυσε λέγει περὶ συμφοράς γὰρ εἴτε, Politi. 298 a τοῦ τῶν πυθαγόμενων ψυχή ἀστυπλήρωσι, Prot. 329 c δ ἐβαθμίσας σοι λέγεσται, τοῦτο μὲν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀστυπλήρωσιν.

ὅτι μὲν γὰρ... The sentence is unfinished, and the opening words are resumed in τὰστα μὲν ὡν ὁτι σύνων ἔχει (inf. η). From ὃς γὰρ ὃς... we enter upon a parenthetical note, which lasts down to ...πράττειν ὀδύνασκοι, and itself contains other parentheses. The outline is: 'for that the just prove to be wiser and better and more capable of action, while the unjust are quite unable to act in concert (...)... this I perceive to be so, and not as you stated at first.' ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ οὐλοφαι...τοῦτο ὁ παντεπτασάς ἀλθῆς λέγομεν. This clause (still following ἐτεκ.) is slightly anomalous. Lit. 'but in point of fact even persons of whom we say that, though unjust, they have at any time done anything vigorously in concert, we do not use the expression with entire truth': i.e. 'but when we say of people who are unjust that they have at any time...we do not use the expression with entire truth.' Grammatically τοῦτο λέγομεν should have been e.g. ὁ παντεπτασάς ἀλθῆς λέγομεν τοῦτο πράξα, i.e. 'when persons of whom we say...we are wrong in declaring to do so.' οὖς, however, is unconsciously treated as if it were εἰ τοιαί.
to which βοι is λυσταφέλητερος is brought forward as demanding detailed examination. In 348 β Socrates finds that Thrasybulus takes up an uncompromising attitude in calling injustice καλόν και εγχευον. He is compelled to refuse this position, by proving that injustice is not καλόν (being neither σοφόν nor ἀφθαρσία), and that it is not εγχευον (being incapable of single-minded action). He now turns back to the question as a whole—which life is the more profitable, in the sense of producing ευδαμονία? Socrates' own summary of the course of the argument is given in 354 a. τό τε ύμνητον—'as our second question.' The first question having been as to whether justice is 'the interest of the stronger.' See 347 β (αν.) ι (init.).

φαινονται—sc. ἀκόσμων ἡμεῖς (rather than τ工作报告, since the meaning is 'they are shown'). ὁ δὲ γὰρ πρὸ τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος κ.τ.λ. For the thought of. 344 ε.

352 ε. ἀκόσμων ἄλλος ἢ ἄλλοι;—(For the form ἀκόσμως v. sup. 338 d καοὐτήρως.) The loss of ἄλλος before ἄλλως would be easy, just as it has been lost from Par. A and other manuscripts immediately below in...μελαρά <ἄλλος> ἀρτέτων....

To say that ὁ δὲ is 'readily' understood from the preceding question is to ignore the repetition of ἀλλως. Thus in δόθην ὁ δὲ ἄλλος ἡμεῖς ἀπόκρισις: Οὔδεπα. Τί δέ; ἀκόσμως ἢ ἄλλος; we might have understood δόθην ὁ δὲ ἄλλος as common to both questions and capable of being so understood with a series of them. With ἄλλος expressed, however, and in its position after δόθηα, the case is different. Nevertheless an emphasis upon ἀκόσμως, recalling the fact that δόθηα had preceded, might suggest that δόθηα ὁ δὲ ἄλλος must be repeated, i.e. 'Could you see with anything else eyes? No. Well, hear with anything but ears?' Whether or not this is possible, is one of those questions about which scholars will differ. Goodwin (M. and T. § 226) accepts the μαξ reading here, and it is wiser to retain it. A case like 360 οὐκέτα δὲ βραδὺ, οὔδε δὲ ἐφανερώσα τοῦ ἀκόσμον οὐκέτα ἄλλος ἡμεῖς ἠμιφάτορεν is, however, obviously much simpler. Cf. 398 a for one equally natural.

A potential optative without ὁ δὲ at all is of course quite out of the question in Attic prose.

οὐδέν δικαίως ὁ δὲ...φαινὲν εἶναι. So Stallbaum for φαινὲν of μας. ὁ δὲ cannot belong to εἶναι, nor can it be joined with a present indicative; Goodwin M. and T. § 195. The one instance quoted, viz. Legg. 712 οὐκέτα δὲ οὐκέτα ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἐθνικὸν ἄνω, οὐκέτα εἶναι, οὐκέτα...εἶναι shows an anacoluthon easily intelligible in a rather long sentence, but not so conceivably here.

353 ε. ἀρέτη. For the special meaning v. sup. 335 ε. ἀρέτην δὲ καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ—'have recourse to the same illustrations.' ἀρέτην ἢ κ.τ.λ.—i.e. 'did we not say that there was...?' (352 a).

For the imperfect of. Crito 47 ν ἀπεκτηθοῦμεν ἑπικού. δὲ τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ ἐγγεγέντα ("as we said") τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ ἀπατώσατο. ἢ ὃς δὲ—So Gorg. 460 λ ἢ. 'Stay now!' Tiens donc. δὴ again implies that we have reached the vital point.

ὕμντον—a word used by Thucydides, Plato, Xenophon, and Aristotle, but not treated as current Attic by Aristophanes or the orators.

CHAPTER XXIV.

353 A. ἀρετὴ—'Will now....' 'Now at last.' (nume demum) [not, of course, as in 340 ε, where the tense is past].

πυθαγόρας ὁ δὲ κ.τ.λ.—ὁ δὲ is naturally kept when ὁ is simply interrogative. The present instance is the indirect form of the direct ὁ τοῦτο ἰσάτον ἰσίων ἐγγορα; see Liddell and Scott, Lex. ὁ δὲ τά ἃ, b.

ὁδὸς particularly common in the second member of such indirect questions. Cf. inf. 354 a σχεδία σείματα εἷναι (μοίην ἀφέναι) ἀρέτη τις σύχως, εἷς (ἢ) καὶ οὐ. Soph. Α. δ ὅπως τὰ ἄλλα ἡμῶν εἶναι ἂν ἔδωκαν (where see Jebb's quotation from Antiph. de casu. Her. p. 131. 14). A collage of examples, however, warrants the belief that (to use Prof. Jebb's imaginary sentence while differing from his explanation) in the second member of such questions as εἰσερχομαι εἰ πράστει ἢ οὐ (ἢ) καὶ προσευκτείς εἰτε πράστει ἢ οὐ (ἢ) the choice is determined mainly by emphasis. The emphatic negative is οὐ. Thus the difference would be expressed by 'See if it is becoming or not (ἢ),' 'see if it is becoming or not (ἢ). This distinction seems conversationally more practicable than the somewhat reconciling discrimination between abstract conception and actual fact. Thus in Pro. 318 α τολλὰ ἐν πτυχωσάσα, εἶναι ἵπποτερον ἐν οὐ (whether it is right to do so or not)....followed by (ἢ) ἔδωκας συμβουλὴν ποιεῖ ὁ δὲ χρόνοι ἐπιτρέπθησας συνάπτο ἄνω ἐν οὐ (whether you ought to do so or not). Note in corroboration of this view that χρόνοι ἐπιτρέπθησας is substituted for ἵπποτερον.

δ οὖν η ἕμμον τι κ.τ.λ.—τι is subject.

κάλλιστα τῶν ἄλλων. This very common Greek idiom, the result of a confusion, is often supposed to have been deliberately imitated by Milton in his 'the fairest of her daughters, Eve.' The same confusion, however, is to be met with frequently in English writers, e.g. Sterne, Sentimental Journey (Gelas) 'of all others...the unfortunate of our own country surely have the first rights,' and is daily heard.

353 Β. ἀρέτη. For the special meaning v. sup. 335 ε. ἀρετὴν δὲ καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ—'have recourse to the same illustrations.' ἀρετὴν ἢ κ.τ.λ.—i.e. 'did we not say that there was...?' (352 a).

For the imperfect of. Crito 47 ν ἀπεκτηθοῦμεν ἑπικού. δὲ τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ ἐγγεγέντα ("as we said") τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ ἀπατώσατο. ἢ ὃς δὲ—So Gorg. 460 λ ἢ. 'Stay now!' Tiens donc. δὴ again implies that we have reached the vital point.
353 C. ἄτοι—The plural is given in all the best MSS. Cf. 503 B, τὰ δὲ τῶν ταύτων...ἐπού τε καὶ...ιμπλήκατο. There, as here and in other places, the use of a v is palaeographically easy to explain, but there are sufficient reasons for believing that even in prose the rule of attaching a singular verb to a neuter plural subject frequently broke down with its own weight.

The verb was apt to depend rather upon the thought than upon the actual word employed. In 503 B the real subject of ἐμπλήκατο is the possessors of the δὲ in question. In 365 B τὰ μὲν λεγόμενα...φαινεις the subject is treated as if it were 'men in general.' Lach 180 ε τὰ γὰρ μερίσματα ταΐε...διαλεγόμενα. See Jell § 365, where the present case is explained as one in which ὁδηγοί (the word previously used) is in the writer's mind as the subject. How easily this might occur is shown by such substitution as in Lach 180 εἰ τυγχάνοι σοι εὐτυχίας ὅτι δής παραγεγομένοι ὁδηγοί βελτίως ποιεῖς ἐκεῖνος οὐ παρεγόταυ, καὶ προσταὶ οἱ τέ ἐσστ σοι εὐτυχίων πολὺν παραγέγονθαι δημοσίων.

The plural with neuter subject is found in epic and is especially frequent in Empedocles, occurs in Pindar and occasionally in Thucydides and Herodotus, often in Xenophon (though sometimes with discrepancy in the MSS, probably due to editorial attempts to preserve the rule), and here and there in other writers. Jell (loc. cit.) supplies examples, e.g. Xen. Ap. i. 2. 23 ἵππα θὰ σου τῷ Σενένατος βασιλεῖ Thuc. iv. 88 τὰ τέλη...ἀστὸν ἐξετάσατο. There is no truth in Porson's μετροτον canon, which limited the plural to cases with an animate subject; nor is it possible in most cases to regard the subject as a collective plural which is itself pluralized.

353 D. αὐτῶν ἢ ἀπράξις—'I mean the special excellence in each case' no matter what the excellence may be. It is not our present concern to define these special ἀπράξεις, but only to recognize that they are essential. The construction of ἄτοι (ἐς ἄτοι τοῖς ἀπράξεις) is not the same (ταχύνει γενέσε) For the use of ἄτοι cf. Ar. Ran. 36 τίς τήν ἄπραξας ὅστε κενταυρόσκε τὸν ἑλέον ὅτι (In. ὃς ὅτι) δὲν ἀποκατάστη ποτὲ. More fully Euthyph. 11 εἰ ἂν κακὶ παραφερομένα...κακία...θν. Both order and sense show that the words τῇ κακίᾳ must not be repeated with κακίᾳ. Each thing has its own particular ἀπράξια; there is no reference to its own particular κακίᾳ, but only to κακίᾳ in general. 'Thanks to its special excellence...but thanks to defectiveness...'

354 A. τῆς—With more vivacity than the deliberative subjunctive: 'Do we put...?' cf. Thuc. vi. 77 μὲν ἔστω κατά πόλεις ἀρρενώμεν; and frequently.

353 D. αὐτῶν—redundant (or resumptive) after τῳ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι κ.τ.λ. Cf. infra 358 B ἄλλα δή λέγων ἀπὸ σοφίας παντοδαπὸν γένεσθαι καὶ μεμισθάναι πάντα χρήματα εἰ δήμοι ἁδίκοι εἰς τὴν πόλιν...προσωμοίον ἢ κἀ ἐτῶν. Eur. Bacch. 201 παράνομα παραδότα ἢ τῷ ὄνομας χρῶν | κεκαθήμεν; ουκείοις αὐτοῖς καταβαλεῖ λόγος ἤκ. ἀνθόδοτος—'assign' (as belonging to its department), cf. Legg. 765 B ἐκ τῶν κρατῶν ἀποδοθὲν τὴν κράτος. See Cope on Arist. Rhet. i. 7. 7 for the uses of ἀποδοθέων.

353 E. ἐν ζωῆ—For ἐκείνον, by an attraction (to the gender of ψυχή).

There is a confusion of expression between (1) ἐς ὅτι ἄλλα ἢ ψυχή...καὶ...φαιμέν ζωῆς ὅτι; and (2) οὐκείοις (οὐ ἄλλα τι σοὶ ἢ) ψυχή...καὶ φαιμέν ἢ...ζωῆς ὅτι; τί οὐκ ἣ τῇ τῇ ζωῆ; That τῇ τῇ ζωῆ is ψυχή ἐγγεγεραι is in one sense a truism, since the presence or absence of ψυχή means the presence or absence of life, ψυχή in fact often—'life.' τῇ τῇ ζωῆ, however, has another meaning, 'the conduct of life,' i.e. the life which consists in the exercise of the faculties (κατὰ ἐνέργεια), Arist. Eth. N. i. 5. 14 defines the 'function of a man' as ψυχῆς τις, τοίχων ἐκτὸς ἐργαζόμενον καὶ πράξεις μετὰ λόγου, and says that it is the function of the συμμαθίου to carry on this life ἐκ καὶ καλῶς. 'Virtue in the soul (the special ἀπράξια) enables life to be lived thus ἐκ καὶ καλῶς.'

353 E. ἐν ζωῆ—But, as has been pointed out in the last note, it is by no means follows that because the soul performs well (ἐν πάντες) it also fares well (ἐν πάντες in the other sense).

354 A. μακάρως τέ καὶ καθαρῶς—ν. sup. 344 B. ἔτοιν—[Εὐθυφρ.] v. sup. 352 A. εἰσταθεῖτο—cf. 352 A. οὐκ is the usual dat. of agent with perf. pass. Litt. 'Let this have been the feastin done by you...'

353 B. τῶν ὁλί παραφερομένων—'the dith which happened to be (from time to time) brought on.' παραφερέω, like παρατιθέω, antronym, of ἀπέφερο. Cf. Εὐθυφρ. i. 119 οἰκοθένει, τοῖς προσόκειται, τὴν κεφαλήν τοῦ παθοῦ. The word is specially applicable, since it is also used of bringing forward arguments, cf. [Eur.] Iph. Aul. 981 λόγος παραφέρεω.
BOOK II.

CHAPTER I.

357 A. λόγου ἀπειλήθαι—not τοῦ λόγου ‘the argument,’ but ‘that I had done with discussion.’

τὸ δ’ ἦν ἄρα...οὐκ ἁπαξίωσέν τι. For τὸ δ’ ‘but, as a fact’; lit. ‘but on the other hand.’ V. sup. 340 ὁ τὸ δ’ ὑπάρχουσα ὁμοιαίη (note).

For ἣν...ἤτα τῷ τῇ δικαιοσύνη, Tim. 51 ὁ τὸ ἀδικία ἀπ’ ὑπ’ ἀριστοκρατείαν. The two words may be separated, e.g. ἢμπ. 193 ὁ τὸ ἄρα, ἀν ἡ αἰσχραί, αἰ ἀντί ἡν τὸ καλὸς ἄνθρωπος ὁμοιαίην.

πρεσβύτης—a prelude (merely). For the absence of μῆν v. note on 333 α πρὸς τὸ ἀρχηγὸν κρίνεισιν. So here the effect is gained by a stress upon πρεσβύτης.

Πλάτων. For Glaucon and his character see Introduction § 6 c. Сε λέγει δὲ καὶ δι’ αὐτὸν τότε... For καὶ δι’ αὐτὸν...see 328 b.

διδασκάλοιν—cf. 368 α. For the use of ἀπεράδος in reference to moral bravery or pluck in argument cf. Meno 51 ὅ ἐν τὶς ἀπεράδος ἦν καὶ μὴ ἀποκαίρως λέγεται.

357 B. τοιῷδε τι ἐναὶ ἅγαθον κ.τ.λ. There is nothing philosophically recondite about Glaucon’s division of ἄγαθον into (1) harmless pleasures with no future results, (3) things unpleasant in themselves and in their results, (3) things unpleasant in themselves but beneficial in their results. The classification is sufficiently exact for the character. It would be over-refinement to press the point that even ἀνάλογον ἁμαρτάνει may leave good consequences.

[Aristotle (Eth. Nic. i. 6. 9) has ὅλως εὖν ὅτι ἀντίθετον λέγετι ἃν ἐπαθή, καὶ τὰ μᾶλλον αὐτὰ, καθάρα ἐκ τίνα τίνα (i.e. goods desired in and for themselves, and a secondary class which are means to these). Ibid. 7. 5 he says that the chief good is εἰσινομία τὰτοθ χάριν ἀρετήματοι καὶ τὸν τότε ἄνθρωπον ἀρετοῖς καὶ δι’ αὐτὰ (μὴ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἄνθρωπος οὐ ἐν ἀνθρώποις αὐτῶν), ἀρετήματος καὶ τὰς τῆς εἰσινομίας χάριν. I.e. what Glaucon calls χαῖρεσιν (=θυμων) and ἄρετον (μοιένος) are put by Aristotle in the same class, viz. the second class of Glaucon.]

cαὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ ὁ πλεῖστον ἁμαρτάνει καὶ μὴν εἰς τὸν ἑπτάοχον διὰ ταύτας ἂν γίνεται κ.τ.λ. This, the reading of the best text, is sound and idiomatic. Greek habitually substitutes the personal or demonstrative for the relative in the second clause of sentences similar to the present. It is too much to say that καὶ δέ δὲ μὴν...is not allowable, but that form of expression would certainly be the exception rather than the rule. Cf. inf. 505 κ δι’ αὐτὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἄραν ἀρετῶν καὶ διὰ αὐτῶν ἄραν ἄραν ἀρετῶν, Ethyd. 301 κ δι’ αὐτῶν ἄραν ἄραν ἀρετῶν καὶ διὰ αὐτῶν ἄραν ἄραν ἀρετῶν καὶ διὰ αὐτῶν ἄραν ἄραν ἀρετῶν.}
change to the demonstrative, the force of the indefinite relative ὅσον pervades the clause. The sense is καὶ ὁδός μὲν... ἀλλὰ ἢ χαίρειν ἡγήστα. The words ἢ χαίρειν ἡγήστα might possibly be suspected by a certain school of critics. They are redundant and, of course, a little illogical: 'they have no future result other than enjoyment while one has them.' But neither of these objections amounts to much when we are dealing with a conversational style. The Greek use of ἀλλος is particularly idiomatic (χαίρειν καὶ τῷ ἀλλο δεδέρχομαι ὦτ.). [An attempt to render χαίρειν ἡγήστα by 'keep on rejoicing' contradicts the bearing of the whole sentence.]

