Plat. Apol. 36b5-37b2

[36b5] What, then? What do I deserve to suffer or pay back, because I didn’t keep quiet in my life, but rather, not caring about the things that the majority (of people care about), money-making and household management and generalships and public speaking and the other offices and caucuses and factions that exist in the city, since I believed that I was in reality a more honest person than so as to be preserved (alive) if I went into those things,

[36c2] I didn’t go into those things (= ἐνταῦθα, “there”), where, if I had gone into them (= ο>({2} ἐλθών, “going whither, engaging in which”), I wouldn’t have been (completing a past contrafactual condition; there is no aorist of εἰμί, but “I was going to X, I was likely to X” ≈ “I would have X’d”) any use either to you or to myself,

[36c3] but to do the greatest benefit to each person by going individually (to him)—there, I affirm, I went,

[36c5] trying to persuade each one of you neither to care about any (μηδενός) of his own business (τῶν ἑαυτοῦ = gen. of τὰ ἑαυτοῦ) before caring about how he would be as good and sensible as possible (lit. “about himself, how he would be,” the “lilies of the field” construction), nor (to care) about the city’s business before (caring) about the city itself, and also to care about the rest of things in this same way (i.e., not neglecting the essential in favor of the inessential)—

[36d1] what, then, do I deserve to have done to me for being a person of this sort? Something good, Athenian men, if at any rate it is truly necessary to propose a penalty in accordance with my deserts. Yes, and something good of such a kind that would be fitting for me, at that.

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1 The commentary is wrong to say that these two conditional participles express “intention of action,” since Socrates has made abundantly clear that going into politics would not have served an intention to stay safe! Socrates says, not that he was too honest a guy to save himself by playing the political game (mistranslation: “too honest than so as to save myself by going into those things”), but that he was too honest to have had any chance of staying alive if he’d tried to play the political game.
2 I.e. ἔμελλον + infinitive ≈ aorist indicative + ἄν (see Smyth §§1960, 2318).
What, then, is fitting for a poor man, a benefactor who needs to have leisure for the purpose of exhorting you?

There is not (anything) that is more fitting, Athenian men, than for a man of this kind to be fed in the prytaneion, much more so than if one of you is has earned a victory at Olympia with a single-horse, a two-horse team, or a four-horse chariot.

For that man (ὁ μέν, the victor) makes you seem to be happy (or, “think that you are happy”), but I (make you) be (happy), and he has no need of food, but I do need it. If, then, in accordance with justice I must propose my deserts, I propose this, provision of food in the prytaneion.

Perhaps, then, also when I say these things to you, I seem to speak in almost the same way as (when I spoke) about pity and entreaty: with stubborn arrogance.

But it is not like that (τοιοῦτον, of the kind I’ve just said), Athenian men, but rather like this (τοιόνδε, of the following kind). I am convinced that I am wronging no one of human beings willingly, but I’m not persuading you of this.

For we have conversed for (only) a short time. Since, as I think, if you, too, had a law (another past contrafactual condition: again, εἰμί has no aorist, and the imperfect can be used instead for an ongoing state in the past), as other people do, to try (a defendant) in a capital trial (περὶ θανάτου, “concerning a death sentence”) not for a duration of only one day, but for many, you would have been persuaded (by me).

But as things actually are (νῦν δέ), it is not easy to clear oneself of great slanders in a short time.

≈ “I cannot persuade you.” This use of the present is basically the same as the use of the imperfect described in Smyth §1896. Remember that the present/imperfect communicate the same verbal aspect (ongoing, repeated, conative, etc.), differing only in reference to present vs. past time.

Here, as often, Greek does not put καὶ in the clause where we would tend to place it. Literally, “if you had a law, as other people also (or ‘besides you’) do” (cf. Smyth §§2885-6).