357 C. ὅσον αὖ: 'for example, again,' i.e. to give instances in this case as in the other.

ἰδρυτάς πεῖ καὶ ἢ ἀλλος χρησιμοποιεῖ—'medical practice and other ways of making money' (or 'moneymaking in general').

There is no need, with Stallbaum, to call in the rendering 'and also money-making.' That idiom of ἀλλος is, of course, familiar enough, e.g. Eur. Med. 297, Euthyd. 213 π. ἢ τ εὐθυδήμου καὶ ὥν δν ὡς ὄρθιον (the Sophists) καὶ ἀλλος μαθητῆς ὑμών πολλιν, Gorg. 473 σ τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔξων ('and foreigners as well'), Phaedr. 232 κ. ὄ.; but it is clear from what follows that Glaucon has in mind a benefit arising from the disproportionate exertion of ἰδρυτάς, and that benefit is the making of money.

tάστα...ἐπίσκοπον φαίνειν ἄν. —This construction of φαίνειν (without εἰναι) = καλῶ is not very common. Yet cf. inf. 360 σ κατοίκοι μέγα τάστα τεκμηρίων ἐπὶ φαίνειν τις, Gorg. 481 σ πάντως εἰς φιλόν τῶν ἐπικτών ἡ γαρ ἡ ἡμέρα τῶν κακών καὶ ἀνθρακάς φησί.

357 D. ἦσθιν γὰρ οὖν...καὶ τοῦτο τρίτον: 'yes, there is this sort also besides the other two' (not τοῦτο τῷ τρίτῳ).

γὰρ οὖν in confirming—'yes, indeed,' cf. Thes. 170 καὶ φιλήτι γὰρ οὖν 'yes, he does say so.' In Parm. 148 γὰρ οὖν ἢ τις ἐστιν εἰς καθάτων. (1) With this punctuation there is a slight irregularity of expression, it being necessary to supply οὕτως θετέον οἷον from τίθην. (2) We may, however, treat ὃμοια as parenthetical and expressive of a slight difference in deciding, i.e. ἄγα μὲν, ὃμοια, ἐν τῷ καλλάγματι (τίθην εἰς τιθήν). For ἀλλὰ without a δὲ-clause, carrying on the same difference of tone, see note on 384 ε ἐκεῖνος μὲν κ.τ.λ. 'I, for my part....'

358 A. σὲ τοῦτον δοκεῖ κ.τ.λ.—'Well, you must know, it does not...' or 'Now it does not....'

The absence of any qualifying or predicative word with δοκεῖ calls for remark. 'It does not seem so' would naturally be σὲ δοκεῖ τοιοῦτον, or ὅτι; or we should look for σὲ τοῦτον δοκεῖ (so τὸν εἶδος) or its equivalent.

It is therefore probable that δοκεῖ has the same value as in e.g. ἦσθιν γὰρ τῷ μαθητῇ καὶ τῷ δημοσίῳ, viz. 'people in general do not approve,' they say: No!' now place. In that case we may either (1) construe the whole sentence σὲ τοῦτον δοκεῖ τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ τῷ ἐπιστάμονι εἴδος (τιθήν αὐτήν), where the same words are supplied as with ἐνιὰ μὲν εἰς, or (2) repeat δοκεῖ with the personal subject (δικαιοσύνην) and understand εἰς with ἐπιστάμονι εἴδος. (For laxity of δοκεῖ cf. 384 b.) The former seems much preferable.

The class-genitive ἐπιστάμονι εἰςδοκεῖ is good in either case. Cf. 367 σ ὁμολογεῖν τοῖς μεγάλοις ἐνιαίοις ἐνεργεῖ δικαιοσύνην and 380 κ. ἢ δὲ τῶν πυκνοτέρων. Dür. Bacch. 1317 τῶν πυκνότατῶν ἐνεργεῖ δικαιοσύνην τέκνων.
CHAPTER II.

[Notes on 358 B—]

Whether the omission is due to homoeoteleuton with φέροις, or whether the words have been interpolated to complete the antis thesis (cf. v. inf.), can hardly be decided.

But I am apparently a stupid person. Stallbaum compares Phileb. 28 ἐὰν εἴη δὲ, ὡς οὖνεν, ἐγώ γελοίος τε ("a ridiculous creature"). Prot. 340 ὡς κακὸν ἄρα μοι ἐγγρατᾶται, ὡς οὖνεν καὶ εἰμι τε γελοῖος ἑαυτός ("a ridiculous sort of
doctor").

358 B. ἀκούσαν — ἐὰν σοι παῦτε δοκῇ—i.e. ἀκούσας (καὶ σκέψασθαι) ἐὰν κ.τ.λ. — listen and see if you will come to the same opinion (as mine). Cf. 434 αἴτε δὲ ἐἄν εἴη, ὡς ἐνεικύ, ξυφδόκει, Ἐκ. Μητρ. τυπ. 4. 12 σκέψαι ἐὰν τόδε σοι μᾶλλον ἄρέσχη. ὡς τις τι νυσίτω ἔχεις, ἐπιστ. χ. 172 γλαυκώνος δὲ ἴδιον φέρεται μένει, ὡς τινα πέρερῃ.

The notion with ἐὰν (or Homeric αἴτε) is that of trial or inquiry, in order to discover whether a result will turn out such and such, while with εἰ the notion is of examining whether a thing is so (e.g. Ἐκ. Ἀνα. αἰτ. 3. 57 σκέψασθαι εἰ ἐλαττόμοις φώμοι καλόνν ἔχεις). Thus ἀκούσαν εἰ σοι τόδε δοκῇ—listen and see whether this is your opinion—but ἀκούσαν ἐὰν σοι τόδε δοκῇ—listen and see whether you will come to this opinion.

A rendering "whether you will remain of the same opinion as now" would require e.g. τί σοι δοκῇ.

έποτε ὅσοι κηληθήσαν — i.e. your talk acted on him like a spell.

The effect of an ἐφοβηθάμεν on a serpent was to render it powerless, or even make it burst (Verg. Eccl. vir. 72).

ἀκότα καὶ άκότα — with ὥζε, δύναμαι, not with ἐνόμω. "What faculty it possesses in itself, when it exists in the soul." ἐν τῇ φύσει should be read with stress.

ἐὰν καὶ σοι δοκῇ: here, of course, quite different from ἐὰν σοι παῦτε δοκῇ above. It is simply the protasis of the ordinary shape with an apodosis in the future. "Well, then, I will act as follows, if you have no objection."

358 C. (πάντας) ἀκότα — referring to δικαιοσύνην. See note on 358 E. In construction it belongs to ἐπιτηδεύοντας, not to the participle, as the order shows.

ἀκότα δρᾶτο — do it! (the said thing) — do so: le font. Cf. inf.

358 E. NOTES.

359 ἐν ἀκότα παῦτε (referring to ἄρεις). Thuc. i. 69 ὡς γὰρ ὁ δικαίωμας ἐν καὶ ἐν παῦτε, περικόροι δὲ, ἀληθέστερον ἀκότα ἄρει.

πολλ' γὰρ ἄρεις ἄφαντον ἄφαντον. The force of ἄφαντον is 'after all' ("when you come to look at it") (= as a matter of fact.

Cf. 375 τοῦ ὁκενομοῦ ὑπὸ ἑνός ἄρα τοιάζεται φώμοι φώς ἐκάστης ὡς ὁκενομοῦ, 438 μέχρι τοῦ ἀκέπτων ἔραξε ὡς ἐκάστης τοῦτο ἀκότα περικόροι ἄρει τοῦ ἄρεις τοῦ ἄρεις ἐν ἀκότα περικόροις. The sense thus—(for whatever may be urged against injustice on moral grounds it is, after all,...)

ὁς λέγοντος. The verb is emphatic: 'so it is said; for I am not of that opinion.'

διακτέριον...ἀκότα κ.τ.λ. — dinned...with hearing....

A comma at ἀκότα is misleading as to the construction. For one participle 'subordinate to, or explanatory of, another' (Jeff § 706, 5), cf. Apol. 31 οἷον...ἀκότα...κατατέταντας ἐν μνήμῃ κρατεῖται ἀκότα περικόροις, Hom. Od. ν. 374 κάπως παῖς τετάρτον νηχέοντας μέν καὶ άρει.

358 D. κατατέταντας. See note on 344 ἐν ἀκότας περικόροις.

εἰ σοι βολαμένος ἐκ λεγό — σο. ἐπί. Cf. 370 εἰ ὡς ἐν αἵτινες χρήσι. (σα. ἐπί.) Thuc. i. 9 εἰ τῇ εἰκόνι τεκμηρίων (σα. ἐπί).

The omission would appear less harsh if an adjectival e.g. εἰ ὡς ἐν ἄρεις had been written. σοι βολαμένος, however, is treated as such a predicate, being a frequent combination in the same sense. Cf. Phaed. 73 ὡς οἴκου παρέστησαμε τοῦτος μόνον εἰ καὶ οἴκους ὑπῆρξε, Ἰππ. Μιν. 383 εἰ καὶ βολαμένος ἐπί τετάρτον, Ἰππ. Ἱα. 46 ἀκότα τοῦτος εἰ καὶ ὅτις γέγονεαι, Ἀριστ. (περὶ τοῦ χρόνουν) 766 ἐναὶ ἐκάστης ὡς ὁ θεὸς ὁμολογεῖται, and, in Latin, Tac. Agr. 18 quibus belliuis volentibus estat. Sall. Ing. 100 uti militiis

358 E. περὶ τοῦτον δικαίωμα, "τί τῇ ὅριτι καὶ ὅτιν ἐχόντωυ δικαίωμα. The reading of the last clause is doubtful, but fortunately the meaning is quite clear. The position to be stated is given above (c init.). as δικαιοσύνην ὡς ἐναὶ φανεροί καὶ ἐχόντως γεγονότα, and inf. 359 α τοῦτο the corresponding phrase is γένοιτο τῷ καὶ καὶ ὡς ἐναὶ δικαιοσύνην.

The best supported reading (Par. Α & Κ) is τὶ δὲ τῷ καὶ ὡς ἐχόντως δικαιοσύνην 1. ὡς τῇ τῷ καὶ καὶ ὡς (ὅτι) δικαιοσύνην ὡς γεγονότα (with projection of τῇ τῷ καὶ καὶ ὡς) 'being what and whence, justice has come into existence.' This is rather awkwardly obtained, and destroys the formal agreement of the expression with c (init.)
and 359 a. The two questions are there equally prominent: 'what it is; whence it comes.' Here the γένεσις is specially emphasized. No one can say that such a variation of phrasing is impossible, but, taken with the awkward construction, it appears unlike Plato's style.

Two related inferior uses have τι οίκους καὶ θέν γέγονε, which may be set aside. The reading is obviously akin to another, τι οίκου τε καὶ κτ.λ. of Ven. II. A little supported, but obvious (and almost certainly 'edited') reading is simply οίκων τε καὶ θέν γέγονε, and τι οίκων τε κτ.λ. may be a confusion of this and the τι οίκων τε κτ.λ. of Par. A.

We are thus, as actual texts stand, reduced to choosing between τι οίκων and οίκων, or else determining a new reading from which all the texts may have been derived. We can, however, hardly start with the easy οίκων and suppose the unlikely τι οίκων to have been derived from it, and even with οίκων τε cannot naturally supply οίκων and preserve the formal agreement above-mentioned.

'The construction of a new reading is hazardous, but I have ventured τι τα δύνατα (sc. ιστι) καὶ θέν γέγονε, 'what it is essentially (cf. φύσις 359 a) and whence it has arisen.' We should then look for the cause of the diversity in an old corruption of ΤΙΤΙΟΝΤΙ, which became ΤΙΟΙΟΝΤΕ or ΤΙΟΙΟΝΤΑΙ or ΤΙΟΝΤΕ. The substitution of τε for ιστι (thanks to the following καὶ) would throw the rest into confusion. οίκων τε is simply a scholar's easiest correction.]

παρακάμφι—emphatic: 'is naturally,' in its φύσις or οίκων.

άστι δοκεῖ. It is true that all the period is introduced by φασὶ, but Glaucon for the moment identifies himself with those who so argue and takes their words into his own mouth. It is quite in the conversational manner that he should speak as if the construction were δόκει, αὐτό φασὶ, δοκεῖ instead of what it actually is. With the new sentence he reverts to the dependent construction, i.e. ἔργασθαι (φασὶ).

It is surprising that anyone with an ear and a feeling for style should write (with Aud)—αλλὰ δοκεῖν λατρεύοντες ἐξεύθεσθαι... αὐτόκτων—sc. οἱ ἀνθρώποι, 'people.' Cf. Thuc. vii. 6) νομίζει, ὅτε πάροιχοι ἐν τῷ μεγάλῳ ἄγωνε, τότε ἐρρή ἐν αὐτοῖς εἶναι εἰκός. This subject then runs on to ἐργασθαὶ following.

359 a. αἰτία with the sense of 'catching' (in hunting &c.). Hence the opposition to ἀκόφηγον. Cf. Tim. 64 ε ἐντιγγέρ ὃ ῥεὶ μεταδίωτον πάντα, δὲν ἐπιστάθην ἥλιον.

For the doctrine (common with the Sophists) cf. 344 c 8 ὁ γὰρ τὸ ποιεῖν τὰ δόκει ἄλλα τὸ πάροιχον φθοράμον ἐνεπείδασον. i.e.

νοεῖται τῶν δάκρων, and Gorg. 488 b, &c. It is natural also to compare the Hobbesian 'contract' or 'covenant' of Justice (ἐπιθυμήσατα inf.). 'The forms taken by somewhat analogous doctrines in Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, and Rousseau are stated and criticized in T. H. Green's Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation, Works, ii. 338' (B. Bosanquet 'Companion to Plato's Republic').

ενδικίας αὗτων [or αὕτων?]—(1) with αὕτων—'covenants belonging to themselves,' i.e. 'among themselves.'

It matters little whether we call the genitive possessive, or subjective ('made by themselves'), or objective (πῶς ἀπό αὑτῶν). These notions are indivisible in the Greek, 'appertaining to themselves.' Jowett and Campbell quote (as objective) Thuc. i. 140 τὸ Μεγαρῶν ψύφημα, but though the deed was, no doubt, πῶς Μεγαρῶς, the actual grammar is nothing more than 'pertaining to the Megarians.'

(2) with αὐτῶν. This admits of two renderings (a) with πεπέρασσο—'and hence laws and covenants belonging to them began to be established as 'began to be established among them.' This is less natural in itself, and is rendered altogether improbable by the necessity of changing the subject again at φυσάται: (b) with a neuter sense in αὕτων, i.e. 'they established laws and covenants concerning them,' viz. injuring and being injured (πῶς δέκατος καὶ τῶν δακτύλων), or, rather, matters connected therewith. So we might say 'they legislated about it.' [This rendering, though apparently overlooked, has much in its favour.]

τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ τοῦ νόμου ἐπίταγμα. The verbal sense is retained in the noun. There is no need to assume a mixture of τὸ...ἐπιταγματικὸν with τὸ...νομοτάγμα. See note on 358 e ἀκόφηγον ὡς ἕνδας and the instances there quoted, and add from Stallbaum 390 a "Ἀρείς τε καὶ Ἀρείον ἔρρησεν Ἡρακλίτου δικαίον, Ἀρείαν τινα ἔπαθεν, ἀρείη τιν' κακαὶ μην αὐτήν ἀλλὰ ἄλλην ἄλλην."
THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO. II. [359 δ—


αὐτὸ ποιεῖν—viz. δόκειν. See αὐτό δόκειν, 358 c.

ἐνυδάθεια τὸ μήτε ὁμόνω κ.τ.λ.—'lay down as a compact the (said) principle of neither wronging nor being wronged.' The article refers to previous mention, sup. δ' (infinitive), φῶς—as opposed to the doctrines of convention (νόμος). Cf. the antithesis φῶς τῆς ἡμέρας...νῦν, inf. c, Gorg. 482 E εἰς τοῦτο ἄγει φορτία καὶ δημογορβή, ὃ φῶς μὲν οὐκ ἔστι καλόν, νῦν δὲ κ.τ.λ.

CHAPTER III.

αὐτὸ—referring to ἀκοιμηθήσων: cf. 358 c.

359 C. δέ οὖν ἐξοφυλάσσομεν...ἐπακολουθήσομεν. The clause is in explanatory opposition to the expression τοῦτο κατάπληκτον, and is under, or carries on, precisely the same regimen.

This construction, which is not rare after τόδε, τούτῳ and similar words, is well illustrated by Madvig Gr Synt. § 100. Cf. Phaedo 68 κ τοῦ δὲ αὐτῶν ὅσον τοῦτο τούτῳ πεπράγη, ἀκόλουθος τινες σάφορον εἰσί; Gorg. 501 B (ὁ ἀληθικὸς) αὐτῷ ἐν τούτῳ καταλυτητικὸς εἰσί; Ἐρ. 467 B ὅ περ τοῦτο γε ἑντὸς τοῦ ἐν πραγματίσκομαι· ἐρήμουσιν ταῖς πάλαις γυναικοῖς.

τῷ τὰ δικαία καὶ τῷ δίκαιῳ. Plato's style is marked by conversational fulness of expression for clearness' sake. Here the words are by their position unmistakably an afterthought to explain ἔκακος.

ἐνα' αὐτοφόρῳ οὖν κ.τ.λ. οὖν = 'well,...' the implication being 'to cut a long story short.' Cf. the use of οὖν after a parenthesis or digression.

Similar, but less conscious, because more stereotyped, is the Herodotean use of οὖν in such an apodosis as Π. 47 ὥς τις ἄσχησ παραίνοι οὖν, αὐτὸς ἢμεταίοις ἢν ὅς ἔραβα εἰσότοι. εἰς ταῦτα λόγον—(1) 'making for the same goal,' while in 360 c εἰς ταῦτα λόγον = 'aim at the same object.' But (2) Eur. Hec. 747 ἐ τοῦ με βοήθητα τκών μηδὲν εἴδον, εἰς ταῦτα δὲ καὶ γὰρ οὖν ἐγὼ κλέων suggests rather the sense 'coming to the same

thing,' i.e. 'agreeing with,' 'meeting on common ground,' the opposite of διαφωνεῖν.

δ' ἀνέκδει φῶς κ.τ.λ. δ', of course, has no reference to ταύτον in the phrase εἰς ταῦτα ὅταν. Nor is it strictly correct to say that its antecedent is πλαστὸς, although, so far as the neuter is concerned, there is no grammatical objection to that view: cf. Eur. Hēl. 1687 γραμματ. ἐν τοιούτῳ οἷς έκ, Soph. O. T. 542 εὐσκοτάζει | ἕρπει, ἐν πλαστῷ κ.τ.λ. ἐνδείκεται, and (with a transition step) Lycog. 997 ταύτῃ καὶ δι' ἐκ τοῦ καλοῦ, δ' πάντα ἡμέρακεν; Lit. 'through sobriety, a thing which...'. As a fact, however, δ refers lastly to the sense, e.g. a πλαστὸς ἔχειν understood from πλαστός. It is not πλαστεία ('greed, 'graspingness') which every φῶς δίκαιον, but rather 'gain,' 'advantage'; not the desire, but the gratification of the desire. Lit. 'because of the (vice of) greed: and this (viz. the satisfaction of greed) is the pursuit of every creature (as such),'

τιν' with πλαστεία does not look forward to the relative, but is the article familiar with abstracts. Jelf. § 448.

τῆς. From the sense 'nature,' and the variety of natures in different creatures, comes the concrete meaning 'creature as naturally constituted,' 'kind of creature,' or briefly 'creature.' Cf. Polit. 272 c μετὰ τὸ θερμόν καὶ μετὰ ἀλληλούπων ἡμισθίατους καὶ τυποθεμένους παρὰ κάσῳ φωτεινοὺς, and inf. 598 C κάθε τούτων τω, οἷς μυθολογοῦσται παλαιοὶ γενόμενοι φῶτοι, ἄ τε Χαμαίμας καὶ Ἡ Σκόλη καὶ Χρυσάδιν. In Isoc. 64 τῶν συμφορῶν εἰς αὐτοὶ τοιαύτα. φωνείς Ἰππίων κατόπτερες Morus explains 'hominis has indole prae-

diti.' At the same time we should not miss the strong emphasis intended by the combination φῶς...πέμφθην in opposition to νόμο (ν. π. sup.).: 'every nature is—naturally, I say, —disposed....' νόμο δὲ βίων παράγεται. The reading καὶ βίων of some ms arose from forgetfulness that βία is simply the common adverb, while νόμος is instr. dat. Cf. 552 οἷς εἰρμίληκα βίων κατέχομεν αἰτίας (I. and C.). 'But is by convention forcibly driven aside to (= prevented and forced to) respect the claims of equity.'

For the thwarting of natural propensities by νόμος cf. Prot. 337 δ ἀ' νομον, πάροδον ἀπ' των αὐθαναμύνων, πολλὰ παρὰ τὴν φωνήν μιμηταίοι, Arist. Eth. N. c. 9. 9 ὡς.

ἐν δ' ἔν...τοῦτο δέ μάλιστα, et. —(1) 'and the power which I mean would be about like (καλώς = σχέδον τι, as often,) the following, viz. if...'; or (2) less well, 'and the power which I mean would exist most effectively in the following shape, viz. if...'. The latter
would rather require e.g. ἐν ὁδῇ ἔχει...οὐκαί ὀνήμα. For
another, though cognate, meaning of ἡμερίστα, v. 344 a.
τοῦ τοῦ Δυσάδος προγόνος. The best ms. give τῷ Γόγνῳ τοῦ Δυσάδος
προγόνος. The ring, however, is regularly known as the ring of
Gyges, and inf. 612 π Plato expressly calls it by that name (ἐν τῇ ἡμερίστῃ τῶν Γόγνων δακτύλῳ, ἐν τῇ ὁδῇ).

Cicer. De Offic. iii. 9. 58, copying and to a certain extent translating
this passage, has hinc ille Gyges inducitur a Platonoe ὑπό ὁδῆς,
and references to the ring of Gyges are frequent elsewhere (e.g. Lactant. Nov. 43. 1. 3. 31). The story of Gyges and his king Candaulus
is told (though with differences) in Hdt. i. 8 sqq., and Gyges, as
founder of the dynasty of the Mermnadæ, is himself a προγόνος
of that dynasty (n.c. 716—546 and ending with Croesus), but there
would not be likely to exist any story of his own προγόνοις. Inf.
360 is the finder of the ring τῇ ἡμερίστῃ κατασφέρει, and this makes him
Gyges and no other.

A poorly supported reading, adopted by Stahlmaur, is Γόγνῳ, but
this is quite ungrammatical for τῷ Γόγνῳ κατασφέρει τοῦ Δυσάδος προγόνος.
Whether Γόγνῳ is the mere adscript which originally caused all the
error (Γόγνῳ having arisen from it by adaptation to the following
genitive), or is a correction of Γόγνῳ by someone who saw that it was
Gyges himself, or whether Γόγνῳ and Γόγνῳ were both
adscripts by different persons (the latter wrong and the other
right), cannot of course be determined.

It is best, however, to suppose that, in any case, the proper name is
an adscript, and to render 'the ancestor of the Lydian' i.e. 'the
Lydian king.' Cf. the familiar use of ὁ Πήρος, ὁ Μῆκος ὁκ. for 'the
king of Persia, of Media.' ὁ Λυδός is then used either (1) generically:
'the Lydian' = the Lydian king in history, or (2) per excellence
of the most famous Lydian, viz. Croesus. There is nothing
unnatural in the use by Glauc. of such an expression: 'the same
sort of power which they say once came into the hands of that
(famous) ancestor of the Lydian.'

In Hdt. i. 17 ὁ Λυδός ὁ Λυδός Βασιλεὺς. So iii. 7 τῆς παρατάδος τῶν
Λαμβρίτων, ιθίδ. c. 3, ιθ. 49 ὁ Πήρος ὁκ. D 359 D, παρά τῷ τότε Δυσάδος ἐρχομένην—viz. Candaules (Hdt. i.
8). παρά = 'in the household (or service, ἐκκλησία,)' of...

When ἀλλα τῇ ἡμερίστῃ—many (though not the best) ms.
have ἐκ μυθολογίοις. The reading of the text is obviously better.
The construction is proceeding under the government of φασί,
but at this point Glauc. wishes it to be understood that he does
not commit himself to the truth of the narrative, in fact dis-
believes it, but is simply repeating the old tale. Hence he

substitutes the depreciatory μυθολογίῳ for the neutral φασί. We
should rather put it parenthetically —'so they say or believe.' In
ἀλλα τῇ ἡμερίστῃ the ἡμερίστη isironical.

θεράδες ἐρχομένην—causes in lateribus fores essent (Cic.).
ὡς φασίνα. It is debatable whether the qualifying 'apparently'
belongs to the preceding νεκρῶν or the following μεῖκος κ.τ.λ.
Its position is not decisive for the former. Thus in Lucian Nuxynom.
10 ο μὲν τὸ σχῆνος, ο δὲ τὴν κεφαλήν, ο δὲ ἀλλο τοι συντετριμμένον,
ἐμι δεκεῖν, ἐκ των τοῦκλοιομενῶν,ὑμᾶς δεκεῖν, ἐκ των τοῦκλοιομενῶν, ὑμᾶς δεκεῖν, ἐκ
to pολύμων παρότερος, and ibid. 17, the qualification
refers to what comes after, and in Plato the phrase ὡς
ἐγὼ ὁμοιομεῖν' regularly precedes rather than follows. On the other
hand it may be argued that Gyges could easily see whether the
body was of superhuman size, but not so readily whether it was a
corpse, and on this ground it is probably best to join the phrase
with νεκρῶν. Cicero has simply hominis portus vidit corpus
magnitudine inuitata,
ὡς φασίνα. The infinitive is exaininable in two ways: (1) as
restrictive (Jelf § 894), cf. 414 ὃ ὁ ἐν τόπῳ, μη δ' ἐκραίνει,
eἰρθήσετι, Phaedr. 230 b ψυχοῆς ἡμίον, ὅ γε τοῦ τῶν τεκμήρισθαι,
Hdt. i. 125 ὃς εἴλατε μεν μερίσθαι, and the frequent use of ὃς,
ὃς δεκεῖν, ὃς εὶπεῖν, ὃς εἰπεῖν, ὃς εἰπεῖν: (2) as ontico obliquus for ἐφαίτις,
depending on the verb of saying (Jelf § 899 d). Cf. inf. 360 ε ὁτι...
ἀδελεύς (Par. A), 408 c δέν ὅδε καὶ εἶπεν μὴ πεπερατήρης καὶ,
ὁρῶν b ὃς ἐραθεῖς ὅτι ἡμέρας, φανερωθήσεται, ἐν Χερ. Cyn.
ν. 2. 4 ἀνέτειλεν τῷ Κλείρῳ οὕτως ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀφέων ἀλλο
tοις ἀπεδράμενοι, ὃς γέρος δεκεῖν, μη δ' ἐν ἀποτελεῖν τοὺς ἐνόμοις ἀπε
there is the same doubt as here.

τοῦτον γ' ἄλλο μὲν ὁδόν, περὶ τῇ χερι χειροτονίαν δακτύλων κ.τ.λ.
is the reading of Par. A, while Ven. εἰσίμενοι ἐφαίτις after δακτύλων.
The common reading is τοῦτον γ' ἄλλο μὲν ἐκείνῳ ὁδόν κ.τ.λ.

The total may be taken as evidence that corruption had occurred
very early, and that both φασίνα and ἐρχομένην are attempts at e-
memulation by inserting the most obvious words. There seems, however,
to be no reason why ἐρχομένην should have fallen out after μὲν or
φασίνα after δακτύλων. Moreover φασίνα would be the proper
word in the latter case. If ἐρχομένη was lost, it was more likely to
disappear between χειρὶ and χειρὶ in the group ΧΕΡΙΕΧΕΙΝΧΕ.
What was actually written by Plato is probably undiscoverable. It
is, for instance, possible that περὶκεφαλής (‘to wear’ or ‘have about
him’) was lost before περὶ..., the text thus being τοῦτον ἄλλο
μὲν ὁδόν ἐρχομένην, περὶ τῇ χερι χειροτονίαν χειρὶ κ.τ.λ.; but almost equal
possibility attaches to so many other conceivable guesses that we
can do no better than retain the 'edited' text of Ven. Π ἀν. with ἦχον. Cicero has (freely) ambulaque asurrens in digito (cf. vii. 137), quern ut detraxise, ēaque indicavit. [For the version of Davies and Vaughan 'from which he took nothing but'...the necessary Greek would be τὸν οὖν ὅτι ἀλλὰ μὲν ἐστὶ, ἐπεὶ ἐπὶ τῷ χείρι χρυσῳ δακτύλῳ περιπεμφανος, περιπεμφάνος δέβασις. It would also be implied that he was naturally expected to take something.]

359 E. δακτύλων. The magic ring is much in evidence in Oriental fable, and it should not be overlooked that the wonderful horse also plays its part in the 'Arabian Nights,' as in the Indian stories of the Panchatantra.

τοῦ πομέδος τὸν πομέδον ἔσεθος, ὡς ἐφαγγέλει Κ. Τ. A. Lit. (1) 'now a meeting having taken place among the shepherds—one they were accustomed to hold in order to report from month to month...'; or (2) 'having taken place, one which the shepherds were accustomed to hold in order to...'; i.e. τοῦ πομέδος may be construed with either γενόμενον or ἔσθενος. The latter makes the more rhythmic sentence. No doubt the day is to a certain degree construed ἔσθενος.

[Editors before Jowett and Campbell seem to have overlooked the fact that τοῦ ἐφαγγέλει Κ. Τ. A. is to be taken closely with ἔσθενος (as above rendered), and not with γενόμενον. It is not 'they met for the purpose of presenting their report,' nor is it 'the usual meeting occurred' (D. and V.). The latter would require τοῦ ἐσθετοῦ, and it is extremely doubtful whether τοῦ ἐφαγγέλει Κ. Τ. A. κατὰ μήνα could mean 'to make their report for the month.' The natural sense is 'to report month by month.']

ἡν σφενδόνη—properly the 'besel' or 'collar,' the hoop holding the stone (σφαγχης). The stone is, as it were, in a sling. The transference of the word to the stone itself was easy. Cf. Eur. Hipp. 892 καί μὴ τόπος γε σφενδόνη χρυσήλατο. Cicero translates by 'palam eius anulii.'

ἐστὶν ἡ ἐστὶν. One has ἦσσο, and therefore it is worth observing that ἦσσο was the prose (and comic) form, while ἦσσος is poetical. The metre of comedy makes for this view, and it is supported by Meisterhans, Gr. Att. Inc. p. 33. 14.

360 A. οὐ διαλέγεται—sc. ἀντίστοιχος. For the change of subject see 383 c. τόν ἀγάλλων γενέται. The gen. as in 388 b τοῦ ἐπιστόμου εἶδος.

360 B. ὁς δόξαι—The reading of all ms. Whether it can stand or not is one of those questions about which scholars are likely always to disagree.

That Glaucon is reporting the views of others can have nothing to do with the optative here, apart from the fact that if he were stating his own opinions directly, there could be no place for the assist δόξαι. He might say ὁς δόξαι and ὁς δόξαι ὅσον, or ὁς δόξαι (restrictive), but no amount of 'indirectness' could turn any of these into ὁς δόξαι.

Views which may be advanced are: (1) that ὁς is to be understood from the previous αὐτής ὅν γένοιτο, as it is understood with ἄκουσαι (352 b), ἄκουσαι (inf. aor.), or in Aesch. Ag. 1049 πειθότα ὅν, εἴ πειθότα, εἴ πειθότα ὅν (inf. aor.). But in those and similar instances (e.g. Xen. Mem. ii. 1. 16) the ὁς is omitted with a word which is in, and suggests, the same regimen with the word actually combined with ὁς: i.e. αὐτής ὅν γένοιτο...αὐτής δόξαι might afford to dispense with the second ὁς; but in the case actually before us the verb δόξαι is not co-ordinate in construction with the verb γένοιτο, but is in a parenthetical and qualifying phrase: (2) that the expression ὁς δόξαι is grammatical in itself. For this view might be quoted Aes. Av. 180 ἐπὶ πόλις; τίνα τρόπον; ΠΕ. ἄσπερ εἶναι τις τάτος...EUR. Andr. 392 πώς αὐς τὰ ὅν, ὃς εἶναι τις, εἴς χρυσάνθαι; Editors are wont to condemn these examples, but it is curious that it should be the same colloquial phrase which occurs in each, 'as one might say,' ὁς δόξαι may be equally colloquial, and both common expressions may date from a period when the optative was more freely used without ὁς (cf. αὐτής ὅν γένοιτο ἄκουσαι and similar idioms). See Goodwin M. and T. §§ 241, 242. The translation 'as it seems' appears quite feasible: (3) that the optative is irregularly assimilated or attracted. Goodwin M. and T. §§ 538, 551. None of the instances there quoted are analogous to the present case.

The second view appears sound enough to make emendation quite unnecessary. If there had been any need to correct the text, perhaps it would have been easier to write ὁς δόξαι (restrictive infinative), and to suppose that this was mistaken for the optative and re-shaped accordingly.]

άπαραντόνος—cf. 619 νά παραντόνον δέ ὅτε τούτων τῷ λείματι ἔχασα εἰς ἱλικόν λέον. Τὸ ἔρρομεν πένα τῶν Προμηθείων are of adamant—the type of the unbreakable and unbreakable.

δε—instead of ἄντε, after ὅπως. Cf. Hdt. iv. 52 κρήνη πείρη, ὡστε ὅτα ὑπὸ πείρη, ὡς ἔγγειλε ἀμάρτητος ἐνία, κρήνη τῶν νεκρῶν, τ. v. 28 (ἀντέ...ἄντε).

τολμήσαι—'steed himself to.'

360 C. σφαγχης βοιόλοιο—The repetition of the same phrase
might be considered objectionable if it were not intentional for emphasis.

360 a 16 ἔκ τοῦ διάδοχον ἦν ὅστις...—see, τοῦ δικαίου ἐθνός, understood from the context.

360 a 18 ἔκ...—to himself'; though it may be beneficial to the community (νεώτητα). Stallbaum quotes Eur. Heracleid. (init.) for the unjust man who is τὸ λέγει τὰ ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἐναλλάσσει μηδενία, ἀπὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐν χρόνιοι ἀκούειν καὶ ἐναλλάσσει μηδενία, ἀπὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐν χρόνιοι ἀκούειν καὶ ἐναλλάσσει μηδενία.

360 a 18 εἰπέ...ἀκεχῖν. So Λ. The ordinary reading is the less idiomatic εἰπέ...ἀκεχῖν. See on ὡς φανερῶς 359 b for the common use of the infinitive in a relative clause in oratio obliqua. Cf. Ἡχ. ν. 84 δ.

360 D. ἀ περὶ τοῦ τυποῦ λόγου λέγων—i.e. its advocate. The sense 'about,' 'concerning,' is too flat.

With words of fighting περί introduce the object at state, and hence often becomes indistinguishable from ἐν σφ. Cf. the Homeric ἐνίκηθαι πετρόν, Ἀχ. Καμ. 191 εἰ μὴ νυκτερών ὡς περὶ τῶν κρασίων, and the expression περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τρόφευμα. So with verbs of the sense ἀπολογετεθαι, where 'pleading about' often means 'pleading in behalf of.' Either sense is imparted here to λέγων, 'contending,' or 'pleading in defense.'

361 a 34 διὰ τὸν τούτο άκαθάρτηθαι φήμος—cf. Ηρ. Στ. τ. 3. 111 Ιώρα ἱνακέντα μετὰ ζιώτου φαταρεῖ ηὐκενς εστὶ.

CHAPTER IV.

361 b 5 τῆς δὲ κράτους αὐτὴν τοῦ βίου περὶ δὲ λέγομεν—In 358 c Glaucon undertakes to speak after the popular style upon three points: (1) the nature and origin of justice, (2) the fact that it is practised under compulsion, (3) the superiority of the unjust life. The first two have been treated, and he here comes to the final question, the one which it is really vital to settle. Hence αὐτήν, 'the actual (practical) choice.'

361 b 9 ησσα (if rightly reported) read περὶ, editors περὶ. As authority is, indeed, of little account in the matter of accents, but editors have been hasty in condemning περὶ. The construction may still be 'the actual choice of life in the case of those concerning whom we speak,' i.e. τῶν κρατῶν ἀντίθετον τοῦ βίου (προμοντάριον) περὶ δὲ λέγομεν (where τομομοντάριον does not, of course, depend on βίος, but is subjective with κράτοις). The omission of τομομοντάριον may appear harsh, but cf. Soph. Aφ. 1050 δοκοῦντ' ἐμοί, δοκοῦντα δ' ἐν κράτεις στρατοῦ (i.e. τομομοντάριον δ' ἐν κράτεις στρατοῦ).

361 c 2 Similarly Tennyson ('Sir Galahad'): 'How sweet are looks that ladies bend / On whom their favours fall!' (i.e. on those on whom...)

With περὶ the construction is nearer, viz. τῆς δὲ κράτους αὐτήν τοῦ λέγομεν περὶ τοῦ βίου 'the choice made in the matter of life by those of whom we speak.' Stallbaum quotes Philoh. 27 τοῦ καλλίου ἐν λόγῳ καὶ τῆς κράτους ἐπιπέδου αἰνειον περὶ καὶ ἑνεχορ. περὶ δὲ τὴν πρωτοτην ἑπιφορεθαιεµένην, a place which he rightly says is 'strictly.' The sovereigns of men were naturally led to connect the preposition with the genitive following.

The article in τοῦ βίου either (1) looks back to 358 c: 'now for the choice as to the life (of which I spoke),' or (2) 'the life (which results in the two cases).'

360 E. ἐὰν διαστημήσαμεν τῶν τε δικαίωτατον καὶ τῶν ἀδικώτατον—οὖν. ἄνδρα, not ἄνδρα, as the following passage shows (...) εἰς τοῦ δικαίου ἐντελευθείας. For τε...καὶ...in contrast ('on the one side...on the other...') see note on 350 b μέσου...τοῦ τε κατάτοπον καὶ τοῦ παρόντος.

τίς τῶν δὲ ἡ διδάσκαλα; ἢδ'—This is Bekker's punctuation for the earlier τίς τῶν δὲ ἡ διδάσκαλα; ἢδ'. In Phaedo 73 c λόγων δὲ τίνων τρόπων; τίνως; ἡδ' εἰς τὰ κ.π.λ. there is the same room for choice as here; but in Legg. 730 τό θέων δὴ χάριν τρόπων ἄρθρα τοιάτου; τοῖσ' ἥδ' τοι κ.π.λ. there is no doubt, and this, together with the Greek custom in conversation or oratory of answering one's own question, makes for the punctuation given in the text.

361 a 36 τοῦ ὅτι—'assume.' The sense 'make,' (= τιμῶν) only attaches to τιμῶν in poetry or in Ionia.

οἱ δὲ άνθρωποι διημιουργοὶ ἢν άνθρωποι τῶν δημομορίας. For the sense of δημομορίας see 340 e.

ἀκρος—cf. 'tip-top' = 'first-rate.' With gen. in Theaet. 159 b οἱ ἀκροι τῆς ποτηρίου ἑκάτερος: with εἰς inf. 499 ὁ ἄκρος εἰς φιλοσοφίαν.

Cf. Ἡχ. ν. 134 'Ἀμυστήριος ὁ Μιλήσιος ψυχήν οὐκ ἄκρος. τὰ τὸ ἀκόμα καὶ τὰ ἀκόμα—the order of nearly all ms is answered, in the familiar Platonic chiasmus (ν. 328 k), by τοῖς νῦν ἑκάστους τὰ ὑπὸ ταῦτα.

It must have been ignorance of this figure which caused a couple of inferior ms (followed by Stallbaum) to reverse the order with τὰ τὸ ἀκόμα καὶ τὰ ἀκόμα. Cf. 321 b ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ φοβία...HELL. 499 ἐν ἀκροσ εἰς φιλοσοφίαν. Cf. Ηχ. τ. 3. 642 τοῦ ἑκάστου κωδικοῦντες τῶν μελλόντων ἐν φόβῳ ἑντὸς...οὐσίαν ὑπὸ καὶ τοῦ ἐκοῦστον ἐν ἑκάστῳ κ.π.λ. τὸν μὲν (ac. the latter) ἐν τῷ φόβῳ ἢ τῷ ἀλήθεια ἢ τῷ πάθει τῆς προθυμίας, τοῖς δὲ (ac. the former) ἐν τῶν ἑκάστους τοῖς ἑκάστους κ.π.λ.
Totius autem inquisitionis nulla captatio est quam coram qui tum, cum maxime failunt, id agent ut vivi boni esse vidantur.

*τὸ τέλες ἀδίκον*—i.e. subjectively: the man whose character and practices are ideally unjust. τὴν τελεωτάτην ἄδικαν—i.e. injustices with all external circumstances ideally in its favour (344 A). Cf. the expression ἐν βίοις τελειαὶ of Arist. Eth. N. i. 7. 15.

καὶ οὐκ ἀφιερωτοῦ—so. ὁδὸν: 'and no deduction must be made.' Cf. the absolute use of the opposite προσθεῖναι in 385 λ and 339 β.

361 B. διναστή—following δοτῶν, the words καὶ οὐκ ἀφιερωτοῦ...δικαιοσύνην being parenthetical to the construction. ὁδὸν—contained accus. : 'in all cases where force is needed.'

διὰ τε ἄνδραν καὶ βραχίονα διὰ διὰ παραμεθυμόν τὸν τάδ’ εἰς τιν’ ἰδοὺς. —The words άνδραν καὶ βραχίονα form one notion, that of his personal qualities; while φιλόν καὶ ωσία are his external advantages. ἄνθισε—cf. τάσιμον 360 ε.

κατ’ Ἀλεξάνδρου κ.τ.λ.—viz. S. c. t. 592 (of Amphiaras)

οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν ἁμαρτόν άλλ᾽ εἰρηνικέας, βαθείων δόξας διὰ φρονεῖς καρποφόρων, ἐκ ἡ τε κεδώ ψαλτάνει βούλευται

Hence ἢθόντα, for which strict prose would require βούλευται, since οὐ δοκεῖν to the stressed δοκεῖν—'not to seem, but to be.'

361 C. ὁδόλου οὖν, ἐτέ...ἐτε—see note on 339 ά ἀναδοτόν...διὰ τὰ τιν’...διατακτικά. We cannot supply ἦν ἄτα, at least with the assumption that those words were actually intended to be understood.

ποιητῶς...διακειμένον—'he must be represented (considered) as situated,' not=ποιητῶς διακειμένη 'he must be caused to be situated.'

βεβασισμένοις—'tried as by the touchstone.' ἡσαυρίζω...ἐτε—'in regard to.'

Of. Thuc. viii. 88 βούλευτως αὐτῶν...ἐτε...Αθηναῖοι φιλόν διεβαλλέν...τῷ μὴ τεγέθησα—'by his refusing to unbind under ill-repute.'

The metaphor is of the softening of something rigid by moistening. Cf. Legg. 860 ε ἀγέρομεν χρωμάζον τῷ φόσει καὶ μᾶλλα τιγχθέντων ὅστε μὴ οὖν ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὸν ἴδεις καρπόν, Asch. P. V. 1008 τέγη γάρ ὁδόν οὐδὲς καλλάσσει κλαρ [λιταί], and the adjective ἄτεγκτος.

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tῶν ἰτι ταῖς γνωσμένων. All men have ἰτι ταῖς, which is, of course, defensible: 'brought on by means of it' (J. and C. quote Themist. 200 2). But the confusion of ἰτι and ἰτο is among the commonest, and the phrase of 357 c and 358 a and b is most natural and likely.

διὰ τίνες τοις κ.τ.λ.—'let him go his ways unalterable...' The best MSS give τίνες, an occasional late form of ἰτος, and ἰτο is actually read by Theodoret and Evæbus as well as by one or two MSS of Plato. But ἰτο was very unlikely to be altered into ἰτο, and the ἰτο itself may with tolerable certainty be considered a correction of an earlier ἰτο, a false reading once common to all copies of Plato. The most natural emendation is Nestich's ἰτο, since it exactly suits the sense, and τί and it were pronounced identically.

For the expression τίνες cf. Soph. O. T. 1459 διὰ τίνες ἡ μᾶλλ᾽ ἡμῶν μορφ’, ὧτε καὶ τίνες, ἰτος.

CHAPTER V.

361 D. ὡς ἀρμονίως κ.τ.λ.—How vigorously you trim and polish each of them for the competition, as if he were a statue! ἀκαθάρτῳ is used of the removal of roughnesses and superfluous material and making the outlines distinct and vivid.

References to the art of the statuary were naturally frequent at Athens, or, indeed, anywhere in Greece. Cf. 450 c, 560 c &c. Moreover Socrates was the son of the sculptor Sophroniscus. The tradition goes that he even executed works of sculpture himself (Dialog. Lysit. x. 19, Paus. iv. 35. 7).

ἐπέδεικται τῷ λόγῳ—either (1) as in 349 α it lit. 'to go out to grapple with the discussion,' or (2) λόγῳ is instrumental.

361 E. καὶ δε κάρ—lit. 'and, of course, even if...'

ἀρμονικότερα—'somewhat boorishly' or 'coarsely.' In Aristot. Eth. N. ii. 7. 13 ἀρμονία (in the domain of ψεύδο) is the vice by defect in that of which ψεύδο is the vice by excess, and of which τὸ μέσον is ἐκπαράστηκε, viz. τὸ ἴδιον. In life in general, he says, the corresponding exhibitions of τὸ ἴδιον are (1) the excess, 'complaisance and flattery,' (2) the mean, 'friendliness,' (3) the defect, 'contentlessness and quarrelsomeness.' Similarly here the position to be taken up appears to Glaucon to be Philistine and wanting in fine feeling.

μαστουχήται κ.τ.λ. For the form of future passive see note on ψφευδόταται 343 n. ῥεθώτατα, of course, is not for ῥεθώταται, but

PL REP.
is the future of ἀθέμα 'am a prisoner.' 'He will be kept in prison.'

So the best ms. Cf. Gorg. 478 ε ἀν ‘κραδες περὶ τοῦ τοῦ ἀθέμα ‘κατά τοῦ τοῦ ἀθέμα ‘κατά τοῦ τοῦ ἀθέμα. Hdt. vii. 18 ἀθέμα ‘κατά τοῦ τοῦ ἀθέμα. In. 618 ε ἀθέμα ἡ ‘κατά τοῦ τοῦ ἀθέμα ‘κατά τοῦ τοῦ ἀθέμα. We are thus confronted with an early divergence of reading ἀθέμα ‘κατά τοῦ τοῦ ἀθέμα and ἀθέμα ‘κατά τοῦ τοῦ ἀθέμα, the former having the better support. So far as the sense goes it is either possible, both punishments being common. The more cruel practice is the more likely to be emphasized here. The pronunciation of ἀθέμα became that of the English a, and may have caused, if not assisted, the corruption.

[No argument can be based upon the passage of Cicero quoted by Lactantius (Inst. v. 13), which is simply a paraphrase of the general sense. The words in Lactantius form a good summary: Quaeo, 2, duo sint, quorum alter optinum vix, aequissimius, summa iustissit, singulare fide, alter insignis scelere et audacia: et sic in eo sit aevore civitatis ut hominum ille sit aequitas accuratissimus faciendae mentis necessarium patris, contra autem, quod sit improvement, existint esse summa probitate ac fide: quiaque hoc optinum omnium civitatum ille sit veras, reipublicam, nunci et demum benefactor, iudiciumequo, exemplar, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigal, vectigala

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χειριζόμενος (cf. χειρ-άλος &c.). χειροδότης is quoted by Gaien from Hippocrates.

The meaning is the same as in ἀνασκολοπεύς, 'impale,' and hence the gloss ἀνασκολοπεύς in one ms. In Gorg. 473 o ἀνασκολοπεύς is substituted.

Thalam—one quoted. See on θαλαμός 361 a.

τό δὲ τοῦ Ἀγαλδοῦ κ.τ.λ.—‘and, as a matter of fact (or ‘after all’), it is, it seems, much truer to apply the saying of Aeschylus to the unjust man.’

ἡν ἄρα might be taken literally 'it was (when Aeschylus was saying it) a sounder thing to say of the unjust man,' in which case ἄρα (like ἔρημος, ἵππος &c.) stands where ἦν ἄρα might have stood. But it is best to assume the usual idiom of ἦν ἀρα (Goodwin M. and T. 39) of a fact which had 'previously been denied, overlooked, or not understood.'

Whether τὸ τοῦ Ἀγαλδοῦ is subject to ὠρθέρηρα ἄρα λέγει (like ἡ πολίς χαλεπὴ ἢ λαύει), or is the object in ὠρθέρηρα ἄρα λέγει τὸ τοῦ Ἀγαλδοῦ, can hardly be determined, but the former reads more naturally.

κατὰ τὸ ἄδικον. It is a mistake to suppose that (λέγει) κατὰ must always mean 'to the disadvantage of...'. Cf. Phaedr. 260 ὁ σωτῆρος λέγει ἀνασκολοπεύς κατὰ τὸ δον, Dem. Phil. 6. ὁ μεγαλότερος οὗτος ἄρα ἐγώ μεγαλότερος. In a neutral sense Soph. 263 καὶ κατὰ τῶν Ἑλλών τὸν τιγκών καὶ ἢκρουν τακτά ἵππους ἔφησεν ἔρημος. Συμφ. 196 ὁ λέγει δ’ ὅτι ἐγώ εἰ μεγαλότερος καὶ θεατῶν καὶ ἵππων καὶ γυναικῶν κ.τ.λ.

ἀδερφὴς ἄλαμος—v. 362 a. He practise his injustices because he is in earnest about them: he does not sham injustice. In being unjust he is not so for the sake of any good name it can bring him (οὐ πρὸς δόξαν ζῶντα). The inversion is humorous: the unjust man makes no parade of his injustice, he is quite willing to be, and not seem, unjust,—to be honestly unjust, even though the world knows it not.

ἀδερφὶς—'genuineness.'

362 B. πρῶτον μὲν ἄρειν...δοκοῦντι δικαίως ἐναι. The dative depends on ἀθέμα, with which ἀθέμα is to be supplied: i.e. ἦν ἀθέμα (ἀθέμα) κατὰ τὸ δον ἀθέμα, viz. πρῶτον μὲν κ.τ.λ.

The series of advantages (ἄρειν, γαμεῖται, &c.) are explanatory of ἀθέμα, with the difference that the sense 'good counsels' passes into that of 'results of good counsels.' A poetical quotation

13—2
brought into prose is treated with some liberty as to its precise meaning and its bearing on the construction.


κεδαγόμενα, ἀπὸ τῶν δυνάτων. For the whole expression cf. Thuc. viii. 21 ὡς καὶ ἐκείνων ἐδὲ ἀγαφῶνοι παρὰ εἰς εἰς εἰς εἰς εἰς οἷς ἐτοι τοῦ δὴ ἐκάθεν.

ἐκμετάλλευσαι, κοινωνόν—cf. ἐκμετάλλευσαι...κοινωνόμενα 339 λ (note).

ὅτι ἂν ἄλπη. Though ἂλπη and βολήται are not synonymous (347 ν) there must be many cases in which either might be used. ‘Anyone he desires’ and ‘anyone he likes’ may therefore be interchanged for the sake of variety. The same device is adopted in 613 A ἔρχομαι τε ἀν ἐκπροσώπους τὰς ἀρχαίας, γαμοῦν τε ἐπόθεν ἐν βολήταισι, κεδαγόμενα τε εἰς ὧς ἂγον.

παρὰ ταύτα πάντα—‘all the time’ (as in παρὰ τάτα τῶν χρόνων, blōr &c.). Cf. 424 τοι ἰδίω...παρὰ τάτα αὐτὸ φιλατίς.

[Other possible renderings are (a) ‘besides all these advantages.’ Cf. 337 ν, Phaedo 74 παρὰ ταύτα πάντα ἐπιτρέπει τοι. (In its ultimate analysis this is identical with the foregoing, the sense being ‘withal’): (b) ‘because of all this.’ See L. and S. par. παρὰ τοῖς.]

κεδαγόμενα—κεφάλαια, κοινωνοῦντα—cf. Thuc. ii. 39 ἄν κριθήν ἦν τις τῶν πολέμων ἰδιών ἐπιθέτησις (i.e. ὑπ. τοῦ ιδίου). The accus. participle is equally allowable with the active διεσπαρῃ (sup.). The construction is βλαστάνει αὐτῷ (τῷ) ὧσπερ ἐκτεθηκέναι—κεφάλαια, which is interchangeable with βλ. αὐτῷ, κεφαλαίονται, ὕφειλθαν, κεφάλαια.

It is otherwise possible to explain it as dependent on φιλάτοι, but the reversion to that construction begins better with the next sentence (introduced by τοῖς).

ἐλις φιλάνθοι πάντα καὶ ἰδία καὶ δημοσίας: ‘and accordingly (i.e. in consequence of his resources) he is victorious in all his conflicts public and private,’ i.e. in law-suits brought by or against him, whether as private δίκαιον or public γραφαί.

ἐλις φιλάνθοι ἵνα echoes the technical phrase εἰσέρχεται δικρίνει.
THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO, II. [362 b—

δέλεφς ἀνδρὶ παρέμ. The source of the proverb is uncertain. The scholiast compares Od. xvi. 97

ὑτι τε καςετής ὑπομεμερεῖ, οὔτι περ ἄησ

marriage and πᾶσαι, καὶ εἶ μέγα νεκρὸ ἄρτα. The words in the text bear much the appearance of having formed the end of a hexameter verse, and Shilleto (in Dem. Fals. Leg. 415 συγγρμοι δέλεφς δοξηθείων) therefore suggests that δέλεφς should be read here. But, even if a familiar verse did contain this form, it by no means follows that Plato so quotes it. With παρέμ cf. παραστάτης, παραστήμια, ad. The sense of the optative of an exhortation (=παρείται) v. Goodwin M. and T. § 725. Here, however, it might be simply a wish (ibid. § 722). The sense of course, is 'a brother is a man's best comrade.'

δέλεφς—μασκ, not neuter.

362 E. ὑπ' ἀγιρ δέλεφειν κ.τ.λ.—lit. 'for we must set forth (and examine) also the representations directly opposed to those of Giacon, I mean the representations which praise justice, &c.' Of grammatically refers to λέγον, these being personified. There is no need to assume the harsh construction οἴοντων οί, 'the representations of these who...' ἄν is probably masculine (οίοντων, οὐτο...) but might very well be neuter (οίοντοι, ά). [The representations made by those who praise justice and blame injustice now require examination. It will be found that the one is commended and the other discommended on the ground of expediency, Gods and men reward justice. But how is a good thing in itself?]


πατέρες τε των κ.τ.λ. The full expression would be πατέρες τε αἰώνων τοιούτων οὖν ἔχομεν: and all who are in the position of guardians till their respective charges,...'

The flexion αἰῶν is alone correct for Plato. Meisterhans Gr. Att. Lus. § 58. 14 gives the rule that, while αἰῶν and αἰών belong to Old Attic, the rest of the declension was based on the original αἰών. It was not till 380 a.c. that the forms αἰῶν, εἰῶν, ιῶν, αἰῶν etc. came into use by analogy with αἰῶν, αἰών.

363 A. οὐκ αὐτῷ δικαιοσύνην ἐπίσκοπον 'not praising the thing itself, justice.' Cf. 473 ο ἐγκορμος αὑτῷ τε δικαιοσύνην οἶων ἔστι, Parm. 130 ο αὐτῷ ὁμοίης, χωρὶς ἤ τις ἡμᾶς ἀμφότερος ἔχωμεν. More fully in Symp. 190 ἀδερφὸς ἀνείπερ ἐν ἀὐτῷ τούτῳ πατέρας ἴχθυον, ἵππον ἡ πατέρα ἐστι πατέρα τούτον;

NOTES.

From this proposition it is but one step to the compounds of Aristotle, αὐτοκορμος, αὐτόσκοπος, etc., as in Eth. N. τ. 6. 5 ἀπορίεις καὶ τις τοῦτο καὶ 

ἀπομυθητάς καὶ ἀπόκειται εἰς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἔστιν τοῦ 

ἀποκείμενος. Such compounds, however, do not belong to Plato. A fuller method of expression is the familiar αὑτῶ ὑπερ ἔστιν, and the fullest would have been δικαιοσὺνα ἐπίσκοπον αὐτὸ τοῦ ὑπερ ἔστιν. More emphasis is gained by the use of the neuter than by the feminine of 612 ὁ ἐν ἀνθρώπου πρὸς ἄνθρωπον ἀνθρώπου κρατεῖ, γίγνεται...ἀρχή καὶ γάρ μοι κ.τ.λ. The singular γίγνεται is an instance of the schema Pindaricum, so named, it is said, because much used by Pindar (though in his extant odes and fragments there are very few examples forthcoming). Sometimes it is known as Doxotico.

Of the extant Pindaric instances most are very dubious. Thus in Pyth. x. 71 κάποι ὑπ' ἔναν τοῖς καθαρίσεσίν there is a variant καθαρίσει, just as in Aesch. Pers. 40 συνετέχει β' ἵλος θρόνου πελάται there is almost no good authority for συνετήται. In Pind. Ol. xi. (x.) 4 κελεύετε ἡμῖν προκείμενος ἐνεπεφέρε πρὸς κάθηται (not ἐγκορμος) is the correct reading, and, as Professor Gildersloe remarks, 'the example disappears.' Nevertheless the construction was not rare in Greek writers, just as it is not rare in late English conversation to begin with 'there was...' and to follow with a plural subject later in the sentence. The verb ordinarily precedes, and in Attic writers the construction is almost (though not entirely) confined to ἐστί, ἐστι, γίγνεται. The singular verb is used while the writer has a single or collective notion in his mind, whereas that notion is afterwards analysed or expressed otherwise. Cf. inf. 463 ο ἐστι μὲν τούτῳ καὶ τοῖς ἔναλεον ἔρχονται τοις καὶ ἔρχονται, Euthyd. 909 ο ἐστι γὰρ ἢ τούτῳ καὶ βαυματιοὶ καὶ ἐρά, Soph. Trach. 530 ἐν δ ἀμφιθελείες κλήμακες, Eur. Ion 1146 ἐν ἐν δ' ὄνομαν γράφαςς τοιοῦτοι ὡφαί, Bacch. 1350 αἰῶν 

βούλθοταί, πρόσωμα, πλημμένας φυγάτ, Al. Vesp. 58 δε. The verb follows in Symp. 188 ε ταχαία καὶ χάλασι καὶ ἐρνηθεὶς...γίγνεται, but there has been an interval between the words and περὶ ἀλήθη has intervened. ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐκδοκίματο ὑπnst τοῦ δικαίου. So all the best ms, while a few inferior copies give τοῦ ἀδικοῦ. The latter is almost certainly a very natural conjecture of some reader who said 'But Glacon did not attribute all these advantages to the just man, but to the unjust. The just man was to be persecuted and the unjust man to flourish mightily in a false reputation for justice.' This,
however, is to misconceive the meaning. τῷ δὲ άκαλυφ does not mean 'one just man' (in the case above imagined') but, generically, the just man (when he is recognised as such). Glaucon did enumerate a number of advantages which a just man will naturally obtain from his reputation for justice (see 361 c infra). It is only when the reputation is reversed that he is persecuted. εἶ τοι πλὴν ή κ.τ.λ.: ‘and these persons make still more of the (respective) reputations.’ It is incorrect to render ‘carry the advantages of a good name still further.’ This would require τῆς τῆς δίκης. Literally we have ‘the question of the reputations (on either side, good or bad).’

τὰς παρὰ βεν εὐδοκήμουσι — not simply τὰς παρὰ βεν (εὐπρίας), but parenthetically, ‘the way in which they are looked upon from heaven (and affected therefrom).’ Cf. Phaedr. 232 a τῆς δίκης τῆς παρὰ τῶν εὐθυγράμμων.

'ιμπάλλουσι — throwing into the scales.

τῷ οὐσίᾳ — made emphatic by position.

ὁ γενναῖος Ἡρωδός τε καὶ Ὅμηρος. In the mind of the speaker the two poets are closely associated in their work and in the character of their theology and ethics. Hence the single article for the single notion. Cf. Phaedr. 111 c καὶ τὸ γε ἡλιός καὶ σέληνι καὶ ἄστρα (‘the heavenly bodies’) τὰ μετέωρα), inf. 372 κ τὸν τὴν δεικνύοντον καὶ δίκαιον, Thuc. i. 36 τῆς τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἡ Σικελίας καλός παράκλου κοίται. Jelf § 459, 9 (b). γενναῖος has something of the sense of ‘simple-minded,’ ‘good old.’ Cf. 348 a πῶς γενναῖοι εἰθέλετε.

363 B. ὁ μὲν κ.τ.λ.—ss. Hasiod Opp. 230, where the words are

τῶν φερόντων μὲν γαλά πολλὸν βλεπ, οὐδὲν δὲ δρῦς

άρχῃ μὲν τὰ φέρει βαλανοῦ, μάσσῃ δὲ μελάσσει,

εἰροσκόνδει δὲ δεῖξε ταξιμερίσθησαι.

In shifting from his indirect quotation of the second line to the direct of the third Plato throws in the word φέρει, which some may wrongly omit in order to preserve the simple line and its metre.

βαλάνους = acorns, chestnuts and probably éρόρδων in general, since drýs was the name for any of the larger trees. Cf. Theoc. x. 119 πάρ δι᾽ οὐν κατεί, ὡς δρῦς ἄρα φέρει.

μέλασας cf. Verg. Ecl. iv. 30 et durae quercus susabunt ruscida mallea.
Elusion of mysteries. According to Suidas (s.v. Μουσών) the ἀνίκητοι or 'skeptics' of Musæus were addressed to this son. Compositions attributed to Ennomus himself were hymns and writings on the mysteries.

ναυακόταρα τὰ γενέα...θυσίαν; i.e. 'they represent the gods as giving their favours to the just in a still more magnificent style.' So inf. διὰ τὸ πάντοτε τύχαιναι (=παύσαν αὐτῶν κατορρήματος).

ναυακοτάρον;—'splendidiores, magnificaentiora.' Stallbaum. The word is not, however, one of unqualified praise, but contains a suggestion of excess, mostly in the direction of the 'showy' or 'dashing.' That which is characteristic of the ναυακοτάρα is something spirited, but lacking in sobriety and solidity. Cf. 563 c ἑνακοταρ καὶ μεγαλοπρεπὲι τῷ διονύσῳ, 563 Ε, Ἀλκ. i. 104 a (Alcibiades thinks he is) ναυακοτάραν γένειν ἐν τῇ τῶλεί, Aristot. Pol. iv. 11. 11 ὧν δημακατιάς τῇ πεινωτατίᾳ...χαίρεται τυραννος.

κατακλάντες—the regular word. Cf. Ἡθ. i. 126 τοῖς Πέρσαις κατακλάντες εἰς λαμάντα εὐθυχεῖς. So κατακλάντες = αὐστρόφων (ad nien- sam). Ark. Vesp. 1208 and passim.

For the joys of the best Stallbaum refers to Od. xi. 603, Pind. Nem. i. 100 (69), Vesp. Aen. vi. 637 &c. The conception is that of Walhalla, with such differences as correspond to the tastes and circumstances of the Greeks and Teutons respectively.

ὑπεφανομένος—i.e. wearing garlands (of myrtle, roses, pansies &c.) like those in the Greek mythology.

363 δ. ἕηδ—almost—τὸ λασκόν, 'from this time forth.' Cf. Ἡθ. πα. 5 ἄυδο ταχύτερον ἥθη ἄγνωστος, 'from this point onwards.' The two expressions are combined in e.g. Soph. Phil. 454 τὸ λασκόν ἕηδ.

αδίπτερος—ἀδίπτερος &c.; as if, instead of Μουσών καὶ ὃ ὅλον ἀνίκητον, ὃς ὅλον μὲν... Cf. 451 πάντων ὧν ἀκτιστέρτερας χρώματα, τῶν ὧν ἀκτιστέρτερας, 455 καὶ γενικά ἵρεις, ὧν ὅλον, Hom. ii. 1. 530 ἀρ' ἀκτιστέρτερος μαθηματικὸς ἐθράψε, ὧν αδίπτερος &c. Inf. 364 ατόμων &c... 'otherwise.' Cf. sup. 349 π (δ &c.).

μακρότερος—ἀποτελείται μαθημάτως; not μαθίσμα: 'draw out to still greater length (a list of) rewards from heaven.' The expression is brachylogy for e.g. μακρότεροι ἀποτελούνται λόγων περὶ μαθήματος.

With ἀποτελείον, of speech, cf. Gorg. 455 δ ἑως μὲν ὅλον ἄντοπον τεταύματα, ὃν σὲ ὅλον τὸ μακρὸτερος λόγων λόγων ἀκτιστέρας, Arist. Ag. 916 μακρῶν γὰρ ἑξετάσας.

363 ε. ἅμα δὲ οὐκ ἔχουσιν—οὐκ ἔχετε. I.e. it is impossible for them to devise anything further than the punishments enumerated by Glaucion (361 e—361 a).

ἐκτιμήην—of the two classes respectively, viz. the just and the unjust.

CHAPTER VII.

ἐδώρ τε λεγόμενον καὶ ἐν τοῖς ποιητῖσι—'in prose as well as verse,' ἰδιότης (ἰδιότης) is preferred to ἰδιώτης, which would be too strong, inasmuch as it would imply a manner markedly devoid of skill.

ἰδιώτης is opposed to ἄνω τεχνών οὐ τεχνών ἡμεῖς (Soph. 291 οὐ τεχνών ἡμεῖς οὐ τεχνών ἡμεῖς;) as the layman or non-expert to the professional. Thus it answers to χειροτεχνής (Thuc. vi. 79), ἄθλητας (Aristot. Eth. n. iii. 8), ῥήτωρ (Ioc. 45), ἀνθρώπης (Plat. Prot. 327 c), ἀτρόμος (Thuc. 178 c), πολεμικὸς (Phaedr. 268 δ) &c. Cf. Phaedr. 268 δ παρ' ἐμοίδις ποιητήν ἰδιώτης ἀντισχεδίας (where ποιητής is used in a wider sense).
For its opposition to πονηροί cf. Symp. 178 b γονής γαρ ἔσωτον ὅπερ εἰσίν ὅπερ λέγονται ὅποτε ὁδικόν ὅπερ ἱστότοι ὅπερ ποιητοί, Phaedr. 238 b τῷ μέτρῳ ὅπερ ποιητοὶ ἡ ἐκεῖν ἐκεῖν ἡ ἔναν μέτρον ὡς ἐνσώσῃ.

With the present passage particularly cf. inf. 366 ε ὡς ὅπερ ὅπερ ὅπερ ὅποτε ὡς ἐκ λέοντος λέοντες ἐξελέχθησαν.

364 a. ἐκ ἔνας στίματος—'with one accord,' and so on. Often joined with πάντες: cf. Legg. 664 Δ μᾶς δὲ φιλον καὶ ἐκ ἔνας στίματος πάντες συμψωμεν. Ἀρ. Ἐκθ. 670 οὐ δ᾽ ἐκ ἔνας στίματος πάντες ἀδάκρασιν. So Ἀεσσ. Ch. 72 τὰς τὰ πάντες ἐκ μᾶς ἑαυτούς, ἐκεῖνος πάντες (where, ἐκ here, ἐκ is modal). The same modal proposition occurs in e.g. Ἀεσσ. Pers. 462 τέλος δ᾽ ἐφορμήθησαν ἐκ ἔνας ἐξελέχθησαν.

ψευδονυμία—not = ἔδοξεν, but including the ἔδοξα as well as the ποιητοί: 'they repeat the same (old) tale.' See note on 329 a.

ἡ σωφροσύνη ταῦτα καὶ δικαιοσύνη—one notion. See note on 363 a ὁ γενομένος Ἡσίοδος ταῦτα καὶ ὁ Ἀρχεῖος.

χαλέπαν μίντιν κ.τ.λ. On μίντιν for ὁ δὲ 327 a. The substitution is all the more desirable here because of the δὲ in the next clause.

For the commonplace itself cf. Ποτ. 339 a, where the words of Simouides are quoted ἐκάτω ἀγαθῶν μίν ἀλάθους γεμίσατε χαλέπαν κ.τ.λ. (where, however, ἀγαθῶν is used in the ordinary Greek sense, of which morality forms but a part). The shape in which it is most frequently cited is that of the passage (inf. λούσα) from Ησιόδος.

ἀκολούθως—the recognised antithesis of σωφροσύνη (Arist. Eth. Ν. iii. 10. 1 &c.).

ἡδὸν μίν κ.τ.λ. The adjectives are arranged, as so often in Plato, with chiasmus: ἡδὸν | ἐπιστομὸν: ἐπιστομόντος | χαλέπαν. So immediately below πλουσίους καὶ ἄλλας δυνάμεις ἐχόντας

ἀθετεῖς

and the verbs εὐδαιμονίζειν (inf. ὅπερροπον: τιμᾶν | ἀγαμάζειν). See note on 328 a.

ὡς ἐκ τοῦ πλῆθος—'in general,' ut plurimum. Cf. Phaedr. 275 b ἀγαμάζεις ὡς ἐκ τοῦ πλῆθος διότι. More fully in Aristotle, Gen. An. ν. 6. 11 ὡς ὁ δὲ καὶ τῷ παραγόντες ποιειλόμενον ὡς ἐκ τοῦ πλῆθος εἰσείτω. Inf. 380 b we have ὡς πλῆθος in the same sense. More commonly ὡς ἐκ τοῦ πολιτικάνως πληροῦσιν καὶ ἄλλας δυνάμεις ἐχόντας

NOTES.

364 a. ποιητοί πλουσίους κ.τ.λ.—'wicked men, if rich or possessed of other sources of power.' Though it would be easy to explain ἀλάθος by the common idiom (inf. = 'means of power in general,' it is more natural to regard πλοῦτοσ as itself a δύναμις, just as ἀθετεῖς often means, or connotes, πένας.

ἐγκεφάλος ἔθοπος—not βούλονται: 'they are quite ready to...,' 'they have no objection.' Cf. inf. 475 ετὸς ἐγκεφάλου ἔθοπος παντὸς μαθημάτων γειηθαί. In Phæado 117 c Socrates drinks the poison μάλα εγκεφάλος καὶ εὐκλέας. The word is one of reproach here as in Dem. 248. 11 ὡς λόγον εγκεφάλος ὅτι ἐν βουλήσεις, and inf. 535 ε ὡς ἐγκεφάλος ἀσθερή τιθὶ ὑπὸν ἐν ἀμφόθεν μελετηθή. It implies the absence of a fine conscience or a proper self-respect.

τοῦτο δὲ... See note on 100 ετὸς 326 a. 'And others, who have to happen to be unimportant and poor, they are prepared to dis-honour and slight, though they acknowledge them to be better than the former.'

364 b. τοῦτω δὲ πάντως—σα, τοῦ λόγου.

οἱ περὶ θεῶν τε λόγου καὶ ἄρετος—'the statements about Heaven and virtue,' i.e. about the way Heaven treats virtue. The position of τε distinguishes this sense from the inapposite 'concerning the gods and (concerning) virtue,' which would be expressed rather by περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἀρετῆς with the regular trajectory (see note on 343 c). Here θεῖον-τε καὶ-ἄρετῆς forms one notion, 'the relation between Heaven and virtue.'

καθαριστῶτατοι λέγονται—take the most wonderful shape.'

πολλοῖς...ἐνυπαγεία | 'often have ore now allotted.' The soror with πολλοίς as in the gnomic (or iterative) use with πολλάκις, ἀπὸν &c. Goodwin M. and T. § 156.

βοῖν κακῶν—life on the material side, in respect of livelihood and circumstances.

ἀγοράται—'mendicants' or 'vagabonds,' originally often priests, and very similar to mendicant friars.

The best known were the μυρτιγράται, who collected (ἀγέχρω) money ostensibly for the worship of Cybele. This term became one of great contempt (Aristot. Rhet. ii. 3. 10) in consequence of the worthlessness of the men and women who practised such mendicity, and who added low arts like those of the later gipsy fortune-teller, the quack, and the indulgence-vendor. In Soph. O. T. 387 the μυρτιγράται Teiresias is thus spoken of: ὕπολεις μάγων ταῦτα μυχαμορ-ράφον, ἵππος τοῦ ἀγοράτα τε εὐθὺς ἐρέθος | μάνων ἀνάρκης. Similarly Ἀεσ. Ag. 1273 (of Cassander) καλομένως δὲ φοιτάτος, ὡς
would have been more favourably considered if this had been perceived, instead of attempting to make the future infinitive depend on ὅτι δόμας. The loss of final τι is always easy, or a very early editor may have misread the construction and altered the text.

σήμερον—used for έτοις in dependent object-clauses (i.e. after ὅτι, ἦν) and final clauses (τι, ὅτι, ἦν).

364 C. ἀδίκημα τοῦ...αὐτοῦ ἢ προγόνων: i.e. 'if a crime attaches to a man, committed by himself or his ancestors.' τοῦ is qualified by a sort of afterthought in partitive apposition: 'a crime belonging to a man, (that is to say, belonging to) himself or his ancestors.'

ἐτε...ἄν τε:...σίν...σίν. ἄν τε is used for the second ἐτε because in direct narration the quack would say ἄν τε ἀδίκημα γέγονεν, ἀκέκατο δόμας, ἄν τε σήμερον ἦπερ τοῖς, βλάφειν, according to the usual manner of conditional sentences.

'The ordinary rendering makes ἐτε answer to ἦ, and this is no doubt allowable in itself.' Cf. Legg. 582 ν, Eur. El. 396, and conversely ἔτε in Eur. Alc. 114. But the sense can obviously be bettered.'

ἀκέκατο—so. αὐτό. For ἀκέκατο in reference to the taint or disease of a sin cf. Pet. 1. 157 ἡ ἀγαθία ἐπεκτάθη ἐφεκατομμύρες. ἐπεκτάθη <ἐπεκτέθη> τοῦ καθότως τοῦ μεσαίως καταστῇ. So in Soph. O. T. 98 ἡ πάντως is called ἠδέρτως.

μετ' ὑπόθεσιν τε καὶ ἀργόντων—cf. inf. τοίς. The sinner will be put to no discomfort, ἀργόντων are sacrificial feasts.

θάλασσα—so. τοῖς, supplied from τοῖς. For the omission cf. 347 c. ἀδήλη cannot mean βλάφειν in Plato, and its proper sense is retained by joining it to μετ' σμικρῶν δαπανῶν. The ἀδήλη would put it 'if you are willing to spend a trifle.'

ἐπαγγειλατ' τοις καὶ καταδέχομαι. Cf. Legg. 583 ν ἢν δὲ κατα-

δέχομαι ἢ ἐπαγγείλει δέ τινα ἐπιθυμίας κτλ. The addition of τοῖς is contemnuous. ἐπαγγελις are properly inscriptions by which supernatural powers (particularly of ἄγαλμα) are drawn to one's aid, while καταδέχομαι (or καταθέσομαι) are 'spells' (βλάφεις) which may simply have a negative effect. Cf. Aesch. Eum. 306 ἦν μὲν ἄκεκατό τοῖς δένε καθέμενος σέλευς. In popular use, however, it is probable that 'incantations and spells' were not distinguished, the terms being combined for comprehensiveness.
The enormity of the notion causes the speaker to add promptly ὡς φαίνων. The expected ὡς...μαρτυρήσασθαί gives place to the finite verb, the construction having been broken by the quotation (cf. 363 9).

Notes:

364 E. βιβλίων κ.τ.λ.—containing the rites of the Orphic telestae. Cf. supra 363 8, note on Museus. For Orphus cf. Ar. Ran. 1052 ὁρφικὸς μὲν γὰρ τελεστὸς ὁ Ἡμιαῦς κατέθεε μέντοι φώνας ὑπόθεται, ἢ Μουσαίοις ὁ Ἡμιαῦς τὰς πνεύματα ταῖς σιδῆρες καὶ χρυσοῖς, Eur. Alc. 667 ὁρφικὸς ἐν σαῦροις, τὰς ὀρφικὰς κατέγραψε γέρνης. Orphus was reputed to be the son of Calliope; hence Μουσαῖον ἔγγυον. The plural Μουσαίοι and the use of ἔγγυον (‘descendants’) rather than ἔγγυον (‘children’) are intended to express a certain indifferance as to the exact legendary relationship, ‘descendants of Selene and Muse, as they allege...’

365 A. ἐκεῖ—In Hades. See note on 330 9.

The meaning is not, of course, that after a man is dead τελεστὴν can be performed to act as a καθαρίσμα for his soul, but that if, while still alive, he is initiated in the purificatory τελεστή, he is not afterwards assured. It is only the αἵματα and ἀτέλέστατα who will lie ἐν βορβορῷ. (cf. 363 8). Phaedo 69 c ὅτι ἐν αἵματα τοιαῦτα ἐπνοοεῖτο ὁ Ἐρίκτος; ὡς καθαρίσματα τε καὶ τυχερομένων ἔκοιτο αἵματα ἀτέλεστα μετὰ τούτων ἐκλύετο. Nor can 364 11 ἐκ τῆς τελεστῆς ὁ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ γένους τοῦ αἵματος ἐν τοῖς ἐκ τοῦ γένους τοῦ ἐξιστότος. Antisthenes cfr. Diod. Laec. vi. 4. μναζυρίας ἐποιεῖτο τοιαῦτα τὰ ὀρφικά, τὸν ἐξερεύνητα ὅτι οἱ τελεσταί μαρτυροῦν τιλλοὺς ἐν τῷ ἐκ ταύτῃ μετάρρυθμῳ. Τὰ δὲ γὰρ ὀνόματα τῶν ἐκ ταύτων δερχόμενων καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας ἑνεκεὶ ὁ Ἐρίκτων ἐκτύπωσε: Soph. Frag. 719 τὸν τρισίθεν βροντών, οἱ τελεσταὶ δερχόμενοι τῆς μάλιστα τούτων τούτων τούτων τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν τῶν των τῆς.
CHAPTER VIII.

ταῦτα πάντα κ.τ.λ. (1) The subject of ποιεῖν is ψυχῆς, ταῦτα πάντα being dependent on ἀκούοντος: "and when the souls of young people hear all these statements, what do we suppose they do?" or (2) the subject is ταῦτα πάντα and ψυχῆς is scions, after ποιεῖν: "what do we suppose all these statements do to the souls of young people when they hear them?" The position of ἀκούοντος makes for the former. ποιεῖν is used of the conduct of the soul, which is personified. Cf. Λτ. Νεμ. 319 ταῦτα ὧν ἀκούοντα αὐτῶν τὸ φθέγγει ἡ ψυχή μου πεπόνησα, Χειμ. Ομ. ν. 1. 27 ἡ γὰρ μοι ψυχή οὐχ ὡς βουλεύοντας παρακείεσθαι, ἀλλὰ ὡς ποιήσασθαι. Hor. Sat. 1. 2. 69 discerat hanc animam. [The whole passage may be rendered 'and when young people hear all these authoritative statements made concerning virtue and vice and the way in which gods and men are disposed to respect them, how do we think the minds of those of them act, who have good natural parts and are capable of fitting, as it were, from statement to statement and gathering therefrom what sort of character and what sort of walk in life one must adopt in order to live his life in the best possible way?']

ταῦτα καὶ τοσάδα: i.e. statements of such a kind (referring to the εἴδη λέγων 363 e) and made with such an accumulation of authority (ὅτι τε λεγόμενα καὶ ὅτι ποιήματα 363 e). In construction the words go predicatively with λέγομαι 'statements made in this shape and with all this warrant.'

οὐ...περὶ αὐτῶν ἐχοντις τιμῆς: lit. 'namely, as to how gods and men are disposed in the matter of respect to be paid to them (respectively).'

τιμῆς as in 389 εἰς τὴν τοῦ ἱεροῦ τιμὴν. For the genitive (which is ultimately participial) cf. 436 τοῦ πῶς ὡς ἐχεις δέχεσθαι τοῦ τοιοῦτον. 571 ὡς ὡσθαν τοις τις ἔχει αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸν κοινὸν ἐξερευνήσῃ, καὶ τὴν σχέσιν εἶχε, καὶ τὸν κοινὸν, οὐκ ἔχει. Συμφώνων ἃς καὶ 26 καὶ καλῶς ἐχοντα λέγεται διότι μένοι. Similarly Legg. 869 τῇ κατὰ ταῦτα ἐπιτικαὶ ἐξατόμισαν.

τὸ ὁδόμηθα...; So τί φομεν often in place of τι φομεν; and e.g. η τῶν λέγομεν; (878 b).

ἐφῆβος. The word is used either absolutely or relatively (ἐφῆβος πόλεως). It is explained inf. 455 εἰ δὲ ἀναστὰς ἔλεγες, τὸν μὲν ἐφῆβον πρὸς τι εἶναι, τὸν δὲ ἄρθιν, ἐν ὧδε μὲν ῥέον τι μαθᾶσαι, ὡς ἐλευθερώς, καὶ δὲ χαλεπῶς, καὶ τὸν ἀπὸ βραχεῖας μαθήσεις εἰς τοῦτο ἐφηβεῖκας

NOTES.

365 κ] εἰ οὖ ἐμαθεῖν, ὡς τὸ πολλάς μαθήσεως πτυχών καὶ μελέτης μηδ' ἂ ἐμαθεῖ ἐσθίον; cf. Aristot. Eth. N. iii. 5. 17. ἀποκριτὶ ἐπιτύμνου. The metaphor (from bees) is qualified by ἀποκριτὶ, after the Greek manner.

[The appearance of οὕστημαν in a correction of Par. A perhaps makes it desirable to state that the ἄθικ prose forms are ἀτύμοι, πτυμοι εἰς τυμηματα. Tragedy uses also ἐπιτύμνοι (πτυμοι, πτυμοι). But πτυμαται and ἐπιτύμια are unclassical. See Rutherford New Phryn. Art. cxxviii.]

συλλογίσασθαι—with a play upon the notion συλλέγων. The 'gathering' of a logical inference is the literal sense, but the notion of gathering honey is, of course, suggested by the metaphor. τῷ τοπικῷ: the τόι of some ass is less good. The sense is quae rationes rather than quossum; 'in what manner of walk.' Cf. Ηδύ. χι. 67 ἐκλεκτόκοι τῶν τολμημέν καὶ ἀποβλέπουν. τοπικῶς is not simply interchangeable with τοπικός, but = 'having bent his steps.'

365 B. λέγω γέρον άν.... so τις from the τις preceding. ἐκείνο το... 'that well-known saying' (cf. honestum illud Solonis, Cio. Senec, 850).

Though the passage does not occur in any extant ode, ἐκείνο is justified by the evident vogue of the quotation in antiquity. Thus it appears in Maxima Tyrius (circ. 150 n.c.) xvi. 1, Cicero ad Att. xiii. 38 and 41, Dionysius Halic. de Compos. Verh. 21, and in a citation from Atticus Plautianus by Eusebius (Prep. Exh. v. 6. 798 b). The whole fragment (Fr. 232) is reconstructed by Bergk as τὸτερον οὐκέτα τέχνος ὥσπερ ἢ σκολίας ἀνάδεικνυμεν ἐπικύρωσεν γέλα άνδρων, δίχα μοι νῦν ἄριστες καὶ καλῶς.

τὸτερον Σφικ. κ.τ.λ. 'Shall I mount to a loftier castle by means of justice or by means of crooked wiles?' τέχνος is not a 'wall,' as may be seen from the following words, but = 'acom or castellum.' Cf. Ηδύ. χι. 14 παρειτῆσθε τὸ τέχνος τὸ ἐν Μέσῳ Κασσάνδρης, and Ι. 91 Λευκου Ῥέχον. Σο άβιδόου τέχνος δει. ὥσπερ, not for ὥσπερ, nor for 'more than usually high,' but a true comparative. The question is 'which offers the loftier stronghold?'

ἀναβαίνον is therefore not to 'mount upon' but to 'go up into,' as to an acropolis. Cf. Hom. II. i. 497 ἐπικύρωσεν γέλα άνδρών, 14—2
The expression is quoted directly from the poet, whereas Plato himself might more probably have written ἀνάγραφον εἰς... τε... λέγομεν... φασιν. For the plural verb used κατὰ σώσειν see note on 385 c.

ἔναι καὶ μή δοκᾶ: 'if at the same time I am thought not to be so,' oὐ δοκῶ is 'I seem not,' rather than 'I do not seem.' Cf. ὁδεῖκεν, οὐ δοκῃ (= ὁρῶμαι), οὐκ ἐδοκέω (=κοίησον) δε. Similarly in English 'I don't think,' 'I don't want to....' The sense therefore becomes the same as if the words had been ἐναὶ καὶ δόξαν ἐχων δύσιαν. Hence ημῖν φανερὸν immediately, these being the consequences of a positive reputation for injustice (cf. 361 ε, 362 λ).

One or two ms's and many editors, through missing the sense of καὶ and of μή δοκᾶ, have reversed the order to the weaker ἐναὶ μή καὶ δοκᾶ.

θερμότερος—a word of poetical colour, used by Plato mostly with a suggestion of satirical exaggeration. In Euthyd. 289 κ the longoosai are ἐνέπορεσαν and their τέχνη in θετερία. Inf. 558 κ θετερία καὶ θῆκεν ἡ τωτῇ διαγωγῇ (so. In a perfect democracy). The word does not belong to other Attic prose writers. It occurs, however, in Ημ. t. 118 ἐνεῖν τῇ τέχνῃ τῆς Ἀρειπίας θερμότερον ὡς ἤδη.

365 C. οἱ σοφοὶ—see 340 κ. The 'sage' here is Simonides, from whom the words are quoted by the scholiast on Eur. Or. 782.

The use there give the corrupt τα δοκέων καὶ τα μελα θεία βασιλεία, where ῬΑΝΑΛΑΘΕΙΑ stands for ῬΑΝΑΛΑΘΕΙΑΝ. The error shows that ἄλθειαι and not ἄλθειαι is the proper form, as in Par. λ.

πρόθυρα μήν καὶ σχῆμα κ.τ.λ.: i.e. περιγραπτῶν περί ἐμαυτὸν σκηνογραφεῖ άργετε (ὁς οὖν οὐκ εἶχαι) πρόθυρα καὶ σχῆμα. καὶ is correlative or explanatory (385 b): 'a front (fronte) or show.'

The passage cannot be acquitted of an incongruous combination of images. 'For my outward appearance in front—(i.e. rendering πρόθυρα καὶ σχῆμα as a boudoir)—I must sketch round myself a sham picture of virtue—[which will look very well if not too closely examined]—while behind I must trail the fox of Archilochus in all its guile and cunning.' However free the sense of πρόθυρα may have become, it never wholly lost its connexion with building or sunk into the mere equivalent of τα ἐπιστρεφομένα μέρα. Moreover the painting of a σκηνογραφία implies a wall. It is therefore impossible to make any clear mental picture out of the sentence as a whole. Whether we call the expression a mixed metaphor or a combination of incongruous metaphors is of little importance. 'In

front I shall be a whitened sepulchre; behind will be the fox's tail' is a fair English equivalent. Unfortunately we know nothing of the original context in Archilochus.

σκηνογράφοι. Properly σκηνογραφία is used of colourless outline in light and shade. It is without finish of detail and can only look passable at a distance. Like scene-painting, it becomes meaningless when approached too near. Cf. Parmen. 165 φ ὁν σκηνογραφήματα ἀποκαταστάτω μὲν ἐν πάντα φαινόμενα...προσέλθωμεν δὲ πάλιν καὶ άνερ, Inf. 583 ὑπὸ τά πόριαθειν, ὅποι, φαινόμενα δήλοι ὑπὲρ ἀλήθειας καὶ τὰ σκηνογραφήματα. Therefore there attaches to the word a special implication of pretense or falsehood. Cf. Inf. 583 τὸν βαρβάτοτα ἄλλον Ῥ ἀλλὰ ἀλήθεια...δὲ γάρ καρδιά, ἀλλὰ σκηνογραφώμενον ταῦτα, Aristot. Met. iv. 20. 2 τῷ νεκρῷ...δοκεῖν γὰρ ἄλθειαι ἦν ἂν εἰς ἐπίτηδες, ἢν ἦσαν ἂν σκηνογραφία καὶ τὰ ἐνύππαι, Crit. 107 κ σκηνογραφία ἄσεβει καὶ ἀπάτηλον.

περιγραπτῶν—either (1) 'paint round me,' or (2) 'draw in outline.' The latter sense of περιγραφή, as opposed to ἀνάγραφη ("fill in"), is seen in e.g. Aristot. Eth. N. Ῥ. 7. 17 περιγράφουμεν μὲν οὖν τάχα τε τάφου 'δε γάρ εἰςόμεθα πρὸ τούτο γε οὖν ἄλθειαν εἰς άλθειαν, and would relieve the pleonasm in κέκλε ἐπί περὶ...περι-

γραπτῶν.

τὸν δὲ τὸν σοφοτότου Ἀρχιλόχου κ.τ.λ. The same reference underlies Themistius Orat. xxii. 379 φωνάζει τὸν τινα καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ σκηνογράφη αὐτὸς, ἄλθειον δέ θυμίζει σκηνογράφη τῇ ἀλλότριες ἄλθειας ἄλθειας. There is obviously no connexion between this and the fragment of Archilochus τῇ' δὲ ἄλθειας κεραία συνεχεῖον τινοπο νομοῦ ἔννοιαν. Αλλότρια—It is an error to say, with Stallbaum, that this is αλλότριος 'the fox's skin.' The adjectives would be inappropriate. Moreover the point that is the hinder part should be 'fox.' κεραίας καὶ τούτων—so. ὥσιν. Νότ τὴν κεραίαν κ.τ.λ. 'In all its guile.' Cf. Thuc. t. 49 ἐπιστρέφω ταύτῃ σκηνής ἐρισμόν. Soph. El. 1148 τῆς ἑρὶ πάλαι προῆρη ἀλλοκληθέντων. The words probably form part of the quotation. Cf. κεραία just cited. Aelian has ἡ κεραία αλοιαλος = ἡ κεραία, and κεραία is frequent. Pind. P. π. 38 κερδοὶ δὲ τὰ μὲν τάτο τὸν κεραίας πνεύμα. ἀλλὰ γὰρ, φησὶ τα, κ.τ.λ. = αὐτὰ εἰσί, ἀλλὰ ἃ δικαιώ. So ἀλλὰ δικαίω (inf. n). The words φησὶ τα are not necessary to the sense. ἀλλὰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.—'No, nor yet....' For γὰρ, see note on 384 a.

The notion is that of the familiar proverb χαλέπα τὰ καλὰ (497 b).
365 D. rατής ἡτόν, ὡς τῇ ἱχνὶ τῶν λόγων φόρε; ‘we must go in that direction (i.e. the direction above mentioned, the way of hypocrisy and τὸ δοκεῖν), as (= ‘for so’) the track of the arguments leads us (or ‘if we are to follow the track of the arguments’).’ This is, of course, very different from ταύτην ἑτόν, ἡ... τῶν λόγων is not the same as τῶν λόγων but all the data,’ or ‘arguments,’ almost=tῶν λεγομένων of sup. A. φόρε; as in ἡ ὄδος φέρε, and the English ‘this road takes you to...’

ζυμομοιότες τα καὶ ἐταίρειαι—cabals and clubs.’ On these see Grote Hist. Greece cap. ixii. (Vol. vii. of 1869).

Such associations were bound by oaths like the one recorded in Arist. Pol. v. 9. 11 “καὶ τῷ ὀδῷ κακίστου ἄνωμαι καὶ βουλεύσω θανατοῦν καὶ ἔχων κακῶν.” For their purpose cf. Thuc. viii. 54 καὶ ψεύτων θάνατος τὰ ζυμομοιοί, ἀλλά ἐστιν ἐν πλῆθος πρὸτερον ἐν τῇ πόλει ὀνοματερία ἐντὸς δικαίως καὶ ἄρχει (‘to control trials and oaths’), ἀπάτες πολλὰς καὶ παρακελευθέντας, ἢποιοι διεσφαρίζοντας κατὰ δικαίαν τὴν δίκην κ.τ.λ., ibid. c. 91. So Thucisc. 173 καὶ τῶν ἐταίρειων ἐν' ἀρχῆς, Ιουλ. 56 καὶ τὰς ἐταιρείας κυριότερον ὀνοματερία, οὐκ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἡκατέρων συμφερόντων (which was the usual custom), ἀλλ’ ἐντὸς τῆς πληθύνουσας ἄνθρωπος. The members of a ἐταιρεία were called ἐταίροι. Dem. Mid. 521, Lyst. Erat. 412 πέντε ἀνδρεῖς ἀνδρεῖς κατήσθησαν ὕπο τῶν καλοκαίριον ἐπικεφάλους. The same kind of clubs existed in Rome under the name of cotipites, fritiasses, sodalitates, and in the Middle Ages we have confraternities.

πεδινὸς δίδασκαλος κ.τ.λ.: i.e. sophists, at whom Plato once more has a passing fling, as he does also at rhetoric, an art distasteful to him. Cf. Gorg. 455 λ ἄγει ἄρα πεδινὸς δημογράφων ἄγαν ἡ ῥητορική, Phaedr. 271 λ ἄγει.

In the Gorgias σοφιστική and ῥητορική are the καλωσείται opposed to λογοκρίτης and δικαίων, two virtues which have their spheres in διμερεία and δίκη respectively (cf. here σοφίς δημογράφος τα καὶ δικαίων).

With πεδινός cf. Quintil. Inst. Or. ii. 15. 13, Gorgias apud Platonem (ac. Gorg. 453 λ) περιευνανυς se artifices in judiciis et in alis coetibus esse ait. The third (epideictic) division of oratory is one with which we are not here concerned.

Though a proper function of the rhetorical teachers is διευθυντά τὸ ἐνδυνάμων πιθανόν in a given subject (Aristot. Rhet. t. 21), they went too far in undertaking (as did Corax, Aristot. Rhet. t. 24. 11) τὸν ἴδιον λόγον κρίτων ποιεῖ—a charge brought against Socrates himself by Aristophanes (Nub. 112 sqq. ὥσπερ λόγοντε φανε τάς κότας).

366 B. NOTES.

In δίδασκαλοι there is satire. The sophists taught for money. Socrates declared himself no teacher, but only a fellow-learner, or at best a μανής ρίς of knowledge. οὐφαί is equally satirical. See Protag. 312 c for σοφίς in this connexion.

εὖ ὑπὲρ τοῦ πεδινοῦ καὶ τὸν πεδινὸν τῆς ὑπομονῆς (sc. ἃ ἐν βίας λέγεται 361 ν), ἢ δὲ τὴν πεδινοῦ πεδινοῦ.

ὁς...τῇ διδασκαλί...: ‘so as to overreach and yet not be punished.’ ὡς γὰρ ἀρχεῖ οὐκ εἰς τὸν ἀθλητήν, ἀλλ’ ἐν τοῖς περίκλεισισ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἱκάνῳ λαυδικόν. The reading of Par. A and most MSS is οὐκοῦν...καὶ ἡμῖν μελητῶν κ.τ.λ. But this could only mean, on our side, must take care to be undetected.

An alteration to οὐκοῦν is of no value, since οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡμῖν μελητῶν would be unnatural Greek for οὐκοῦν οὖν ἡμῖν μελητῶν. It should mean ‘it is not the case that we also should care,’ whereas what is required is ‘we also need not care.’ The latter sense is given by the very poorly supported οὐδέν ἢμῖν which J. and C. adopt. But how came καὶ to be substituted for οὐδέ? It is also given by the καὶ ἡμῖν οὖν μελητῶν of one inferior MS. This, however, is manifestly a correction only. Again, there is slight support for οὐκοῦν...καὶ ἡμῖν μελητῶν τοῦ λαυδάνων; but, even though we may admit the question after οὐκοῦν (‘well then’), it is evident that καὶ is impossible. ‘If the gods do not care...why should we also care?’ is as bad in Greek as in English. A conjecture of Basset is ἀρρητῶν, which may be right, although, as J. and C. perceive, it rather suggests a duty of neglecting than an opportunity of not troubling. The evidence of the MS goes to prove an early corruption. The conjecture in the text is based (1) upon a comparison of the two readings οὐδέν καὶ (2) upon the belief that οὐδέν was omitted in most MS because of being misread in the hypothetical clause already containing μήδεν.

The appropriateness of καὶ becomes obvious if we look simply at...
the words εἰ θεός μηδὲν μὲλεί, καὶ ἥραξιν αὐθέν μελητὴν ‘if the gods
care not, we also need care not.’

365 E. αὐτοῖς ήμαν ἢ ἀκριβαῖν — ‘know or have heard of
them.’ The sense is, more fully, αὐτοῖς ήμαν ἢ ἀκριβαῖν, ᾧ ἀντὶ τῶν θεὼν εἰσί.

[When it is said that εἰδον τινα is not Greek for认识 quale-
quidem, the remark is true; but εἰδον τινα is perfectly good
and ordinary for εἰδον so qu’ on est, i.e. εἰδον τινα, δέστις
(ὅσοιος δέοι) εἰσί. Thus in Eur. Med. 89 εἰδόθη τινὰ, δεικνύων τὸν
και Αρ. Ran. 385 εἰδόθη τούτων καὶ διεξερχεῖται πάλαι, the
meaning is ‘I know what to expect of her, him.’]

ἀκριβάμεν αὐτοῖς is made possible by the intervening ήμαν. The
combination would hardly occur alone.

τῶν λόγων ὡς τῶν λεγομένων, ‘tradition,’

τῶν γεναλογησάντων ποιητῶν—e.g. Hesiod and Homer. Cf. Hist. ii. 58 Ἡθόδων καὶ Ἀρμόν...οὖν δὲ εἰσί οἱ παράγαγοι ἑκατοντάρχης
‘Ελληστή, καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς τὰς ἐποιηματικὰς δόσεις καὶ τιμῶς τα καὶ τέχνας
dιπλῶς καὶ εἰδικῶς διαφέρει καὶ εἰδικῶς αὐτῶν σημαδεύεται (on which see Baehl’s Excursus,

ἑνῶς ὄνο...παράγαγε: i.e. τοιοῦτον ἑνῶς, v. 334 p.

ἀγαρίφας—so best, ζευγαρίφας in 364 p. Similarly at that place there are variants εὐχάρις and ἀγαρίφας.

In all probability the true Homeric forms were written in some of the texts of Plato by persons who recalled the original passage.

As no decision can be final on such a point, it is best to follow the
authority of the better text.

παράγαγεσθαι ἀναπαύμενοι. The participle defines or specialises
the wide παράγαγεσθαι, which might mean ‘decide’ or ‘mislead,’
as well as ‘pervert.’ Cf. inf. 388 ἡ ἡμέρα σὺν εὐθέαν παράγαγεν]
Legg. 885 p εἰπαρμαχόμενον ἐνεργείας τα καὶ εὐγένεια παραγεμένον.

The notion here is of being ‘turned aside’ from the exercise of strict
justice by means of bribes.

ἀναπαύμενοι is frequently used of bribing: e.g. Ar. Pax 692 κατ
περίκλος τῶν λαόκοις τῶς μεγίστους χρήματα. Cf. the saying of
Hesiod ἀπαθεῖα ἀνθρώπων (which, however, is meant in a more
pious sense).

εἰ ᾅς ὅν παρειν—‘well, admitting (as we must of course)
that we are to believe them.’ ᾅς ὅν implies that the matter must be
cut short.

ἐκ τῶν ἀδικημάτων—‘out of our ill-gotten gains,’ ‘out of
the results of our injustices.’ Cf. Χοι. Ἡλ. τ. 9 τρέφει τὸ

366 λ']

NOTES. 217

ναυτικὸν ἀπὸ τῶν νῆσων (‘from the resources of the Islands.’) Ar.
Plut. 369 πλουτάνεσθαι ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν κομῶν.

366 A. ἀξίμαμεν μὲν κ.τ.λ. Par. A omits μὲν (which is due to
Muratorus), but many of the better texts read μὲν. The latter
is probably derived from μόνι (where the accent would represent
the final syllable or), a misreading of μέν. On the other side Par. A
might easily omit a second μὲν after the μέν which introduces the
sentence.

With the construction ἀξίμακεν ἀπὸ θεῶν ἐσόμεθα (ἀπὸ θεῶν)
[of. Thuc. i. 139 ἦν ὁ μεγάλος ἄξιμωτος ἕνων τῶν ἀντικάν
πολέμων ἐκβαλλόντος καὶ ἀκαραθάντως (ἐπὶ ὄσταν ὀπραξώμενος κ.τ.λ.).

An awkward conglomeration of participles will be found in Gorg. 494 c
λέγει, καὶ τὰς ἐπιθέματι απάνθεσιν ἑκάστην καὶ διόμενον
πληρῶς χαίροντα εὐδαίμονον ξύλ (if the text is sound).

λισόμενοι is, of course, poetical. The speaker is recalling the
Homeric line of 364 π, λισόμενον ὅτε κέν τι ἔρχεται καὶ ἀκαθάρτη.

ἀξίμαμεν ἀπαλλάσσομεν. The rule is laid down (by Cobet and others)
that with the active ἀπαλλάσσω an adverb is required, but with
the middle an adjective. No doubt custom did favour this distinction,
but with the present instance to the contrary cf. Soph. 254 δ ἂν
ἀπαλλάσσω ἀπαλλάσσων. So with participle Hist. iii. 69 τοῦ μεν μὴ
χαίροντα ἀπαλλάσσων. Lucian Alex. 37 ἀπαλλασσόμενος...παίδοισιν.

On the other hand Gorg. 457 καὶ ἔστω γε ταλαιπώτατα ἔχετρα
ἀπαλλάσσομαι.

ἄλλο γέρον—v. 365 c.

ἡ αὐτοῖς ἡ παίδες παιδῶν—cf. 364 c ἐπὶ ἄκρημα τῶν γέρων αὐτοῖς
ἡ προγόνων. The descendants are not punished directly for the
crimes of their ancestors, but the μόνος or μόρος attaching to an
unexpiated crime leads to an ἁγίον in the family, from which
proceed sins and penalties from generation to generation. Cf.
Aesch. Ag. 1566 τοῖς ἄν γνόνν ἄνθρωπον ἔμβλεπον δόμον: ἐκκλησίας
τός ἄν. ἢ πέφω, πήσετε λοιπόν κλαίμενοι κ.τ.λ.: ‘but be (so. our young
εὐφοροί), following out his reasoning, will say...’ cf. λέγει γάρ ἐν
πρὸς αὐτός 365 π.
THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO, II. [366 a—

αὐτῷ δὲ δύνασαι—these words are accidentally omitted by Par. A and some other MSS (presumably because of the similar ending τελεστὰ—δύνασαι).
The article αἱ τελεστὰ and αὐτῷ refer to 364 π.: 'here is where is the effect of our mystic rites once more comes in.'

οἱ λέγει τὸν—especially those presiding over the τελεστὸν, e.g. Demeter and Dionysus. Of Soph. O. T. 921 Δίκαιος Ἀπασίγον... ὅπως λέγω τῷ ἦλθεν εὐδοκῆ πάρη.

366 B. ὁς αἱ μεγάλαι πάλαι λέγουσι—i.e. there are purifying gods—at least all the greatest communities, the centres of illumination, tell me so, and it is not for a humble individual to dispute their word. [There is a special reference to Athens and the Eleusinian mysteries.]

οἱ θεοὶ ποίησε: e.g. Museaeus and Oryphas (364 π).


μηθύσωσίνι—more than λέγοντι. They are in the secret and disclose it to the outside world.

CHAPTER IX.

τί—i.e. after all these arguments.

τρὶς μέγας ἁμαρτίας—i.e. in preference to an injustice of the amallest kind (τελεστὴν 361 λ'). Not strictly identical with τρὶς μέγας.

ἀλλα πάντως ἐν ὅσην: The expression κτῆσασθαι άδων could hardly occur alone, but the addition of the superlative makes the sense 'to secure the result, or profits, of ideal justice.'

ὁς τῶν πολλῶν τε καὶ ἄραν λεγόμενοι λόγοι. The participles add something to λόγοι: 'the statement commonly made by (=the traditional statement of) people in general and supported by the highest authorities.' The sense is, of course, very different from that of ὁ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ ἄραν. The τε καὶ gives the meaning 'not only general, but including the highest authorities.' The article is not repeated because the ἄρα is included with, not opposed to, the πολλοὶ. With τῶν πολλῶν cf. ὁς αἱ μεγάλαι πάλαι λέγουσι (c. viii. fin.). For ἄραν κφ. 360 π. The reference is to the poets and sages (ὁ σοφὸς of 366 ο and ὁ θεὸς παίδες of sup. ο

366 D. ψήφι—The subject τῆς is to be supplied from οἴκος. So in Latin quisque is often to be supplied after nemo (Hor. Sat. i. 1. 6). Stallbaum quotes Symm. 129 κπα ταῦτα ἀκούειν οὐδὲ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀκούειν. ἡ δὲ ἀκούειν ἀκούει ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀκούει, αὐτὸ δὲ—v. 359 c.

ὁς δὲ, δήλον: of. Dem. Timoc. 730 τῆς διοίκησιν ἀναιρεῖ, τῆς θ' ἤλθαι καὶ τῆς δολαί—ὡς δὲ, ἐν γὰρ φαίνεται. In such brachylologies it
in equally possible to regard as (1) =δινω 'and how (it is so)....'
or (2) =δι, cf. the brachylogio δηλοντε, i.e. δι ουτως εξαι. 
εις δυσκαλον ελλον — ου, του αδεκουν.

δεντεπο...ο λαγο...ορμησε...εστη...δει κ.τ.λ.—viz. 358 b and 362 e. The sentence may be construed in two ways: (1) δεντεπο

ατα α το λαγο όρυσε...εστη...δει κ.τ.λ.: "whence all this argument, both on Glaucon's part and mine, began to say

'my good sir...,'" i.e. α λαγος is personified: (2) δεντεπο ατα α 

λαγος αρμησε και τρει να ομαι...('οτε ημας επειν κ.τ.λ. 'whence all this argument started both on his part and mine against you, (whence, I mean, we started) to say...'

The latter is probably the nearer to Plato's mind, although there is little doubt that in reality the sentence is the result of some confusion between the simple ειπε, δεντεπο α λαγος αρμησε...προς εινα, δει...the fact (with which this argument began) that... 

and the simple ειπε, δεντεπο αρμησεν και τονε και ημαι...ειπεν 

εις κ.τ.λ. Similar in expression is Hdt. vi. 50 το ετεπε ειςλαγος 

ο λαμις ελαμησεν εις καται ελεγθεναι (L. and C.).

By omitting ειπεν we make the construction clear, but the interpo-

lation was improbable.

366 E. ατα τον ε δραχης ημων κ.τ.λ.: 'down from all the
demigods whose utterances have been preserved.' λαγος

λαμεμεσι are not 'accounts of them handed down to us.' This 

would rather have been the singular λαγος, and it is away from

the sense.

The words μεχρ των ην ανθρωπων should be joined with δραχη-

ους, not (as by Stallbaum) with λαμεμεσι: 'all of you, from

the earliest heroes down to the present generation.' Cf. Legg.

771 c μεχρ των δοεκα απο μας φεεθονυς.

By φρασι are meant the legendary personages to whom various

moral sayings were attributed by poetry or tradition. From these

we pass through the more historical sages μεχρ των ναυ ανθρωπων.
Among the φρασι the speaker is probably thinking of Heracles, for

whose 'elocu' (as told by Prodicus) see Xen. Mem. ii. 1. 21.

δεκα ε δαζα, so. επαινε η φεγο. Op. 363 λο ατα ατου διεκαουσυν 

επαινουσι δελλ τας ας αυτης ευθυμιας.

ατα δε μετατρον κ.τ.λ. It is no doubt just possible to make this

accus. depend on ετεπεδο, the words το λαγο being instrumental. 

But ετεπεδο το λαγο is so familiar an expression in Plato that we

are scarcely justified in breaking it apart in this instance and

attaching to it an unfamiliar usage. See 349 ι (note). In reality

367 λ] NOTES.

the accus. is κατα σάνων. Plato wrote ατα δε μετατρον as if

it were to be governed later by e.g. ατα ατους διεκαουσυν ας τι κερι.

By the time he reaches odos...λαγος he is no longer alive to the

exact way in which the sentence began. Literally 'as for each

in itself, regarded as existing with its essential quality in the

soul of its possessor and unperceived by gods or men, no one,

either in prose or verse, has satisfactorily grappled with the

argument that....' Such anachronisms are particularly frequent in

sentences which begin with the accusative and delay the verb.

Cf. Legg. 810 ο ημοιον τα ψυχα γελοια ποιησαν τα και 

αισχρας αγορας εν τω ανθρωπων ταυτης απαλλαγων.

τη αιτου δυναμι—dat. of attendant circumstances. Cf. Thuc.

viii. 27 ο 'ερμαινον...ατελει τη νεφο...δωσησαι, and the familiar

η μα ται αυτω ατω ανθρωποι.

ον εις κεινον λαγου—ν. note on ιδια ληγμον 368 α.

το μεν...δικαιοσυνη δε—clearness is gained by the substitution of

the precise name instead of το δε. Cf. Charm. 116 η αντα 

μεν γεγον εγερες των, αδι αδι αδη μελετε μελλουν αγαθον δη και 

κακον.

367 A. ξυνους η. So Λ and other ss. A variant is 

ξυνουκηλ. Either is allowable, but the substantive is more

idiomatic and the adjective preferable.

The expression is somewhat poetical. Cf. Soph. O. C. 1133 δ της

οικι καιν θεων ιουνους: Ηθ 764 ου δορ μεγες μελαι βαβει 

ξυνους δε μοι, Α. 611 ηε τοις ματης βαλουσοι. Elsewhere in Plato,

Syrp. 203 του επιδειξε ξυνους, Phileb. 65 c ηνοικε ξυνους.

υπερ δικαιοσυνης τα και αδικαιας. Though περι may often be used

for ζαρ (see note on 360 α), there is no clear instance of υπερ in

the simple sense of περι. Examples quoted from Aristotle and

Demosthenes need closer examination.

In Hdt. ii. 123 τα ληγματα υπερ επαυτων υπο γεγον τοις 

reading is doubtful, variants being 'υπερ' (which is probably correct) and περι. In

Hom. Π. vi. 554 της υπερ στθεν αεξε μελει τοις the meaning is

'1 am reproached for your sake.' In Apol. 39 ειδον αυ διελεχθην 

υπερ του γεγονους τουτου πραγματου = 'on behalf of what has

occurred.'

The sense here is 'they would say this on behalf of their view of

the relations of justice and injustice.' For this use of τα και

of. 364 το περι διων να ληγον και αιτηθη 'the relations of the gods to

virtue.'

φορτικας, δη γε ημι δοκει: 'in a vulgar manner,—at least so I

think.'
The word *φορτικός* expresses 'vulgarity in person, manners or intellect...want of cultivation, especially philosophical cultivation...a coarse habit of mind which looks merely at the surface of things, with little or no faculty of observation or power of distinction, and contents itself with a mere vulgar knowledge shared by the rest of mankind' (Gope, Aristot. Rhet. ii. 21. 16). In fact the meaning comes very near to 'Philistine.' Cf. Apol. 39 a ἐφιδ' ἴπτε τοι*ν* φορτικόν μὲ καὶ δικαιομ. έλεγον δ' (i.e. not χαριστεί). Inf. 353 τοῖς άδικοῖς χρεματού τοι*ν* φορτικόν τινα ἔγενε, Phaed. 256 b φορτικότατα τε καὶ χαρισμάτως, Aristot. Eth. N. i. 5. 1 οῖς πολλοί καὶ φορτικοφάσσατο...οἱ δὲ χαριστέοι, ibid. iv. 3 connected with βουλολόγους, and Pol. vii. 8 opposed to πνευμαθείς.

In the later Greek (of Lucian, for example) its meaning shifted somewhat, and it often = έπιχείδη, of pedantic affectation.

367 B. καταπεταίνα—n. note on 348 a and cf. 358 b. αὐτῆς δ' αὐτή—κατά rather than with ποιεῖν.

Δικαλείσθαι—'challenged you.'

οὰ τὸ δίκαιον φήσομεν κ.τ.λ.: 'we shall say that you are not praising justice, but semblance, and that you do not blame the being unjust, but the seeming so.' Of course εἰς cannot be supplied after δίκαιον.

367 C. τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἐλλότριον ἄγαθον κ.τ.λ.—sup. 348 c. φιλολόγημα—v. n. 359 a. τῶν μεγίστων ἄγαθων—for the gen. cf. 358 δ αὐθίν...τὸν ἀντίκον ἐπιθέσαν. τῶν τε ἀσκομαθῶν...πολλά δὲ μᾶλλον.... The speaker begins the clause as if he would end with αὐτὸ τα αὐτῶν, but, wishing to insist more upon the second point, he substitutes ταλ' δὲ μᾶλλον κ.τ.λ.

The addition of extra emphasis to the second member very frequently causes a slight deviation in expression. Cf. Pol. 270 τὸ ἄλλο τε παθήματα πόλει, μέγιστον δὲ τάδε, inf. 304 c ἐν τῇ τῆς ἐπικεφαλής παλαιότερον δὲ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ, Thuc. i. 25 ἀρα δέ καί αφ' τοῦ καὶ αὐτῆς καὶ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἀληθείᾳ, ἀσκομαθήτω. καὶ ἰδίων δὲ—No climax is intended in δ', which merely ends the enumeration. Cf. Meno 87 ε' ἄγαθος καὶ ἰδίως καὶ κάθες καὶ πολλοί δ'. Its force is something like 'and here we will stop.'

367 D. γόμυμα τι τα αὐτῶν φύσει: 'effective (productive) in their own nature and not made so by reputation.' Hearing, seeing, &c. are productive of good in themselves; to possess them is enough; their effectiveness does not depend upon whether we are thought to possess them or not.

That which is γόμυμα is that which has a δύναμις in itself. Thus γόμυμα ὁδ' are opposed to ὑπομέονα ("wind eggs"), as containing a δύναμις of producing chickens. Cf. Thuc. 151 b γόμυμον ὁ ὑπομέον. It is probable that Plato has this application of the word in mind.

From this sense we pass to that of 'genuine.' Cf. Thuc. 150 c γόμυμων τε καὶ ἀληθές (τε καὶ ψεύδος, Al. Rep. 96 γόμυμος ποιητής.

τοῦτον 'οὖν αὐτὸν ἑίματον δικαιοσύνη: the construction as with τεμαχίζω τὰ τιμῶν. In full ἑίματον δικαιοσύνην αὐτὸ τάδα ('simply that'), δ' ἔδωκεν τὸν ἔξωτα (contained acc. as with ἄρσενι) αὐτὴ δ' αὐτήν. αὖν brings the matter to the point (cf. 359 c), as after a parenthesis. The sentence which begins with τοῦτο αὖν...has grown to some length, and αὖν resumes the intention with which it began. Cf. Apol. 29 c εἰ μᾶλλον ταὐτά κατ' εὐνοο...εἰ μᾶλλον, εἰπεν ἄρα, εἰπεν τούτου ἀφάντερ κ.τ.λ.

καὶ ἄδικα βλάπτει...a brachylogia, not to say ungrammatical, attachment ('vel si mavis negligenta' Stalbham). The thought is καὶ τοῦτο αὖν 'οὖν δέκας δ' αὐτὴν τοῦ ἔξωτα βλάπτει. ἀνασκομαθήμα—λ. gen. Inf. 354 d καὶ δέκας τοῦ ἄλλα λέγωντος, 518 c δικαλείσθαι, 518 c δικαλείσθαι.

A better supported reading (given also by Par. A in the margin) is ἀκομαθήμα, but that should mean 'admit that they are right,' 'accept it from them' (cf. 329 π), whereas ἀκομαθήμα possesses the required sense 'put up with,' 'tolerate.' In the text Par. A gives ἀκομαθήμα, which is plainly meaningless and is due to the frequent confusion of propositions in compounds.

ποι αὐτῶν—not with δῆλος, but with the participles.

εἶ μένοι καλέσων of Par. A is perhaps slightly better than καλέσων. 'I would not put up with it from you...unless you were to bid me,' and that, he thinks, is improbable.

367 E. αὐτῆς δ' αὐτή—Par. A and others have αὐτήν δ' αὐτήν through (apparently) a false notion that the words should depend on ἐξωτα. This is obviously much less elegant, and the expression of π τοῦτο (sup.) is best here also.
CHAPTER X.

δὲ μὲν δὴ ἡγέμον...ἀτρός οὖν καὶ τότε....Τὸ δὲ μὲν δὴ the second member of the sentence would naturally respond with τότε δὲ... or τότε δὲ καλ.... But in the answer to δὲ (πολλὰκι δὲ) the place of δὲ is often taken by αὖθις, which is somewhat stronger. Thus αὖθις τότε would naturally answer to δὲ μὲν. To this is added καλ, which emphasizes τότε with something like the sense of ‘particularly,’ as in the familiar ἀλλὰ τε καὶ.... and in the καὶ δὴ καὶ ἡγεμονίαν of 328 ν. οὖν is hardly translatable (cf. 593 c), but contains the notion of ‘however’ or ‘at any rate’ (i.e. ‘I always did admire them, but, whatever may be said of that, I did then δὲ’).

Cf. Prot. 335 ὁ δὲ μὲν ἦγορός σου τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀγαματικός, αὖθις καὶ νῦν ἑπάνω καὶ φιλό, Theaet. 172 c καὶ πολλάκις μὲν γε δὴ, ὁ δ’ αὐθινε, καὶ ἄλλος κατεύθυνε, αὖθις καὶ νῦν γελοιος φανερώς, Hippias Mai. 282 c πολλάκις μὲν καὶ ἄλλους δημοσίης ἁπάντως, αὖθις τὰ τελευταία κ. τ.λ.

A very literal rendering of the particles would give ‘I always indeed (μὲν) as a matter of fact (δὲ) admired them, but, however that be (οὖν), I was especially at that time (καὶ τότε) exceedingly delighted.’

φῶς—‘ability.’ Cf. εὐφῶς 305 λ.

368 A. εἰς ὑμᾶς—‘in regard to you’: ‘wrote verses upos you....’ Cf. Phaedo 61 b εἰς τὸν θεὸν ὑποστήριξ. Hdt. iv. 98 γράμμα ἀποδεχθέτω εἰς τὴν γέφυραν, i. 86, δ. The poet was probably Critias.

ὁ παῖς ἐκεῖνος τοῦ ἄνδρος: ‘the son of an illustrious sire,’ ἐκεῖνος being used like illeus (‘that famous’). Some translators take it to mean ‘of the man there named,’ i.e. of Ariston in the line quoted. Not only is this a clumsy anticipation, but in Phileb. 38 b Socrates calls Protagoras ὁ παῖς ἐκεῖνος ταύτης, where the language shows that the expression was current, being probably a complimentary catch-phrase or stock quotation from some source now unknown.

πέρι τῆς Μεγαρῆς μάχης. The particular battle is unknown. War between Athens and Megara was very frequent. The article τῆς need not mean ‘the great’ or ‘famous’ battle, but simply ‘the battle in which you were engaged’ and to which the poet refers.

368 B. τοῦ ἄνδρος τοῦ ἑμιτέρου τρόπου—‘your character in general.’

ἑπορός ὃ τι χρησιμοὶ: the precise dative can hardly be supplied. It is not ὅπως, nor τῷ λόγῳ, but rather the sense of τῷ πράγματι: ‘what to do with (the matter).’ The same absolute use appears in Protag. 331 c λοιπὸν δὲ ἀδόκησαν ὑπὸ ἄρτου ἄρ γνωρίσω, καὶ ἠθέρας ὃ τι χρησιμοί, Λύσ. 213 c τί ὁμιλούσθη, ἢ τι ἐγὼ; Gorg. 465 b.

[χρησιμοὶ is the reading of Par. A, but many ms have χρησιμοὶ. Both are good Greek (for the future cf. Soph. O. C. 1792 ὅτε ἐμοί δοκεῖτ' ἐν δόμοις ὡς ἔχω &c., Thuc. iii. 108 ἄπως ὅτι τὸ ἄπως τοιοῦτον πολυχώρασθαι ἢ καὶ ἀπορεῖται διασωθῆναι. The senses of καὶ δοκεῖ φαίνειν καὶ νοθεία καὶ φαίνειν sit are very near to each other, and as αὖθις to be interchanged in the ‘indirect deliberative’ as the future and the subjunctive in direct questions e.g. χρησιμοὶ; ἢ συγκόμοι; ἢ τι δρᾶσθαι; Hence ὡς ὃς ἂν τι χρησιμοὶ ἢ τι δράς, ὡς ὃς ὃς τι χρησιμοὶ ἢ τι δράς.] (Note: the ms text of section 368 refers to the subject of the next paragraph.)
when there is such negative, is true only in the first half, and is but one example of his excessive love of idiomatic rules without exceptions.)

368 C. ἡρετικὸν, i.e. ἡ ἡρετικήν ἐπεξεργασία.

368 D. ἐπιθεῖ τόν ἡμᾶς ό τι δεῖ αὐτός: either (1) ἡμέρας ἐγὼ, a use which occurs (a) freely in poetry, (b) in prose, when a writer is speaking of himself (the editorial 'we'), when a king so speaks (the royal 'we'), when a modest tone is assumed, and when a speaker is voicing the views of a profession &c.

369 A. εἰς τὸ μετὰ τῶν ἡμῶν κ.τ.λ.: 'observing in the less the likeness of the greater,' i.e. 'finding the analogy which the less bears to the greater.'
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